No. 00-147
Lawful Commands of Police
Cite as Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. No. 00-147
S T A T E O F T E N N E S S E E
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
425 FIFTH AVENUE NORTH
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37243
September 26, 2000
Opinion No. 00-147
Lawful Commands of Police
QUESTION
Whether an individual who intentionally but passively refuses to obey a law enforcement officer’s
reasonable, lawful command commits an offense under Tennessee law?
OPINION
No, an individual who intentionally but passively refuses to obey a law enforcement officer’s
reasonable, lawful command does not commit an offense under Tennessee law because force is a necessary
element of resisting arrest.
ANALYSIS
This issue is controlled by the decision in State v. Corter, 854 S.W.2d 653 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1992), that construed Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602(a), the provision making resisting arrest a
misdemeanor offense. That statutory subsection provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t is an offense for a
person to intentionally prevent or obstruct anyone known to the person to be a law enforcement officer .
. . from effecting a stop, frisk, halt, arrest or search of any person, including the defendant, by using force
against the law enforcement officer or another.” Id.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the defendant on the charge of resisting
arrest, the court in Corter held that force to resist a law enforcement officer’s lawful command is a
necessary element of the offense. 854 S.W.2d at 655. Based on the facts of that case, the court found
the evidence of force insufficient where the defendant initially refused to get into the officer’s patrol car and
directed obscene language at the officer. Id.
The facts in your example reflect no forceful or aggressive conduct on the part of the individual who
merely sits in the vehicle and refuses to exit when commanded by the officer. Based on the authority of
Corter, this office concludes that passive resistance to a reasonable, lawful command from a law
enforcement officer would not constitute an offense under the statute requiring use of force. It appears from
the published and unpublished opinions that some kind of physical force is required.
Page 2
PAUL G. SUMMERS
Attorney General and Reporter
MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General
ELIZABETH B. MARNEY
Assistant Attorney General
Requested by:
Hon. Tom Wright
General Sessions and Juvenile Judge
Greene County Courthouse
101 South Main Street, Suite 303
Greenville, TN 37743