No. 17-85
(1) Third class cities under the mayor-council form of government pursuant to Chapter 77, RSMo 1978 and RSMo Supp. 1984, may provide fire protection services outside the city limits, so long as the safety, health, welfare, property, or commerce of the inhabitants of the city are benefited thereby; and (2) such cities may enter into mutual aid agreements with "voluntary" fire service organizations, so long as the safety, health, welfare, property, or commerce of the inhabitants of the city are benefited thereby.
Cite as Mo. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 17-85
.
-~I
(1)
Third class cities under the
mayor-council form of government
pursuant to Chapter 77, RSMo 1978
and RSMo Supp. 1984, may provide fire protection services outside
the city limits, so long as the safety, health, welfare, property,
or commerce of the inhabitants of the city are benefited thereby;
and (2) such cities may enter into mutual aid agreements with "vol-
untary" fire service organizations, so long as the safety, health,
welfare, property, or commerce of the inhabitants of the city are
benefited thereby.
CITIES OF THIRD CLASS:
CITIES, TOWNS, AND VILLAGES:
February 22, 1985
The Honorable Bob Ward
Representative, District 151
Post Office Box 1548
Desloge, Missouri
63601
Dear Representative Ward:
OPINION NO. 17-85
This opinion is in response to your questions asking:
(1)
May a third class city furnish fire pro-
tection outside the city limits, and if
so, to whom?
(2)
Can cities enter into mutual aid agree-
ments with fire service organizations
that are not statutory fire districts or
incorporated cities, such as voluntary
fire service organizations?
Your opinion request indicates that you are concerned with the
City of Farmington; the City of Farmington is a third class city
with the mayor-council form of government.
The controversy appears to involve the validity of Farmington
City Code Section 29-125, which states:
For all persons who are being furnished
water by the city and living outside the city
limits, the city shall furnish all the usual
and available fire protection therefor with-
out the usual described fees paid by non-
The Honorable Bob Ward
residents of the city.
However, the prior-
ities for the use of the city fire equipment
and crews shall remain the same with top
priority for fire protecti~n to be given to
the residents of the city.
This ordinance provides residents of the City of Farmington
priority in fire services.
Apparently, the City Council of Farm-
ington has arrived at the "priority service" provision as a way
of allocating the City's limited fire protection services.
We
assume that such a limitation is valid.
I.
Extraterritorial Fire Protection Services
A.
Constitutional Charter Cities
In Miller v. City of St. Joseph, 485 S.W.2d 688 (Mo.App. 1972),
the issue was whether the City of St. Joseph had the authority to
enter into oral understandings to provide fire protection services
to the Stockyards Association and residents of four residential areas,
all of which were located outside the city limits.
The City of St.
Joseph is a constitutional charter city operating under Article VI,
Section l9(a), Missouri Constitution (as adopted October 5, 1971),
which states:
Any city which adopts or has adopted a
charter for its own government, shall have all
powers which the general assembly of the state
of Missouri has authority to confer upon any
city, provided such powers are consistent with
·the constitution of this state and are not
limited or denied either by the charter so
adopted or by statute.
Such a city shall, in
addition to its home rule powers, have all
powers conferred by law.
Such powers are sometimes referred to as "residual powers"; meaning,
constitutional charter cities have all residual powers not prohibited
1we do not opine on the propriety of the City of Farmington
exercising extraterritorial water service powers.
See, e.g., Mis~
souri Cities Water Company v. City of St. Peters, 534 S.W.2d 38 (Mo.
1976) (construing Section 250.190, RSMo 1969, and concluding that
extraterritorial water service is authorized under such statute).
-2-
The Honorable Bob Ward
to them.
Section 5.7 of the Charter of the City of St. Joseph re-
quired the city to provide fire protection services within the City
of St. Joseph.
Section 2.13(20) of the Charter of the City of St.
Joseph provided that the City had the pmver to "[d) o all things
whatsoever necessary or expedient for promoting and maintaining the
comfort, education, morals, safety, peace, government, health, wel-
fare, trade, commerce, or industry of the City and its inhabitants."
485 S.W.2d at 689.
Testimony at the trial showed that the City had an oral under-
standing to provide fire protection services to the members of the
Stockyards Association.
The Stockyards Association made an advance
annual contribution of seventeen thousand five hundred dollars
($17,500.00), and members of the Stockyards Association agreed to
pay fifty dollars ($50.00) per fire call into the Firemen's Pension
Fund.
Testimony also showed that the City agreed to provide fire
protection services to four residential subdivisions outside the
City containing approximately six hundred and fifty (650) houses;
the subdivision construction contractor or the home associations
were to pay the City fifty dollars ($50.00) per hour for each fire
call.
The court noted that the combustible nature of the stockyards'
facilities constituted a threat of the spread of fire to buildings
within the city limits, but immediately adjoining the stockyards;
that if the stockyards burned, many inhabitants of the City would
be unemployed; and that many of the people who reside in the four
residential areas are employed in the City, and the economic loss
by fire to such people would affect the City.
Accordingly, the
court concluded that the City had the authority under Section 2.13
(20) of the City Charter to protect the safety, health, welfare,
and commerce of the City by providing extraterritorial municipal
fire protection services.
B.
Statutory Class Cities
In contradistinction to the residual powers approach applicable
to constitutional charter cities, third class cities with the mayor-
council form of government are governed by the "Dillon" rule, named
after Judge Dillon, who wrote a treatise on municipal corporations.
The Dillon rule is municipal corporations possess only those
powers expressly granted to them, those powers implied in or inci-
dental to those expressly granted them, and those powers essential
to the municipality.
Any reasonable doubt as to whether a power
has been delegated to a municipality is resolved in favor of non-
delegation.
Anderson v. City of Olivette, 518 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Mo.
-3-
The Honorable Bob Ward
1975); State ex rel. City of Blue Springs v. McWilliams, 335 Mo. 816,
74 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Bane 1934) (quoting, 1 Dillon on Municipal Corpor-
ations, § 89 (3rd Ed.)).
Extraterritorial powers must be expressly
granted in clear and unmistakable language.
See Taylor v. Dimmitt,
336 Mo. 330, 78 S.W.2d 841 (1934); Hissouri PUblic Service Co. v.
City of Trenton, 509 S.W.2d 770 (Mo.App. 1974).
The general rule is
that extraterritorial fire protection services are ultra vires.
16
E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, Section 45.05a (3rd
Ed. S. Flanagan 1984) .--
Section 77.260, RSMo 1978, states:
The mayor and council of each city gov-
erned by this chapter shall have the care,
management and control of the city and its
finances, and shall have power to enact and
ordain any and all ordinances not repugnant
to the constitutiOn and laws of this state,
and such as they shan-deem expedieilt for ·the
goodgoverr1rner:lt of the city, the preservati"Orl
of peace and goo~order, the Eenefit of trade
and commerce, and the hearth of the inhabitants
thereof, and such other ordinances, rules and
regulations as may be deemed necessary to carry
such powers into effect, and to alter, modify
or repeal the same.
[Emphasis added.]
The above emphasized portion of this statute contains a "general
welfare" clause (the "expedient for the good government of the city,
the preservation of peace and good order, the benefit of trade and
commerce, and the health of the inhabitants" language) and a "re-
sidual powers" provision (the "all ordinances not repugnant to the
constitution and laws of this state" language).
The courts have held that "general welfare" provisions may not
be used as authority for the exercise of police powers not covered
by a specific grant of power.
Anderson v. City of Olivette, 518
S.W.2d 34, 37-38 (Mo. 1975); Tietjens v. City of St. Louis, 359 Mo.
439, 222 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Bane 1949).
However, we find no interpreta-
tion of the "residual powers" provision in Section 77.260, RSMo 1978.
The "residual powers" provisions of Article VI, Section 19(a),
Missouri Constitution, and Section 77.260, RSMo 1978, contain very
similar language.
We believe that the reasoning of the Miller case
applies to third class cities with the mayor-council form of govern-
ment, under the "residual powers" language found in Section 77.260,
RSMo 1978, and that such cities may provide extraterritorial fire
protection services, so long as the safety, health, welfare, pro-
perty, or commerce of the inhabitants are benefited thereby.
The
-4-
The Honorable Bob Ward
provision of such services, as provided by Farmington City Code
Section 29-125, is not prohibited or repugnant to the Constitution
and laws of this state.
We do note that Article VI, Sections 23 and 25, Missouri Con-
stitution, prohibit the granting of free fire protection services
to private entities.
Accordingly, the provision of free extrater-
ritorial fire protection services by a city is generally repugnant
to the Constitution of Missouri.
However, if the fire protection
provided is primarily for a public purpose, then this consitutional
prohibition is not applicable.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Jardon v.
Industrial Development AuthorityOf Jasper County, 570 S.W.2d 666
(Mo.Banc 1978).
If the provision of the fire protection services
is primarily for the benefit of the landowner or resident of the
property affected by the fire, then such services may not be granted
free-of-charge.
Such services would have to be provided by an oral
contract, see Miller, 485 S.W.2d at 692 (oral city contracts are not
enforceable against city but are not void per se), or a written con-
tract, see Section 432.070, RSMo 1978.
Such contractual charges are
voluntary, and such charges do not need to be approved by the voters
under the Hancock Amendment, Article X, Section 22(a), Missouri Con-
stitution.
See Pace v. City of Hannibal, No. 65725 (Mo.Banc 1984);
Opinion No. 122, Leffler, 1982.
Accordingly, the "no fees" provi-
sion of Farmington City Code Section 29-125 is constitutional only
if the fire protection provided is for a public purpose, such as,
to save the City of Farmington and its inhabitants from the spread
of fire.
II.
Mutual Aid Agreements With Voluntary Fire Service
Organizations For Extraterritorial Fire Protection Services
Section 77.190, RSMo 1978, inter alia, authorizes third class
cities with the council-mayor form of government to organize fire
companies and pay the same for services provided; however, this
statute does not authorize the operation of such fire companies
outside the corporate boundaries of the city.
Sections 71.370 to 71.390, RSMo 1978, appear to authorize
mutual aid agreements for extraterritorial fire protection services
between cities.
This statute does not authorize mutual aid agree-
ments for extraterritorial fire protection services with private
voluntary fire service organizations.
Article VI, Section 16, Missouri Constitution, and Section
70.220, RSMo 1978, authorize municipalities to contract with pri-
vate entities for the planning, development, construction, acquisi-
tion, or operation of any public improvement or facility, or for a
common service.
-5-
The Honorable Bob Ward
Section 432.070, RSMo 1978, states:
No county, city, town, village, school
township, school district or other municipal
corporation shall make any contract, unless
the same shall be within the scope of its
powers-0r be expressly authOrized by-law, nor
unless suc~contract be made upon a-considera-
tion wholly to be performed or executed subse-
quent to the making of the contract; and such
contract, including the consideration, shall
be in writing and dated when made, and shall
be subscribed by the parties thereto, or their
agents authorized by law and duly appointed
and authorized in writing.
In light of our conclusion above that Section 77.260, RSMo
1978, and the Miller case authorize third class cities with the
mayor-council form of government to provide extraterritorial fire
protection service, so long as the inhabitants of the city are
benefited thereby, we believe that such extraterritorial services
are within the scope of the city's powers and are a common service
also provided by voluntary fire service organizations.
Therefore,
mutual aid agreements for extraterritorial fire protection services
between third class cities with the mayor-council form of govern-
ment and voluntary fire service organizations are authorized by
Miller v. City of St. Joseph, 485 S.W.2d 688 (Mo.App. 1972); and
Sections 70.220, 77.260 and 432.070, RSMo 1978.
We view the application of this opinion to be very limited.
Cities are only allowed to provide extraterritorial fire protec-
tion services in order to "protect themselves".
Accordingly, we
do not view this opinion as authorizing the provision of extra-
territorial fire protection services by cities, with or without
mutual aid agreements, at distances far from the boundaries of
the city.
CONCLUSION
It is the opinion of this office that:
(1)
Third class cities under the mayor-council form of gov-
ernment pursuant to Chapter 77, RSMo 1978 and RSMo Supp. 1984, may
provide fire protection services outside the city limits, so long
as the safety, health, welfare, property, or commerce of the in-
habitants of the city are benefited thereby; and
-6-
The Honorable Bob Ward
(2)
such cities may enter into mutual aid agreements with
"voluntary" fire service organizations, so long as the safety,
health, welfare, property, or commerce of the inhabitants of the
city are benefited thereby.
Very truly yours,
!tM?:-~~
WILLIAM L. WEBSTER
Attorney General
-7-