No. 32-78
Opinion letter to The Honorable Warren Welliver
Cite as Mo. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 32-78
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JOHN ASHCROFT
JEFFERSON CITY
ATTORNEY GENERAL
65101
October 19, 1978
OPINION LETTER NO. 32
Honorable Warren Welliver
State Senator, 19th District
317 Guitar Building
P. 0. Box 758
Columbia, Missouri 65201
Dear Senator Welliver:
This letter is in response to your request for a
ruling on the following question:
"Are patients who now reside in homes
for the mentally retarded, but whose
parents do not reside in Missouri, residents
of Missouri for the purpose of receiving
benefits from the Department of Mental
Health?"
(314) 751-3321
In your request, you have presented the following hypo-
thetical cases to illustrate your question:
"Case #1 -
The patient was placed in the
home for retarded children by his parents for
long-ter~ care and will probably be in the
home for the rest of his life.
The parents
do not live in the State of Missouri.
The
patient is over 21 years old and has lived
at the home for more than a year.
No guardian-
ship has been established.
"Case #2 -
The patient was placed in
the home for the mentally retarded by a
Department of Mental Health from another
Honorable Warren Welliver
state.
Because of the program available at
the home for the mentally retarded, it is
expected that the patient will stay in the
home for the rest of his life.
However,
the other state will not pay for his care
and treatment past the age of 21, because
it claims that the patient then becomes a
resident of Missouri.
The patient is now
21 years old and has been in the home since
he was 17.
No guardianship has been established.
"Case #3 -
A parent who lives out of the
state has established guardianship for his son
on the basis of incompetency.
The parent placed
the son at the home for the mentally retarded
and expected him to spend most of his life there.
The parent lives out of the State of Missouri.
The son has lived at the home for the mentally
retarded for five years and is now 33 years old."
In responding to your question, we do not attempt to deter-
mine the obligations of this state or other member states
under the Interstate Compact on Mental Health, Sections 202.880
RSMo et. seq., because such determinations should be made in
conjunction with the member state in the context of the particular
fact situations.
The question presented in the opinion request, and
the accompanying hypotheticals assume that the receipt by
the patients of benefits from the Hissouri Department of
Mental Health turns on the question of whether the patients
are residents of Missouri.
However, it is necessary to consider
factors other than residency in answering your question.
The Department of Mental Health is charged by statute
with paying the costs of care and treatment only for individuals
who are patients of the Department.
Section 202.863 RS~,lo
1977 Supp. reads in part:
"1.
Patients admitted to the facilities
for the mentally ill or retarded of the
department of mental health under the
provisions of this law shall be classified
as private or state patients .
*
*
*
"3.
If any person is admitted to a state
facility who is unable to pay for care and
treatment, as determined by the application
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of the standard means test pursuant to the
provisions of section 202.330, the cost of
said care and treatment shall be paid for out
of funds appropriated to the department of
mental health." (emphasis added).
If patients in the hypotheticals are not patients of
the Department of Mental Health, they would not be eligible
for departmental benefits.
There are several ways under statute in which an individual
may seek to become a patient of the Department of Mental Health.
For example, admission may be obtained through medical certifi-
cation (Section 202.601 RSMo 1969), as a voluntary patient
(Section 202.783 (RSMo 1969), by order of a probate court
(Section 202.807 RSMo Supp. 1975), by order of a juvenile court
(Section 211.201) I or by various emergency procedures (Sections
202.800, 202.803, 202.805 RSMo 1969).
In H.C.S.S.B. 651,
which repeals many of the sections just cited, effective,
January 2, 1979, similar procedures are specified for becoming
a patient of the Department of Mental Health. See, e.g.,
Section 202.187, providing for voluntary admissions of
mentally retarded and developmentally disabled persons to
private and public facilities.
Through one of these procedures,
an individual may obtain the status of a patient of the
Department of Mental Health without being a resident of
Missouri.
The statute does not provide that an individual may
become a department patient simply by being hospitalized in
an institution situated within Missouri.
Rather, an individual
can become a patient of the department by one of the means
provided in the statutes. It does not appear from the
hypotheticals that these patients are departmental patients;
therefore, absent acquisition of that status, departmental
benefits would not be availabLe to them.
If the individuals in the hypotheticals are accepted as
patients by the department, they do not qualify automatically for
the free receipt of department benefits or for unconditional
payment by the department of all or part of the cost of
their care and treatment. Rather, one must look to the
statutes governing the department and case law interpreting
those statutes to determine which parties are responsible
for the costs.
Contrary to the assumption implicit in the
opinion question and hypotheticals, resolution of this
question does not turn on the residency of the parties
involved.
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The law is clear that the department is to look first
to the patient's estate for payment of costs.
Section 202.240,
RSMo 1977 Supp., reads in part:
"If any person be admitted to a facility
of the department who has an estate or if
while a patient of any such facility shall
become possessed of such an estate, such
patient or his guardian shall pay for his
support and expenses at the facility as
determined by the application of the
standard means test pursuant to the
provisions of section 303.330 out of the
patient's estate; and if such person shall
at any time become indigent, he shall be
supported and maintained at the facility by
the funds appropriated to the department of
mental health." (emphasis added).
See also Section 202.831 RSMo Supp. 1975 which provides
that those responsible by law for the payment of patient costs
remain responsible in nursing home and related placements.
Indigency rather than residency is the criterion for
payment of patient costs by the department.
These sections
do not exempt the estates of non-resident patients from
liability for these costs but instead mandate that any
person admitted to a department facility and having the
resources shall be responsible for the costs of his treatment
and care.
In each of the hypotheticals, the patient is an adult.
It is not clear whether or not the patient has an estate
available to pay costs accrued in receiving department care,
assuming that the individuals in each case are accepted as
patients by the department.
If an estate is not available,
or the estate is exhausted, the department may properly look
to the parents of the patient for payment of costs.
The Missouri Supreme Court has endorsed the principle
of parental responsibility for the costs of supporting an
adult child in certain circumstances.
In the case of
Fower v. Fower Estate, 448 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1970) the court
held that a parent has a duty during his lifetime to support
his adult unemancipated, unmarried and needy child who since
some time during minority has been totally disabled.
See
also, State ex rel. Kramer v. Carroll, 309 S.W.2d 654 (Mo.
App. 1958). 'The patients in-the hypotheticals appear to fit
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the criteria for continued parental responsibility into the
child's majority.
For example, hypotheticals one and three
state that the patients are expected to be institutionalized
most of their lives, an apparent recognition of serious
disability.
If the responsible party does not pay for the costs of
treatment and care, the patient may be discharged when
payment is not forthcoming.
The superintendent of the facility
"[M]ay return the patient to the sheriff
of the county or municipality or to the
guardian, trustee or person responsible
for the payment of the installment, and
at the expense of the county, municipality,
guardian, trustee or person."
Section 31.050
RSMo 1969.
This section, like the others
discussed in this opinion,
does not exempt from its coverage non-residents who are
patients of the department.
Specific authority is also given to the department to
transfer to the state of residency non-residents committed by
a court order to the department, assuming the making of
"proper arrangements" for the transfer with the state of
residency, §202.875 RSMo 1969.
As the above discussion indicates, the department is
responsible for the payment of the costs of care and treatment
of the patients under discussion only if, (a) the individual
is a patient of the department, (b) the individual is indigent,
and (c) the parents are indigent.
Under the principles discussed above, the individuals
in hypotheticals
one and three are not eligible for benefits
from the Department of Mental Health.
The facts presented
do not indicate that they are currently patients of the
Department.
Such a status is a prerequisite to the assumption
by the Department of costs, and mere confinement in a private
institution located in Missouri does not make one a patient
of the department.
In addition, simply becoming a patient
of the department does not entitle one to receive free services
of the department, because the estate of the patient and the
patient's parents remain liable, unless they are indigent.
Finally, it is to be noted that the estates of those
individuals who receive aid from the Department of Mental
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Health are liable for this debt. §473.398 RSMo 1977 Supp.
It is clear from this discussion that the legislature
intends for the Department to expend its own funds for the
costs of caring for its patients only when no other alter-
native source of payment is available.
In the second hypothetical, the mental health agency
of another state placed the patient in the private facility
in Missouri.
Such a placement imposes no obligation upon the
Missouri Department of Mental Health.
The other state remains
responsible for payment of the cost of care and treatment.
The fact that the individual has turned 21 years of age is
irrelevant in this situation.
Disputes concerning the status
of such patients should be resolved, if possible, through use
of the Interstate Compact on Mental Health.
JOHN ASHCROFT
Attorney General