Missouri credit unions are authorized to invest their funds in bonds of school districts.

CREDIT UNIONS: Missouri credit unions are authorized to invest their funds in bonds of school di str icts . OPINION No. 27 [1963] January 24, 1963 Honorable R,. B. Nac.key Acting Commiasion•r of Finance Je££•~eon Buil ding J•ff•raon ti ty, Missouri Dear t.tr. Mackey t Thta opin1on ia r &ndered in reply to a request over t he signature of I . W. Whitaon, $upeM'i,eor ot Credit Un- ions, auch request reading, in part, aa followal •lJay a Miaaourt State Chartered Credit Union inve't in bonda !.a- sued by school diatricta 1_j Mta..- souri..• A !.1iaeour1 credit union'• power to i nveet ita funds ls found in the following language from Section 370. 070 RBMo 1959: •A credit union shall have the following power•• • • * * * • * {)) It ~Y invest, t hrough ita board of d1r•etora, in t he bonds of t he United States, or ot any state thereof or of any munic1- pa11 ty, the bonds of which tmlnici- pali ty are legal investment a .for saVings banks in t he st4te of Miaaou.ri and. in t he aharea of cr-edit tinions to which it 1• eligible to memberships. * * •• Language quoted troa aubparagt'aph () ) of Sec~ion 370.070 Rm·~ 1959, supra, makea no mention of bonds of a achool Honorable R. B. ~lackey dletriet aa a lawful investment for credit uniona but it doea rater to bonds o£ any rnmieipality 1111hieh are legal investment a for savings bank a of Uisaouri, and eanctione the aame aa proper investments for credit uninna. At this point we are confronted ~th the fact that House Bill No, 102, Pa•aed by the 70th General Aaaembl y of lUsaouri, Lawe of Miaaouri, 1959, effected an outright repeal of Chapter 364 RSMO 1949, aa amend6d, entitled "Savings Banks And Safe Deposit Institutions . ~ We are thus faeed .S.th eon.-truing a lltatute, Section 370,070 RSrD 1969, which incorpor•tea, ~1 general reference, cert.:J.n prortid.ona of section 364. 070 RSf.t> 1949, which were repealed in 1959. In order that we ~ have be.i'ore ue the pertinent prov1eiona ot Section 364. 070 RSNo 1949, now expreasly repealed, we quote pertinent provisions £rom auch statute ae follows& "All auma tao received, except thoae held as bailee for safekeeping and storage only, and the income derived therefrom, and all moneys antruated to any auch corporation, by order of court or other lawful authority, ehall be invested only as follows& • * * * •• ** * (4) In bonds of any city. county, town, township or achool district of this state that has not defaulted in the payment ot any part o£ either principal or interest thereo~, within five yeare previoua to making such investment; and provided, auch bonded debt doea not eKCead five per centJ • • *~ The first issue 1111hich preaenta itself tor determina- tion ia: Did the t.g1alature by repealing Chapter 364 in ita entirety intend to el1m1nate aa legitimate invest- Honorable R. B. Mackey ments by oredi t uniona "the bonds of • • • • any mwtici·- pality • • • • ~ch bonda "are legal inv•stmenta £or saving a banks?" In the pre.mia.es, we believe that aU that can be interred from repea.l of Chapter 364 is a legialat1 ve intent to do away with savings banks and not to inhibit inve~tment practices of credit union•• Wo are aware or the cases which h,ave h$l.d that in order for a statute, which adopts another, to survive the r epeal or th& adopted statuta, the adoption must be by specific · descrtpt.t ve reference. . State "!. Willi arne (Mo.. SUp~~ 1911), 140 s. \f. 894; Gaaton v. Lalnldn tf.to.sup., 1~)), ZL s. w. 1100. Howevel', we are also cognisant o.f the principle that *'the ba.aic Nle of construction of an ordinance or statute is to t1ret aeek the lawmakera' intention, and if posaible to effectuate that intent1on.n Laclede Gae Co. v. City or· s~. · Louis (roo. sup •. , 19,3), ~5) s. w. 2d g32, S3 5. Moreover, we al_ao have the rule th.at "The repeel of a statute by 1tnp:Lication is a matter of legialati ve intent, 1a not presumed and is not· fa-vor-ed.• State v. Oswald (Mo. SUp., 1957)1 )06 S. w. 2d 559, 562• Applying these latter rules to tbe instant ease, we must conclude that the ~•peal of ChaPter 364 cannot be regarded aa impliedly .-epealing •o mu.ch of Section 370.070 as authorises e,.edit Ul'liona to invest in lm.U.lieipal bonds. It ia obvioua from a reading of Section )70.070 that the legielature intended cred1t unions to have such power li.mited only by the qualification that these bonds DJU.et be o£ the 'type 1n wbich savings ~a could. inveet ~ It cannot be reasonably s~d that the elimination of the qualification as a x-esult of the eliJDination of eevinga banks muat be regard•d as a revocation of the authority granted to credit uniona by Section 370.070. The_ gene~al rule ·is stated in 62 c.J.s •• Statutes. Section 3 70. page $4 7 • thusly: 8Aa a rule the adoption o£ a stat- ute by rei'erence :ts eonatru.ed ae an adoption of the: law ae it existed at Uhe· time·the adopttng statute wa• paas&d, and. th&rerore, is not af- fected by any subsequent modifica- ... 3- Honorable R. B . · ~~ckey tion o£ the statute adopted unless an intention to the contrary i s clear~y manifested; * * *" In Devery v. Webb (Idaho SUp. , 1937), 70 P. 2d 317, a situation analogous to the instant case arose when a statute governing the organization of highw~y districts was repealed. The statute which sets out the procedure for dissolving euch a district, I.C. A. Section )9-l5S2, provided in part that a highway district could be dis- solved when a petition was signed by •a majority o£ the persona possessing the qualifications necessary to sign a petition tor the organising of su~h hiGhway district .. ·" Since the repeal of the organizing statute elioinated the concept of a person who poaaeaaed the "qualifications necessary to sign a petition for tlte organi&ing of such highway district • • • , " the argument was oade that the repeal of the oraanising section, l . c. 3791 "destroyed the means whereby highway d1atr1cta Dight t>e disorganised." In rejecting this contention, the court said, 1 . c. 379t •[3,4]. Where a specific provision ·· or direction of a atatute is referred to and adopted by a subsequent enact- cant, the repeal o£ the former statute does not work a repeal o£ the specific portion thereof adopted in the latter, so tar as the same 1a requisite or ap- plicable to the operation and enforce- cent o£ the subsequent statute.• In the instant ease, we adopt the n.ew that credit unions may still 1nve~t in municipal bonds and that the type o£ municipal bonds 1n W\ich they may invest are those set out in the now repealed Section 364.070 Wio 1949. Having ao held, it is necessary to determine whether a school district is a "muni.cipality-1' as that term is used in Section 370.010. Perhaps, the clearest guide to the meaning of that term ia the series of worCle -4~ Honorable R. B. J.laokey which appear in the statute it adopts by r~erence. Sec- tion 361 .. 070(4) RSMo 1949, pernd.tted savings banka to in- vest in "bonde of any city, county, town tomah1p or school d1atr1ct • • • " It would oertai;ly appear that the legidat1ve intent in the uae of the word ~cipallty• in S.ct1on 370.070 waa that the word shoulcl be regarded aa embrac~ all the specific t~s appeariQg 1n Section 364.070(4). 'l'he only alternative to aueh a holding would be that the Legislature meant to exclude aome and include others, without apeoifying which category each waa to fall into. At beat, such a conclusion ia highly unlikely. l4oreover, it 1e cl.ear that the tem "municipality• encompaaeea far ~re than the elaseio oonqept of a city. In holdinf that the St. Louie Housing Authority 1a a municipal tt, our Supreme Court said 1n St. Louie Housing Authority v. City of St.Louis (1951), 2)9 s. w. 2d 289, 294-295S ·~~cipality now has a broader meaning than 'city• or •town,' and presently includes bodies public or essentially govern- mental in character and func- tion and diatinguiahee pt.tbllc bodies, such aa plaintif'f, from corporation• only quaai-public 1il nature. 42 c .. J . p.J.U); 61 C.J.S.,MUnicipal! page 945; Qurry v. Sioux C ty Dift• Tp., 62 Iowa,lOa, 17 u.w. 191. But the two terms {municipall~y and munioipal corporation)are often interchangeably used. Like~ae, •munic1~ corporation,• in the broader aenae now includes pub- lic corporations created to per- form an eeaential public service and 'is applied to any public 1ocal corporation exercieing some £uncuon ot government.' •Dmieipal corporation' now also includes a corporation created principal_ly ae an il.nstrumentali ty or the state but not for the pur- -5- Honorable R. B. l!ackey pose of regulating ~he internal local and special affairs of a compact co~ty.u SeeJ also, Buaaell v. Frank (1941), 34.8 lo. 533, 154. s.w. 2d b) t in lddch a Missouri sa-hool district was held to be a mun1cipality, and Laret Investment Co. v. Diekmann (1939), 345 l.Jo. 449, 134 s. w. 2d 65, in which the Supreme Cou~ discusses the broad application of the term "municipality." Under sonte circumstances, the term "municipality" poaaibly ~uld not include a school district. llove"ter, under the facts of this ease, we believe that the term •municipality• in the adopting statute waa meant to in- clude all of the specific terms used in ~l& adopted atatute. COilCLUSIO!J It is, therefore, the opinion of this office that credit unions organised 1n l·fisaollri ~ invest their funds in bonds of school districts which otherwise qualify under the terms of the now repealed Section 364.070 RSMO 1949. This opinio~, lfhich I h.x-oby approve, was pl'epared by my aasiatent 41-bert J . Stephan, Jr. AJS lc Very truly yours, THOMAS J.'. EAGLETON Attorney General