Astronautics Corp. of America

ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA 623 Astronautics Corporation of America and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO Astronautics Corporation of America and Phyllis L. Flikeid Astronautics Corporation of America and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO. Cases 30-CA-384, 30-CA-397, and 30-RC-434. May 16, 1967 DECISION AND ORDER Respondent's president on June 21, 1966, did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 2 The General Counsel excepts to the failure of the Trial Examiner to find that Respondent's letter of June 15, 1966, contained a threat of loss of existing benefits if the employees voted in favor of the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. We agree. Respondent's letter to all its employees, stating that "Under the law, an employer is not required even to continue in effect its existing benefits if a union wins Bargaining is a two- way street and it starts from scratch," carries with it the coercive implication that the employees may wind up with less than what they already have, in the event they exercise their lawful right to bargain collectively, and, accordingly, violates the Act We further find that these statements, when viewed in the context of other violations committed by Respondent, are sufficiently serious to justify the issuance of a remedial order. Compare, Howell Refining Company, 163 NLRB 18 (1967) BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS On December 23, 1966, Trial Examiner Abraham H. Mailer issued his Decision in the above- entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner further found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended dismissal of these allegations. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision with a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed cross-exceptions to the Decision with a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing, and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, cross- exceptions, and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,' and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, as modified herein.2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Respondent, Astronautics Corporation of America, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. i In the absence of exceptions , we adopt pro forma the Trial Examiner's recommendation that certain statements made by TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ABRAHAM H. MAILER, Trial Examiner: In Case 30-CA-384, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO, herein referred to as the Union, filed a charge on May 2,1 a second amended charge on May 23, and a third amended charge on June 27. In Case 30-CA-397, Phyllis L. Flikeid filed a charge on May 17. Upon the aforesaid charges, the Regional Director for Region 30 of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, on July 29, issued a consolidated complaint on behalf of the General Counsel of the Board against Astronautics Corporation of America, herein called the Respondent, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151,et seq.), herein called the Act. In its duly filed answer, Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor practice. In Case 30-RC-434, pursuant to a petition filed by the Union on April 20, and a Decision and Direction of Election issued by the Regional Director on May 24, an election by secret ballot was conducted under the direction and supervision of the Regional Director on June 22. A tally of the ballots showed that there were approximately 137 eligible voters and that 128 ballots were cast, of which 56 were for the Union (Petitioner), 68 were agairt"st the Union, and 4 were challenged. The Union filed timely objections to conduct affecting the results of the election. Thereafter, the Regional Director caused an investigation to be made on the objections and, on August 1, issued and served on the parties his Report on Objections in which he recommended that one objection be overruled. As to the remaining objections, he found that they raised substantial issues with respect to credibility which could most expeditiously be resolved by a hearing, noting that the allegations in the objections are substantially similar to the allegations in Case 30-CA-384, which was then scheduled for hearing before a Trial Examiner. Accordingly, he ordered that the representation case be consolidated with the complaint cases herein for the purpose of eliciting evidence pursuant to which the Board may discharge its duties under Section 9(c) of the Act. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Trial Examiner Abraham H. Maller at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, I All of the events in the instant proceeding, unless otherwise specified, occurred in 1966 164 NLRB No. 89 624 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD on August 30, 31, September 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8. The General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Union were represented and were afforded full opportunity to be heard and to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral argument, and to file briefs with me. Briefs were filed by all parties represented by counsel. Upon consideration of the entire record, including the briefs of the parties, and upon my observation of each of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, a Wisconsin Corporation with its principal office and plant in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of electronic aircraft instruments. During the 12 months immediately preceding the issuance of the consolidated complaint, Respondent sold and shipped, in interstate commerce, products valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside the State of Wisconsin. In view of the foregoing, I find and conclude that the Respondent is engaging in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to assert jurisdiction here. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Brotherhood of Electrical) Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO, is, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III THE ISSUES 1. Whether the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by: (a) Promising the employees benefits if the employees rejected the Union. (b) Threatening employees that if they voted in favor of the Union, Respondent would cease its existing practice of interdepartmental transfers during a work shortage, thereby threatening employee layoffs. (c) Discriminatorily promulgating an invalid no- solicitation rule designed to interfere with the Union's campaign, and thereafter enforcing said rule against union solicitation while at the same time permitting employees to solicit for other purposes. (d) Unlawfully soliciting, assisting, and inducing its employees to revoke the authorizations they had previously given to the Union. (e) Threatening an employee with termination because of her membership in, support of, and activities on behalf of the Union. (f) Threatening an employee with reprisals and retribution if the Union were voted into the plant. (g) Interrogating an employee with respect to the union sentiments, sympathies, and interests of another employee. (h) Announcing and granting disproportionate wage increases to certain of its employees, designed to discourage said employees from becoming or remaining members of the Union, or otherwise assisting the Union. (i) Threatening employees with loss of existing benefits if the employees voted in favor of the Union. 2. Whether Respondent discriminatorily suspended employee Jean Ilgenfritz because of her membership in, sympathy for, and activities on behalf of the Union. 3. Whether the Respondent discriminatorily issued a written reprimand to employee Jean Ilgenfritz because of her membership in, sympathy for, and activities on behalf of the Union and because she had previously given testimony in a hearing conducted by the Board. 4. Whether the Respondent discharged employeee Phyllis Flikeid because of her membership in, support of, and activities on behalf of the Union. 5. Whether the objections to the election are supported by substantial evidence. IV THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background L The Union's campaign at Respondent's plant began on November 15, 1965 However, authorization cards were not distributed until February 1966 Union meetings of employees began on March 26 and were held weekly thereafter, except on Memorial Day In the meantime, a rival union, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America attempted to organize Respondent's employees. The attempt appears to have been short-lived. Under date of March 11, "Astronautics U.E. Organizing Committee" sent a letter to the Respondent's employees, in which it compared their wages and benefits with those which U.E. had obtained for the employees at Allen-Bradley and charged that more than a dozen of Respondent's employees have been fired during the past several weeks without being given a reason. On March 17, Respondent held a meeting of its employees in the plant cafeteria. President Nathaniel K. Zelazo, Vice President Norma Z. Paige," and Personnel Manager Anthony Methenitis spoke at this meeting. President Zelazo referred to the U.E. letter and stated that he had received one. Vice President Paige reminded the employees that the Respondent had in effect a rule prohibiting solicitation during worktime, but that during their lunch hour, coffeebreaks, and before and after worktime, they could do as they pleased. Personnel Manager Methenitis referred to the statements in the U.E. letter concerning people that had been discharged and asked if there were any questions. Employee Jean Ilgenfritz asked about two friends of hers who had been discharged and who had not been given any reason therefor. Methenitis replied that he had no records with him at the time and asked Ilgenfritz to come to his office the following day. The following day she went to Methenitis' office. Respondent had asked her to take another employee with her, and she was accompanied by employee Mary Graf. Present at Methenitis' office, in addition to Methenitis, were Production Manager Gerald Tackes and Foreman Feltis. Ilgenfritz asked about the two people who had been discharged, and Methenitis looked at his records and told Ilgenfritz that there was a reason for their dismissal and that they had been given a reason therefor. He asked her to tell these people to call him if they desired. I None of the events detailed in this subsection is alleged to have constituted an unfair labor practice 3 Paige is a member of the bar of New York ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA 625 B. Alleged Restraint, Coercion, and Interference Admittedly, Respondent sought to combat the Union's attempt to organize the plant. This involved letters to, and mettings with, the employees, and other conduct alleged to be violative of the Act. 1. The meetings of April 7 On April 7, Production Manager Tackes held meetings with each department on company time.4 At these meetings, Tackes opened the proceedings by stating that he had noted an apparent change in atmosphere during the union campaign and he was concerned because it was affecting the work of the employees, pointing out that the work they do is very delicate and requires a good deal of concentration. He told them that he had received reports of union discussion going on during working time and that there was pressure being applied to the employees to join the Union. He suggested that it would be best for the employees to confine their discussion of unionization to times when they were not working. He pointed out that with a union in the plant things may not always be better; that some unions by contract ask for departmental seniority as opposed to plantwide seniority and that under such a contract the Respondent could not freely transfer people from department to department when work in any particular department slackened; that this might result in a situation where one department might be laying off people while another department was hiring employees: that the Respondent did not want this type of arrangement, but might be forced into it with some union. He told them that the last layoff that Respondent had experienced was in 1963; that although work at the moment was slow, Respondent had no intention of laying off any people in the foreseeable future.' Tackes' statement was not coercive. He did not threaten a change in Respondent's practice, if the employees chose the Union to represent them. He was merely pointing to the fact that, if the employees selected a union as their bargaining representative, the union might demand departmental seniority which might not be to their advantage. Such a statement is not violative of the Act. Cf. Copeland Oil Co., Inc., 157 NLRB 126.'' 