OFFICIAL OPINION No. 25

OFFICIAL OPINION No. 25 Policemen and Firemen's Collective Bargaining Act, 43 P.S. §217.1, et seq.- Liquor Code, 47 P.S. §2-209-Liquor Control Board--Enforcernent person- nel as "policernen." 1. Liquor Control Board Enforcement Officers are not "policemen" within the meaning of Policemen and Firemen's Collective Bargaining Act of June 24, 1968, P .L. , Act No. 111 (43 P .S. §217.l, et seq.) and within the meaning of Article III, §31 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 2. Provision of Article III, § 31 of the Pennsylvania Constitution permitting compulsory arbitration of labor disputes involving policemen and firemen, binding on the Legislature, is a narrow exception to a fundamental prin- ciple of representative democracy and must be construed narrowly. Honorable Ronald G. Lench Secretary Office of Administration Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Dear Secretary Lench: Harrisburg, Pa. April 23, 1973 You have requested our opm10n as to whether or not "en- forcement officers" of the Liquor Control Board are "policemen" within the meaning of the Policemen and Firemen's Collective Bargaining Act of June 24, 1968, P .L. , Act No. 111 ( 43 P.S. §217 .1 et seq.). You are advised that they are not "police- men" within the meaning of that Act, and, more importantly, within the meaning of Article III, §31 of the Constitution of this Commonwealth, the implementation of which Act 111 was designed to accomplish.I Article III, §31 of the Constitution provides : "§31. Delegation of certain powers prohibited. "The General Assembly shall not delegate to any spe- cial commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any munic- ipal improvement, money, property, or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever. Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation or any other provision of the Constitution, the General Assembly may enact laws which provide that the findings of panels or commis- sions, selected and acting in accordance with law for the adjustment or settlement of grievances or disputes or for collective bargaining between policemen and firemen and their public employers shall be binding up- on all parties and shall constitute a mandate to the 1. On November 20, 1968, former Attorney General William C. Sennett was called upon to answer the question you have raised and determined that Liquor Control Board Enforcement Officers, inter aHa, were not policemen within the meaning of the Constitution or of Act 111. We concur in that opinion, but, however, feel it necessary to set forth in a fuller analysis the reasons for ours and Attorney General Sennett's conclusion. 60 OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL head of the political subdivision which is the employ- er, or to the appropriate officer of the C~mmonwealth if the Commonwealth is the ~mployer, V?i~h respect to matters which can be remedied by administrative act- ion, and to the lawmaking body of ~uch political sub- division or of the Commonwealth, with respect to m.at- ters which require legislative act.ion, t,o take the. action necessary to carry out such findings. (Emphasis add- ed.) Act 111 implemented this provision by providing, inter alia, for compulsory arbitration-binding upon the Comrnonwealt!t and/ or its political subdivisions-in order to re.solve la~or dispu~es involving policemen and firemen, when an impasse m collective bargaining has occurred. The question of whether a Liquor Control Board Enforce- ment Officer is a "policeman" within the meaning of the Con- stitution cannot be fully and convincingly determined solely by looking to dictionaries or even to court decisions which have construed the word "policeman" in other contexts and have found it to encompass certain occupations and not to encompass others. This is because those dictionary definitions and court decisions were not construing the word "policeman" against the background of Article III, §31 of the Constitution. Needless to say, the question you asked us has not been determined judicial- ly. Thus, we must look to the purpose of Article III, §31 and Act 111 to determine the proper meaning of the term "policeman" in answering the question you pose. See Statutory Construction Act of 1972, P.L. , Act No. 290, 1 Pa. S. §1921 ( 46 P.S. §1921). In that regard, it is clear that the constitutional pro- hibition against delegation of the tax-levying power to private parties is a fundamental concept of representative democracy and that the above-emphasized portion of Article III, §31 is a narrow exception carved out to prevent the kinds of strikes or work-stoppages by policemen and firemen that leave the citizen- ry at large unprotected and put its lives and property in im- minent danger. Judged by that standard, we do not believe that a work stop- page by Liquor Control Board Enforcement Officers, while ad- mittedly very damaging to the Commonwealth and its taxpayers, can be placed in the same category as a strike by policemen and firemen. While it is possible that should this question be litigat- ed, a trier of fact might be given the latitude to find otherwise, Cf. Allegheny v. Venneri, 5 Comm. Ct. 105 (1972) we do not believe that it was the intention of the people in approving the 1967 amendment to Article III, §31, to cover all "peace officers" having law enforcement responsibilities and powers,2 but only 2. T~is would include at the State .level, at least, parole officers, State in- stitution guards, and Capitol Pohce and Commonwealth Property Police - as well as Liquor Control Board Officers. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 61 those upon whom the general public relies for protection of their lives and property and which lives and property would be placed in imminent peril should a work stoppage occur. We note that this interpretation is buttressed by the provis- ions of the Public Employe Relations Act of July 23, 1970, P. L. ___ , Act No. 195 ( 43 P.S. §1101.101, et seq.) which pro- vide for a more limited compulsory arbitration proceeding for institutional guards and court personnel. Since these officers have many of the powers of policemen, and since institutional guards are described as "peace officers" elsewhere in the law, it is obvious that the Legislature did not consider all "peace of- ficers" to be "policemen" within the meaning of Act 111. (It should be noted that Act 111 was expressly saved from repeal by §2002 of Act 195 ( 43 P.S. §1101.202 ).) For these reasons, we reaffirm the previous opinion of this Office that Liquor Control Board Enforcement Officers are not "policemen" within the meaning of Act lll. Sincerely yours, MARK P. WIDOFF Deputy Attorney General JSRAEL P ACKF.L Attorney General