12 CSR 10-3.294
Component Parts (Rescinded October 30, 2002)
AUTHORITY: section 144.270, RSMo 1994. This rule was previously
filed as rule no. 77 Jan. 22, 1973, effective Feb. 1, 1973. S.T. regulation
030-24 was last filed Dec. 31, 1975, effective Jan. 10, 1976. Refiled
March 30, 1976. Rescinded: Filed April 4, 2002, effective Oct. 30,
2002.
The Blueside Companies, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, Case No.
RS-82-4625 (A.H.C. 10/5/84). The issue in this case was whether
chemicals used by the taxpayer in its hide processing operation
were partially or totally exempt from sales/use taxes under
section 144.030.2(2), RSMo (Supp. 1983) as “materials. . . which
when used. . . become a component part or ingredient of the new
personal property resulting from such manufacturing, processing,
compounding, producing or fabricating. . . .”
The Administrative Hearing Commission ruled that section
144.030.2(2) did not just apply to manufacturers. The statute
applied instead to materials used in manufacturing. It is the goods
that are used, not the purchaser of the goods, which defines the
extent of the exemption.
Secondly, the commission found that the taxpayer was entitled
to claim the exemption even though it actually performed the
work in question on a contractual basis. It is not necessary that
the taxpayer be manufacturing its own goods, and even if it were,
as noted previously, the exemption in question is not limited
to manufacturers but to manufacturing, etc. The fact that the
taxpayer worked on a contract basis was irrelevant.
The commission also found that the key to whether materials
become a component part or ingredient of the new personal
property was whether the taxpayer purchased them for its own
use and consumption or for resale. Looking to legislative history
the court found that section 144.030.2(2) was in fact simply a
repetition of the exclusions already inherent in the definitional
provisions of section 144.010.1(8) defining “sale at retail.”
While acknowledging that on two previous occasions courts of
the state of Missouri have ruled in the taxpayer’s favor in cases
similar to this one, the commission noted that such rulings were
not in accordance with either the well-established rule that
exemption statutes must be strictly construed against the taxpayer
or the historical purpose of the statute as it was explained in
Southwestern Bell Telephone v. Morris, 345 SW2d 62 (Mo. banc
1961). The commission noted that courts in other states have
consistently ruled that the component part exemption is akin to
the sale-for-resale philosophy and that chemicals which are not
detectable in the finished product do not constitute component
parts. Numerous cases from other jurisdictions were cited.
Moreover, the mere presence of traces of a chemical in a final
product does not make the chemical a component part. The court
cited as an example microscopic particles of water vapor and
other gases which are left in mined coal by explosives. These trace
chemicals do not make the explosives a component part.
The court also cited the elimination of double taxation as the
rationale for the component part exemption. Therefore, if the
presence of a material in a finished product is merely incidental
then the material was not purchased for resale and the purchase
should be taxable. In the case at hand the court noted that various
products that were purchased to form chrome-tan were totally
retained in the product. These materials should be exempt because
they were purchased with the intent that they would be resold as
part of the product.
The commission distinguished cases where part of the material
was intended to become a component part. While some states
have taken the position that the purchase of a material with the
intention that part of it shall remain in the product at the time
of resale will exempt all of the material, the commission took
the position that only the part which was intended to become a
component part should be exempt, noting that section 144.030.2(2)
expressly provides that exemptions for various materials only
apply to the extent they are incorporated into products which are
intended for resale.
Hardee’s of Springfield, Inc., et al. v. Director of Revenue, Case
No. RS-82-2181 (A.H.C. 6/11/85). The issue in this case was the
imposition of use tax upon shortening used for deep frying goods
at petitioner’s restaurants. Petitioner asserted that use tax was not
due on any of the shortening because it became an ingredient or
component part of new personal property and thus was exempt
as provided by section 144.030.3(1), RSMo (1978). The director
countered that petitioner had to be a manufacturer to qualify
for this exemption and that no exemption was proper unless the
ingredient was totally incorporated into the new product.
The commission cited Blueside Company v. Director of
Revenue, Case No. RS-82-4625 (A.H.C. 10/5/84) for the proposition
that the exemption also applies to processing. However, again citing
Blueside, the commission held that the ingredient of component
part exemption is only applicable to the extent that the article is
incorporated in new property. In addition, those articles whose
presence in the final product is not necessary or essential are not
exempt. The Administrative Hearing Commission found that 50%
of the shortening in question was absorbed and therefore exempt.
The bulk of the unabsorbed shortening was sold for salvage.
Petitioner contended that this salvage sale constituted a retail sale
and that its use of shortening was therefore exempt under section
144.615, RSMo (1978) as property held for resale in the regular
course of business. However, the commission rejected petitioner’s
argument by stating, “If the by-product is an inconsequential
portion of the taxpayer’s business and the by-product is sold as
salvage primarily to avoid the cost of refuse collection, the articles
in the by-product would not be exempt from use tax because those
articles would be held substantially for use and not for resale.”
P.F.D. Supply Corporation v. Director of Revenue, Case No. RS80-0055 (A.H.C. 6/6/85). The issue in this case was the imposition
of sales tax on certain sales transactions of shortening and
nonreusable plastic and paper products which petitioner sells to
restaurants for use in the preparation and service of food products.
Petitioner asserted that the sales in question were exempt as
sales for resale because the purchasing restaurants were not the
ultimate consumer of the goods in question. The Administrative
Hearing Commission, relying on the exemption set forth in
section 144.030.3(1), RSMo for materials purchased for use in
“manufacturing, processing, compounding, mining, producing
or fabricating” found that the production of food by a restaurant
constituted processing.
Relying on its previous decision in Blueside Co. v. Director of
Revenue, Case No. RS-82-4625 (A.H.C. 10/5/84) the commission
found that the petitioner’s sale of shortening was exempt from
taxation to the extent that the purchaser intended for it to be
absorbed into the fried foods. The sale of the portion which the
purchaser did not expect to be so absorbed was not exempt as
an ingredient or component part. However, petitioner asserted
that the unabsorbed portion was exempt as a purchase for resale
because it was sold by the purchaser for salvage after being used.
Again referring to Blueside, the commission held that the salvage
sale was only incidental to the primary transaction. Therefore, the
purchasing restaurant was the user and the sale to that restaurant
was a taxable retail sale.
However, the commission also found that the petitioner
accepted exemption certificates in good faith for all the shortening
held. Acknowledging that the Missouri Supreme Court in
Overland Steel, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 647 SW2d 535 (Mo.
banc 1983) held that the good faith acceptance of an exemption
certificate does not absolve the seller from liability for sales tax,
the Administrative Hearing Commission cited other authority for
the proposition that the seller is exempt. The commission resorted
to section 32.200, Art. V, section 2, RSMo (1978) of the Multistate
Tax Compact which specifically provides such an exemption. The
Supreme Court had not addressed this in the Overland Steel case.
Not only did respondent have a regulation, 12 CSR 10-3.194, which
recognizes the applicability of section 32.200 to Missouri sales and
use tax, but it had another regulation, 12 CSR 10-3.536(2) in effect
at the time of the audit which specifically relieved the seller of
liability when an exemption certificate was accepted in good faith.
Based upon this the commission found that the seller’s good faith
exempted it from liability.
Finally, the commission held that nonreusable paper and
plastic products were purchased for resale, inasmuch as they were
provided to restaurant patrons as part of the cost of the food and
beverages. Therefore, the sale to the restaurants was not a taxable
transaction and no tax was due from the petitioner on such items.
Hardee’s of Springfield, Inc. et al. v. Director of Revenue, Case
No. RS-82-wr 42181 (A.H.C. 6/11/85). The Administrative Hearing
Commission held that the ingredient or component part exemption
is only applicable to the extent that the article is incorporated in
new property. In addition, those articles whose presence in the
final product is not necessary to essential are not exempt. The
commission found that 50% of the shortening in question was
absorbed and therefore exempt.
Teepak, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, Case Nos. RS-86-0123 and
RS-86-1430 (A.H.C. 5/13/88). In this case, the taxpayer argued that
casings used in the manufacture of hot dogs were exempt from
sales tax under the component part exemption. The Administrative
Hearing Commission rejected the taxpayer’s argument, finding
that there was no purposeful incorporation of the casing, or its
parts, into the finished hot dog, therefore, the component part
exemption did not apply.
Pea Ridge Iron Ore Co., Inc. v. Director of Revenue, Case Nos. RS84-1398, RS-84-1468, RS-84-1469, RS-84-1470, RS-84-1728, RS-841729 and RS-86-0517 (A.H.C. 6/30/88). The primary substantive issue
was whether the taxpayer’s purchases of grinding balls, grinding
rods, bentonite and olivine were exempt under the steel products
exemption in 144.030.2(2), RSMo which exempts “materials
and manufactured goods which are ultimately consumed in
the manufacturing process by becoming, in whole or in part, a
component part or ingredient of steel products intended to be
sold ultimately for final use or consumption.” The Administrative
Hearing Commission held that the presence of the grinding media
and bentonite in the final product, though a secondary purpose
and not the primary intended purpose, was sufficient to qualify
the materials for the steel products exemption. The materials were
purchased with an intent and purpose of becoming an identifiable
and detectable ingredient or component part of the iron ore pellets,
and therefore were exempt.
Marshall Scott Enterprises, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, Case No.
RS-87-0786, Kentucky Fried Chicken of Spanish Lake, Inc., Case
No. RS-87-0787 and Al-Tom Investment, Inc. d/b/a Kentucky
Fried Chicken, Case No. RS-87-0788 (A.H.C. 7/8/88). The taxpayers
contended that the purchases of shortening were excluded from
taxation under 144.010.1(8), RSMo, because the shortening was
substantially incorporated in the food products and therefore was
for resale as a portion of the food products. The Administrative
Hearing Commission rejected this argument and reaffirmed its
decision in Blueside Companies, Inc. v. Director of Revenue,
Case No. RS-82-4625 (10/5/84).
Snap Shot Photo v. Director of Revenue, Case No. RS-87-1056
(A.H.C. 8/29/88). The Administrative Hearing Commission found
that all chemicals used in the photofinishing process as part of a
closed vat system, and not washed away during the process, were
exempt from taxation because “all such chemicals do become
ingredients and component parts of all the products over time.”
St. Joe Minerals Corporation v. Director of Revenue, Case Nos.
RS-85-1812 and RS-85-2289 (A.H.C. 9/13/88). The Administrative
Hearing Commission reaffirmed earlier decisions that held that
before materials can be exempt as component parts or ingredients
they must be shown to have been purchased for the purpose of
becoming part of the final product. They must also be shown to
have become a part of the product and must be detectable in the
final product. They must also serve a purpose in the final product
and not be just an impurity. It is not enough that the materials
are necessary to the manufacturing process; it must be shown that
the materials are purposefully incorporated into that final product.