2. The Respondent's letter of April 8 Under date of April 8, Respondent sent a letter to all of its employees disputing certain alleged statements made by the Union. In pertinent part, the letter read as follows: LET'S SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT RIGHT NOW NO ACA employee will have to quit a union to work at ACA. NO ACA employee will receive any benefits or privileges just because he belongs to a union. NO employee will lose any benefits or privileges just because he belongs to a union. Your Company will not threaten, coerce, or force you in any way because of your thoughts or acts on the union issue By the same token, your Company will not tolerate any threats, force or coercion by union organizers and "inside contacts" on employees. The letter then mentioned the fringe benefits which the Respondent had established for its employees in the past and continued as follows- All these benefits and advantages you have received without a union. No union obtained them for you. It won't require a union to keep them for you. Quite the contrary, your company is dedicated to continue to improve your benefits and advantages as your company grows and can afford to do so. One final point should be brought out. A union must have signed cards to get a foothold in a company. Because of changes by the National Labor Relations Board, it is now possible to have a union certified as a representing body WITHOUT AN ELECTION merely on the basis of signed union cards. Therefore, your signing a card "to get them off of your back" could backfire, your signing a card to stop the threats could backfire Don't sign a union card unless you are absolutely convinced a union will make ACA a better place for you. The General Counsel contends that this letter, although carefully worded and subtly phrased, carries the firm impression that the employees could reasonably expect the granting of future benefits coupled with their rejection of the Union. I do not agree. In James A. Pearson, d/b/a Crystal Lake Broom Works, 159 NLRB 429, it was held that similar language "`at most contained a vague suggestion of the possibility that at some indeterminate date the Employer might evolve a formula whereby these benefits could be increased. This, we believe, falls short of the type of promise contemplated by the Act."' (Quoting from American Laundry Machinery Company, 107 NLRB 511, 513 ) Accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed in this regard. 3. The no-solicitation rule NO ACA employee will have to loin the union in order to work at ACA. " The complaint alleges that these meetings occurred on April 11, and employees Flikeid and O'Konek fixed that as the date of the meetings The precise date is not crucial It is clear that these employees and Tackes were all testifying about the same event To the extent that the date may be deemed material, I credit the testimony of Tackes that the meetings occurred on April 7 Tackes had more reason to note and remember the date than did the employees It appears from the record that prior thereto, on April 5, Tackes and President Zelazo held similar meetings with each department The complaint does not allege any violation by Respondent at the meetings of April 5 The credited testimony of Tackes who impressed me as being an honest witness Tackes ' source of information was a contract between another union and the Lear Corporation, a competitor of The General Counsel contends that early in April the Respondent announced a rule prohibiting union Respondent . Several employees testified regarding this incident, but did not contradict Tackes' testimony in any substantial regard Employees Ilgenfritz and O'Konek added that, when Tackes spoke in their department , he referred to the fact that people had come upstairs (to the office) to discuss their problems, and that Ilgenfritz and employee Graf had done so , that, when Ilgenfritz came there , she made a remark about the fact that people were taking bets as to how long she would be working there, and that Tackes replied that he could assure the employees that Ilgenfritz would have a job as long as she wanted it. The General Counsel contends that Tackes' statements constituted also the announcement of an invalid no-solicitation rule This contention is discussed infra under the subheading "The No-Solis cation Rule " 626 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD solicitation, which was invalid because; (1) of the timing of the announcement of the rule; (2) the fact that it was by its terms limited to union solicitation and was never applied to other forms of employee solicitation; and (3) was disregarded by the Respondent who contemporaneously engaged in coercive acts of antiunion solicitation on company time. Although the complaint originally alleged that the no- solicitation rule was promulgated on or about April 21, the allegation was amended during the hearing by changing the date to April 5. Presumably, the amendment is based upon a written warning notice issued by Respondent on that day to employee Agnes Snyder, which read as follows: You were observed Monday, April 4, 1966, at 2:30 p.m. soliciting another employee for union membership. Solicitation for a union is not allowed during business hours and no further solicitation will be tolerated.7 Snyder admitted that she had, in fact, engaged in union solicitation as charged in the warning notice. Thereafter, as previously noted, Production Manager Tackes suggested in the meetings of April? that the employees should limit their discussions of unionization to nonworking hours such as breaks, lunch periods, and before and after work. Also, during the latter part of April, Tackes met with the entire second shift. According to Tackes, the meeting was prompted by the fact that one of the employees had come to him in tears, saying that she was being needled relentlessly by her fellow employees on the second shift. Tackes told the employees that he would prefer it if they limited their discussion of unionization to nonworking hours such as breaks, lunch periods, and before and after work; that it would be best for everyone concerned if they spent their time at work as pleasantly as possible. During his talk he made the comment that there were a lot of union buttons being worn and reminded employees that they had a right to belong and attempt to organize a union as they had not to belong or to eliminate themselves from an organizational