48-73
County
Cite as N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 48-73
OPINION
48-73
February 9, 1948 (OPINION)
COUNTY
RE: Redistricting May Be Done Within Reasonable Time
This office is in receipt of your letter under date of February 3,
1948, with reference to the validity of the action taken by the
redistricting board of Sargent County on January 6, 1948.
In your letter you outline the history of the proceedings leading up
to the redistricting of the county.
We assume from what you say in your letter that the petition filed
with the County Auditor was sufficient and that it conformed with the
requirements of section 11-0703 of the 1943 Revised Code. You say
that "The question now which interested citizens desire to have
submitted are two. The first one is--was the action of the
redistricting board taken on January 6, 1948, legal and effective?"
You say further - "If you answer that question in the affirmative,
there is no use to go further.
"If you answer that question in the negative then the following
question presents itself. Can the redistricting board still
act on the petition before it or will it be necessary, in order
to vest them with jurisdiction, that new petitions be
circulated?"
We do not understand the import of your second question. For if the
board did not have jurisdiction to act on the petition on January 6,
1848, it seems to us that it would logically follow that it would not
have jurisdiction to act at a later date.
In your opinion given to Elmer Walsted, Chairman of the Board, on
January 7, 1948, you said:
"It is the writer's opinion that the redistricting board did
not proceed within the twenty days after the petition to
redistrict was filed with the County Auditor and did not
proceed within the twenty days to redistrict the county into
commissioner's districts; therefore, the actions of the county
redistricting board are void of no force and effect, and the
present commissioner's districts remain as they were prior to
the action of the redistricting board."
In a letter addressed to Gerald W. Brekke under date of January 30,
1948, a copy of which you undoubtedly have, we said:
"It is my opinion that section 11-0703 requiring the County
Auditor to call a meeting of the board within twenty days after
a sufficient petition for redistricting has been filed merely
prescribes the duty of the County Auditor as to calling a
meeting of such board and that his failure to call such meeting
does not affect the validity of the petition filed or the
jurisdiction of the redistricting board to act thereon.
"It is my opinion, that section 11-0703 requires the County
Auditor to call a meeting of the board within twenty days after
a sufficient petition for redistricting has been filed and that
the petitioners, and the public, may assume that he will do so.
No proceedings by mandamus, or otherwise, may be commenced to
compel him to call such meeting until after the expiration of
twenty days after such petition has been filed. But if, after
the expiration of twenty days, a meeting of the redistricting
board has not been called, mandamus proceedings to compel the
Auditor to call a meeting of the board may be instituted.
"It must not be lost sight of that the County Auditor is merely
an administrative officer. And it cannot logically be
contended that his failure to perform a purely ministerial duty
within a certain period of time can affect the validity of a
sufficient petition for the redistricting of the county or the
jurisdiction of the redistricting board to act thereon."
We adhere to he views thus expressed. It was undoubtedly the
intention of the legislature that the County Auditor should be given
twenty days in which to determine the sufficiency of petitions for
redistricting. A sufficient petition must be signed by "at least
twenty-five percent of the qualified electors of the county as
determined by the number of votes cast for the office of Governor at
the preceding general election."
As we interpret your opinion given to Mr. Elmer Walsted, your only
reason for holding that the redistricting board had lost jurisdiction
to consider the petition, and to act thereon, was the failure of the
board to meet and proceed with the redistricting of the county within
twenty days after the petitions had been filed. As far as this
office is informed nothing has been disclosed to indicate that the
action of the redistricting board if it had met and acted within
twenty days after the petitions were filed would have been different
than the action taken by the board on January 6, 1948, or that
anything has transpired that would affect the need for redistricting
as requested by the petitioners.
It is, therefore, our conclusion that the action of the redistricting
board taken on January 6, 1948, is legal and valid. For although
section 11-0703 of the Revised Code provides that "the board shall
proceed at once to redistrict the county into commissioner's
districts," nothing is contained in any section of chapter 11-07
which invalidates the action of the board if not taken "at once". A
reasonable interpretation of the statutes justifies the construction
that the board may act within a reasonable time and that the
redistricting of a county may be done after care consideration in
order that the districts be "as regular and as compact in form as
practicable and as nearly equal in population as possible". (Section
11-0704).
NELS G. JOHNSON
Attorney General