Electrical Construction Corp.

340 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD assist United Textile Workers of America, AFL, or any other labor organization, to bar- gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL offer to Bertha Pelka immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the interference, restraint, coercion, and discrimination against her. All of our employees are freetobecome , remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining members in good standing in United Textile Workers of America, AFL, or any other labor organization, except to the extent that this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. GERA MILLS, Employer. Dated .............. By....................................................................................... (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and INDUS- TRIAL UNION OF MARINE AND SHIPBUILDING WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO. Case No. 1-CA-1471. April 21, 1954 DECISION AND ORDER On November 10, 1953, Trial Examiner Charles W. Schneider issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged inthe complaint and recommended dismissal of those allegations. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs. The General Counsel filed no exceptions. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was com- mitted. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has con- sidered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in this case, and finds merit in the Respond- ent's exceptions. 1. The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent did not refuse employment to Doyle in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act as alleged in the complaint. As no exceptions were filed to this finding, we shall dismiss that portion of the, com- plaint. 108 NLRB No. 70. ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION 341 2. We are unable to agree with the Trial Examiner in his finding that the Respondent has violated Section 8 (a) (4) of the Act. During the last week of May 1953, Doyle inquired of Foreman Woodward' concerning the possibilities of employment with the Respondent as an electrician. He was told that the Respondent was "begging for electricians." The following Tuesday, Doyle visited the Respondent's place of business, applied for employ- ment to Superintendent Jacobson and gave himhis qualifications as an electrician, but was not hired.' Doyle then telephoned Jacobson on Friday, June 5, and was told that there was no change but Doyle would probably hear from him. The Respond- ent, at that time, needed mechanical men-installers of fixtures, cables, and clips--a lower paying job requiring less skill which electricians can and do perform when needed. Over the weekend, Jacobson decided to reinterview Doyle andhirehim if he could do mechanical work. On Monday, June 8, Jacobson was informed by a Board field examiner that Doyle had filed Section 8 (a) (3) charges against the Respondent. Jacobs on told the field' examiner in effect that he had been considering going down to the housing project to see Doyle and now because he filed the charge he did not consider him adesirable employee. Jacobson testified at the hearing that he was disconcerted by what Doyle had done and that he felt it would be inadvisable to hire Doyle under the circumstances. Several employees in mechanical men and electrician classifications were hired bythe Respond- ent between July 7 and August 13. Doyle, however, did not apply for employment with the Respondent at any time after filing the charge, and at no time after the charge was filed did the Re- spondent have occasion to tell Doyle that it would not hire him. Although the Trial Examiner found no merit in the Section 8 (a) (3) charge filed by Doyle, he, nevertheless, found that the Respondent did not reinterview Doyle because he had filed the charge; that he would have been hired had he been interviewed; and that, therefore, Doyle was refused employment, in violation of Section 8 (a) (4), because he had filed the charge alleging a violation of Section 8 (a) (3). In support of this finding, the Trial Examiner relies on the Maclin and Mooresville Mills cases. ' However, each of these cases involved a laid-off em- ployee who after filing an unfair labor practice charge against an employer applied for reinstatement and was thereupon rejected because the employee either had filed the charge or had refused todropthe charge uponthe request of the employer. In the instant case , however, Doyle had not been employed by the Respondent in the first instance, and moreover at no time after filing the charge against the Respondent had he requested employment. Although the Respondent admittedly decided that it 'Woodward could not hire or discharge employees but could effectively recommend such action. 2 The record revealed that electricians were not needed at that time but were needed approximately 2 weeks later. 3 John H. Maclin Co , 84 NLRB 384 at 386-387; Mooresville Mills, 99 NLRB 572 at 586, 589. 