17-57
Montana Attorney General Opinion 17-57
Length: 606 wordsOfficial source
Cite as 17 Mont. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 57
Opinion No. 57.
Taxation-Real Property-Remitting
Penalty and Interest.
HELD:
1.
According to the language of the
statute. in order to redeem lands from
delinquent taxes it is necessary that
he pay all delinquent taxes to and in-
cluding the first half of 1936.
2.
Senate Bill No. 1 does not af-
fect assignments of tax sale certifi-
cates made before March 1, 1937.
3.
The constitutional authority of
the legislature to enact Senate Bill
No. 1 does not depend upon the ex-
istence of an emergency since emer-
gency does not create power. (Home
Building and Loan
Association
v.
Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398.)
Mr. 1. E. McKenna
County Attorney
Lewistown, Montana
Dear Mr. McKenna:
March II, 1937.
You have asked our confirmation
of your opinion to County Treasurer
58
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Ferrell, dated March 5, 1937, upon
the following questions submitted to
you:
"1.
Must a taxpayer pay all de-
linquent taxes to and including the
first half of 1936 at one time before
December 1st, 1938 or may he pay
any particular year and stilJ receive
the benefit of this Act?"
The reasoning of opinion No. 99
in Volume 16, Opinions of the At-
torney General, p. 98, applies, as the
wording of the two acts are similar.
We agree with your conclusion that
this question must be answered in
the affirmative and that there is no
redemption of real property as pro-
vided for by Senate Bill No. I, unless
all of the taxes are paid.
"2.
In the matter of a tax deed
can action be started where old as-
signments were issued before March
1st, 1937?"
The last sentence of Section 1 of
this Act provides:
"This Act shall not apply to the
purchaser of any ceritficate of sale
made prior to the passage and ap-
proval of this Act."
The Act would therefore not affect
assignments made before March I,
1937, the date when the Act was passed
and approved.
3.
You have raised the further
question whether the legislature may
constitutionally declare an emergency
for a period covering nearly two years,
or until December I, 1938.
We do not believe that the power
of the legislature to waive payment of
interest and penalty depends upon
an emergency. As said by Chief Jus-
tice Hughes in Home Building and
Loan Association v.
Blaisdell, 290
U. S. 398:
"Emergency
does
not
create
power. Emergency does not increase
granted power or remove or diminish
the restrictions imposed upon power
granted
or
reserved. * * * While
emergency does not create power,
emergency may furnish the occasion
for the exercise of power. 'Although
an emergency may not call into life
a power which has never lived, nev-
ertheless emergency may afford a
reason for the exertion of a living
power already enjoyed.' Wilson v.
New. 243 U. S. 332. 348."
Our Supreme Court in State ex
reI. Sparling v. Hitsman, 99 Mont.
521, apparently did not uphold a simi-
lar law on the theory that an emer-
gency existed which gave the legisla-
ture the power to enact such law. Our
court quoted with approval the lan-
guage of Chief Justice Hughes, supra.
It is possible that where the con-
tinued operation of a law depends upon
the existence of an emergency, the
fact of such emergency is open to
judicial inquiry. However, we do not
believe that the operation of Senate
Bill No.1 depends upon the existence
of an emergency. Until a competent
court, if ever, shall place some limita-
tion upon the operation of the Act,
we must assume that it is valid ac-
cording to its terms.