80OAG295
80OAG295
Cite as 80 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 295
295
STATE’S ATTORNEYS
C OUNTIES
)
B UDGETARY
A DMINISTRATION
)
APPROPRIATIONS ) NATURE OF COUNTY FUNDING
OBLIGATION
July 11, 1995
The Honorable Jack Johnson
State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County
You have requested our opinion whether the budget adopted by
Prince George’s County for fiscal year 1996 unlawfully interferes
with your discretion to prosecute crimes committed in the county.
You have described in detail the severe impact of this budget on
your prosecutorial function. In your view, the budget falls so short
of your needs that it “would seriously undermine the ability of [your]
office to prosecute offenses within a wide range of criminal
categories.”
For its part, the County has suggested that the budget for your
office maintains funding at a reasonable level, permitting necessary
prosecutorial functions to be performed. In the County’s view, your
office can cut positions and operating expenses not directly
associated with the prosecutorial function.
This opinion cannot resolve a disagreement of this kind.
Instead, we shall set out the legal framework and offer a conclusion
based on your assessment of the budget’s effect. At the same time,
we strongly urge your office and the County to renew your efforts to
reach a compromise. Litigation should be a last resort.
For the reasons stated below, we conclude as follows: A
county must provide the State’s Attorney with sufficient resources
so that the State’s Attorney retains prosecutorial discretion for all
significant offenses. To the extent that the budget provided to your
office compels you to forgo investigations and prosecutions for
several significant types of offenses, it falls short of the legal
requirement imposed on Prince George’s County.
I
296
1 The following table summarizes the budgetary picture:
Amount
Variance From FY 1995
FY 1995 allocation
$5,671,399
---
FY 1996 request
$6,203,804
+$532,405
FY 1996 allocation
$5,038,611
-$632,788
Impact of Fiscal Year 1996 Budget
Prince George’s County is experiencing severe fiscal stress.
As a result, the County adopted a budget for fiscal year 1996 that
reflects significant reductions in many areas.
The Office of the State’s Attorney has been hard-hit. For fiscal
year 1995, the office’s budget was $5,671,399, an amount that
supported 128 staff positions. Because of increased workload, your
office requested an increase of approximately 9.4 percent. The
budget for your office approved by the County Executive and
County Council reflects an 11 percent decrease from the prior fiscal
year.1
Your letter to us describes the impact of the budget cut as
follows:
Based on current workload, which has
increased approximately 20 percent during the
first quarter of 1996, the proposed budget cuts
and the resulting drastic reduction in staff
(approximately
25)
would
seriously
undermine the ability of this office to
prosecute offenses within a wide range of
crime categories.
In the District Court Division, for
example, we will not be able to prosecute
small drug cases, domestic violence cases, and
a number of other matters. In the Juvenile
Division, which now has a 30 day turn-
around, we will be unable to prosecute drug
297
2 These recommended reductions involve, among others things, a
one-third cut in law clerk positions and a twenty percent cut in secretarial
staffing.
cases, car jackings, handgun offenses, petty
thefts, car thefts and many other cases
affecting the personal safety of citizens in
Prince George’s County. In the Criminal
Trials Division, simple robberies, property
offenses and other matters could not be
prosecuted. In the Homicide/Narcotics
Division, we will not be able to pursue asset
forfeitures, nuisance abatement, complex drug
wiretap cases, and white collar crimes.
Information that you provided us also indicates that the reduced
budget would require personnel reductions of such a magnitude that,
in the Juvenile and District Court Divisions of your office, there
would no longer be enough attorneys to cover all of the courtrooms.
The impact that you describe would significantly alter the
manner in which you manage your office. In order to concentrate
resources on prosecution of the gravest offenses, you would be
compelled to forgo prosecution in entire categories of offenses. You
would no longer be able to exercise discretion to prosecute certain
cases within these categories; instead, you would be compelled by
resource constraints to forgo all prosecutions in these categories.
The County Attorney paints a different picture. In a letter to
us dated July 3, 1995, the County Attorney describes a series of
reductions in the State’s Attorney’s budget, recommended by the
County’s Office of Management and Budget, “focused on reductions
in positions and operating expenses not directly associated with the
prosecutorial function.”2
An Attorney General’s opinion cannot sort out factual or policy
disagreements of this kind. Our general practice is to offer our
views on the law based on the facts presented to us in the opinion
request, and we shall do so here.
298
3 At the time that Murphy v. Yates was decided, the Constitution
prohibited even the General Assembly from interfering with the common
law duties of the State’s Attorney. Thus, the General Assembly’s attempt
to vest certain criminal enforcement responsibilities in the State
Prosecutor was held unconstitutional. Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. at 494.
