01-023
Printing Of Slip Laws; Effect Of Certain Line-item Vetoes By The Governor On Earmarking Appropriation Items
Cite as Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 01-023
DON STENBERG
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DATE:
SUBJECT:
STATE OF NEBRASKA
®ffit~ of f4~ ~fnrtt~\! ®~u~ral
June 25, 2001
"2115 STATE CAPITOL BUILDING
LINCOLN, NE 68509-8920
(402) 471-2682
TOO (402) 471-2682
CAPITOL FAX (402) 471-3297
1235 K ST. FAX (402) 471-4725
* otod.3
NO.
STATE OF N!;Er\ASiv\
OFFICIAL
JiJN 2 6 2001
DEPT. OF ,JUSTICE
STEVE GRASZ
LAURIE SMITH CAMP
DEPUTY ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Printing Of Slip Laws; Effect Of Certain Line-item Vetoes By The
Governor On Earmarking Appropriation Items.
REQUESTED BY: Joanne Pepperl
Revisor of Statutes
WRITTEN BY:
Don Stenberg, Attorney General
Dale A. Comer, Assistant Attorney General
LB 543 from the 2001 legislative session is a general appropriations bill which
makes appropriations for the expenses of Nebraska government for the biennium ending
June 30, 2003. That bill was passed by the Legislature and submitted to Governor
Johanns for his approval on May 9, 2001. Subsequently, the Governor made a number
of line-item vetoes in various portions of the bill. The focus of your opinion request is line-
item vetoes made in Section 44 of LB 543, dealing with the State Department of Education.
As is the current practice with large appropriation bills, Section 44 of LB 543 starts ·
with the following general appropriation language:
Sec. 44 AGENCY NO. 13 - STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Program No. 25 - Education, Administration, and Support
FY2001-02
FY2002-03
GENERAL FUND
811 ,437,932
840,150,645
Jennifer M. Amen
David K. Arterburn
William R. Barger
L. Jay Bartel
Frances M. Bertsch
J. Kir1< Brown
Marie C. Clarl<e
Delores N. Coe-Barbee
Dale A. Comer
David D. Cookson
Kyle C. Dahl
Scott G. Gunem
Susan J. Gustafson
Robert E. Harkins
Royce N. Harper
Jason W. Hayes
Amber F. Herrick
W illiam L. Howland
Marilyn B. Hutchinson
Kimberly A. Klein
Printed with soy ink on recycled paper
Chartotle R. Koranda
George R. Love
Charles E. Lowe
Lynn A. Melson
Ronald D. Moravec
Fredrick F. Noid
Teresa J. Nutzman·Buller
Thomas J. Olsen
Hobert B Rupe
James D Smith
James H. Spears
Marl< D. Starr
Martin Swanson
John R. ThOmpson
Melanie J. Whittamore-Manlzios
Linda L. Willard
Joanne Pepper!
June 25, 2001
Page 2
CASH FUND
8,078,968
8,088,244
FEDERAL FUND est.
169,725,203
171,488,298
REVOLVING FUND
515,805
531,508
PROGRAM TOTAL
989,757,908
1 ,020,258,695
SALARY LIMIT
8,825,407
9,257,690
After the general appropriation language, Section 44 contains a number of individual
"earmarking" provisions which designate specified sums of money for particular purposes.
Some of those earmarking provisions provide that the funds included therein shall only be
used for certain purposes; some do not.
Some of the earmarking provisions also
appropriate monies to specific named Funds and Programs. Examples of the earmarking
provisions at issue in your opinion request include the following language:
and
There is included in the amount shown for this program $3,397,721 General
Funds provided as state aid for FY2001 -02 and $3,482,664 General Funds
provided as state aid for FY 2002-03 for programs for learners with high
ability.
There is included in the amount shown for this program $55,000 General
Funds provided as state aid for FY2001-02 and $55,000 General Funds
provided as state aid for FY2002-03 for economic education programs.
