W. Va. Op. Att'y Gen., Murphy (Aug. 15, 2025)
Opinion of the Attorney General Regarding Trial Court Rule 44.01 (August 15, 2025)
STATE OF WEST EVIRGINIA
MONTH
SEMPER
State of West Virginia
Office of the Attorney General
John B. McCuskey
Phone: (304) 558-2021
Attorney General
Fax: (304) 558-0140
August 15, 2025
The Honorable Seth Murphy
Marion County Prosecuting Attorney
213 Jackson Street
Fairmont, W. Va. 26554
Dear Prosecutor Murphy:
Your office has asked for an Opinion of the Attorney General about the disclosure of
supervision records under Rule 44.01 of the West Virginia Trial Court Rules. This Opinion is being
issued under West Virginia Code Section 5-3-2, which provides that the Attorney General "may
consult with and advise the several prosecuting attorneys in matters relating to the official duties
of their office." When this Opinion relies on facts, it depends solely on the factual assertions in
your correspondence with the Office of the Attorney General.
You explain that Marion County's probation office refuses to provide supervision records
to your office absent a written court order, even when those records are necessary to prosecute
revocations. The probation office maintains that Trial Court Rule 44.01 mandates this disclosure
restriction. We understand that you disputed this reading of Rule 44.01 on two separate occasions.
On the first occasion, the probation office asked your office to file a petition for revocation of
probation against a juvenile probationer due to a failed drug screen. Your office filed the petition,
but because probation did not provide the drug screen results to you or the probationer's counsel,
the court dismissed the case. On the second occasion, the probation office again asked you to
initiate revocation proceedings because of a failed drug screen, but again, the probation office
refused to provide the drug screen results. Following an in camera hearing, the judge verbally
ordered production of the drug screen, but the probation office still insists on having a written
order before production.
With these facts in mind, you raise the following legal question:
Does West Virginia Trial Court Rule 44.01 require probation officers
to secure a court order prior to disclosing supervision records
related to a revocation proceeding to the prosecutor and defense
counsel?
Hon. Seth Murphy
August 15, 2025
Page 2
We conclude that Trial Court Rule 44.01 does not apply to disclosures to counsel in a
revocation proceeding. So probation officers need not obtain a court order before producing
discovery to the prosecutor and defense counsel.
Discussion
A. Before examining the trial court rule at issue, "it is helpful to review the burdens of
evidentiary proof and the procedural standards implicated" during revocation proceedings. State
V. Foye, 916 S.E.2d 88, 96 (W. Va. 2025). A revocation hearing "does not have the same stringent
requirements as a criminal trial." State ex rel. Jones V. Trent, 200 W. Va. 538, 541, 490 S.E.2d 357,
360 (1997). This is because "probation is not a sentence for a crime but instead is an act of grace
upon the part of the State to a person who has been convicted of a crime." Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel.
Strickland V. Melton, 152 W. Va. 500, 165 S.E.2d 90 (1968) (cleaned up).
Yet, probationers are still afforded procedural protections before probation terms are
changed. Revocation hearings "must comport with principles of fundamental fairness." United
States V. Tyler, 605 F.2d 851, 853 (5th Cir. 1979). Thus, a defendant must be afforded certain
"minimal procedural [due process] protections" during a revocation hearing. Syl. Pt. 12, Louk V.
Haynes, 159 W. Va. 482, 484, 223 S.E.2d 780, 783 (1976); see also Foye, 916 S.E.2d at 95
("Probationers are entitled to due process when faced with revocation of their freedom.") (cleaned
up).
Included among these requirements is the "disclosure of the evidence against him or her."
W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(2); accord Syl. Pt. 12, Louk, 159 W. Va. at 484, 223 S.E.2d at 783
(listing requisite procedural protections). And before revocation may be ordered by a court, the
court must find-based on evidence-that "reasonable cause exists to believe
the probationer"
violated the terms of his or her probation. W. VA. CODE § 62-12-10(a)(1); see also Foye, 916
S.E.2d at 98 (construing "reasonable cause" to mean "proof by a simple preponderance of the
evidence.").
B. With these standards and procedures in mind, we turn to Trial Court Rule 44.01, titled
"Petition for Disclosure of Presentence or Probation Records." Rule 44.01 provides:
(a) Except as provided in TCR 43.02, no confidential records of the
court maintained by the probation office, including presentence and
probation supervision records, shall be producible except by written
petition to the court particularizing the need for specific information.
(b) When a demand for disclosure of presentence and probation
records is made by way of subpoena or other judicial process to a
probation officer, the probation officer may petition in writing
seeking instructions from the court regarding a response to the
subpoena.
(c) No disclosure shall be made except upon order of the court.
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Hon. Seth Murphy
August 15, 2025
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On its face, Rule 44.01 does not specify the disclosures to which it applies. Yet reading
Trial Court Rule 44.01 in pari materia with related rules governing probation records demonstrates
that its application is limited: it applies only to third parties-not to counsel litigating revocation
proceedings. See also Syl. Pt. 5, in part, Fruehauf Corp. V. Huntington Moving & Storage Co.,
159 W. Va. 14, 15, 217 S.E.2d 907, 908 (1975) ("Statutes which relate to the same persons or
things, or to the same class of persons or things, or statutes which have a common purpose will be
regarded in Pari materia").
Consider Rule 44.01's neighboring rule, Trial Court Rule 43.01. That rule governs
presentence investigation reports, which are no doubt confidential records, and provides for
automatic disclosure to counsel: "[T]he probation officer shall disclose the presentence
investigation report to the defendant and to counsel for the defendant and to the attorney for the
State not less than ten (10) calendar days prior to sentencing." W. VA. TR. CT. R. 43.01(a). And
Rule 44.01 expressly carves out situations covered by Rule 43.02. Under Rule 43.02, the probation
office must disclose to counsel, upon request, "all underlying public record information pertaining
to the defendant that was gathered by documents obtained and used in the preparation of the
presentence report." W. VA. TR. CT. R. 43.02(b). Taken together, Rule 44.01 is not meant to apply
to discovery disclosures for revocation proceedings.
Reading Trial Court Rule 44.01 differently would undermine basic principles of due
process and the Rules of Criminal Procedure that guarantee a defendant a right to receive discovery
in a revocation proceeding. For one, Rule 32.1(a)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that prior to a revocation hearing, the probationer shall receive "disclosure of
the evidence against him or her" W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(2)(B) (cleaned up); accord State V.
Ellis, No. 21-0076, 2022 WL 1714609, at *3 (W. Va. May 26, 2022) ("The court properly denied
petitioner's request for discovery because the State provided petitioner with all the evidence it
intended to use at petitioner's probation revocation hearing, thus meeting the safeguards of Rule
32.1 and
procedural protections"). For another, it's "axiomatic" that due process demands a
probationer to receive and make use of all evidence against him. U.S. V. Dixon, 187 F. Supp.2c
601, 603 (S.D.W. Va. 2002). So Rule 44.01 cannot extend to the probation office an unfettered
right to refuse disclosures to counsel who are otherwise entitled to inspect and make use of
information as legal counsel. Put plainly, a court order is not required to do what the law already
requires.
The federal rules don't erect such a hurdle either. See, e.g., State V. Ketchum, 169 W. Va.
9, 13 n.4, 289 S.E.2d 657, 659 n.4 (1981) (considering analogous federal rule governing probation
in evaluating West Virginia probation requirements). For example, Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides that prior to a revocation hearing, a probationer is entitled to
"disclosure of the evidence against the person." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2)(B). The Southern
District of West Virginia's Local Rules of Criminal Procedure likewise demand disclosure before
revocation, prescribing that "[t]he probation officer shall, without further request by the
probationer, or releasee, or his/her counsel, disclose to the probationer or releasee or his/her
counsel, all evidence against the probationer or releasee
including any potential oral statement
and any potentially exculpatory material." S.D.W. VA. Loc. R. 32.1.1(b). Similarly, in the
Northern District of West Virginia, "the probation officer shall release necessary probation records
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Hon. Seth Murphy
August 15, 2025
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to other federal, state, county and municipal law enforcement agencies
without petitioning the
Court or obtaining a court order directing the disclosure of those records." N.D.W. VA. Loc. R.