342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD would not be advisable to hire Doyle after he filed the charge, the Respondent did not communicate that fact to Doyle, nor did it tell him that he would be refused employment if he applied. In a case4 involving facts similar to those of the instant case, an employee first filed Section 8 (a) (3) charges against the respondent and later filed Section 8 (a) (4) charges, The wit- nesses for the respondent testified at the hearing that the em- ployee would not have been employed after filing the Section 8 (a) (3) charge had he been present when the vacancies arose, but this attitude was not conveyed to the employee. The court, at page 48, said: Undoubtedly this evidence warrants the conjecture that if Smith had been available whenvacancies occurred, he would probably have not been chosen, although of course one can- not be quite certain what decision the company would have made if confronted with the actual situation. It is sufficient to say that the employer was never called upon to make this particular choice, and that no unlawful discrimination actually occurred. The National Labor Relations Act is not concerned with hypothesis, but with realities; it does not seek to prohibit evil intent but unfair labor practices, and there was no substantial evidence such a practice inert airs case. (Emphasis added.) Here, too, the record shows, at the most, a state of mind, but no actual act on the part of the Respondent pursuant to such state of mind. As Doyle did not apply to the Respondent, the latter was never called upon after the charge alleging a violation of Section 8 (a) (3) to decide whether to hire Doyle or not. Con- sequently, there is no proof that any violation of Section 8 (a) (4) in fact occurred. We shall, therefore, also dismiss that portion of the complaint. In accordance with the foregoing, we shall dismiss the com- plaint in its entirety. [The Board dismissed the complaint.,] 4F. W. Poe Manufacturing Co. v. N. L.R. B., 119 F. 2d 45 (C. A. 4), setting aside the order of the Board in 27 NLRB 1257. Intermediate Report and Recommended Order This proceeding brought under Section 10 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act (61 Stat., 136) against the Respondent, Electrical Construction Corporation, upon charges duly filed, complaint, and answer, was heard, pursuant to due notice, in Boothbay, Maine, on October 5, 1953 The allegations, denied by the answer, are that the Respondent, in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act, refused to hire Daniel Joseph Doyle because of his Union member- ship and activities, and further, in violation of Section 8 (a) (4) and (1), refused to hire Doyle because he had filed charges of unfair labor practices against the Respondent i All parties were represented by counsel, participated in the hearing, and were afforded full opportunity to present and to meet evidence, to engage in oral argument, and to file briefs Briefs were filed by the Respondent and by the Union on October 26, 1953, and have been con- 'An allegation in the complaint to the effect that the Respondent had also violated Section 8 (a) (3), (4), and (1) by discharging and refusing to reinstate one Erwin Greenleaf, was withdrawn by the General Counsel at the opening of the hearing. ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION 343 sidered on October 29 amendments to its brief , likewise considered , were received from the Respondent. From my observation of the witnesses , and upon the basis of the record in the case, I make the following. L FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS It is conceded , and found , that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act, and that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) of the Act.2 IL THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES In the early part of 1953, Daniel Doyle, a qualified marine electrician, resident of Boothbay Harbor , and a long-time employee of Bath Iron Works , assisted the Union in an organizational campaign at several shipyards in Boothbay Harbor. Among these yards was Sample's, the prime contractor for the ships on which the Respondent does the electrical installation. The Respondent's work is performed in Sample's yard. The campaign was a matter of common knowledge in the community. Among other activities, Doyle permitted Union meetings to be held at his house, passed out union literature at Sample's gate, and testified at a representation hearing involving one of the other yards. Around the latter part of May 1953, Doyle inquired of Harold P. Woodard, the Respondent's foreman, and a supervisory employee, as to the possibilities of employment with the Respond- ent as an electrician. Woodard told Doyle that the Respondent was "begging for" electricians. Doyle, with the apparent recommendation of Woodard, then applied to the Respondent's super- intendent , Oscar Jacobson, for employment , gave his qualifications , and was told that he would be called if he could be used On the following day, the Respondent's leadman, Withington, told Doyle that he was wasting his time applying for employment with the Respondent: Doyle, Withington said, was "black- listed" because he was a "union agitator." 8 About June 5, Doyle telephoned Superintendent Jacobson and asked what the situation was Jacobson told Doyle that there was no change, but that Doyle would probably hear from him. At that time the Respondent needed mechanical men - - installers of fixtures, cables , and clips-- a job for which Doyle was qualified and which electricians can and do perform when needed. Jacobson was then, according to his testimony, "leaning toward" hiring Doyle. Over that weekend, however, Foreman Woodward, in a conversation with Doyle, told Doyle-- though without authority from Superintendent Jacobson, and without his knowledge--in sub- stance, that the Respondent would not employ him. In the same conversation, according to Doyle's testimony--denied by Woodard- -Woodard told Doyle that Superintendent Jacobson had requested Philip'Blake, personnel director for Sample, to "clear" Doyle for employment, but that Blake had, for undisclosed reasons, refused I find it unnecessary to decide this conflict.4 Over the same weekend a charge, alleging that the Respondent had refused to hire Doyle because of his Union activity, was filed with the Board by Doyle's representative on behalf of Doyle Over the same weekend, unaware either of Woodard's conversation with Doyle, or of the filing of the charge on behalf of Doyle, Superintendent Jacobson decided that he was in a 2 The Respondent, a Massachusetts corporation with its principal office in Boston, Massa- chusetts, is an electrical contractor engaged at Boothbay Harbor, Maine, as a subcontractor, in the installation of marine electrical equipment in crash boats for the U. S. Air Force, and mine sweepers for the U S. Navy. An undisclosed percentage of Respondent's raw materials are secured from Boston. During the past 2 years the value of the Respondent's work on the mine sweepers was $210,000. No estimate could be given as to the value of the Respondent's services on the crash boats, on which some 28 employees are presently working for the Respondent. a Withington has the reputation of being a practical joker. I find him not to be a supervisory employee. There is no other foundation lending probative value to his declaration. I do not attribute the declaration to the Respondent, 47he evidence is to the effect that applicants for employment in the Harbor are cleared through the various yards in order to avoid the "pirating" of labor. Doyle was not at that time employed in the Harbor. 344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD position to hire a man, and resolved to contact Doyle for the job. On Monday , June 8, however, Jacobson was informed of the filing of the charge . He thereupon decided that it "wouldn't be advisable to hire[Doyle ] under those conditions " Conclusions The Respondent' s answer, admitting the failure to hire Doyle, ascribes as reason therefor, its "inability to profitably hire said Doyle at the time application was made by him for employment " However , at the hearing the Respondent advanced several additional reasons for not hiring Doyle, namely ( 1) he was unfit for employment , and (2) upon hearing of the filing of the charge, it concluded that he was no longer interested in employment In my opinion , the evidence does not establish that Doyle's Union activities were a factor in the Respondent' s decision not to employ him . It is my judgment , however , for the reasons hereinafter given, that the evidence preponderantly establishes that the reason Doyle was not hired was that he had filed charges under the Act 1. Unavailability of employment As to this, the Respondent's contention, and some of its testimony , is that at the time of Doyle's application it had no vacancies as electricians , a condition which continued to exist until late June. The explanation given is that in May a stepup in delivery schedule of one of the ships required the use of every available man , and more, on that ship , in order to insure its delivery in late May. Because of that circumstance, no mechanical work preparatory to the actual connection of cables had been done on the next ship at the time of Doyle's application. Consequently , the assertion runs , the Respondent , though it needed mechanical men, had no need for electricians at that time, nor indeed until late June The evidence establishes , however , that electricians are to a large extent interchangeable with mechanical men: The electrician can and does do mechanical work when necessary, and the Respondent so uses them. In addition the Respondent , as Woodard' s testimony indicates, anticipated a "terrific" delivery date on the next ship. Qualified electricians were hard to get and it was certain that the Respondent would need them in the very near future. Woodard's statement to Doyle, when the latter