In light of the subsequent amendment of Article V, §9 of the Constitution,
the General Assembly now has authority to transfer duties from the State’s
Attorney to another official. See Article 10, §33B (enforcement
responsibilities of the State Prosecutor).
II
Duties of the State’s Attorney
Under Article V, §9 of the Constitution, a State’s Attorney
“shall perform such duties ... as shall be prescribed by the General
Assembly.” The General Assembly’s prescription of duties is a most
general one: “The State’s Attorney for each county and the City of
Baltimore shall, in such county or city, prosecute and defend, on the
part of the State, all cases in which the State may be interested ....”
Article 10, §34 of the Maryland Code. This unfettered grant of
authority has been characterized as a “prerogativ[e] of the office.”
Babbitt v. State, 294 Md. 134, 138, 448 A.2d 930 (1982). The
General Assembly’s decision not to enumerate or define the powers
of the State’s Attorney means that “‘State’s Attorneys are vested
with the broadest official discretion.’” State v. Romulus, 315 Md.
525, 537, 555 A.2d 494 (1989) (quoting Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md.
475, 489, 348 A.2d 837 (1975)). The State’s Attorney’s prerogative
to decide whether to prosecute someone suspected of having
committed a criminal offense is so important, as a matter of public
policy, that it is protected by absolute immunity from federal civil
rights liability. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Doe
v. Mayor and City Council, 745 F. Supp. 1137 (D. Md. 1990).
Except by authorization of the General Assembly, no public
official may interfere with the State’s Attorney’s exercise of
discretion. See Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. at 494-95.3 See also Hicks
v. Orange County Bd. of Supervisors, 138 Cal. Rptr. 101, 108 (Cal.
App. 1977) (“the discretionary power vested in the District Attorney
to control the institution of criminal proceedings may not be ...
conferred on another by [county officials]”).
299
III
Budgetary Responsibility of the County
Under Article 10, §40(a), the counties are required to pay the
salaries and other “office ... expenses” of the State’s Attorneys:
The State’s Attorneys in the several
counties of the State shall receive annually the
respective salaries set forth for performing
duties required of them by their respective
public local laws and the public general laws,
and such expenses as are provided by law and
by the current practice in several counties.
The State’s Attorneys shall receive annual
payments for office, traveling and other
expenses. All payments for salaries and
expenses shall be made by the respective
counties in equal monthly installments unless
otherwise specified.
Elaborating upon this general provision, Article 10, §40 goes on to
itemize specific funding allocations for each county. In Prince
George’s County, “the State’s Attorney may appoint two deputy
state’s attorneys and 54 assistant state’s attorneys.” Article 10,
§40(q)(2). The salaries of these deputies and assistants “shall be
within the discretion of the State’s Attorney,” up to caps set out in
the statute. Article 10, §40(q)(3) and (4).
Under Article 24, §8-101(2), the State’s Attorney’s office for
each county “is subject to the budget and fiscal policies and
purchasing laws of the county in which it is located.” However, this
provision does not authorize counties to avoid the funding obligation
otherwise imposed under Article 10, §40. Rather, Article 24, §8-101
requires the State’s Attorney’s office and other county-funded State
entities to submit to county budget procedures, not county budget
control. See Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md. 275, 288, 558 A.2d
399 (1989); 76 Opinions of the Attorney General 194 (1991) ; 73
Opinions of the Attorney General 92 (1988).
300
4 In the earlier opinion, we had concluded that a county may not
apply its budget process so as to “deprive the court of adequate and
suitable facilities, equipment, or personnel reasonably necessary to carry
out the court’s judicial function.” 73 Opinions of the Attorney General at
92. See also, e.g. Gary City Court v. City of Gary, 489 N.E.2d 511, 512
(Ind. 1986) (local government must appropriate funds “necessary to
maintain the court at a degree of efficiency necessary to discharge its
duties and neither extravagant, arbitrary nor unwarranted”). See generally
Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Inherent Power of Court to Compel
Appropriation or Expenditure of Funds for Judicial Purposes, 59
A.L.R.3d 569 (1974).
Disputes between State’s Attorneys and county officials over
the sufficiency of county financial support are not unprecedented.
Invariably, these disputes have been resolved through discussion and
compromise, as they should be. We are aware of no court decision
that interprets the pertinent language in Article 10, §40.
In one prior opinion, we addressed “the relationship between
the budget and fiscal policies of [a] county and the conduct of the
office of State’s Attorney, as this relationship is determined by State
law.” 74 Opinions of the Attorney General 263 (1989). The specific
question was a narrow one: whether Howard County’s chief
budgetary official had authority to disapprove the State’s Attorney’s
request for certain out-of-state staff training.
