81OAG147
81OAG147
Cite as 81 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 147
147
1 The Commission may also wish to seek a legislative clarification,
so that the Ethics Law explicitly recognizes what we believe is current
law: that willfully false statements on a financial disclosure form may give
rise to a perjury prosecution.
PUBLIC ETHICS LAW
CRIMINAL LAW ) PROSECUTION FOR PERJURY FOR FALSE
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
October 21, 1996
Mr. John E. O’Donnell
Executive Director
State Ethics Commission
You have requested our opinion whether (1) a false statement
on a financial disclosure form filed pursuant to the Public Ethics
Law could potentially result in a perjury prosecution under Article
27, §435 of the Maryland Code; and (2) whether financial disclosure
statements must be notarized.
Our opinion is as follows:
1.
Although the oath on the financial disclosure form omits
any reference to “penalties of perjury,” this omission does not
preclude a perjury prosecution under Article 27, §435. Nevertheless,
so that the form correctly reflects this possibility and does not
suggest that the Commission believes otherwise, we recommend that
the form be changed to include a reference to penalties of perjury.1
2.
Financial disclosure statements must be notarized, unless
the required oath is sworn to before some other official authorized
to administer oaths.
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I
Background
Under §15-601 of the State Government (“SG”) Article,
various officials and candidates for office are required to file
financial disclosure statements. These statements are to be “filed
under oath.” SG §15-602. Although the statute itself specifies in
considerable detail the content of these statements, the Ethics
Commission is required to “prescribe and provide forms for each
document required by this title.” SG §15-205(a)(2).
The financial disclosure statement currently prescribed by the
Commission contains the following oath: “I hereby make oath or
affirm that the contents of this financial disclosure statement,
including the Schedules attached hereto, are true and correct to the
best of my knowledge, information and belief.” The form requires
the oath to be sworn before a notary public.
The wording of the oath is different on the Commission’s form
for the reporting of lobbying activities: “I solemnly swear or affirm
under the penalties of perjury that the contents of this report
including any attachments thereto, are complete, true and correct to
the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.” This difference
raises the question whether the omission of the phrase “under the
penalties of perjury” from the oath in the financial disclosure
statement bars the prosecution of an official or candidates who lies
on this statement.
II
Potential Prosecution
The financial disclosure subtitle of the Ethics Law, SG Title
15, Subtitle 6, contains no penalty provisions. By contrast, certain
parts of the law applicable to particular jurisdictions contain specific
criminal sanctions. See SG §§15-835(b) and 15-840. The
enforcement subtitle applicable to the Ethics Law as a whole
contains criminal penalties only for knowing and willful violations
of the lobbying subtitle. SG §15-903. Therefore, a criminal
prosecution for lying on one’s financial disclosure statement is
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2 A false statement on a financial disclosure statement would subject
the individual to disciplinary action under SG §15-904.
3 Under Article 1, §9 of the Code, any oath requirement in the Code
may be satisfied by an affirmation.
possible only if authorized under a provision outside the Ethics
Law.2
“The crime of perjury was part of the common law to which
the inhabitants of Maryland became entitled by the declaration in
Art. 5 of the Declaration of Rights .... The Legislature has enacted
a Perjury Act which explicitly recognizes common law perjury.”
State v. Levitt, 48 Md. App. 1, 9, 426 A.2d 383 (1981). This statute,
Article 27, §435, provides as follows:
An oath or affirmation, if made willfully
and falsely in any of the following cases, shall
be deemed perjury: First, in all cases where
false swearing would be perjury at common
law; secondly, in all affidavits required by law
to be taken; thirdly, in all affidavits to
accounts or claims made for the purpose of
inducing any court or officer to pass the
accounts or claims; fourthly, in all affidavits
required to be made to reports and returns
made to the General Assembly or any officer
of the government; fifthly, in all affidavits or
affirmations made pursuant to the Maryland
Rules or Maryland District Rules.
This statute “embraces both common law perjury and also those
various other false oaths that would have constituted false swearing”
at common law. Hourie v. State, 53 Md. App. 62, 67 (1982), aff’d,
298 Md. 50, 467 A.2d 1016 (1983).
Willfully made false statements on a financial disclosure form
would seem to fall squarely within the statute. The form contains an
“oath or affirmation,” because SG §15-602(2) requires a filing under
oath and the wording is that of an oath or affirmation.3 “An oath is
a solemn unilateral vow, made before a person authorized by law to
administer oaths, to do or abstain from doing certain prescribed acts
applicable to the office or duty being entered, the falsity of which is
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4 Maryland Rule 1-304 provides for the form of an affidavit, in
which the phrase “under the penalties of perjury” is to be used. However,
this rule only “applies to procedure in all courts of this State ....” Rule 1-
101. It cannot fairly be read to address the potential applicability of
Article 27, §435 to an affidavit filed with a government official outside
the judicial system.
5 The filing requirement, then codified at Article 33, §29-4(a), was
as follows: “Each person holding an office set forth in Section 29-3 ...
shall file with the Secretary of State ... the statement required by this
subtitle ....”
punishable by law by way of criminal sanction.” Brady v. City of
Laurel, 40 Md. App. 373, 377, 392 A.2d 89 (1978). See also
Greenwald v. State, 221 Md. 235, 240, 155 A.2d 894 (1959). The
financial disclosure statement is also an “affidavit,” which is simply
a writing verified by an oath or affirmation. See Collins v. State, 12
Md. App. 239, 243 n.4, 278 A.2d 311 (1971), aff’d 265 Md. 70, 288
A.2d 163 (1972). See also Black’s Law Dictionary 58 (6th ed.
1990). Finally, it is an affidavit “required by law to be taken” and
one “required to be made to [a] repor[t] ... made to ... [an] officer of
the government.”4
Hence, we conclude that Article 27, §435 applies to willfully
false statements on financial disclosure forms. Our analysis would
be incomplete, however, if we did not recognize that defendants
might argue for a different conclusion based on the history of the
Ethics Law and the administrative practice under it.
In 1973, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 267, a
financial disclosure bill. This bill explicitly required financial
disclosure statements to be filed “under oath, based upon personal
knowledge and subject to the penalties of perjury.” Because of
doubt about the constitutionality of the bill, it was vetoed.
A new financial disclosure law was enacted in the 1973 Special
Session of the General Assembly. This bill, enacted as Chapter 3 of
the Special Session, omitted any reference to an oath or the penalties
of perjury in the provision related to financial disclosure statements.5
Then, in 1975, the provision was amended to require that the
statement be filed “under oath or affirmation,” but no reference was
added to the penalties of perjury. See Chapter 848 of the Laws of
Maryland 1975.
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This history, a defendant might argue, reflects a legislative
decision to omit from the Ethics Law a reference to the penalties of
perjury, and hence, a decision that a willfully false statement on a
financial disclosure form should not give rise to a perjury
prosecution. This argument might be given some support by the
Ethics Commission’s administrative practice in omitting a reference
to penalties of perjury from its financial disclosure form, in marked
contrast to the inclusion of that very language in its lobbying
reporting form.
In our opinion, however, this argument is based on a
misconception of the significance of this sequence of events. The
1975 legislative decision to add an “oath or affirmation” requirement
for financial disclosure statements without an additional reference to
“penalties of perjury” does not necessarily support the conclusion
that the General Assembly intended to spare liars from prosecution
for perjury. The General Assembly might simply have determined
that the inclusion of the oath requirement itself was sufficient to
invoke the possibility of prosecution under Article 27, §435, without
the additional language that had been included in the vetoed 1973
bill. “Since this subsequent legislative action may arguably support
either [view of the statute] we do not consider it a reliable source of
legislative intent ....” Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 698 n.2, 668
A.2d 1 (1995). Moreover, “the mere fact that the General Assembly
has declined to adopt a particular proposal does not preclude ...
incorporating the substance of that proposal into the common law or
our interpretation of a statute.” Goldstein v. State, 339 Md. 563,
569, 664 A.2d 375 (1995).
Despite our view that the legislative history does not negate a
prosecution under Article 27, §435, we must acknowledge the
possibility that a court might see the issue differently. Moreover, a
prosecutor legitimately takes this doubt into consideration when
deciding whether to bring a case. To eliminate all doubt, the Ethics
Law itself should be amended to clarify that the oath for the
financial disclosure statement is made subject to the penalties of
perjury. In the interim, and because we conclude that current law,
correctly construed, already achieves that result, the Ethics
Commission should revise the financial disclosure form to include
the same reference to the penalties of perjury as is found in the
lobbying activity form.
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6 If the Commission decided, as a policy matter, that the notarization
requirement was too burdensome or otherwise undesirable, the
Commission might pursue an amendment to the Ethics Law akin to §1-
201(b)(2) of the Business Occupations and Professions Article, which
allows an unwitnessed, signed statement under penalties of perjury to
suffice as an oath or affirmation.
III
Notarization Requirement
As discussed in Part I above, the Public Ethics law requires
financial disclosure statements to “be filed under oath.” SG §15-
602(2). The term “oath” implies a swearing before someone who is
authorized by law to administer the oath. See Brady v. City of
Laurel, 40 Md. App. at 377. A notary public is so authorized. See
also Article 68, §3. See generally Soper v. Jones, 171 Md. 643, 646,
187 A. 833 (1937).
In theory, the Ethics Commission has the discretion to
prescribe a disclosure statement that would allow the oath to be
sworn before someone other than a notary who is likewise
authorized by law to administer oaths. The Commission’s decision
to standardize the oath administration by requiring that the oath be
taken before a notary is a reasonable one, however, and, in any
event, the Commission must require evidence that the oath was taken
before an authorized official.6
IV
Conclusion
In summary, it is our opinion that:
1.
A willfully false statement made under oath on the
Commission’s financial disclosure form may be prosecuted as
perjury under Article 27, §435. Nevertheless, so that the form
correctly reflects this possibility and does not suggest that the
Commission believes otherwise, we recommend that the form be
changed to include a reference to penalties of perjury.
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2.
Financial disclosure statements must be notarized, unless
the required oath is sworn to before some other official authorized
to administer oaths.
J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Attorney General
Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice