Electronic Ballot Tabulation—Election Procedures (Ballot Marking Devices and Precinct Counters)

PURPOSE: This rule provides procedures to be used by election authorities using optical scan electronic ballot tabulator voting systems and ballot marking devices. (1) Each unit or case shall only be opened in the presence of a bipartisan team which shall verify the accuracy of the seal number before the seal is broken. (2) The election authority shall be responsible for ensuring that sufficient certificates or log entries are made on each transfer of ballot marking devices, electronic ballot tabulators, memory components, paper cast vote records, and ballots to accurately recreate each movement of the ballot marking devices, electronic ballot tabulators, memory components, paper cast vote records, and ballots. Each transfer shall include a statement that no election material was added, subtracted, or altered except as provided by statute or rule and that no irregularities were noticed unless otherwise noted. (3) The election authority or his/her representative shall be on hand at all times in the counting center when the ballots, paper cast vote records, and memory components are unsealed. The units and containers shall be unsealed in the presence of bipartisan teams which shall verify that the seal is intact, and verify the seal number where numbered seals are used, before the seal is broken. When sealing and unsealing the containers, the members of the bipartisan teams shall verify the seal numbers by their signatures on a log sheet designed for that purpose. (4) The tabulation and consolidation shall be performed in public. The election authority may make reasonable rules and regulations for conduct at the tabulating center, including limiting access to the tabulation area, to ensure the security of the results and the returns and to avoid interference with the tabulating center personnel. (5) Upon receiving the ballot marking devices, electronic ballot tabulators, memory components, paper cast vote records, and ballots, the election authority shall verify that the seals are intact, verify the seal number where numbered seals are used, and that there is no evidence of tampering with the units, cases, containers, or their contents. (6) Following acceptable procedures appropriate for the make, model, and version of the ballot marking device or electronic ballot tabulators in use, the election authority or his/her designee shall transfer the vote totals from the memory components into the election management system for official tabulation and consolidation. (7) Prior to certification of the election results, the accuracy certification team(s) shall tabulate the same set of votes used in the pre-election internal logic and accuracy test performed pursuant to 15 CSR 30-10.140(6)(C) on each memory component used at the polling locations to tabulate votes on ballot marking devices and electronic ballot tabulators. This section shall not apply to any memory component on which election results are stored. (A) If the results are not identical to those produced in the pre-election test for any memory component, the team shall not certify that the unit in which that component was used was operating properly. 1. In the case of an electronic ballot tabulators, the necessary corrections shall be made to the program until the results are identical and the ballots cast on the electronic ballot tabulators in which the memory component was used shall be retabulated and the consolidated results corrected accordingly. (B) If the results are identical, the team shall certify that the unit was operating properly. (8) The paper cast vote records audit trail tapes and ballots shall be kept secured until they must be unsealed to be hand counted in the post-election verification of electronic results pursuant to 15 CSR 30-10.110 or until they must be unsealed to be hand counted when a manual recount of votes is ordered. They shall only be unsealed in the presence of bipartisan teams which shall verify that the seal is intact, before the seal is broken and which shall reseal the containers in such a manner that if the container is opened, the seal will be broken beyond repair after the post-election audit or the manual recount is complete. When sealing and unsealing the containers, the members of the bipartisan teams shall verify the seal numbers by their signatures on a log sheet designed for that purpose. AUTHORITY: section 115.225, RSMo Supp. 2023.* Emergency rule filed June 21, 2006, effective July 1, 2006, expired Feb. 22, 2007. Original rule filed June 21, 2006, effective Dec. 30, 2006. Amended: Filed Nov. 29, 2023, effective June 30, 2024. *Original authority: 115.225, RSMo 1977, amended 1993, 1995, 2002, 2006, 2018, 2022.