Relying on an earlier opinion about the application of county
budgetary procedures to a circuit court, we observed that “problems
of a constitutional dimension would arise if a county exercised this
grant of power so as to prevent its State’s Attorney from carrying out
his or her constitutional responsibilities.” 74 Opinions of the
Attorney General at 266. The county was obliged, we wrote, “to
refrain from exercising its supervisory power over fiscal matters if
its supervision would prevent the State’s Attorney’s office from
obtaining ‘adequate and suitable goods and services’ to meet the
office’s needs.” 74 Opinions of the Attorney General at 266
(quoting 73 Opinions of the Attorney General at 96).4
We concluded our opinion with this description of the county’s
obligation to yield to the State’s Attorney’s assertion about the
necessity of an expenditure:
301
5 Counties are obliged by statute to pay the salaries of the sheriff
and deputies and “necessary expenses.” §2-309 of the Courts Article,
Maryland Code.
In our view, a disagreement of this kind
should be resolved in favor of the State’s
Attorney if the State’s Attorney asserts that
application of the county’s fiscal procedures
would pose unacceptable interference with the
conduct of the State’s Attorney’s office. Were
it otherwise ) that is, if a county were free to
insist upon its view of the necessity of a
purchase of goods or services ) the threat to
the conduct of the State’s Attorney’s office
that we regard as constitutionally unacceptable
will have materialized.
74 Opinions of the Attorney General at 266-67.
The 1989 opinion did not directly address your question,
however, because in that instance the budget of the State’s
Attorney’s office was sufficient to pay for the disputed item of
expenditure. Our opinion expressly avoided discussing the
“circumstances, if any, in which a county might be compelled to
provide nonbudgeted funds to a State’s Attorney’s office.” 74
Opinions of the Attorney General at 264 n.1.
In another opinion, this office did comment on a budgetary
“stalemate” between a sheriff and a county.5 In 60 Opinions of the
Attorney General 647, 657 (1975), Attorney General Burch was
asked to decide the manner in which “a stalemate [can] be resolved
between the sheriff who deems both additional personnel and
additional deputies to be necessary for the effective performance of
his duties but cannot make the appointments, and the county
commissioners who refuse to authorize the funds.” After
admonishing the sheriff and the commissioners “to make honest
attempts to resolve their differences through negotiation and
compromise,” Attorney General Burch fashioned the following
balancing test: “Since the duties of the sheriff clearly cannot be
abridged by action of the county commissioners, we believe that the
county has an implied obligation to provide the sheriff, within
reasonable limits, with the necessary funds to adequately discharge
his constitutional and statutory obligations. Conversely, we believe
302
6 This passage from Attorney General Burch’s opinion was quoted
by the Court of Appeals in Rucker, seemingly with approval. See 316 Md.
at 288 n.7. This approach is also consistent with a circuit court decision
requiring a county to pay for certain operating expenses of a local election
board. State Admin. Bd. of Elec. Laws v. Talbot County, No. CG1622
(Cir. Ct. for Talbot Co. May 27, 1992) (applying Article 33, §2-4(b) of the
Code, which requires county payment of “necessary and reasonable
expenses”). A similar balancing test was recently set forth in a letter of
advice from the Counsel to the General Assembly concerning all locally
funded State officials:
The line between permissible and impermissible
[local] budget control would undoubtedly be a
factual question that would turn on the
reasonableness of the budget cutting device
chosen, the extent of any reduction in
appropriation, and the resulting impact on
performance of constitutional duties. To put the
matter directly, government and governmental
officers, including elected constitutional officers,
must meet their obligations with reduced funding.
There is, of course, a funding level beyond which
it is impossible to go and still have these offices
meet their obligations.
Letter to William S. Ratchford, II, Director of Fiscal Services, from
Assistant Attorney General Robert A. Zarnoch at 5 (October 30, 1992).
that the sheriff has an obligation to realistically assess the needs of
his office and to request only such additional funding for personnel
as he deems absolutely necessary for the adequate performance of
his functions.” 60 Opinions of the Attorney General at 657.6
As far as we are aware, only one out-of-state decision has
addressed local funding of a prosecutor’s office. In Reed v.
