15-516
Montana Attorney General Opinion 15-516
Length: 1,046 wordsOfficial source
Cite as 15 Mont. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 516
Opinion No. 516
School Districts-High Schools-Trans·
portation of Pupils-Boa~'d, Rent and
Tuition of PupiJs.......;Contracts-School
Funds, Expenditure of.
HELD: The trustees of an elemen-
tary school district have no power to
contract for the transportation of high
school pupils.
Section 1, Chapter 102, Laws of 1929.
may authorize transportation of pupils
out of one district into another with-
out requiring that the schools in thc
la tter district be closed.
Pupils of schools other than the con-
tracting district may be furnished trans-
portation so long as such trall~portation
is not a charge against the district
contracting and so long as such pupils.
or their parents, pay their proportion-
ate share for such transportation.
April 19, 1!)34.
You submit a copy of the decree of
the District Court of the Fifth .Tudi-
cial District, in the case of ;\iaynard
Lovell VS. Rebich. et aI., trustees of
School District 3 in Beaverhead Coun-
ty and request m~' opinion on the fol-
lowing:
"We respectfully request ~'our opin-
ion as to whether or not the trustees
can pay each family livin~ more than
three miles from school transporta-
tion to their own district school Rnd
those families pool thei r transporta-
tion money anrl hire a hus driver to
hring those elementary children to
Dillon to school. Can they have hi~h
school students as a matter of con-
Yenience, The county high school does
not allow transportation.
"If we cannot do that, how can we
legally transport those children to Dil-
Ion? The trustees deemed the matter
of transporting pupils outside the
three mile limit to Dillon to be for
the best interests of the di~trict since
the people liyin~ several miles fro))]
school could and would have broken
the distr.ict."
The contract made by the board for
the transportation of children was suc-
cessfully attacked on the ground that
your hoard assumed to contract to
transport both high school and elemen-
tary school children. The trustees of
an elementary schoul district have no
OPIXIOXS OF THE ATTOHXEY GENERAL
power to contract for the transporta-
tion of high school pupils, and. as the
contract was shown to be indh·j,.:ible
and 110 budget authori7.ed anywhere to
pay for transporting high school pupils.
the court could not, of course. uphold
such contract.
The decree does not state, of course,
the legal grounds hut a letter from the
prior county attorney indicates that
the court might ha\'e decided the ques-
tion upon the ground that there was
no statute authorizing transportation
of children out of olle district into an-
other unless the trustees closed the
school in that district. We think it
very likely that the following language
in section L Chapter 102, Laws of
1929,
ma~' authorize transportation
without the closing of the schools:
"Wben they deem it for the best in-
terest of such district. and the pupils
residing therein. that any of such pu-
pils should be sent to a school in their
own or some other district. they must
expend any moneys belonging to their
district for the pur.pose of either pay-
ing for the tl"llnsportation of such pu-
pils from their homes to the puhliC"
school or schools of such district or
for their board, rent or tuitioll; while
actually attending such school, .... *."
Since the law requires the attendance
of all children within certain ages, we
think that. the words "any of such
pupils" haye a significance. If the pro-
\'ision read "all of such pupils". it
would c1earl\' indicate thnt the school
in the district must he closed before
the transportation was authorized. Ha \--
ing used the language "any of such pu-
pils," it mnst ha\-e contemplated that
a part of the pupils might be trans-
ported even though a II of them were
not transported, and sincc all PUI)ils
within certain ages must go to school,
necessarily there must be a local school
left to educate those not transported.
"Till you consult with the trustees
upon the possibility that a method
might be found in Chapter 102, Laws of
1929, amending Section 1010, H. C. M.,
Ifl21, which provides that the trustees
of a school district. may contract for
the transportation of pupils and Illa~'
also
permit pupils attendillg other
schools to take advllntage of the COII-
\'enience of such transporta tion opera t-
ing in their locality even though such
pupils attend a school that is not a
public school. The contract of the trus-
tees of District No . .'l. with the bus
operator. must, of course. be confined
to the transportation of pupils of the
plementary district, to be made a charge
against District No.3. The statute, as
we construe it, does not prohibit the
carrying of other pupils if the charge
or expense of the transportation of such
other pupils is not a chat'ge 01' expense
against Dishict No.3, such other pu-
pils paying 'Itheir proportionate f'hare
of the cost of such transportation."
Possibly the high school might pay for
the transportation of the high school
pupils. As we recall. the Dillon high
.~chool, where the high school pupils at-
tell(l. does not provide for transporta-
tion.
Such being 'the case the high
school pupils taking advantage of the
transportation line operated- by the
contract to transport the elementlll'Y
. pupils, or their parents, would have
to 111lY their proportionate share for
such transportation.
Said Section 1010, as amended, em-
powers the Board to either furnish
transportation for pupils, or pay for
transportation per pupil as set out in
the statute.
The schedule may he
changed by the board suhjed. to the
approval of the county supel·intendent.
The statute does not proyide any
schedule of allowance for hoard. etc.,
but it is reasonable to assume that the
schedule for transportation would be a
fair guide in fixing the amount to be
allowed for hoard, rent and tuition, tak-
ing into account, the fact that the par-
ents would he relieyed of the expense
of the board of the pupils at home.
The statutes pro\-ide that the trus-
tees may expend school funds for the
purposes named. So long as such fund"
are expended in good faith and wi,thin
the intent and tel'IIls of Ole statute we
think the method is left to the discre-
tion of the Board.