80OAG130
80OAG130
Cite as 80 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 130
130
FAMILY LAW
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT ) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND
SCOPE OF IMMUNITY
August 4, 1995
Ms. Gloria Goldfaden
Governor’s Council on Child Abuse and Neglect
On behalf of the Governor’s Council on Child Abuse and
Neglect, you have requested our opinion on several issues relating
to the State law on the reporting of child abuse and neglect.
Specifically, you pose the following questions:
1.
How is “good faith” defined under §5-702(2) of the
Family (“FL”) Article and §5-362 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings (“CJ”) Article, Maryland Code?
2.
Are there any circumstances under which “good faith”
reporting of suspected child abuse is not given statutory immunity
from criminal penalty or civil liability?
3.
How does the term “suspected” child abuse, as used in FL
§5-702(1), relate to the term “reason to believe,” as used in FL §5-
705(a)?
4.
Are there any circumstances under which a person who
suspects child abuse need not report the abuse to the local
department of social services or appropriate law enforcement
agency?
Our opinion is as follows:
1.
“Good faith” is not defined in the statute. By court
interpretation, the term means “with an honest intention.”
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1 For the most part in this opinion, we shall refer only to child abuse.
In general, the same conclusions would apply to the reporting of child
neglect.
2.
Any person who reports suspected child abuse in good
faith is immune from criminal penalty or civil liability.1 This
immunity is qualified immunity; it does not extend to a report made
in bad faith. Nor does immunity from criminal liability extend to an
abuser who reports his or her own conduct.
3.
The term “suspected,” as used in FL 5-702(1), should be
construed as synonymous with the “reason to believe” standard in
FL §5-705(a).
4.
Anyone who has reason to believe that child abuse has
occurred must report the situation. The only exceptions to this near-
absolute duty are those set out in the statute: information
encompassed by the attorney-client privilege described in CJ §9-108
or information otherwise encompassed by the duty of confidentiality
owed by an attorney to his or her client; information that, if reported,
would breach the constitutional right to assistance of counsel; and
certain confidential communications to a minister, clergyman, or
priest. Apart from these exceptions, a person has an affirmative
obligation to report suspected child abuse.
I
Statutory Text
FL §5-705(a) imposes the following legal duty to report child
abuse or neglect:
(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2)
and (3) of this subsection, notwithstanding any
other provision of law, including a law on
privileged communications, a person other
than a health practitioner, police officer, or
educator or human service worker who has
reason to believe that a child has been
subjected to abuse or neglect shall:
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(i) if a person has reason to believe that
the child has been subjected to abuse, notify
the local department [of social services] or the
appropriate law enforcement agency; or
(ii) if the person has reason to believe
that the child has been subjected to neglect,
notify the local department.
FL §5-704 imposes the same duty, with certain additional
requirements, on health practitioners, police officers, educators, and
human service workers. See generally 78 Opinions of the Attorney
General 189 (1993).
FL §5-708 grants immunity to a person who reports suspected
abuse or neglect: “Any person who makes or participates in making
a report of abuse or neglect under §5-704 or §5-705 of this subtitle
or participates in an investigation or a resulting judicial proceeding
shall have the immunity described under §5-362 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article from civil liability or criminal penalty.”
Correspondingly, CJ §5-362 grants immunity to “[a]ny person who
in good faith makes or participates in making a report of abuse or
neglect under §5-704 or §5-705 of the Family Law Article or
participates in an investigation or a resulting judicial proceeding ....”
See Wildauer v. Frederick County, 993 F.2d 369, 373 (4th Cir.
1993).
II
Definition of “Good Faith”
The term “good faith” is not defined by the statute. The term
has been explained, however, by the Court of Special Appeals:
“Good faith” is an intangible and abstract
quality that encompasses, among other things,
an honest belief, the absence of malice and the
absence of design to defraud or to seek an
unconscionable advantage.... Thus, we would
infer that the definition of “good faith” under
FL §5-708 means with an honest intention.
133
Catterton v. Coale, 84 Md. App. 337, 342, 579 A.2d 781 (1990),
cert. denied, 321 Md 638 (1991) (citations omitted). See also Laws
v. Thompson, 78 Md. App. 665, 678, 554 A.2d 1264, cert. denied,
316 Md. 428, 559 A.2d 791 (1989). “Good faith” takes on meaning
from its opposite, “bad faith”; the latter term means “not simply bad
judgment or negligence, but it implies a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and a conscious doing of wrong.” Catterton, 84 Md.
App. at 342.
Catterton itself illustrates the distinction. The Court of Special
Appeals held that immunity under FL §5-708 mandated dismissal of
a claim that alleged negligence by an investigator. But a claim that
alleged a fabrication by the investigator should not have been
dismissed. 84 Md. App. at 342-43.
Thus, a person reports in “good faith” if the report is made with
an honest intention, even if the report turns out to be unfounded. A
person reports in bad faith if the report is deliberately dishonest.
III
Scope of Immunity
A.
Introduction
From the very beginning, the General Assembly has linked
immunity to the duty to report child abuse. When the General
Assembly first required physicians to report abuse of children whom
they were treating, it granted immunity from civil liability for anyone
participating in the report or any juvenile proceeding resulting from
the report. Chapter 104, Laws of Maryland 1964. Over the years,
the reporting requirement was progressively expanded and is now
universal. See generally 78 Opinions of the Attorney General 189,
195-97 (1993). Immunity was correspondingly expanded to its
present form.
Immunity, then, is an essential tool for an effective reporting
system. The mandate to report would be undermined if a potential
reporter had to weigh the risk of civil or criminal liability as a result
of making a report.
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2 Good-faith immunity is a common component of other states’
reporting laws. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §19-10-110 (immunity from any
liability, civil or criminal provided such actions are taken in good faith);
Ill. Ann. St. Ch. 325 §5/9 (“any person participating in good faith in
making a report of child abuse shall have immunity from any liability,
civil or criminal”); Mich. Code §41-2-203 (immunity from liability for
reporting incident of abuse in absence of evidence of bad faith or
malicious purpose); Pa. Stat. Ann. §6318 (“A person participating in good
faith in making a report of suspected child abuse shall have immunity
from any civil or criminal liability”); Va. Code Ann. §63.1-248.5 (person
making a report of certain injuries to children shall be immune from any
civil or criminal liability in connection therewith, “unless it is proven that
such person acted in bad faith or with malicious intent”); Wyo. Stat. §14-
3-209 (“any person participating in good faith in any act of reporting child
abuse is immune from any civil or criminal liability”).
B.
Qualified Immunity
The immunity afforded a reporter of child abuse is qualified
immunity. That is, the statute protects those who report child abuse
and neglect in “good faith.” Thus, where a person makes a report
with an honest intention, without malice or a design to defraud or
seek an unconscionable advantage, that person is protected from
civil or criminal liability.2 Catterton v. Coale, 84 Md. App. at 342.
See also Awkerman v. Tri-County Orthopedic Group, P.C., 373
N.W.2d 204, 208 (Mich. App. 1985) (child abuse reporting statute
clearly and unambiguously provides immunity to persons who file
a child abuse report in good faith); Davis v. Durham City Schools,
372 S.E.2d 318, 320 (N.C. App. 1988) (a report of suspected child
abuse made in good faith clearly falls within the scope of immunity
contemplated by reporting statute). See generally Annotation
Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statute Requiring
Doctor or Other Person To Report Child Abuse, 73 A.L.R.4th 782
(1989). Conversely, a person who makes a report in “bad faith” is
not subject to the qualified immunity under Maryland law. See
Catterton, 84 Md. App. at 343.
That the immunity under FL §5-708 is qualified, rather than
absolute, reflects the General Assembly’s policy decision. Other
states have opted for absolute immunity. See, e.g., Ala. Code §26-
14-9 (“Any person participating in the making of a report of child
abuse shall, in doing so, be immune from any liability, civil or
criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed”). See also
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3 Statutes that deal with the same subject matter are in pari materia
and must be construed harmoniously in order to give full effect to each
enactment. Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 436, 639 A.2d 675 (1994).
See also State v. Cicoria, 332 Md. 21, 42-43, 629 A.2d 742 (1993); State
v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 7, 629 A.2d 742 (1993); 2B Norman J. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction, §51.02 (5th ed. 1991) (legislative
provisions that are in pari materia should be construed together).
Thomas v. Chadwick, 274 Cal. Rptr. 128, 133 (Cal. App. 1990)
(intentionally false report by a mandated reporter is immunized);
Hartley v. Hartley, 537 N.E.2d 706 (Ohio App. 1988) (absolute
immunity to anyone making report of child abuse whether in good
faith or not).
By its terms, FL §5-708 extends immunity to criminal liability
that may result from making or participating in a report of child
abuse. However, it does not immunize the underlying abuse. In
other words, the class of persons entitled to immunity from criminal
liability is restricted to those persons who report someone else’s
alleged child abuse, not their own.
Article 27, §35C provides that “a parent or other person who
has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the
supervision of a child or a household or family member who causes
abuse to the child is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject
to imprisonment for not more than 15 years.” We must take account
of this statute when we construe the grant of immunity in FL §5-
708.3 If FL §5-708 were construed as extending to a perpetrator of
the child abuse, Article 27, §35C would be meaningless. See
Popham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co, 333 Md. 136, 148-49, 634 A.2d
38 (1993) (statutes that deal with the same subject matter should be
construed together and harmonized to the extent possible; neither
should be read so as to render the other meaningless). See also State
v. King, 434 N.W.2d 627, 638 (Iowa 1989) (reporting of child abuse
does not entitle perpetrator to claim immunity from prosecution);
State v. Howland, 484 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1984) (class of persons
entitled to immunity from criminal liability does not include
perpetrators of abuse); Henderson v. State, 758 S.W.2d 694, 696
(Tex. App. 1988) (individual’s report of his own conduct was not
grounds for immunity under a child abuse reporting statute). See
generally Annotation, 73 A.L.R.4th at 830.
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IV
“Suspected” Abuse and “Reason to Believe”
FL §5-702 declares the legislative policy underlying the
enactment of the child abuse reporting laws. Their purpose “is to
protect children who have been the subject of abuse or neglect by:
... giving immunity to any individual who reports, in good faith, a
suspected incident of abuse or neglect.” (Emphasis added.)
Recitals of purpose reflect “the reason or occasion for making
a law”; they “explain in general terms the policy of the enactment.”
62 Opinions of the Attorney General 245, 250-51 (1977). Thus, a
codified statement of policy like FL §5-702 can be an important aid
in construing ambiguous text. See, e.g., Parrison v. State, 335 Md.
554, 560, 644 A.2d 537 (1994). Nevertheless, policy recitations are
distinct from, and cannot by their own force alter, substantive
elements of the statute. See Hammond v. Frankfeld, 194 Md. 487,
491, 71 A.2d 482 (1950). See also 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland
Statutory Construction, §47.04 (5th ed. 1992).
FL §5-705(a) contains the operative language “reason to
believe”; that term identifies the circumstances under which a person
must report child abuse to the local department of social services or
law enforcement agency. The term “suspected,” as used in FL §5-
702, does not modify this substantive requirement. Instead,
“suspected” should be interpreted as a short-hand way of describing
“reason to believe.”
V
Reporting of Child Abuse
FL §§5-704(a) and §5-705(a) together require that anyone who
has reason to believe that a child has been subjected to abuse “shall
notify” the local department of social services or the appropriate law
enforcement agency. The term “shall” means that compliance is
mandatory. See Thanos v. State, 332 Md. 511, 522, 632 A.2d 768
(1993); Tucker v. State, 89 Md. App. 295, 298, 598 A.2d 479 (1991);
Robinson v. Pleet, 76 Md. App. 173, 182, 544 A.2d 1, cert. denied,
313 A.2d 689, 548 A.2d 128 (1988). See also 3 Sutherland
Statutory Construction §57.03.
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The only exceptions are in FL §5-705(a)(2) and (3). Paragraph
(2) excuses reporting of information encompassed by the attorney-
client privilege described in CJ §9-108, reporting of information
otherwise encompassed by the duty of confidentiality owed by an
attorney to his or her client, and reporting that would violate the
constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Paragraph (3) excuses
reporting of certain confidential communications to a minister,
clergyman, or priest. See generally Mary Harter Mitchell, Must
Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus Clergy
Privilege & Free Exercise of Religion, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1987).
Unless one of these exceptions applies, a person has an affirmative
and unqualified obligation to report child abuse.
J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Attorney General
Kimberly Smith Ward
Assistant Attorney General
Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice