83OAG109
83OAG109
Cite as 83 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 109
109
1 This conclusion was originally provided in a letter of advice.
Because of the importance of the matter, we are reissuing the letter, with
minor stylistic changes, as a formal opinion.
GOVERNOR
APPOINTMENTS ) GENERAL ASSEMBLY ) FORMER SENATOR
EXPELLED FOR THE REMAINDER OF TERM IS UNQUALIFIED
TO BE APPOINTED TO FILL THE VACANCY
February 11, 1998
The Honorable Agnes Welch
Baltimore City Democratic
Central Committee
You have requested our opinion concerning the effect of the
Senate’s resolution expelling former Senator Larry Young. The
Democratic Central Committee for District 44, you point out, needs
to know “whether or not the [former] Senator can occupy the vacant
seat and if they select him, can he regain his seat until the next
election?”
Our opinion is as follows: In light of the wording of the
Senate’s expulsion resolution, former Senator Young is legally
unqualified to serve in this seat until the next election.1
I
Analysis
On January 16, 1998, the Senate approved a resolution
expelling Senator Young “for the remainder of the current 4-year
term.” As evidenced by both the language of the resolution and its
explanation on the floor, the Senate intended the resolution to be a
disqualification, barring former Senator Young from returning this
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2 On January 15, 1998, the Senate President read on the floor and
distributed to Senators a document called Questions and Answers on the
Discipline of State Legislators, prepared by the Attorney General’s Office.
Included in this document was the following:
Q.
If Senator Young is expelled, why couldn’t he be
seated as his SUCCESSOR if nominated by the
district central committee and appointed by the
Governor?
A.
Because the resolution would expel him for the
remainder of his four-year elected term.
Because the Senate’s power to exclude a member, i.e. refuse to seat him,
is keyed to an absence of qualification by the legislator, it is clear that the
resolution was viewed as a disqualification for the remainder of the term.
3 Section 19 provides as follows:
Each House shall be judge of the qualifications
and elections of its members, as prescribed by the
Constitution and Laws of the State, and shall
appoint its own officers, determine the rules of its
own proceedings, punish a member for disorderly
or disrespectful behavior and with the consent of
two-thirds of its whole number of members
elected, expel a member; but no member shall be
expelled a second time for the same offense.
year to the Senate pursuant to nomination and appointment under
Article III, §13 of the Maryland Constitution.2
The Senate acted pursuant to Article III, §19 of the
Constitution, which empowers it to “be the judge of the
qualifications ... of its members ... [and to] expel a member ....”3 The
Senate’s power to include this disqualification in an expulsion
resolution reflects the traditional power of a parliamentary body.
Under the English common law as of 1776, the English Parliament
could exclude a member for the duration of the Parliament from
which he had been expelled. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 524-27 (1969). This aspect of the English common law as it
prevailed in 1776, unless revised, continues to be Maryland law. See
Article V of the Declaration of Rights. Therefore, the Senate
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4 English common law later changed to prevent exclusion of
expelled members who were subsequently reelected. See Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. at 527-29; Letter of Advice to Delegate Robert L.
Flanagan from Assistant Attorney General Richard E. Israel (January 19,
1998). Moreover, the 1776 Maryland Constitution and later Constitutions
prohibited two expulsions for the same offense. These developments,
however, did not appear to alter the power of a house of the General
Assembly to expel a member for the remainder of his or her term. As Mr.
Israel pointed out in his letter of advice to Delegate Flanagan, for more
than 150 years, the language of what is now Article III, §13 only
authorized the filling of a General Assembly vacancy for the remainder of
a term with “another person,” not the person expelled.
5 In Coleman v. Rose, 86 P. 296, 298 (Kan. 1906), a Kansas court
said that:
The resignation or the removal of an officer
during his term and the election or appointment of
(continued...)
expulsion resolution could, and did, expel Senator Young for the
remainder of his unexpired term.4
This interpretation of the Senate’s power is also consistent with
the prevailing case law in other jurisdictions. For example, in Gelch
v. State Board of Elections, 482 A.2d 1904 (R.I. 1984), Rhode
Island’s highest court surveyed decisions from Kansas, Minnesota,
Tennessee, and New York and noted that:
In these cases, ... certain officials who
were removed from office or declared
ineligible for office during the terms to which
they had been elected or appointed sought to
fill the unexpired portions of their terms. All
of these cases hold that the full term or tenure
of the officer was a part of and included in the
office and that when removed from office, the
incumbent was removed for the full term or
tenure then being served.
482 A.2d at 1212. The Rhode Island court concluded that a removed
mayor “was not legally qualified to be a candidate to fill the vacancy
in the office ... for the unexpired term.” 482 A.2d at 1217.5
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5 (...continued)
a successor do not divide the term nor create a
new and distinct one. In such a case the successor
is filling out his predecessor’s term; and when the
defendant reentered the office and undertook to
exercise its duties he was simply serving a portion
of the very term which the court had decided that
he was unfit to hold. Since under the law he
forfeited and was ousted from the right to occupy
the office for the remainder of the term, no
subsequent election or appointment could restore
to him that which he was adjudged to have
forfeited and lost. The electors of the city are as
much bound by the law and the judgment rendered
in pursuance of the law as their representatives
and officers, and the special election did not
warrant the defendant in ignoring or violating the
judgment rendered under the law.
6 That the Governor is prohibited from appointing an unqualified
nominee to a General Assembly vacancy does not infringe on the
Legislature’s constitutional power to judge the qualifications of its
members. As construed by the Court of Appeals, Article III, §19 makes
the General Assembly the “ultimate,” not sole, judge of the qualifications
of a member, as long as no principle of separation of powers is
transgressed. See Lamb v. Hammond, 308 Md. 286, 297, 518 A.2d 1057
(continued...)
Because Senate adoption of the January 16 expulsion
resolution creates a disqualification with respect to former Senator
Young’s ability to serve as his own successor for the reminder of his
unexpired term, the Central Committee’s nomination of former
Senator Young to fill the vacancy would be a nullity. That is, the
Governor would have a duty to decline to appoint him to fill the
vacancy.
To be sure, under Article III, §13, the Governor is usually
bound to appoint the person selected by the Central Committee. See
62 Opinions of the Attorney General 241, 244 (1977). This
mandate, however, must be construed as an obligation to appoint a
person “otherwise properly qualified to hold the office.” See Article
III, §13(a). For example, the Governor could not ratify the Central
Committee’s nomination of an underaged person or one refusing to
relinquish a second office.6
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6 (...continued)
(1987).
7 If former Senator Young were appointed to a House vacancy, the
situation would be vastly different. Because he is not disqualified from
serving in this body, the Governor would be obligated to approve the
Central Committee’s nomination. Of course, the House could still expel
him for the same offenses considered by the Senate.
II
Conclusion
Because former Senator Young is disqualified from serving the
remainder of his unexpired term in the Senate, the Governor may not
appoint him to fill this vacancy, and the Central Committee’s
nomination of him would be legally ineffective.7
J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Attorney General
Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice
Robert A. Zarnoch
Assistant Attorney General