79OAG021
79OAG021
Cite as 79 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 21
21
BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS
MUNICIPALITIES ) VALIDITY OF “GRANDFATHER” PROVISION
FOR LOCAL LICENSING OF HEATING CONTRACTORS
October 19, 1994
The Honorable Alfred A. Hopkins
Mayor of Annapolis
You
have
requested
our
opinion
concerning
the
constitutionality of §9A-506 of the Business Regulations (“BR”)
Article, Maryland Code, which permits local subdivisions that
required a license for heating, ventilation, air-conditioning, and
refrigeration (“HVAC”) services on or before January 1, 1990, to
continue to require these licenses after a statewide licensing
requirement took effect. Specifically, you have asked whether BR
§9A-506 violates Article XI-E, §1 of the Maryland Constitution
because it affects some municipalities differently than others. You
have also asked whether the date chosen, January 1, 1990, is so
arbitrary as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Finally, you have asked whether BR §9A-506 is
invalid because it deprives some municipalities of a funding source
for their HVAC inspection duties.
For the reasons stated below, we conclude that BR §9A-506
does not violate Article XI-E, §1, because it is not a local or special
law but rather a part of a public general law that treats all similarly
situated municipalities even-handedly. We further conclude that the
date chosen was not so arbitrary or capricious as to deny due process
and that a municipality has no legal right to any specific source of
funding for its inspection and enforcement activities.
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I
Background
A.
The State Law
BR §9A-506 was enacted in 1992 as part of a comprehensive
State law regulating persons who provide HVAC services. Chapter
649, Laws of Maryland 1992. Under this law, a person who
provides HVAC services must obtain a license from the State Board
of Heating, Ventilation, Air-Conditioning, and Refrigeration
Contractors and be covered by certain minimum amounts of
insurance. BR §§9A-301 and 9A-402. The State law also sets the
qualifications and continuing education requirements for State,
county, and local HVAC inspectors. BR §9A-403.
BR §9A-506 provides, in its entirety:
(a) Any subdivision of the State which
required a local license to provide heating,
ventilation, air-conditioning, or refrigeration
services on or before January 1, 1990 may
continue to require a local license for services
performed within that subdivision.
(b) Any subdivision which requires a
local license under this section may not
discriminate against applicants who are not
residents of that subdivision.
(c) In the event that any subdivision
which requires a local license discontinues
that requirement after the effective date of this
Act, that subdivision may not thereafter adopt
a license requirement.
(d) A State license is required to provide
heating, ventilation, air-conditioning, or
refrigeration services anywhere within the
State, whether or not the individual holds a
local license.
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BR §1-204(a) excludes Baltimore City and Prince George’s and
1
Worcester Counties from the provision. BR §1-204(c) provides that a
“municipal corporation ... may require a local license if necessary for
regulatory purposes in the interest of the public health, safety, or morals.”
However, the fact that BR §9A-506 is written as an authorization, rather
than as a prohibition, indicates that the General Assembly did not
contemplate local HVAC licensing under BR §1-204(c).
The term “mechanical contractor” is not defined but apparently
2
includes those who install or replace mechanical systems, which include
heating systems, ventilating systems, and cooling systems. See
§17.18.060A. Thus, this license is a local HVAC license.
This section was apparently considered necessary to overcome the
prohibition in BR §1-204(b), which provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this
article or Article 24, Title 11 of the Code, a
county, municipal corporation, or other
political subdivision of the State may not:
(1) require a local license in that county,
municipal corporation, or political subdivision
to engage in a business or occupation for
which a State license is required under this
article; or
(2) impose a local fee or tax to engage in
a business or occupation for which a State
license is required under this article.1
B.
The Annapolis Ordinance
Annapolis’s “Mechanical Code”, as amended in 1991, requires
a person who works as a mechanical contractor to obtain a
mechanical contractor’s license from the city’s director of public
works. Annapolis City Code §17.18.030A. The requirements for
2
the various types of licenses are to be established by the department
of public works. Id. An applicant must satisfy State insurance
requirements before a license will issue. Annapolis City Code
§17.18.040. The fee for a license is $50 for two years.
§17.18.030C.
The city ordinance also requires a permit for the installation or
erection of mechanical systems, the fee for which is based on the
24
value of the work to be done. §17.18.07A. Additional fees are
charged for reinspection and investigations. §17.18.070B.
II
Municipal Home Rule
Article XI-E, §1 of the Maryland Constitution provides as
follows:
Except as provided elsewhere in this
Article, the General Assembly shall not pass
any law relating to the incorporation,
organization, government, or affairs of those
municipal
corporations
which
are
not
authorized by Article 11-A of the Constitution
to have a charter form of government which
will be special or local in its terms or in its
effect, but the General Assembly shall act in
relation to the incorporation, organization,
government, or affairs of any such municipal
corporation only by general laws which shall
in their terms and in their effect apply alike to
all municipal corporations in one or more of
the classes provided for in Section 2 of this
Article. It shall be the duty of the General
Assembly to provide by law the method by
which new municipal corporations shall be
formed.
This language limits only the power of the General Assembly
to enact laws that are “special or local.” It does not limit the power
of the General Assembly to enact public general laws that may affect
some municipalities differently than others. For example, in Prince
George’s County v. Laurel, 262 Md. 171, 277 A.2d 262 (1971), the
Court of Appeals upheld a law extending the Regional District to
include all of Prince George’s County except for the City of Laurel.
The Court noted that the Regional District Act is a public general
law and that, despite the express mention of Laurel, the law was not
merely local in its effect.
BR Title 9A is a comprehensive general law regulating HVAC
services statewide. The fact that a single section of the title relates
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In addition, it could be argued that BR §9A-506 does apply to all
3
municipalities uniformly, because it gives all municipalities the identical
power: to continue in effect any HVAC licensing program they had in
effect on or before January 1, 1990.
A municipal corporation in Maryland has no due process rights
4
that it can assert against the State. See Board v. Secretary of Personnel,
317 Md. 34, 44, 562 A.2d 700 (1989). See also City of Chesterfield v.
Director of Revenue, 811 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. 1991). Nevertheless, for the
sake of thoroughness, we address this argument.
to pre-existing local regulation does not alter its general character.
In fact, the Court of Appeals has recognized that laws requiring
occupational licensing in a political subdivision are not local laws,
because they affect the right of persons who reside outside the
jurisdiction to engage in that occupation. Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md.
251, 261, 183 A. 534 (1936).
BR §9A-506 is part of a comprehensive public general law and
deals with a subject matter that is of general, rather than simply
local, concern. Hence, it does not violate Article XI-E, §1.3
III
Retroactivity
It has been suggested that BR §9A-506 is unconstitutional
because “it was made retroactive to an arbitrary date.” The
retroactive nature of a statute alone does not render it
unconstitutional. Instead, a retroactive statute will be upheld unless
it is so arbitrary and capricious that it violates due process. Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). In this instance,
4
there is a rational explanation for the date chosen by the Legislature.
The first bill to regulate HVAC contractors passed by the
General Assembly was House Bill 807 of 1988, which was vetoed
by the Governor. Veto Message on House Bill 807, Laws of
Maryland 1988 at 5369. This bill contained no provisions on local
26
See House Bill 560 of 1991 and House Bill 1386 of 1992. House
5
Bill 1386 was enacted as Chapter 649 of the Laws of Maryland 1992.
licensing. Nor did House Bill 1036, which was introduced in 1989
but did not pass. The first bill to contain such a provision was House
Bill 1009 of 1990. That bill provided that local subdivisions that had
HVAC licensing prior to January 1, 1988, could continue to require
local licensing.
In this context, the January 1, 1988, date served the purpose of
preserving those local ordinances that existed before statewide
licensing became an issue, while excluding ordinances that may have
been passed with the view of gaining revenue while piggy-backing
onto any State law that passed. Making a law retroactive to preclude
action in anticipation of the law’s passage is not irrational and does
not violate due process. Pension Benefits Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray
& Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984).
In subsequent years, the HVAC regulatory bill was
reintroduced with the same provision, but the date was moved
forward a year each time, so that only ordinances passed in the prior
two years would be invalidated, while more established ordinances
would be preserved. In our view, the General Assembly’s moving
5
the date forward in this way did not render the retroactivity provision
so arbitrary or capricious as to violate due process.
IV
Municipal Finance
It has also been suggested that BR §9A-506 is invalid because
it “fails to create a procedural or funding mechanism for city
enforcement of its [HVAC] regulations.” In fact, the structure of the
ordinance would suggest that the city’s inspection of mechanical
services and enforcement of its mechanical code are funded through
the permit mechanism, which is not preempted by BR §9A-506. In
any event, the city has no right to a special funding source for these
functions.
27
A municipal corporation is a creature of the State and is subject
to absolute control by the Legislature. Rockville v. Randolph, 267
Md. 56, 296 A.2d 574 (1972). Municipalities have no inherent
rights, but derive whatever powers they possess from the
Legislature. Jewel Tea Company v. Bel Air, 172 Md. 536, 192 A.
417 (1937). The Legislature can modify, alter, or abolish those
rights and duties at any time. City of Frederick v. Groshon, 30 Md.
436 (1869).
Funds held by a municipal corporation are held for the benefit
of the public and also are subject to the control of the Legislature.
State v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 12 G. & J. 399 (1842). See also
Revell v. Annapolis, 81 Md. 1 (1895) (Legislature may require a
municipality to issue bonds to pay for a school); Hagerstown v.
Sehner, 37 Md. 180 (1872) (Legislature may revive municipal
liability for riot damages). The absolute control of the Legislature
over municipalities extends to the taxes and fees that they may
charge. Controller v. Pleasure Cove Yacht Club, Inc., 334 Md. 450,
463, 639 A.2d 685 (1994). In fact, the Constitution provides that:
No ... municipal corporation shall levy
any type of tax, license fee, franchise tax or
fee which was not in effect in such municipal
corporation on January 1, 1954, unless it shall
receive the express authorization of the
General Assembly for such purpose, by a
general law which in its terms and its effect
applies alike to all municipal corporations in
one or more of the classes provided for in
Section 2 of this Article.
Annapolis has no legally cognizable right to license HVAC
contractors or to charge a fee for that license, and elimination of that
authority by public general law does not render BR §9A-506
unconstitutional.
28
We note that Anne Arundel County’s licensing scheme is
6
permissible under BR §9A-506, for it was in place prior to January 1,
1990.
V
Conclusion
In summary, it is our opinion that BR §9A-506 is entirely valid.
The City of Annapolis may not enforce its Mechanical Code so as to
require city licensing of HVAC contractors.6
J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Attorney General
Kathryn M. Rowe
Assistant Attorney General
Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice