45-135
Highway Contracts
Cite as N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 45-135
OPINION
45-135
September 7, 1945 (OPINION)
HIGHWAY CONTRACTS
RE: Bids for Equipment
This will acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 28, 1945,
in which you say that Attorney Vernon Johnson of Wahpeton, North
Dakota, representing August Vagts, a contractor, whose residence is
Breckenridge, Minnesota, contends that his client is entitled to the
award of a contract for furnishing gravel on a state highway in
Pembina County designated as SAP441A and 338 Cpt. You say that Mr.
Johnson bases his contention on the fact that Mr. Vagts was the low
bidder when bids were opened August 17, 1945.
You further say that the question arises: "Does Mr. Vagts meet the
requirements of the 5 percent preference law by maintaining an office
in North Dakota and paying workmen's compensation on his employees in
North Dakota as alleged by his attorney? Also, there is the question
with regard to 90% of his employees being residents of North Dakota
for at least one year as stipulated in the law."
You say further:
"The second low bidder was Butler Construction Company of Grand
Forks with $22,963.50. The question as to the residence of 90%
of his employees also would be pertinent inasmuch as Grand
Forks is a border city, and it is entirely possible that
several of his employees may not have resided in North Dakota
for at least one year."
Section 24-1201 of the Revised Code of 1943 provides:
"In the letting of any road or bridge, road work, or for road
material or culvert, by the state highway department or by any
political subdivision of the state, preference to the extent of
5 percent shall be given to all bona fide contractors who have
been continually in business and have resided in the State of
North Dakota for a period of at least one year prior to filing
his bid, if at least 90 percent of the employees of such
contractor engaged in highway construction and maintenance
shall have been residents of the State of North Dakota for at
least one year, and shall be citizens of the United States or
shall have declared their intention to become such. Such
preference shall not apply to federal aid projects."
The original act giving preference to resident road contractors was
enacted in 1931. Chapter 154 of the Session Laws of that year
provided that in the event of approximately equal bids, the bid
submitted by a contractor or bidder who had maintained a residence
and place of business in this state "continuously for a period of
more than one year prior to the filing of such bid" should be deemed
and held to be the lowest bidder and that the contract should be
awarded accordingly.
In 1933, the Legislature amended chapter 126 of the Session Laws
of 1931 by providing that in order to obtain the 5 percent preference
therein provided "that at least ninety (90) percent of the employees
engaged in highway construction and maintenance shall have been
residents of the State of North Dakota for one year, and shall be
citizens of the United States or have declared their intention to
become such."
The requirement that at least 90 percent of the employees engaged in
highway construction and maintenance shall have been residents of the
State of North Dakota for one year, etc., was undoubtedly embodied in
chapter 126 of the Session Laws of that year because of the acute
depression and widespread unemployment then prevailing.
In 1985, the Legislature enacted chapter 218 of the Session Laws of
that year. That act required state departments, offices, and
bureaus, and local governmental units and local officials when
purchasing goods, merchandise, supplies, or equipment of any
character to give preference to bidders or sellers "resident in North
Dakota," utility, fitness and quality being equal. In 1943
chapter 198 of the Sessions Laws of that year was enacted. This
measure amended chapter 218 of the Sessions Laws of 1935 so as to
require a 5 percent preference in favor of North Dakota residents.
Chapter 198, Laws of 1943, is embodied in chapter 44-08 of the
Revised Code of 1943 under section 44-0802. Section 44-0802 of the
Revised Code (chapter 198, Laws 1943) defines the term "resident
North Dakota bidder or seller" as follows:
"The term 'a resident North Dakota bidder or seller' when used
in this chapter unless the context thereof clearly provides
otherwise, shall mean a bidder of seller who shall have
maintained a bona fide place of business within this state for
at least one year prior to the date on which a contract was
awarded."
It will be noted that the definition of the above phrase "resident
North Dakota bidder or seller" applies only to bidders and sellers
mentioned in chapter 44-08 of the Revised Code. It does not apply to
contractors mentioned in section 24-1201. Section 24-1201 provides
for a five-percent preference to a contractor "who has been
continuously in business and has resided in the State of North Dakota
for a period of at least one year prior to the filing of his bid, if
at least 90 percent of the employees of such contractor---shall have
been residents of the State of North Dakota for at least one year and
shall be citizens of the United States, or shall have declared their
intention to become such."
In view of the fact that Mr. August Vagts is a resident of
Breckenridge, Minnesota, it is my opinion that, under the provisions
of section 24-1201 of the Revised Code, he is not a contractor who is
entitled to any preference when bids are opened and considered by the
State Highway Commissioner.
