No. 00-05
Fund raising, School Property, County Trustee, Audits
Cite as Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. No. 00-05
S T A T E O F T E N N E S S E E
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
425 Fifth Avenue North
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37243-0497
January 11, 2000
Opinion No. 00-005
Fund raising, School Property, County Trustee, Audits
QUESTIONS
1.
Does state law require that the funds of the Blount County School Food Service
Association be deposited with and/or controlled by the county trustee or by any other official of
county or state government?
2.
If not, is Blount County legally authorized to impose such requirements upon the
association?
3.
If not, is Blount County legally authorized to require the association to submit to audit
by county government?
OPINIONS
1.
No, state law does not require that the funds of the Blount County School Food
Service Association be deposited with and/or controlled by the country trustee or by any other
official of county or state government.
2.
No, Blount County is not legally authorized to impose such a requirement upon the
association.
3.
No, Blount County is not legally authorized to require the association to submit to
audit by county government.
ANALYSIS
It is our understanding that the Blount County School Food Service Association
(“Association”) is a private unincorporated association of employees of the Blount County Board
of Education, and is not an official entity of Blount County or the Blount County Board of
Education. It is also our understanding that the Association raises funds through membership dues,
some of which may be collected from members while they are on school property, and through
various fund raising activities, but that the Association does not receive funding from the Blount
County Board of Education, Blount County, or the State of Tennessee. Finally, it is our
understanding that the Association does not represent Blount County School Food Service
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It is our understanding that the Blount County School Food Service Association
("Association") is a private unincorporated association of employees of the Blount County Board
of Education, and is not an official entity of Blount County or the Blount County Board of
Education. It is also our understanding that the Association raises funds through membership dues,
some of which may be collected from members while they are on school property, and through
County Board of Education, Blount County, or the State of Tennessee. Finally, it is our
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State law does not provide Blount County with the authority to require the Association to
deposit its funds with the Blount County Trustee or any other Blount County official. Furthermore,
in the absence of funding of the Association by Blount County, or some other form of official
affiliation between the Association and Blount County, there does not appear to be any basis for an
implied grant of such authority. Nor does state law authorize Blount County to audit the account
books of the Association.³
County Board of Education ("Board"). Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203(a)(2). See also Howard v.
Bogart, 575 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tenn. 1979) (noting that the "county board of education is the
supreme authority in school matters within the county"). Based upon our understanding that the
Association is composed of employees of the Board and not employees of Blount County, and that
some of the Association's activities may occur on Blount County School property, it is possible that,
district and its employees, and the power to regulate and control the use of school property within
County Trustees are constitutional officers whose duties are prescribed by statute. Tenn. Const., art. VII, §
²County Executives are constitutional officers whose duties are prescribed by statute. Tenn. Const., art. VII,
§1; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 5-6-106-205. County Legislative Bodies are also constitutional officers whose duties are
³Corporations or other entities that receive "grants from or through [the] state" are subject to audit by the State
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County Trustees are constitutional officers whose duties are prescribed by statute. Tenn. Const., art. VII, §
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1; Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-11-104.
County Executives are constitutional officers whose duties are prescribed by statute. Tenn. Const., art. VII,
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§1; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 5-6-106-205. County Legislative Bodies are also constitutional officers whose duties are
prescribed by statute. Tenn. Const., art. VII, § 1; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 5-5-118-127.
Corporations or other entities that receive “grants from or through [the] state” are subject to audit by the State
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of Tennessee Department of Audit. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-3-304.
employees for the purpose of collective bargaining with the Blount County Board of Education.
Based upon these premises, our analysis is as follows:
1.
There is no statutory requirement that the funds of the Association be deposited with,
or controlled by, the Blount County Trustee, or any other Blount County or State government
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official.
2 and 3. Blount County is a political subdivision of the State of Tennessee and its powers
and duties are prescribed by statute. Morris v. Snodgrass, 886 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1994). Accordingly, Blount County may exercise power only where such power is “derived
explicitly or by necessary implication from state law.” Town of Carthage, Tennessee v. Smith
County, Tennessee, 1995 WL 92266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (relying on Bayless v. Knox County, 199
Tenn. 268, 281, 286 S.W.2d 579, 585 (Tenn. 1955)).
State law does not provide Blount County with the authority to require the Association to
deposit its funds with the Blount County Trustee or any other Blount County official. Furthermore,
in the absence of funding of the Association by Blount County, or some other form of official
affiliation between the Association and Blount County, there does not appear to be any basis for an
implied grant of such authority. Nor does state law authorize Blount County to audit the account
books of the Association.3
State law vests authority for the management of the Blount County Schools in the Blount
County Board of Education (“Board”). Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203(a)(2). See also Howard v.
Bogart, 575 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tenn. 1979) (noting that the “county board of education is the
supreme authority in school matters within the county”). Based upon our understanding that the
Association is composed of employees of the Board and not employees of Blount County, and that
some of the Association’s activities may occur on Blount County School property, it is possible that,
under certain circumstances, the Board may have some authority regarding the activities of the
Association.
For example, state law explicitly provides local boards of education and local directors of
schools (superintendents) with the authority to manage the relationship between a local school
district and its employees, and the power to regulate and control the use of school property within
their jurisdiction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-301(f)(31); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-2-203(b)(4),
property for any of its fund raising activities, the Association could certainly be required to comply
School property for such activities. To the extent that the Association uses its members' work time
to collect membership dues, Association members could also be required to comply with any
and/or any contractual provisions within a particular employee-member's employment contract with
of education nor the director of schools has the authority to require the Association to deposit its
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203(b)(10)(A), & 405 (1994 & Supp. 1998). Thus, to the extent that the Association uses school
property for any of its fund raising activities, the Association could certainly be required to comply
with any regulations that the Board may have promulgated regarding the use of Blount County
School property for such activities. To the extent that the Association uses its members’ work time
to collect membership dues, Association members could also be required to comply with any
regulations the Board has established regarding employee use of work time for personal business
and/or any contractual provisions within a particular employee-member’s employment contract with
the Board.
In the absence of state or county funding of the Association, however, neither the local board
of education nor the director of schools has the authority to require the Association to deposit its
funds or subject its account books to audit with any official of the state or county.
__________________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS
Attorney General and Reporter
__________________________________
MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General
__________________________________
JAMES D. ROUNDTREE
Assistant Attorney General
Requested by:
Representative Howard T. Kerr
State Representative, 20th Legislative District
206 War Memorial Building
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0120
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