46-312
Water Conservation
Cite as N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 46-312
OPINION
46-312
April 10, 1946 (OPINION)
WATER CONSERVATION
RE: Commission - Powers - Counties
This office is in receipt of your letter of April 8, 1946, and a copy
of a letter addressed to the state water conservation commission by
William W. Felson of Cavalier, North Dakota.
Mr. Felson desires to be informed as to whether or not landowners, or
officials, of Cavalier County, have the legal right to divert surface
waters by artificial ditches or drains into Pembina County and thus
flood the lands of Pembina County farmers. In his letter, Mr. Felson
says:
Have the farmers, or officials, of Cavalier County the right to
divert their water into Pembina County by artificial ditches.
That is have they right to dig drainage ditches, place highway
obstructions along boundary line between Pembina and Cavalier
County, thence place culverts in such road embankment so as to
divert water from natural watercourses, place such culverts at
points which result in injury to farms on the Pembina County
side."
I beg to advise you that a landowner, municipal corporation, drainage
district, or public official, does not have the legal right to divert
surface water by artificial ditches unto anyone's land. A proper
outlet must be provided for water collected in an artificial drain.
A landowner may ditch the water on his land into a nature watercourse
provided he does not thereby flood lands not owned by him. Anyone
who drains his land by collecting the water thereon in constructed
ditches, and casts the water upon other lands, will be responsible in
damages for the injury sustained by the owners of such lands. A
landowner, drainage district, or municipal corporation may in a court
action be enjoined from artificially flooding lands.
It does not appear that North Dakota has definitely adopted either
the common law rule, with reference to surface waters, which holds
that surface water is a common enemy and that a proprietor may by
embankment, or dike, or otherwise defend himself against its
encroachments, nor the civil law rule which holds that the lower
estate (land) is subject to a natural servitude and is bound to take
the natural flow from the higher grounds. The Supreme Court of this
state has in each case brought before it considered the facts and
circumstances, and has, in effect, decided each such case on its
individual merits. The court has, especially in its later decisions,
applied the equitable maximum, "one must use his own rights as not to
infringe upon the rights of another." (Subsection 5, section
31-1105, Revised Code of 1943.)
The owner of the higher land cannot, in my opinion, legally collect
the surface water thereon and cause it to flow on the land of the
lower proprietor in a different manner from which it flowed by nature
nor may he materially increase the quantity thereof to the injury of
the lower land. The following cases sustain this view:
Wirds v. Vierkant, 131 Iowa, 108 N.W. 108.
Cranson v. Snyder, 137 Mich. 340, 100 N.W. 674.
Todd v. York County, 72 Neb.207, 100 N.W. 299, 69 L.R.A. 561.
In the case of Baker v. Incorporated Town of Akron (a municipal
corporation), 145 Iowa, 485, 122 N.W. 926, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 619, the
Supreme Court of Iowa held:
The owner of higher land has no right, even in the course of
the use and improvement of his property, to collect the surface
water on his land into a drain or ditch, increased in quantity
or in a manner different from the natural flow, and divert it
on the land of another, to the injury of such land."
The Supreme Court of the state of South Dakota which has adopted the
civil law rule as to surface waters holding that the proprietor of
higher land has an easement or servitude--that is to say--the right
to have the surface waters of his land flow over the lower land, held
in the case of Bailey v. Chicago St. P.M. & O. Ry. Co., 25 S.D. 200,
126 N.W. 268, that "it is an actionable wrong to collect surface
water and discharge it in unusual and unnatural quantities upon the
land of another."
It, therefore, follows that a landowner cannot legally build ditches
and convey the surface water on his land unto and upon the land of
his neighbors, and that no municipality or drainage district can
legally construct a drain, for the purpose of drainage, unless the
water is conveyed into a natural watercourse capable of taking the
water without damaging anyone.
An artificial drain must, as stated, have a suitable outlet. Nor can
a landowner or a municipality artificially drain water into the drain
of a drainage district without paying for the privilege.
Therefore, the appropriate remedy for the condition described in Mr.
Felson's letter is the joint construction of a drain by the boards of
drainage commissioners of Cavalier and Pembina Counties, under the
provisions of sections 61-2160 and 61-2161 of the 1943 Revised Code.
In his letter, Mr. Felson also asks what authority the state water
conservation commission has with reference to drainage. The
commissioner was primarily created to conserve water and to provide
for its utilization in stabilizing agricultural production. But the
last five years have created a need for the services of the
commission in aiding Red River Valley counties in solving their
drainage problems. The commission has the authority to investigate
and study the drainage problem in Pembina and Cavalier Counties. In
my opinion, the commission should authorize an investigation by its
engineers. Recommendations based on such investigation should be
submitted to the county commissioners and drainage commissioners of
Pembina and Cavalier Counties.
NELS G. JOHNSON
Attorney General