32.02.
Of course, the purpose of Rule 44.01 is to promote the confidentiality of probation's
records. But this concern is only served by limiting third party disclosures; "disclosure [of
probation records] to the public could seriously undermine the [sentencing] process." Howe V.
Detroit Free Press, Inc., 487 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Mich. 1992). Prosecutors have independent duties
to keep their files confidential, and it's the defendant's prerogative to share his own information.
C. Too, there are practical issues with applying Trial Court Rule 44.01 to counsel in active
revocation proceedings.
Without discovery, a prosecutor cannot satisfy the applicable standard of proof by
providing sufficient evidence of the existence of a violation and of the propriety of revocation. See
e.g., Belk V. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1994); Rich V. State, 640 P.2d 159 (Alaska Ct. App.
1982) (probation revocation reversed because state presented no evidence to satisfy its burden of
proving good cause to revoke probation); Commonwealth V. Maggio, 605 N.E.2d 1247 (Mass.
1993) (state must do more than merely present the bare fact of an indictment or indictments for
unrelated offenses in order to sustain burden of presenting sufficient evidence to justify
revocation); Randall V. State, 741 So.2d 1183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1999) (at revocation
hearing state must produce enough evidence to satisfy standard of proof; probationer did not admit
violations and no violations were proven). Even more, "[t]he prosecuting attorney representing
the State and, as a consequence, the victim, in criminal matters has a legitimate role to play in
probation considerations" and a court's "decision should consider the input of the [prosecutor], as
well as the probation office." State ex rel. Reed V. Douglass, 189 W. Va. 56, 58, 427 S.E.2d 751,
753 (1993). Conversely, a probationer will not be able to effectively defend against the petition
for revocation. And trial by ambush is a thing of the past.
Together, application of Rule 44.01 to discovery in revocation proceedings would run afoul
of "the twofold aim
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." Berger V. U.S., 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935) (cleaned up). "The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both
fundamental and comprehensive." U.S. V. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708-09 (1974). So "[t]he ends of
criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative
presentation of the facts." Id.
Docket congestion would also ensue if orders were required for the disclosure of evidence
in every revocation proceeding. Requiring this from our circuit courts is unreasonable and will
produce substantial financial costs for the State to maintain such a system. A revocation
proceeding is not as rigid as trial proceedings, nor was it ever intended to be. This is because
"probation is not a sentence for a crime but instead is an act of grace upon the part of the State to
a person who has been convicted of a crime." Syl. Pt. 2, Melton, 52 W. Va. at 500, 165 S.E.2d at
91 (cleaned up). Stated another way, "probation is simply one of the devices of an enlightened
system of penology which has for its purpose the reclamation and rehabilitation of the criminal."
Id. at 506, 94. So a revocation hearing "does not have the same stringent requirements as a criminal
trial." Trent, 200 W. Va. at 541, 490 S.E.2d at 360. The State has an interest in expeditiously
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Hon. Seth Murphy
August 15, 2025
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containing the threat posed by, and imposing punishment upon, noncompliant probationers. And
the law concerning revocation proceedings is designed to properly balance the State's interest in
informality, flexibility, and economy with the probationer's conditional liberty interests.
At bottom, applying Rule 44.01 to revocation discovery disclosure frustrates the purpose
and intent of probation enforcement mechanisms, overcomplicates a flexible penal system, and
flies in the face of due process.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we conclude that Trial Court Rule 44.01 does not apply to discovery
disclosures made in the course of a probation revocation proceeding.
Sincerely,
John B. McCuskey
Attorney General
Holly J. Wilson
Principal Deputy Solicitor General
Mattie F. Shuler
Assistant Solicitor General
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