Pursuant to art. IV,§ 15 of the Nebraska Constitution, 1 the Governor used his line-
1 That constitutional provision provides, as is pertinent:
Every bill passed by the Legislature, before it becomes a law, shall be
presented to the Governor. If he approves he shall sign it, and thereupon
it shall become a law, but if he does not approve or reduces any item or
items of appropriations, he shall return it with his objections to the
Legislature, which shall enter the objections at large upon its journal, and
proceed to reconsider the bill with the objections as a whole, or proceed to
reconsider individually the item or items disapproved or reduced.
The Governor may disapprove or reduce any item or items of
appropriation contained in bills passed by the Legislature, and the item or
items so disapproved shall be stricken therefrom, and the items reduced
Joanne Pepper!
June 25, 2001
Page 3
item veto to reduce and veto a number of the provisions in Section 44 of LB 543. With
respect to the general appropriation language at the beginning of the section, he crossed
out the total sums under the GENERAL FUND and PROGRAM TOTAL entries, and
inserted the following reduced amounts:
GENERAL FUND
PROGRAM TOTAL
FY2001-02
811,218,432
989,538,408
FY2002-03
839,912,645
1,020,020,695
With respect to the "earmarking" sections, he simply crossed out and initialed a number
of the earmarking amounts without inserting either reduced figures or a zero. However,
the total of the "earmarked" sums which were vetoed exceeded the amount of the
reductions which the Governor made in the GENERAL FUND and PROGRAM TOTAL
entries. When the Governor returned the bill to the Legislature with his objections, he
made the following comments with respect to Section 44:
The General Fund appropriation to the Department of Education's
Administrative and Support Program had been increased to provide funding
for a variety of educational leadership, policy setting, technical assistance,
and administrative activities. I am reducing the amount for several items
added above my recommendations by one-half and encourage the
Commissioner of Education and the State Board of Education to direct the
remaining amounts in a manner that satisfies the needs or enhances the
performance of our current education programs. I have vetoed specific
earmarking amounts related to these items to allow this discretion for the
Commissioner of Education.
I have not reduced the additional
appropriations of 2.7 million dollars for each year of the biennium that we
have included for the Attracting Excellence to Teaching program.
Legislative Journal, 97th Neb. Leg., 1st Sess. 2008 (May 14, 2001 )(Message from the
Governor regarding the return of LB 543). The Governor's veto message to the Legislature
regarding LB 543 also included a chart which indicated that the vetoed amount for Section
44 was the amount of the reduction in the general appropriation language at the beginning
of the section. /d. at 2012. We understand that the Governor's changes to LB 543 were
not overridden by the Legislature.
shall remain as reduced unless the Legislature has reconsidered the item
or items disapproved or reduced and has repassed any such item or items
over the objection of the Governor by a three-fifths approval of the
members elected.
Joanne Pepper!
June 25, 2001
Page4
As Revisor of Statutes, you are responsible for preparing the slip laws of legislative
bills which show the version of those bills passed by the Nebraska Legislature. The slip
laws are also included in the bound session laws for each legislative session.
In your
opinion request letter, you state that it has been your prior practice, with respect to line-
item vetoes by the Governor, to print the figures in an appropriations bill as changed by the
Governor unless the line-item vetoes were overridden by the Legislature.
If the vetoes
were overridden, you print the original figure, the subject of the successful override, in the
corresponding slip law. However, you also state that you are unsure as to how to reflect
the changes made by the Governor in LB 543 in the slip law for that bill because:
It is unclear whether the removal of the earmarked amounts is within the
Governor's authority to veto an item of appropriation. If the earmarked
amount is removed from the slip law, the language could be read as allowing
a higher dollar amount for the particular item contrary to legislative intent.
As a result, you requested our opinion "as to how these changes made by the Governor
[in LB 543] should be shown in the slip law."
ANALYSIS
Our research has disclosed no Nebraska cases which take up the precise issues
raised in your opinion request, and indeed, there is very little Nebraska case law which
deals in any way with the Governor's veto authority. Nor are there any previous opinions
from this office which directly consider the matters you have raised. As a result, we have
reviewed a number of case authorities from other jurisdictions pertaining to the veto
authority held by a governor, although the applicability of those cases is often limited, given
the peculiarities of each state's constitutional provisions in that area and the different
factual circumstances before each court. Those case authorities offer some guidance in
the present instance.
We will first set out several generaLrules or conclusions which may be drawn from .
various cases dealing with the gubernatorial veto or line-item veto authority.
1.
Several underlying purposes have been offered for a governor's line-item
veto authority. Those include: a.
the prevention of "log rolling"2 and
omnibus appropriation bills, b. the prevention of corruption and the passage
of hasty and ill-conceived legislation, and c. the achievement of fiscal
2 "Log rolling" involves the practice of jumbling together incongruous subjects in
one legislative act in order to force a passage by uniting minorities with different
interests when the particular provisions could not pass on their separate merits.
Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1383 (Colo. 1985).
Joanne Pepper!
June 25, 2001
Page 5
constraint and the advancement of statewide rather than parochial fiscal
interests, i.e., the governor can excise unneeded programs or expenditures
from an appropriations bill to restrain public expenditures. Washington
State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wash.2d 309,931 P.2d 885 (1997); State
ex ref. Col/ v. Carruthers, 107 N.M. 439, 759 P.2d 1380 (1988); Colorado
General Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1985); Cennarrusa v.
Andrus, 99 Idaho 404, 582 P.2d 1082 (1978).
2.
A governor's veto power is a negative power and not a positive power. That
is, with respect to line-item vetoes, it is a power to delete or destroy a
particular item and not a power to alter, enlarge or increase the effect of
remaining items. The line-item veto power is not the power to enact or
create new legislation by selective deletions, and a governor does not have
the power to enlarge an appropriation by removing restrictions imposed by
the legislature. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 419 Mass. 1201,
643 N.E.2d 1036 (1994); Harbor v. Deukmejian, 240 Cal. Rptr. 569, 742
P.2d. 1290 (1987);Co/orado General Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371
(Colo. 1985); State ex ref. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 1979);
State ex ref. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 (1974).
3.
A governor cannot line-item veto qualifications, conditions, limitations or
restrictions on the expenditure of public funds without vetoing the item of
expenditure which they modify. Stated another way, if a provision in an
appropriation is a condition or restriction imposed by the Legislature, the
governor cannot disapprove the restriction alone, he or she must approve the
entire appropriation item with the restriction, or disapprove or reduce the
entire item with the restriction. Attorney General v. Administrative Justice
of the Boston Municipal Court, 384 Mass. 511, 427 N.E.2d 735 (1981);
State ex rei. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 1979);0pinion of the
Justices to the Governor, 373 Mass. 911, 370 N.E.2d 1350 (1977); Henry
V. Edwards, 346 So.2d 153 (La. 1977); Brault v. Holleman, 217 Va. 441, ·
230 S.E.2d 238 (1976); State ex ref. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524
P.2d 975 (1974); State ex ref. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1973).
4.
The legislature cannot intrude upon the governor's constitutional right to veto
substantive matters by inserting inappropriate substantive provisions in an
appropriations bill. If that occurs, such substantive provisions will be treated
as "items" which are subject to the governor's line-item veto authority.
Colton v. Brandstad, 372 N.W .2d 184 (Ia. 1985); Henry V. Edwards, 346
So.2d 153 (La. 1977).
Application of the rules and conclusions set out above to the present circumstances,
Joanne Pepperl
June 25, 2001
Page 6
particularly those rules dealing with the nature of the line-item veto power and its effect on
restrictions or conditions created by a legislature, might seem to suggest that the
Governor's vetoes of the "earmarking" provisions at issue in Section 44 of LB 543 are
improper as an attempt to create new or altered legislation by selective deletions of
restrictions created by the Legislature. However, there is a another group of cases which
is relevant to this issue.
In Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706 (Ia. 1975), the Iowa Supreme Court held that
lawful qualifications imposed by the Iowa Legislature upon various appropriations were not
separate, severable provisions which could be vetoed by the governor under his line-item
veto power. However, in the course of that opinion, the court stated:
We would also have a different case had the legislature attempted to evade
the item-veto amendment by the device of a lump-sum appropriation
followed by subdivisions calling for the expenditure of the lump sum in
specified amounts for named purposes. See People ex rei. State Board of
Agriculture v. Brady, 277 Ill. 124, 115 N.E. 204 [1 917]. The legislature
contended in Brady that the governor could not item-veto one of the
subdivisions without vetoing the lump sum, as the subdivision constituted
qualifications upon the appropriation of the lump sum. The Illinois Supreme
Court held otherwise, however, saying to hold that the whole bill was one
item would constitute a legislative evasion of the governor's authority to veto
distinct items.
The legislative device of a lump-sum appropriation with subdivisions
unconstitutionally invades the item-veto authority of a governor, just as the
gubernatorial device of the veto of a qualification on an appropriation
unconstitutionally invades the lawmaking authority of a legislature.
/d. at 714 (emphasis in the original). Other cases which have followed the Brady "lump
sum" rule, at least in some measure, include Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483,479 A.2d 403 .
(1984), Green v. Rawls, 122 So.2d 10 (Fia.1960) and Reardon v. Riley, 10 Cal.2d 531,
76 P.2d 101 (1 938). In the Karcher case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated:
Courts in other jurisdictions that have specifically considered this issue in the
context of similar constitutional provisions for a gubernatorial line-item veto
power have upheld the executive's right to reduce or eliminate specific
appropriations without reducing by a like amount the total appropriation in
which the specific item is included. In Reardon v. Riley, the court expressly
ruled that the governor's refusal to make a corresponding reduction in a total
appropriation equal to the reduction of a lesser-included appropriation does
not constitute an unlawful "affirmative" use of the constitutional veto power.
Joanne Pepperl
June 25, 2001
Page 7
By upholding this exercise of the line-item veto power, the court reasoned
that it not only gave full effect to the intent of the legislature, but also
preserved the governor's power to reduce or eliminate items of an
appropriation, as well as to approve them. Thus, although the legislature
intended to authorize the total appropriation "regardless of the subsequent
fate of the specific and included items of further appropriation," the governor
could properly reduce that total by an amount less that the sum of the vetoed
included items.
Such action on the part of the governor, in the court's
opinion, did not
improperly increase an appropriation without legislative action,
nor did it constitute an unauthorized veto of conditional or
provisional language used in connection with the specific and
included items of appropriation. It was an "elimination" of the
specific and included items and a reduction of the general and
inclusive item of appropriation. Such a conclusion appears to
effectuate the intent of the Legislature without depriving the
Governor of the full effect of the veto power granted him.
*
*
*
The result espoused by the Appellate Division in the instant case -
disallowing· the deletion of an included appropriation without a corresponding
reduction of the total appropriation- would too easily permit the Legislature
to circumvent the Governor's line-item veto power and upset the system of
checks and balances that must operate in the budget-making arena.
Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483, 499, 500, 479 A.2d 403, 412 (1984)(citations omitted).
It appears to us that the Brady "lump sum" rule has application to the present
situation. For one thing, the factual circumstances in the various "lump sum" cases which .
follow the Brady rule closely resemble the facts at issue here, i.e., in those cases the
legislature appropriated one general sum with other specific appropriation amounts
included within that sum, and the governor line-item vetoed the specific appropriations
which were part of the total without reducing the general sum to the same extent.3 In
3 The cases which follow the Brady "lump sum" rule do differ from the present
circumstance in one respect. The state constitutions at issue in those various cases all
contain some language to the effect that those items of an appropriation which are
approved by the governor apart from the line-item vetoes shall become law. Art. IV, §
15 of the Nebraska Constitution does not contain such additional "approval" language.
We do not believe this constitutes a significant difference.
,.
r.
i
Joanne Pepperl
June 25, 2001
Page 8
contrast, the factual situations in the first group of cases cited above often involved
gubernatorial vetoes of directive language or conditions in appropriations bills without a
corresponding reduction in the actual appropriation at issue.
In addition, a number of courts have defined an "item" in an appropriations bill as
an "indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose." Green v. Rawls, 122 So.2d
10, 15 (Fla. 1960). Accord Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371
(Colo. 1985); Brault v. Holleman, 217 Va. 441, 230 S.E.2d 238 (1976). That definition
comports with the definition of "to appropriate" as defined by the Nebraska Supreme
Court. State ex rei. Norfolk Beet-Sugar Company v. Moore, 50 Neb. 88, 69 N.W. 373
(1896). It also comports generally with the requirements for a valid appropriation under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-804 (1998). In that context, the "earmarking" amounts which were
vetoed by the Governor in Section 44 of LB 543 appear to be "items" of appropriation
which might be vetoed by the Governor in that they state that a specific sum of money
should be used for a stated purpose.
As a result, in the absence of any clear Nebraska law, we believe that application
of the Brady "lump sum" rule is appropriate under the circumstances set out in your
opinion request. That brings us to your ultimate question as to what should be printed in
the slip law.
It appears clear from the Governor's veto procedures regarding the earmarking
items at issue that· he did not wish to eliminate all appropriations for the· programs named
therein. He did not place a zero above the items when he crossed them out, and his
reduction and veto for the entire Program 25 contained in Section 44 of LB 543 was for an
amount less than the amounts of the earmarked items which he vetoed. On that basis you
could print the slip law with the language of the earmarked sections intact, minus any
number amount, based upon the fact that only the number amount in the earmarked
section was vetoed by the Governor. The propriety of that course of action, it seems to us,
is dependent upon whether any appropriation still exists for the purposes set out in the
earmarked sections.
In Green v. Rawls, 122 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1960) the governor of Florida vetoed specific
sums for salaries of officials set out within a general appropriation for salaries because
those salaries were, in his view, too low. The court ultimately held that those same officials
could be paid a larger salary than the specific sum originally vetoed by the governor in part
because the general appropriation for salaries was undiminished by the governor's veto
action with respect to the specific sums within the larger appropriation. Similarly, in
Reardon v. Riley, 10 Cal.2d 531, 76 P.2d 101 (1938), the Governor of California vetoed
items within an appropriation to the Department of Industrial Relations which provided that
specific portions of the total appropriation should be expended as therein designated
because the governor considered the Department of Industrial Relations better equipped
Joanne Pepperl
June 25, 2001
Page 9
to make the allocations at issue. The court held that those vetoes eliminated the specific
items at issue, but did not affect the overall appropriation to the Department.
See also
Op. Att'y Gen. No.# 14 (January 28, 1981 )(Veto of earmarked amounts by the Governor
left total appropriation available for any of the authorized purposes of the fund.).
In the present instance, it appears to us, based upon the authorities discussed in
the previous paragraph, that the general appropriation for Program 25 set out at the
beginning of Section 44 is undiminished by the Governor's vetoes of earmarked amounts.
As a result, a general appropriation in the reduced amounts approved by the Governor
(GENERAL FUND of 811,218,432 for FY2001-02 and 839,912,645 for FY2002-03,
together with a PROGRAM TOTAL of 989,538,408 for FY 2001-02 and 1 ,020,020,695 for
FY 2002-03) still exists for expenditures within the purposes of Program 25. Since we
assume that the various earmarked amounts within Program 25 are permitted within that
program, it appears to us that an appropriation still exists for the earmarked items which
the Governor vetoed. For that reason, we believe that it is appropriate for you to print the
slip law with the language of the earmarked sections intact, minus the number amount
excised by the Governor.
Sincerely yours,
DON STENBERG
~;:1k_
Dale A. Comer
Assistant Attorney General
Approved by: