79-123
Conflict of interest of selectman of a town serving as an officer in the Army Corps of Engineers or as a part-time deputy sheriff
Cite as Me. Op. Att'y Gen. 79-123
MAINE STATE LEGISLATURE
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RICHARD S. COHEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
S·rATE at' MAINE
Di!:l'A1t'1'M~N'l' 01•' 'l'H~ A'lvl'OU.N~Y G~N~H.AL
AUGUSTA, MAINE 04333
June 14, 1979
Honorable James A. McBreairty
Senate Chambers
State House
Augusta, Maine 04333
Dear Senator McBreairty:
71-/2.3
STJ.iPH.EN L. l)IAMONU
JOHN S. GLEASON
JOHN M. R. PATERSON
ROBERT J. STOLT
DEPUTY ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Subsequent to our opinion to you on March 26, you have
asked two additional questions.
First, you have asked whether a selectman in the Town of
Allagash who is an officer in the Army Corps of Engineers, the
agency responsible. for,construction of the proposed Dickey-
Lincoln Dam, has a conflict of interest by virtue of holding
those positions.
The mere fact that the selectman holds a posi-
tion in the Army is not per sea conflict of interest.
The
existence of a conflict wouldarise only in the context of
particular issues or contemplated acts and cannot be answered
except in the context of a specific fact situation.
The mere
holding of these positions does not in itself create a conflict.
Should a conflict arise, however, it could be avoided by the
individual disqualifying himself from performing one of his
duties.
·
Second, you have asked whether a. selectman may also serve
as part-time deputy sheriff.
We have reviewed our files and find
that previous opinions of the Attorney General have expressed
conflicting view .on this question.
By an opinion dated March 5,
1937, this office stated that it was an incompatibility for an
assessor to be a deputy sheriff.
On February 9, 1955, the
office stated that it was not incompatible for a selectman to be
a deputy sheriff unless the selectman was also 1.a local assessor.
On March 11, 1966, the Attorney General issued an opinion stating
that the positions of selectman and deputy sheriff were not
incompatible.
Unfortunately, none of these earlier opinions
provides any reasoning, each of them·being conclusory in nature.
Page 2
The earlier opinions of the Attorney General were based on an
interpretation of·the common-law concept of incompatibility as set
forth in Howard v. Harrington, 114 Me. 446 (1916).
Subsequently,
new statutory provisions have been enacted which relate in part
to this question.
Title 30 M.R.S.A. § 951 prohibits a full-time
deputy from holding a position as a municipal officer.
No
similar prohibition·exists, however, regarding part-time deputies.
While Title 30 M.R.S.A. § 959(2) authorizes participation by all
deputies in "elections" and permits them to run for local office,
it is silent on the question of whether a part-time deputy may serve
simultaneously as a municipal official.
Given the absence of a statutory provision on the subject, we
must apply the principles of comrnon·1aw incompatibility as stated in
·Howard·v. Harrington, supra.
That case holds generally that no
person can occupy two·offices with inconsistent functions which
preclude the person from being able to discharge the duties of
each office.
Although Howard gives no precise formula for deter-
mining inconsistency., we do not believe it is incompatible for a
part-time deputy to be a selectman.
The function of a deputy is to enforce the law.
The function
of a selectman is to conduct local municipal business and, where
authorized, enact J,ocal ordinances.
Ordinarily a selectman has
little, if any, authority to adopt a mun•icipal ordinance, that
function being·reserved to the.entire town meeting.
Assuming that
the deputy may be called onto enforce an ordinance, that does not
create any inconsistency. ·In Bamford v. Melvin, 7 Mo. 5 (1830)
and Stubbs v. Lee,.64 Me. 195 (1874), the Law Court held that it
would be incompatible for a deputy to be a justice of the peace
or trial justice, since in each case the individual as a judicial
officer would be exercising a power clearly in conflict with his
law enforcement.duties. ·However, we do not perceive the same
problem arising out of the possibility that, on limited occasions,
a deputy sheriff might be called upon to enforce an ordinance which
he voted to adopt in his capacity as a selectman.
For that reason,
we do not deem the offices to be incompatible.
Having answered the comrnon..-law incompatibility issue, the
question arises as to·. whether the positions of deputy sheriff and
selectman· are · consti.tutionally compatible.
Article III, § 2 of
the Maine Constitution provides that "no person or persons
belonging to either of these departments [legislative, executive
or judicial.] shall exercise any .of the powers belonging to either
of the others, except in cases ·herein expressly directed or per-
mitted." It has long·been the rule in Maine that a sheriff or
deputy is a member·of "the executive branch. 'Bamford v. Melvin
and Stubbs v. Lee, supra.
Although the sheriff is a constitutionally
created officer,· Me. ;Const. Art. IX, § 10, the inclusion of the
sheriff in the executive branch stems from the office's principal
function of law enforcement.
r
Page 3
Given this fact, the question then narrows to a determination
of whether a selectman is an officer in a different branch of
government, i.e., the legislative branch.
In an analogous case
the Maine Law Court intimated that a mayor may be a member of the
executive branch of state government, despite the fact that he was
elected locally, since the mayor's functions involve duties affect-
ing the general·public which are create~·by and delegated to him
under state law.
Howard v. Harrington, supra. It may logically
follow, therefore, that a selectman, insofar as he is delegated
certain legislative functions by municipal charter, may likewise
be a member of the legislative·branch.
However, we think there
are persuasive grounds to conclude that a municipal selectman or
city councillor is not in fact a member of the state legislative
branch.
Apart from.the now rather dated dicta •in Howard v. Harrington,
we know.of no Maine case stating or implying that a locally elected
official is part of the state legislative branch of government in
the sense that it is referred·to in Art. III, §§ lor 2 of the
Maine Constitution.
While the case law recognizes a distinction
between state and local offices, the line between them is not clearly
defined.
See generally the discussion in McQuillen, Municipal
Corporations,§ 4.115 (3d ed. 1973) and Dillon, Municipal Corporations,
§ 97 (5th ed., 1911).
Generally, however~ the distinction appoars to
rest on whether the official is charged with duties affecting the
state at large or responsibilities essentially local in character.
Viewed from this perspective, we would characterize a town select-
man as a local official.
In addition, we think it unlikely that the reference to the
legislative branch in the Constitution was intended to encompass
local officials like a selectman.
While it· is possible that a
selectman is a state official in the sense that the position is
created and the powers prescribed by statute, it nevertheless
seems unlikely that the reference to the legislative branch in
Art. III, § l, of the Maine Constitution was intended to encompass
local elected officials.
Rather, it is far more probable that
for constitutional purposes the reference to the legislative
branch in Art. III, § 1 was intended ·to refer back to the
Legislature, as def·ined and created in Art. IV of the Maine
Constitution.
For that reason, we conclude that there is no constitutional .
incompatibility with a part-time deputy sheriff serving as a local
municipal official since the selectman is not in a separate consti-
tutional branch of government.
I trust this answers your questions.
If I can be of further
assistance, please let me know.
fl..in{eye,Q_
d~Ta;:._..·;,
JMRP/ec
JOHN M. R. PATERSON
Deputy Attorney General