Washington Parish Police Jury, 518 So. 2d 1044 (1988), the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that a parish (the Louisiana
equivalent of a county) had a duty under the pertinent statute to fund
a local prosecutor at the level requested by the prosecutor. Although
much of the decision is of little interest, focusing as it does on the
particulars of the Louisiana statute, some elements of the Louisiana
court’s analysis are pertinent. The objective of the Louisiana
funding provision, like the Maryland provision, is “to insure [that]
the basic funding of the district attorney will not be impaired”:
303
“Because of the importance of the constitutional function performed
by the district attorney’s office, it is imperative that there be a
reliable source of funding to ensure the operation of the office.” 518
So. 2d at 1048. The Louisiana court also imported into its analysis
the familiar concept of reasonableness: Although the parish was
legally obliged to fund the district attorney’s expenses, that duty “is
limited by the standard of reasonableness.... Accordingly, the
budget request of the district attorney must be legitimate in that it is
related to the function of his office. Also it must be quantitatively
reasonable.” 518 So. 2d at 1049.
No precise formula can be laid down for the reasonableness of
a State’s Attorney’s budget request. We think it evident, however,
that a State’s Attorney must be provided with sufficient resources to
carry out the core function of the State’s Attorney’s office ) to
determine whether to prosecute any given offender, for any type of
crime.
Of course, prosecutorial discretion is inevitably related to
resource availability. The bigger the State’s Attorney’s budget, the
more cases the State’s Attorney is able to prosecute. Conversely,
limited resources limit discretion. To borrow Attorney General
Burch’s formulation, any State’s Attorney “has an obligation to
request only such ... funding ... as he deems absolutely necessary for
the adequate performance of his functions.” 60 Opinions of the
Attorney General at 657.
But surely a State’s Attorney’s budget request is realistic when
it does no more than preserve the State’s Attorney’s ability to
exercise that discretion within every significant category of criminal
offenses, to engage in standard investigative procedures like
wiretaps, and to staff all courtrooms. In our view, a court would find
unreasonable, and therefore in violation of the statute, a budget
allocation so insufficient as to preclude the State’s Attorney from,
for example, assigning personnel to handle such significant matters
as domestic violence cases and robberies.
The point can be illustrated by a hypothetical: Suppose that a
State’s Attorney announced, as a matter of policy, that the State’s
Attorney would no longer prosecute anyone in a domestic violence
or robbery case. Such a policy might well amount to “wilful neglect
of duty” and therefore subject the State’s Attorney to removal from
office. Article IV, §7 of the Constitution. See State ex rel. Brickell
v. Martin, 61 So. 491, 492 (Ala. 1913) (“‘willful neglect of duty’ ...
304
7 “[A] municipality has no vested right in or to its public funds
such as to preclude legislative interference. Accordingly, statutory
charges imposed upon a municipality by the legislature take precedence
over a more permissive use of municipal funds.” 2 Eugene McQuillan,
Municipal Corporations §4.140, at 289 (3d ed. 1988). See also id. at
§4.165. See generally Howard County v. Matthews, 146 Md. 553, 561,
127 A. 118 (1924). Indeed, even a charter-imposed tax cap might have to
yield to funding needs imposed by State law: “County governments are
required by state law to provide many public services such as public
education, police and fire protection services, water and sewage services,
etc. If it is ... demonstrated in a particular case that a local limitation on
property tax revenues so hampers a county government that it cannot
perform the duties required under state law, a tax limitation charter
provision may well be found to be invalid as applied.” Board of
Supervisors of Elections v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220, 243-44, 608 A.2d
1222 (1992).
is an intentional failure or omission of an officer to perform a plain
and manifest duty which he is able to perform when he omits to do
so”). A county may not, through its budget decisions, force a State’s
Attorney to take steps that, if done willfully, would breach the
State’s Attorney’s constitutional duty.
We are not suggesting that a State’s Attorney may ignore a
county’s dire fiscal situation. To the contrary: If the matter were
litigated ) a circumstance that we assuredly hope can be avoided )
a court would undoubtedly give “[d]ue consideration ... to any
adverse effect which [a court’s funding] order would have on
specific fiscal and other interests of the unit from which the funds
would come.” Gary City Court v. City of Gary, 489 N.E.2d 511, 513
(Ind. 1986).
Yet a county may not view the State’s Attorney’s Office as
simply one among many similarly situated competitors for limited
resources. Because the General Assembly has mandated funding of
the State’s Attorney’s office at a reasonable level, the funding needs
of that office take precedence over county agencies, even if the
county would prefer to allocate proportionally greater funding to
those other functions.7
305
IV
Conclusion
In summary, it is our opinion that Prince George’s County
must provide the State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County with
sufficient resources so that the State’s Attorney is not altogether
deprived of a significant aspect of the State’s Attorney’s
prosecutorial discretion.
J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Attorney General
Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice