85-101
Is it a conflict of interest for a newly elected member of the county quorum court to also be a VP of Sales and/or hold some office with Riggs Tractor Company (a company which does business with the county)? 14-14-1202 Conflict of interest does exist.
Cite as Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. 85-101
STATE OF ARKANSAS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
JUSTICE BUILDING, LITTLE ROCK 72201
STEVE CLARK (501) 371-2007
ATTORNEY GENERAL
OPINION NO. 85-101 April 8, 1985
al
Mr. William Clay Brazil
Prosecuting Attorney
1005 Front Street
Conway, Arkansas 72032
Dear Mr. Brazil:
You have requested an opinion from our office on the following question:
Does the election to the Faulkner County Quorum
Court of a Vice President in charge of sales or
another officer of Riggs Tractor Company, preclude
the County from continuing to do business with this
company?
The answer to your question is governed by Ark, Stat. Ann. §17-4208(3)
(1980) which provides, inter alia, that "No officer or employee of county
government shall: (a) be interested, either directly or indirectly, in any
contract or transaction made, authorized, or entered into on behalf of the
county . .. ." (Emphasis Added).
Although we are aware of no Arkansas case which defines an “indirect interest”,
this type of "conflict of interest" statute is common throughout the United
States. In United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520
(1961), the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret a federal provision
prohibiting any direct or indirect interest in government contracts by govern-
ment agents. The Court said, "The statute is thus directed not only at dishonor,
but also at conduct that tempts dishonor, . . +, It attempts to prevent honest
government agents from succumbing to tempation by making it illegal for them
to enter into relationships which are fraught with temptation." Id at 549-50
We think this interpretation best serves the spirit of §17-4208, significantly
entitled "Ethics for county officials and employees."
Furthermore, under Arkansas Law,
"(T]he meaning of a statute must be determined from the
natural and obvious import of the language used by the
legislature without resorting to subtle and forced con~
struction, for the purpose of limiting or extending the
meaning. * * * * Ite is our duty to construe a legislative
enactment just as it reads."
City of. North Little Rock v. Montgomery, 261 Ark, 16, 18, 546 S.W. 2d 154, 159
(1977) (Citing Black v. Cockrill, Judge, 247 Ark, 367, 389 S.W. 2d 881 (1965).
Mr, William Clay Brazil
April 8, 1985
Page 2
The word "indirectly" was defined in Cahen Trust v. United States, 292 F.2d 33,
36-(1961)—as"roundabout;—.. not resuiting-_directly—from—an_act_or_cause_but___
more or less remotely connected with or growing out of it." (Quoting Webster's
New International Dictionary.)
Also important to the natural and obvious import of the lanpuage used is the
breadth of the prohibition, there being no delineated exceptions as in other
Arkansas statutes. Compare Ark. Stat, Ann. §19-909 (Supp. 1983).
Accordingly, we conclude that §17+-4208 is broad enough to encompass the
situation where a Quorum Court member is an officer of a private business
enterprise and that a conflict of interest, barring further business with
the enterprise, does exist.
The foregoing opinion, which IT hereby approve, was prepared by
Chief Deputy Attorney General Rodney Parhan,
Yo ruly,
STENE 4 RK ht-
Attorkey General
SC:RP:1m