94-005
94-005
Cite as Md. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 94-005 (unpublished)
Cite as: Opinion No. 94-005 (January 24, 1994) (unpublished)
JUVENILE CAUSES ) CONFIDENTIALITY OF JUVENILE
RECORDS
January 24, 1994
The Honorable Michael R. Gordon
House of Delegates
You have requested our opinion about a number of issues relating to the confidentiality of
juvenile records. In a recent letter of advice to the Director of the Montgomery County Criminal
Justice Coordinating Commission, Assistant Attorney General Ronald M. Levitan addressed each of
the questions that you posed in your opinion request. Letter to H. Jerome Miron (January 3, 1994).
A copy of Mr. Levitan's letter is attached.
We have reviewed Mr. Levitan's response and concur with his conclusions. One item
warrants some elaboration, however.
You asked whether the confidentiality restrictions that ordinarily govern police records of a
juvenile apply when the juvenile is charged as an adult under §3-804(e) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings ("CJ") Article, Maryland Code. The pertinent confidentiality provision, CJ §3-828(a),
provides in general that "[a] police record concerning a child is confidential and shall be maintained
separate[ly] from those of adults. Its contents may not be divulged ... except by order of the court"
) that is, the juvenile court ) "upon good cause shown." The subsection goes on to authorize
confidential access and use of the record by the Department of Juvenile Services and law enforcement
agencies.
Citing a passage in In re Diane M., 317 Md. 652, 657, 566 A.2d 108 (1989), in which the
Court of Appeals described CJ §3-828 as governing "disclosure of police records of a juvenile in the
custody of juvenile authorities ..." (emphasis added), Mr. Levitan advised that "if a juvenile is charged
as an adult with a crime which falls outside the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the
confidentiality provisions of CJ §8-828 do not apply." Advice letter at 2.
We agree. The General Assembly has created two distinct spheres, reflecting the two
different ways in which society responds to the criminal misconduct of children: the Juvenile Causes
Act and the ordinary criminal process. The appellate courts have emphasized the separation of the
two spheres. A circuit court sitting as a juvenile court, for example, "may exercise only those powers
granted to it by statute, and it may not exercise powers it otherwise could exercise if it were sitting
as a criminal court." In re Glenn S., 293 Md. 510, 511, 445 A.2d 1029 (1982). See also Crosby v.
State, 71 Md. App. 56, 65, 523 A.2d 1042 (1987) (discussing age as a "dividing line between the
adult and the juvenile systems"). Cf. Aye v. State, 17 Md. App. 32, 299 A.2d 513 (1973) (discussing
jurisdictional consequences of waivers).
In most cases involving delinquent acts by children, the Legislature has determined that the
appropriate response is "to remove from children ... the taint of criminality and the consequences of
criminal behavior." CJ §3-802(a)(2). Confidentiality is a key factor in achieving this result for
children over whom the juvenile court exercises jurisdiction, and CJ §3-828 guarantees confidentiality
within that sphere. But when a child, pursuant to statute, is prosecuted as an adult, the ground rules
change. Nothing from the sphere of juvenile causes, including its confidentiality strictures, carries
over.
Should this result be viewed as undesirable from a policy perspective, the statute could be
amended to apply confidentiality requirements to a prosecution of a child as an adult. But, in our
view, the law does not do so now.
J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Attorney General
Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice