Constitutionality of LD 548, An Act to Enhance the Prosecution of Child Pornography Cases

MAINE STATE LEGISLATURE The following document is provided by the LAW AND LEGISLATIVE DIGITAL LIBRARY at the Maine State Law and Legislative Reference Library http://legislature.maine.gov/lawlib Reproduced from scanned originals with text recognition applied (searchable text may contain some errors and/or omissions) REGtQi",!:-\L 0FFICI::S: 05-5 s~ r-1,\:.ZU)l,V .:3:· .. 2:;,m ?LS'!_:':Z 3.,'-.i,lGi)R. L'.1.L>.lNE --;~_;.tj \ Honorable Janet T ]\;fills House of Representatives Two State House Station Augusta, r.i1E 04333-0002 i\,fay 10, 2005 RE: LD_ 548 (112nd legis_ 2005) Dear Representative Nlills: TsL: (=:U7) 941-3070 f.;_;(: (::'.07) 941-3075 -~4 0.-\.l( S·r~EET~ +7H ?u.JOR PORTLAND, lYL\iNE 041iJ1-301-+ TEL:(2071 322-0260 F.-\.'C (207) S:'.2-:J'.:59 TDD: (877) -+'.'.3-3800 123 S\VEDEN ST., STE- 2 C.\iUBCU, :vi..i-..1NE 04736 'T2L: ;_2D7) ➔96-J79:2 F..;_:.;::: (207\ 496-3:91 Attorney General Rowe has asked that I respond to your letter of April 19, 2005 in which you raise questions about constitutional and other issues regarding L.D_ 548, ").,_n Ac-r to Enhance the Prosecution of Child Pornography Cases." L.D. 548 (hereinafter ·'the bill") contains two separate proposals. I will address each in turn. Pronosed Affirmative Defenses to the Crimes of Dissemination of Sexuallv ExDlicit Ma-rerial and Possession of Sexuallv Explicit Material The bill would create a new affirmative defense for both the current crimes of dissemination of sexually explicit material, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 283(1)-(Supp. 2004), and possession ofse:,-ually explicit material, 17-A:WLRS.A. § 284(1) (Supp. 2004). See Subsection 3 of the bill. Proposed new section 286 creating the affinnative defenses provide::, as fullows: & 236_ Affl.rmative defense It is an affirn1ati.,.ve dc±'ense to section 283 or sectiOn 234 that rhe allesred minor deoicted in the sexuallv exolicit material is rrot an a.ctual oerson or is not a minor. \:\Then in the ~\Jaine Criminal Code~ as l1ere, . _ .rhe statute explicitly designates a maner as an proved by the de fondant by a rreponderance of the evidence. : --A rvI.R S. A. § l 0 1 (2) ( 1983 ). Consequently, proposed section 286 vvould require that ~:: the trial of a defendant charged with some form of the crimes of dissemination of . ~,.71::1l1y 2y:,]icir m~1t2ri:;d nr possession nfse'CT1.1lly e'<r,licit materi::il. it wnnld be :cumbent upon a defendant who chooses to use the affirmative defense to demonstrate : · the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that the person depicted in the sexually -_ ·:olicit material is either not in fact an actual nerson - Le.~ not a real human beinsi (17- .. 4- ~ L ., - ' .. R.S.A §2(20) \)983))- or is not in fact a minor. Turning to the two crimes to which this affirmative defense is to have application · namely, sections '.283 and :284 of the Criminal Code - each form of these two rbstantive crimes as defined bv the Maine Le2:islature includes as a factual "element" :mt the victim depicted in the s~x:ually explicit material be an actual person1 and that ·erson be under a specified age.2 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 'n.f-,=.rl <;;:rqt-ps r00s+1·+11+i~ T"Atl ,; 0 th» C:t.tc., f~·f 'n,a.t ,., ~ •A "'"'Ch "'l"'ment or''ev"''""Y _,..i..Ut. ........... '-'i..-'-''-' --v .... " ............ J..vn .L._ .... l"'L,lf:,,..S 1.,l.1. ..... u aL,l,,,., 0 .LI a1..1. ............. o 1::-'fv', ..... l,,..1..-1, ... '.J '-' .1. .1. V.1. ~rime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970): Stare v. Jervis, 384 A.2d 45, 47 (rvie. 1978). The Maine Criminal Code expressly requires 1.othing less. 17-AwI.R.S.A. § 3:2 (1983);3 see also State v. Kim, 2001 ME 99, 19, 773 A.:2d 1051, 1055 (" ... the State bears the burden of proving each element of the charge ::eyond a reasonable doubt, and the court must instruct the jury on the elements of the :rime and the State's burden of proof'). \\There, as here, the Legislature has chosen to. ::nake the facts of "actual person" and "age" elements of both crimes and thus facts .·elative to which the State of Maine must bear the full burden of persuasion, the proposed 1ffirrnative defense seeking to place upon the defendant a burden to disprove these same :acts is an apparent violation of foderal due process and wholly inconsistent with the Unlike the federal counterpart that criminalized se:;-,..-ually explicit material depicting virtual :1ildren (18 TJ.S.C. §2256(8)(B)) as ,.vell as actual children (18 TJ.S.C. §2156(8)(A)), Maine's :irnes require that the depiction be of an actual child. Hence, ,,vhen the United States Supreme ·r111rt ctn1C'lr ,-1c\urn tf'P FPrlPr-:i1 -crirh1'.ll f"'h11rlr~n ~r'n'triclrn, -:ic q11h~t':lt1t'-i-;1ll;t f'YVP-rhr0'.lH ::,nrl in :olation of the First Amendment, Ascroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 23..J. (2002), b.ine" s cri...mes were unaftecteci. by that decision. Although both section 283 and 284 require that the sexually explicit material depict '"a minor," ·e elementally required actual age is not U11ifor111. For purposes of paragraphs A and B of .bsection l of section 283, the "minor'' must be "a person. who has not attained 18 years of age." --.A. 0/LR.S __ 1.. § 281(2). For purposes of paragraphs C J11d D of subsection l of section 183:- the 'lin,Jr~~ nu1st ~e :.:.less t...1-iaD. 12 years of age .... , For purposes of paragraphs _.i_ ~rid B of st1bscction 1 -· -.:!~(•t1nn 7~~J.. 1-h~ .:.;mlnnr ... ~ m11~r nnr h!:nn-~ ~,.;in +!1rt :rtt~ln~d 1 J. ;,e~rc:: ,1+":1~f-". !"'l" r=:nr P"~r--ises 1Jf ir::i.gr::i.pbs C and D of subsection l of section 28../., the '"minor" must rrot have '•in fact attained 12 :ars of age. 3orh ,Jfthe fucmal clemern:s :1.r issue here 2.re "elements ofilie crime·• bec::i.use they ::ire c{press mandate of section 3 2 of the C rimin:11 Code.-+ Or st1ted in a slightlY diff ererrt ::1:umer, the Maine Legislature cannot, consistent 1,vith federal due processJ and section _; 2, treat a fact simultaneously as both an element of a crime and as the basis for an :.ffirmative defense to that crime. 6 Prnnosen Victim c..\2:e rharnze in the Clnss D Forw nfthe Crime of Possession of Sexuallv Exolicit Material 'ThP hill n;rn ilri r5ii•,P rhe ,:iaP ,,f ,:i v1rtim r1,-,nirted in tl,,-, •,p•nrn llv Pynlirit m!'.ltPrinl ...., }. .J 1. _-,) m anJer 1-+ vears of age to under 16 vears of age as to the Class D form of the crime ;f possession dr se:G.mlly-explicit material, 17-A i::LR.S.A. § 284(1 )(A) (Supp. 2004).7 :2e Sections l and 2 of the bill. Although not immediately apparent from the bill itsel±: :Le-vation of the statutory age ceiling by two years to include 14 and 15 year-old victims ;otentially impacts upon the current statutory permissive inforence contained in ;ubsection 3 of section 284. Subsection 3 provides as follow,s: The aze of the Derson denicted mav be reasonablv inferred from the depiction. Competent medical evidence or other expert testimony may be used to establish the age of the person depicted. (Emphasis supplied) Pursuant to subsection 3, the basic fact to be inferred is the age of the victim depicted in thp. <:Pxu~11,r P.vp"11c1"t matPrral T"t..e nP.,.,.,.,;<:!"1.blp, j--C'e,0 nce 1·s that "l1Ch aO'P ,~an be 1n£p,,-1P.r1 "_._..,_. w....,,,~ ...., ... _ . ._,,~ ... ..a. .., ..,.,,,, .,1. • _._ll .t'..,,..._;_J...J..1._,._. ....., .:.lll! .... V.r..L ..__., ,J 1, .::,v Vi,. • ..L ~.._ ...,.__.. from the depiction itself Tw-o preliminary points need to be identified. First, as a matter of federal due process, in any criminal case a rarionai connection musr exist between the basic fact and 1 Additionally, any jury instructions provided by a trial court under these circumstances would be ~ontradictory and confusing, since a trial court would presumably be instructing the jury that, on :he one hand, the State of Maine has the burden to prove the tYvo facts of "actual person" and ;age" beyond a reasonable doubt while, on the other hand, the defendant has the burden of .iisproving the existence of one or both of these same two facts by a preponderance of the ~~-lidence. D11e precess requirements are the same under the Maine and United States Constitutions. State . Anderson, 1999 i'.VIE 18, ~ 9, 724 A.2d 1231, 1234; see also State v. Smith, 366 A.2d 865, 868 Me. 1976) (_due process requirements reiai:ive co a sraruroq inrerence are the same under brn:h : onstirutions). _.Uthough it is possible that :1 state mighL within constirutional limirations, modify its stltutory cle-finition { i crime so as [O conven whm was previously a face clement imo an affirmative defense, given me two :cts :it issue tlu1t dces net appeJI fe~sibie here. Cvnzpare. i.g., Parterson v. _'\le1v J:'"ork" -t32 TJ. S. 197 '. 977) '.Vith_Hit!lanev v. /Yilbur, +:21 U.S. 684 (197j) (in me context of rhe crime of murder and me dirmati-,,;e defense to murder oL::-,.1:reme emotional disrress). The Class C form of chis crime :J.ddressing a victim under 12 years of age, 17-A M.R.S._A. ~ 8--l-( l °}( {:) i SnpD. 2004 \ ls un;:iifcc"Icd b:.t this proposn.l. the presumed or inferred fact. Lecuy v. [.,11ired States, 395 U.S. 6, 38 (1969); see aL;;o State v. i\Jc;.Val(v, 443 A.2d 56, 59 (i\:[e. 1982). Second, as a matter of evidentiary mie, Jubmission of the question of the existence of a presumed or inferred fact to a jury is made contingent upon a trial court finding that "a reasonable juror on the evidence as a ,,;,;hole, including the evidence of the basic facts, could find ... the presumed fact ;inferred factl bevond a. reasonable doubt." M.R.Evid. 303(b): see also J/JcNallv. 443 .... ... .; ' .. · ' ~ . A.2d at 59, n. 3 and 4; Fidd & Murray, .1.Haine Evidence§§ 303.2 and 303.4 at SO and 8'.2 .. i.l.cDl""/in!l beth the federi:ii due orccess rec.1uirement andRuie 303(b) to the ...... ., - ..i.. ... \. .• ::;ratutory permissible inference in subsection 3, the validity and evidentiary weighr of the inference is arguably strongest when the depiction is that of a prepubescent child or a :hild approaching puberty and arguably weakest when the depiction is that of an .1dolescent approaching adulthood. If the core impetus for the proposed inclusion of both 14 and 15 year-old minors is to criminalize and prosecute depictions relative to these two added age groups, the application of subsection 3 to such cases is questionable, p2.rticulariy in light of Rule 30'.3(b) given the difficulty of inferring the age of an adolescent approaching adulthood. On the other hand, if the core impetus for the age ceiling change is instead to facilitate successfol prosecutions relative to children under 14, as currently, the application of subsection 3 appears enhanced, since it eliminates the current requirement that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the depicted minor be in fact under 14 - i.e. not yet 14, 15 or approaching 16. Instead~ in proving the minor to be under 14, the State need only distinguish the under 14 victim from a 16 or older minor, arguably an easier task under subsection 3. ,..- .................. .-, ~ . \IV .K0:DJW