No. 25-69

An unsatisfied judgment of a magistrate court warrants suspension of driving privileges of the defendant until it is satisfied, released, or until a period of ten years expires after rendition or revival of said judgment or from the date of the last payment on the judgment. Failure of the plaintiff to revive such judgment after three years in no way affects the suspension of driving privileges contemplated by the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law.

Year: 1969Length: 1,175 wordsOfficial source

Cite as Mo. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 25-69

DlRF.CTOR OF RRVF.~UE: An unsatisfied judgment of a ma~is ­ trate court warrants suspension of driving privileges of the defendant until it is satisfied, released, or until a period of ten years expires after rendition or revival of said DRIVERS LICENSE : J UDGI·1ENTS : f.10'I'OR VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY : jud~ment or from the date of the last payment on the judgment. Fail- ure of the plaintiff to revive such judgment after three years in no way affects the suspension of driving privileges contemplated by the i-lotor Vehicle Safety Resoonsibility Law . March 11, 1969 Honorable Thomas A. David Dire~tor , Department of Revenue Jefferson Building Jefferson City, Missouri 65101 Dear Mr. David: OPINION NO. 25 FIL ED :2r This is in response to your recent request for an opinion of this office. Your request reads as follows: "It has been the practice of the Safety Respon- sibility Unit of this department that when a persons driver's license has been suspended under Chapter 303 because of an unsatisfied judgement in a magistrate court, that the unit hold t~e license in suspension for a period of 10 years from the date of the rendition of the judgement. As you are aware, an execution can issue on a magistrate court judgement for a period of 3 years from the date of rendition and a magistrate court judgment can be revived any time during a period of 10 years of date of rendition . "vie would like to have your official opinion on the following question: Should the Safety Re- sponsibility Unit of this department consider a magistrate court judgement null and void after 3 years and lift the suspension of the licenses or should that unit follow their present prac- tice of holding the licenses in suspension for 10 years? "If you interpret the law to mean that we must lift the suspension at the end of 3 years then Honorable Thomas A. David w~at would the unit have to do to comrl~ with the law 1.f sometime durin']; the nerjod or 10 years and after the expiration of 3 yearc; and after the susnension had been lifted the nlain- tiff revives the jud~ement so that execution can be issued for another 3 years? ~·lould this unit have to issue a ne1.'1 exniration or not? 11 ~or reasons hereinafter stated, we are o~ the opinion that your present policy is not only warranted but reauired by law. Sections 303.090 and 303.100, RS~·lo and 303.110, qs•1o Suon . 1967~ set out the procedure whereby the Director of ~evenue shall susnend the driving privile~es of a person who fails to satisfy a jud~ment against him within sixty days after it beco~es final . (The type of ,j uctgment contemplated ls, of course, one for ". . . dama~es arisinp;; out of the ownership, maintenance or use of' any motor vehicle; . .. " Section 303. 020 ( 3), RS'·lo Supp. 1967). The sus:;:>ension remains in effect as long as the judgment remains unsatis~ied or until a con- clusive presumntion of satisfaction arises (as hereinafter discussed), or until the occurrence of certain other contin~encies not relevant to this inquiry. Section 303.110, RS~1o Supo. 1967 . It is correct that execution can issue on the judgment of a ~a~istrate court only within three years of rendition thereof, unless the j udf"ment is prooerly revived . Section 517 . 810, RS''1o, reads as follows: nNo plaintiff nor his legal representative shall, at any time after the expiration of three years from the rendition of a judgment by any ma~is­ trate, sue out an execution thereon, unless such judq;ment shall be revived as herein directed." A close reading of the foregoing section reveals that it does not nullify the jud~ment but simply imposes an additional reouire- ment on the manner of enforcing it after three years, i . e . , the necessity for formally "reviving" the jud~ment. Under the procedures for reviving the judgment, the burden is on the jud~ment -debtor " ... to show cause, if any he has, why such jud~ment should not be revived; ... 11 Section 517.830, RSMo. The only . st::ttutory g;rounds for denial of an order reviving the jud~ment is where the defendant can " ... show and establish that t he jud~ment has been paid or satis- fied ... 1 ' Section 517.850, RSMo. Thus, as contemt')lated by the statutes, the judgment, even after the running of the three year period, is presumed unsatisfied (and, therefore, is in effect) unless the contrary is shown and established. Moreover , since Section 517 . 810 ~overns only the method by which a plaintiff may collect his judgment after three years, we do not believe that such considerations should in any way affect the per- formance of your duties with respect to the suspension of drivin~ - 2- i'onorable Thomas A. David privile~es . It mir;ht also be noted that \·Ie are fortified in this conclusion by the clos i n~ sentence of Section 303 . 110 which reads : ·' ... A dischar~e in bankrurtcy followin~ the renderinr; of any such judpo;ment shall not re- lieve the jud3ment-debtor from any of the reauirements of this chapter . 11 'l'11at is to say·' the narformance of the functions of the director is in no way contingent upon the practical aspect of collectibility of the judgment in question . On the other hand, Section 517.870, RSI1o, states in part ". . . that no jud~ment shall be revived after t he lapse of ten years from tl1e rendition thereof, or from the date such judgment may have been last revived, . . . . , And uncter t he terTl'}s of Section 516 . 350, ns-lo;; a judgment is "conclusively oresumed to be paid" after ten years have elapsed after the rendition of jud~rnent, revival upon oersonal ser- vice, or last paynent thereon . Hence, until ten years have elapsed after an:r of the events con- te~plated in Sections 517 . 870 and 516 .350, suora, an unsatisfied jud~ment requires suspension of drivin~ prjvileges unless such privi- le~es are restored by some other procedure provided for by Chapter 303 . CONCLUSIOtJ It is therefore the opinion of this office that the thre0 year period contemplated by Section 517.810, RSMo, in no way affects or limits the functions of the Director of Revenue with respect to the suspension of drivin~ p rivile~es on the basis of an unsatisfied judrr- ment of a magistrate court. However, such jud ~ment is conclusively presumed to be satisfied after ten years have elapsed from the rendi- tion of such judgment or from the date of revival or from the date of tne last payment on the judgment and a suspension of drivinr; privi- le~e~ would terminate upon the passa~e of such ten year period. ,,e fore~o1 r o; O""l i n j on , which I hereby approve, was prel')"' l'e 'i bv n: lls"' n t "l ""'cr t .~ . '"''Jhan, Jr. ~~"::J:~-Le .Hw·~ r; . 1 \~mo ~tto rnev ~~ne~~l -3-
No. 25-69: An unsatisfied judgment of a magistrate court warrants suspension of driving privileges of the defendant until it is satisfied, released, or until a period of ten years expires after rendition or revival of said judgment or from the date of the last payment on the judgment. Failure of the plaintiff to revive such judgment after three years in no way affects the suspension of driving privileges contemplated by the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law. | Justis AI