inquired about prospects of employment , to the effect that the Respondent was "begging for" electricians , seems about to sum up the situation. In his testimony Woodard sought to explain this assertion of his to Doyle as "mistaken," but it is significant that, according to his own testimony , Woodard told Doyle as late as June 6 (by which time Woodard could scarcely have continued to be mistaken ) that he wanted to "hang on to" Doyle, indicating that he needed him The evidence likewise shows that, whether it needed electricians or not, the Respondent hired them during the same period of time. Thus , on the day Doyle first talked to Jacobson, May 28, Erwin Greenleaf, a mechanical electrician , was hired but was laid off the same day. On Monday, June 8, an electrician was hired , though this may be explainable because of the individual' s familiarity with office work On June 9, Millard Pinkham, an electronics elec- trician, was hired to install electronic cables and apparatus--a job for which Doyle was qualified . On June 15, on June 16, and thereafter , other electricians were also hired. There were thus job vacancies which Doyle was qualified , on the basis of his experience as the Respondent knew it, to fill. In any event , Jacobson's testimony makes clear that on'June 8 he intended to contact Doyle with regard to employment --a somewhat pointless action unless he considered hiring him Consequently , whether there were actual job vacancies on that date would not be con- trolling , even if it were a fact Jacobson considered hiring Doyle , and the issue is therefore whether he changed that view for legitimate reasons. 5 5Jacobson's testimony is that on the morning of June 8, ... I perhaps made up my mind I would hire him - - [Counsel for Respondent): You say you actually would have? A. If the interview that I would have with him would bear out that he could do mechanical work and have a knowledge of the work he would do. ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION 345 2. Fitness for employment Except for a period of military service in World War II, Doyle had been employed by the Bath Iron Works, shipbuilders, for 18years, thelast 8 of them as a marine electrician and mechan- ical man Superintendent Jacobson's testimony is that Doyle's experience appeared to qualify him for employment by the Respondent. As I interpret the testimony Foreman Woodard, who knew the workmen in the community, recommended Doyle to Superintendent Jacobson. Doyle, in fact, had done electrical work for Woodard in the latter's home. It seems clear to me from the testimony, and from observation of the witnesses, that neither Jacobson nor Woodard had any real doubts as to Doyle's technical qualifications for an electrician's job with the Re- spondent. However, Jacobson testified that one of the reason he originally hesitated about hiring Doyle was because of concern over whether Doyle might be a "drinking" man 6 However, Jacobson specifically disclaimed any imputation that Doyle was a drunkard, or that his habits were such as would disqualify him for employment. Indeed, Doyle's 18 years of service with the Bath Iron Works would seem to negate any such conclusion Jacobson's testimony as to how this issue arose is as follows: Q. [Counsel for Respondent] At what time did you meet Mr Doyle, Mr. Jacobson, the morning he was introduced to you by Mr. Woodard? A. It was fairly early -- between seven and seven-thirty or thereabouts. Q. In the morning? A. In the morning. Q. Did you smell anything? A. I smelled he had a bad breath. Q. Was it in the sense of alcohol or bad because he didn't brush his teeth A. Seems to me it was smoking and alcohol -- it was a stench. Q. Did you consider that as a relevant factor in making up your mind if you were to make it up whether or not to hire a man on the job qho smells of alcohol at seven to eight o'clock in the morning? A. Not wholly. It was a factor The Respondent's employees generally both smoke and drink "Drinking" men are not uncommon, either in the industry or in the Respondett's employ. Thus, on June 8, 1953, the day Jacobson decided not to contact Doyle, he hired an electrician with a reputation in the community for drinking, who had left his prior job because of an extended drinking bout--all of which Jacobson knew--and who, on the Friday prior to the hearing, had been sent home by Jacobson for drunkenness on the job. This employee was not discharged by Jacobson. I conclude that Jacobson had no real concern about Doyle's "drinking" habits, and neither the record nor my observation of Doyle reveals a basis for any 7 Finally, if Jacobson had any doubt about whether Doyle's personal habits would make him a desirable employee, Jacobson apparently resolved them in favor of Doyle over the weekend. Thus, he decided, according to his testimony, to reinterview Doyle and to hire him if Doyle "could do mechanical work and [had] a knowledge of the work he would do." 3. Whether the Respondent believed that Doyle was no longer interested in employment It seems apparent from the evidence that the reason Superintendent Jacobson abandoned his decision to contact Doyle was because of the filing of the 8 (a) (3) charge--which I find unsub- stantiated. Thus, Jacobson described his reaction as follows, when informed on June 8 that Doyle had filed the charge: Q. What was your immediate reaction A. I was surprised. 6 This contention is not discussed in the Respondent's brief and should probably therefore be considered abandoned; but is nevertheless considered, since raised in Jacobson's testimony. 7 In this connection, I have noted that 2 weeks prior to the hearing Jacobson contacted the Bath Iron Works for information as to Doyle's record there. The evidence does not indicate that he learned anything derogatory to Doyle. 346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Q. Why were you surprised? A. Because over the weekend I had made up my mind that I would go down to either [Doyle's home]or call Doyle up and give him another interview about hiring him And when [a Board field examiner] mentioned the fact that Mr Doyle filed a charge about me, I was surprised and kind of felt mean about it that anybody would do that to me. And further on: Q. After the Examiner told you that Doyle had filed a Charge what did you tell the Examiner? A. I was surprised and I came out with a statement or words to the effect that I was considering going down to the housing project to see Mr. Doyle about employment and now because he had made that charge, thinking along the lines that he didn't want to work for me -- the hell with him--excuse my French--that's the way I felt about it.8 Jacobson then testified that he did not consider Doyle to be an applicant for a job after the filing of the charge. I have difficulty in understanding how Jacobson could have arrived at this conclusion. I do not think that the filing of a charge of refusal to hire reflects an abandonment of a desire for employment. Ordinarily, in the absence of unusual circumstances, I would conclude the exact opposite. Under thepresent circumstances, and from observation of Jacobson and consideration of his testimony, I cannot credit the assertion that he actually entertained the thought that Doyle had abandoned his desire for employment. 9 On the basis of thewhole record, it is myconclusion that Jacobson did not reinterview Doyle, and declined to further consider him for employment, because Doyle had filed the 8 (a) (3) charge. Doyle's status was thus changed from that of a person being considered by the Re- spondent for -employment, to one whom it would not so consider. This alone, in my judgment, constituted a violation of Section 8 (a) (4). John H. Maclin Co., 84 NLRB 384, 386-387, Mooresville Mills, 99 NLRB 572, 586, 589. I further find, however, on the basis of Jacobson's testimony, that Doyle would have been hired had he been interviewed. See Jacobson's testimony quoted in footnote 5, supra. Doyle was qualified to do both electrical and mechanical work a fact not now disputed, and which Jacobson would have ascertained in the interview--even if he did not already know. Apart from its position that the complaint is factually unsupported, the Respondent also urges certain legal and procedural defenses. Thus, the Respondent--distinguishing the case of Phelps-Dodge Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 313 U. S 177, in which the Supreme Court held that an applicant for employment was within the protection of Section 8 (3) of the Wagner Act- -con- tends that an applicant for employment is not an "employee" within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (4). The Respondent 's position is that such distinction results from the fact that section 8 (a) (3) forbids discrimination as to "hire," whereas Section 8 (a) (4) forbids it only as to "employees." The cases, however, draw no such distinction. In the case of Briggs Mfg. Co., 75 NLRB 569, 570-572, the Board held that the word "employee" in Section 8 (4) of the Wagner Act was a generic term applicable to applicants for employment, and not a word of art referring only to persons then employed by the charged employer And see also decisions after the 1947 amendments John Hancock Ins. Co , 92 NLRB 122, 133; Atlanta Broadcasting Co., 79 NLRB 626; cf. Mead Corp., 52 NLRB 1361. It is consequently found that Doyle was an employee within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (4) of the Act. The Respondent further contends that the complaint must be dismissed for the reason that no charge alleging an 8 (a) (4) violation was filed. The record discloses, however, that on 8In an affidavit given June 9, and which he testified was true, Jacobson said in part: "Over the weekend was the first time that I thought I could use any men. Yesterday, I had planned to either go down to JDoyle's] housing project or call him by telephone but then I learned he had filed a charge from the Examiner; I decided then that it wouldn't be advisable to hire him under those conditions." 9In its brief the Respondent urges that Doyle had actually ceased to be an applicant for employment because "his inquiries suddenly stopped the day before he filed his charge." The reason Doyle ceased making inquiries concerning employment is quite apparent: Foreman Woodward told him that the Respondent would not employ him. ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION 347 August 6, 1953, a charge was filed alleging that the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (4) with respect to the hiring of Doyle. The jurisdictional requirement was thereby satisfied. That the charge may have lacked sufficient factual elaboration to constitute an effective pleading is immaterial. It alleged a violation of Section 8 (a) (4), was timely filed, and was duly served upon the Respondent. It is found that Doyle was refused employment by the Respondent on June 8, 1953, and there- after, because he had filed charges under the Act; and that the Respondent thereby violated Section 8 (a) (4) of the statute, and interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Ill. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth above, occur ring in connection with its operations previously described, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstruct- ing commerce and the free flow of commerce. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it will be recom- mended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. It will be recommended that the Respondent offer Doyle employment as an electrician at its Boothbay Harbor operation and, in accordance with the Board's usual remedial policies (The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch. 65 NLRB 827; Crossett Lumber Co., 8 NLRB 440; F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289) make him whole for any loss of pay incurred since June 8, 1953, by reason of the discrimination. In view of the circumstances of the violation, I do not deem a general cease-and-desist order necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. It will be further recommended that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violation of Section 8 (a) (3). Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1 By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 2 By discriminating against Doyle because he filed charges under the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (4) of the Act. 3 The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 4 The Respondent has not committed unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publicationj, APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations ofa Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate against employees because they have filed unfair labor practice charges under the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL offer Daniel Doyle employment as an electrician at our Boothbay Harbor operation. 348 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL make Daniel Doyle whole for any loss of pay incurred as a result of our failure to hire him. ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Employer. Dated . ............... By.............................................................................................. (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted,for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. THE MENNEN COMPANY and JAMES GRAHAM, Petitioner and LOCAL 649, UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL. Case No. 4-UD-2. April 21, 1954 DECISION AND ORDER Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (e) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Eugene M. Levine, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds: 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The labor organization involved claims to represent em- ployees of the Employer. 3. On July 21, 1953, the Petitioner, an employee of the Em- ployer, filed a petition seeking rescission of the authority of the Union to enter into a union-security agreement made pursuant to Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. The Employer is engaged in the manufacture of toiletries. Before 1953, the Employer carried on production operations in a plant at Newark, New Jersey, and warehousing and shipping operations in a separate plant at South Kearney, New Jersey. In February 1953, the Employer transferred the operations of the Newark and Kearney plants to a new plant at Morristown, New Jersey. While still operating at the separate locations, on November 15, 1951, and February 8, 1952, respectively, the Union and the Employer executed separate collective-bargaining contracts covering warehouse employees at South Kearney, and production-maintenance employees at Newark. Both these contracts will expire on May 15, 1954. In view of the fact that we are on the same date directing a representation election, and that the current contract contain- ing the union-security clause will expire on May 15, 1954, we find that no useful purpose would be served by directing a 108 NLRB No. 61