The question as to whether or not 90 percent of the employees
employed by the Butler Construction Construction Company of Grand
Forks have been residents of the state for at least one year and are
citizens of the United States or have declared their intention to
become citizens is not a question of law. It is a question of fact
which must be determined by the Highway Commissioner upon evidence or
proof furnished by the Butler Construction Company. But if the
Commissioner shall find that 90 percent of the employees of this
company have not been residents of North Dakota for at least one
year, then this company is not entitled to preferential
consideration. In that case the status of the Butler Construction
Company and Mr. Vagts as bidders would be the same and Mr. Vagts
being the lowest responsible bidder would be entitled to be awarded
the contract in question.
I assume that corporations are sometimes contractors, and that as
such they submit bids for highway construction work in competition
with individual contractors. Under the laws of North Dakota, a
foreign corporation which has a certificate of authority to transact
business in this state, and which maintains an agent and an office
there, is, under the provisions of section 10-1712 of the Revised
Code, entitled to the "same rights and privileges that a domestic
corporation would possess if organized for the purposes set forth in
the Articles of Incorporation of the foreign corporation---." Hence,
a foreign corporation entitled to do road construction work in North
Dakota would be entitled to the same consideration as a bidder for a
contract to perform such work as a domestic corporation, assuming
that 90 percent of the employees of both have been residents of North
Dakota for at least one year, etc.
This proposition presents an anomalous situation. For then a foreign
corporation, entitled to do business in this state, and maintaining
an office here, is entitled to the five-percent preference conferred
under section 24-1201, whereas, Mr. Vagts, who resides in
Breckenridge, Minnesota, but who maintains an office in Wahpeton,
North Dakota, and who is also entitled to perform work as a
contractor, is not entitled to such preferential consideration.
In view of this situation, we are confronted with the serious
question as to whether section 24-1201 contravenes the following
questions of the Federal Constitution.
1. Section 2 of Article IV of the Federal Constitution
provides: "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states."
2. Article XIV of Amendments to the Federal Constitution which
provides: "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
3. Section 11 of our State Constitution provides: "All laws
of general nature shall have a uniform operation."
4. Section 20 or our State Constitution provides: "No special
privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may
not be altered, revoked or repealed by the Legislative
Assembly; nor shall any citizen or class of citizens be
granted privileges or immunities which upon the same terms
shall not be granted to all citizens."
5. Section 13 of our State Constitution provides that no
person may be deprived of his property without due process
of law.
It is a familiar principle or rule of law that the discretion of the
Legislature is very broad in the exercise of the police power, both
in determining what the interests of the public require and what
means and measures are reasonably necessary for the protection of
such interests. But the enactment of section 24-1201 of the Revised
Code can hardly be characterized as an exercise of police power. It
may be conceded that the Legislature by enacting section 24-1201
intended to promote the public welfare because when chapter 154 of
the Session Laws of 1931 and chapter 126 of the Laws of 1933 (the
provisions of which are embodied in section 24-1201 of the Revised
Code) were enacted when drought and economic depression had caused
widespread unemployment.
But it cannot be successfully maintained that under the guise of
providing employment on public works unconstitutional class
legislation may be enacted. For classification must be based upon
some natural principle of public policy and a fundamental principle
in classification is that a law shall affect alike all persons in the
same class and under similar circumstances. 12 Am. Jur., sec. 478,
p. 144.
Courts have repeatedly held that "if persons under the same
circumstances and conditions are treated differently there is
arbitrary discrimination and not classification." 12 Am. Jur.,
sec. 480, p. 149. However, it is generally conceded that the
Legislature may discriminate between classes in regulating a
business, where discrimination is based on a reasonable distinction
involving the public welfare, and the statute is applicable to all
who come within the classification.
Numerous authorities and state and federal court decisions hold to
the same effect. The following are representative.
"A legislative classification, in order to be valid, must not
be artificial, arbitrary, and unreasonable." Ex parte DeKoltz,
98 Neb. 861, 155 N.W. 240.
"Const. article 6, sec. 18, prohibiting the passage of any law
granting to any citizen, class, or corporation privileges or
immunities which on the same terms shall not equally belong to
all citizens or corporations, requires that every prescribed
rule shall have substantially the same operation as to all
persons or corporations in substantially the same situation."
Morrow v. Wipf, 22 S.D. 146, 115 N.W. 1121.
"Statute granting one class of persons, property, occupations,
or industries rights or privileges denied to another, under
same or substantially similar conditions, denies equal
protection of law." In re Christoph (Wisconsin) 237 N.W. 134.
"Legislature may classify persons and objects for purpose of
legislation, if classification is based on justifiable
distinctions;---" (Const. U.S. Amend. 14, Const. N.D. sec. 13.
Bratberg v. Anderson-Fumley Thresher Co. (N.D.) 238 N.W. 552.
"Act No. 212 Public Acts section 5 (Mich.) providing for the
examination and licensing of barbers, and that no person shall
receive a certificate who at the time of his examination is an
alien, is repugnant to the U.S. Const. Amend. 14, insofar as it
discriminates on account of citizenship." (Mich.) Templar v.
Michigan, State Board of Examiners of Barbers, 90 N.W. 1058,
100 Am. St. Rep. 160.
"S.D. Laws 107, p. 414, chap. 194, sec. 2, requiring agents of
nonresidents nurserymen selling nursery stock in S.D. grown in
other states or territories to carry a duplicate permit issued
by the state board of agriculture, is invalid as a
discrimination between resident and nonresident dealers." Ex
parte Hawley, 115 N.W. 22 S.D. 23, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 138.
"'Privileges and immunities' within constitutional provisions
entitling the citizens of each state to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states are words of
comprehensive meaning and protect the rights of a citizen of
one state to pass into another state for purpose of engaging in
lawful business without molestation, to acquire personal
property, to hold real estate, to maintain action in the courts
of the state, and to be exempt from any higher taxes than are
imposed by the state upon is own citizens." U.S.C.A. Const.
Article 4, sec. 2--Ward v. State of Maryland, 79 U.S. 418,
20 L. ed. 449.
"The privileges and immunities clause of the Federal
Constitution prohibits legislation by one state against the
citizens of another state and secured to them the equal
protection of its laws and the same freedom possessed by its
own citizens in the acquisition and enjoyment of property."
Williams v. Bruffy, 90 U.S. 176, 24 L. ed. 716.
"The object of the second section of article 4 of the Federal
Constitution, declaring that citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several states, is directed against state action and its object
is to place the citizens of each state upon the same footing
with citizens of other states and inhibit discriminating
legislation against them by other states." U.S. v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290.
"The constitutional provision that the citizens of each state
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states prevents a state from discriminating
against citizens of other states in favor of its own citizens."
U.S.C.A. Constitution Article 4, sec. 2. Hauge v. Committee for
Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 84 L. ed. 1423.
"Discrimination against resident aliens under Anti-Alien Labor
Law (Arizona) renders the statute invalid under U.S.
Constitution Amendment 14, as denying equal protection of the
laws." Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 60 L. ed., 131,L.R.A.
1916 D, 545.
In view of the decisions of state courts and of the Supreme Court of
the United States, on might naturally conclude without further
consideration and without further search of authorities that section
24-1201 of the Revised Code of North Dakota and status of like nature
and effect are unconstitutional. But the courts have also held in
numerous cases that the constitutional provisions of the United
States Constitution and of our State Constitution have no application
to the actions of individuals in making contracts, etc. In other
words, an individual contractor in his private capacity can generally
hire whom he pleases and can determine the qualifications of his
employees. In his private business an individual can discriminate
between citizens of his own state and the citizens of another state.
In fact he can discriminate on the basis of color, race, creed or any
other individual preference.
In the case of Helm v. McCall, 36 S. Ct. 78, 299 U.S. 175, 60 L.
ed. 206, Ann. Cas. 1917 B 287, the United States Supreme Court held
that privileges and immunities of citizens are not abridged contrary
to Article 4, section 2 of the United States Constitution by
section 14, chapter 31 of the Consolidated Laws of the State of New
York providing that only citizens of the United States may be
employed in public work and that citizens of New York must be
preferred.
Although the constitutionality of section 24-1201 is very doubtful,
notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Helm v. McCall, supra, it is my opinion that
the doubt must be resolved in favor of its validity. This act is
presumed to be constitutional. And in view of the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in the case cited, there is a probability
that our state Supreme Court would hold that section 24-1201 of the
Revised Code is not violative of the Federal Constitution or of our
State Constitution, because as a proprietor the State may control the
construction of its own projects and the distribution of its own
money. For in the awarding of contracts, or any other state
undertakings, the Legislature has broad powers in its determination
of public policy, and in order to promote the welfare of its citizens
may impose such conditions as it shall deem reasonably necessary.
NELS G. JOHNSON
Attorney General