42-97
School Districts
Cite as N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 42-97
OPINION
42-97
October 10, 1942
(OPINION)
SCHOOL DISTRICTS
RE: Pupils - Residence
The questions you present can be answered only in a general way. The school boards in
this state have considerable discretion in adjusting questions arising in connection with the
opening and closing of schools.
Where schools are closed for economic reasons or lack of attendance, it is the duty of the
board to furnish proper and convenient school facilities for the pupils from some other
school. Such proper and convenient school facilities must be provided for the pupils in the
territory of the school closed until such time as it may be reopened by the board. In
determining what shall constitute proper and convenient school facilities the school board
shall consider the distance of such child from the nearest school and all surrounding
circumstances and the board may furnish transportation to such other school or pay an
extra allowance for transportation or furnish the equivalent thereof in tuition or lodging in
some other public school.
In case of dispute between patrons and the school board as to whether or not the school
board shall furnish or arrange to furnish adequate facilities, the matter may be submitted
by the patron to a board of arbitration consisting of the County Superintendent of Schools,
one arbitrator named by the patron, and one arbitrator named by the school board, and the
determination of such arbitrator, after hearing, shall be binding upon the school board.
As I have pointed out, the school board has considerable discretion as you will observe by
reading the statute. I have particular reference to chapter 206 of the Session Laws of
1838, which you will find in the last supplement to the school laws. For your convenience I
am sending you a copy of the compiled school laws, together with the latest supplement,
and I would refer you to page 18 of the supplement.
When the school board has acted within the law according to its best judgment, there is
nothing that this office can do. The board may take such action as in its judgment it
deems best within the provisions of the law.
With reference to residence for school purposes, the word "residence" as used in the
school laws is not synonymous with "legal residence". This question was before the
Supreme Court of the state in the case of Anderson v. Breithbarth and in that case the
court said:
"The word 'residence' as used in the school laws is not synonymous with
'legal residence'; it is not restricted to the domicile of the parents of the child,
but must be construed in a broader sense as meaning the actual residence
of the child - the place which constitutes its home when not called elsewhere
for temporary purposes, the place to which it returns in seasons of repose,
whether with its parents or others. The policy of our school laws is not to
shut out a pupil, but to compel attendance, and the laws should be liberally
construed to carry out this practically universal American principle."
Their decision, however, differentiates between the situation where children come into the
school district merely for the purpose of obtaining school privileges. The requirement for
the payment of tuition governs in such cases, and it is immaterial whether the children
come alone or the parents come with them. When the purpose of a nonresident is to
obtain school privileges only, and maintains his residence in another district, then the law
provided for tuition governs, but tuition may not be charged within the district of residence
regardless of which school within such district the children attend.
The questions presented in your letter are largely within the discretion of the school board
and this office has no authority to interfere with any decision the board may make where
such decision is based upon facts peculiar to the local situation and where such decision is
made in pursuance of the law governing the facts.
I am returning all of your correspondence herewith.
ALVIN C. STRUTZ
Attorney General