campaign, and they could do as they chose." A review of the record convinces me that an oral rule prohibiting solicitation during working time was in effect before the start of the union campaign and that the prohibition was not limited to union solicitation. The rule was in effect at Respondent's Wisconsin Avenue plant from which it moved to its present location in April 1965, and three employees who worked at the Wisconsin Avenue plant testified that they were aware of the rule. As previously noted, during the meeting of March 17, Vice President Paige reminded the employees of the rule.9 Since the rule had been established long before the advent of the Union, the warning notice to Snyder did not constitute the promulgation of a new rule. By the same token, Production Manager Tackes' suggestion to the employees at the meetings of April 7 and in the latter part of April was merely the reminder of a preexisting rule, and not the promulgation of a new rule. The rule was presumptively valid, Walton Manufacturing Company, 126 NLRB 697, 698, enfd. 289 F.2d 177 (C.A. 5), and the General Counsel in his brief so concedes. We, therefore, turn to the question whether the rule was unfairly or discriminatorily applied. The no-solicitation rule was enforced during the Union's campaign. As noted above, Personnel Manager Methenitis issued written warnings to employees Agnes Snyder and Lynn Morton for soliciting for the Union on company time. On April 14, Ilgenfritz came to Methenitis' office and complained that Gerry Anderson, a fellow employee, was soliciting for a company union on company time. Methenitis asked Ilgenfritz to list the circumstances by date, place, etc., but Ilgenfritz refused to do this. Nevertheless, Methenitis summoned Anderson to his office and told him that he had heard that he was soliciting for a company union on company time. Anderson denied engaging in such conduct. An exception to the no-solicitation rule appears to be the handling of the United Fund Campaign in which the Respondent participates each year. In 1965, the campaign in Respondent's plant was initiated by a letter from President Zelazo to all employees telling them that Respondent is behind the United Fund and encouraging the employees to participate. These letters were put into the employees' timecard slots. Approximately a week later, pledge cards were put into the timecard slots. When this procedure failed to show a satisfactory return, Respondent asked each department manager to go around and pick up the pledge cards. This was done on company time. Also, if the employees desired, they were given an opportunity to leave their work stations to talk to their foremen to discuss their pledge. Before the termination of the campaign, an employee was designated by each of the various department managers to speak to the employees and suggest that, if they were going to donate, they should turn their pledge in at that time. During the 1964 campaign, each department manager was told to select a couple of employees to distribute the pledge cards and literature. This was also done on company time. The record shows also that there were violations of the no-solicitation rule, particularly in Foreman Pilak's department. This took the form of collections among the employees for gifts to employees who were sick, retired, or experienced blessed events. The manner of taking up the collections was that a jar was passed among the employees who put in their donations and signed a paper. Foreman Pilak admitted that he was aware of the no-solicitation rule, but "looked the other way" when such collections were being taken during working time. On the other hand, Foreman King rigidly enforced the rule and on one occasion confiscated the collection jar when it was being passed during working time. On two other occasions, Production Manager Tackes stopped collections which were being taken during working time. Finally, the General Counsel points to the fact that the Respondent conducted meetings on company time in which it campaigned against the Union. In advancing this ' A similar notice was given to employee Lynn Morton for soliciting for the Union on company time s Tackes' testimony as to his statements to the employees was corroborated substantially by employees Robert Petre and Richard Blanding, witnesses for the General Counsel. 9 The General Counsel urges me to disregard Paige's testimony in this regard, because three employees testified that they were not aware of the rule prior to April I found Paige to be an honest, straightforward witness , and I credit her testimony which was corroborated by Personnel Manager Methemos Of the three employees who testified as to their lack of awareness of the rule, only one, Ilgenfritz, testified concerning the meeting of March 17, and she did not explicitly contradict Paige's testimony in this regard. ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA 627 contention, the General Counsel states in his brief that he is not unmindful of the Supreme Court's decision in N.L.R.B. v. United Steelworkers of America, CIO (Nutone, Inc.), 357 U.S. 357, nor the Board's holding in James Hotel Company, d/b/a Skirvin Hotel and Skirvin Tower, 142 NLRB 761, in which it was held that an employer's meetings held on company time did not invalidate an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule. The General Counsel, however, seeks to distinguish these cases by arguing that in neither case was the contention made that the rule was discriminatorily promulgated, nor was the employer's antiunion solicitation coercive to the extent as that herein. The General Counsel further contends that the instant case is governed by the Board's holding in The Wm. H. Block Company, 150 NLRB 341. The contention must be rejected. As I have previously pointed out, at none of the three meetings discussed above (meetings of March 17 and April 7 and 21) were any coercive statements made by the Respondent. Similarly, as is pointed out infra, none of the statements made by the Respondent at the meeting of June 21 were coercive. The basis for the General Counsel's attempted distinction of the Nutone and Sktrvin cases is therefore lacking. Conversely, the Block case is inapposite, as the Board found that the no-solicitation rule in that case had been promulgated "specifically for the purpose of defeating union organization." In the instant case, I have found that the no-solicitation rule was promulgated long before the Union's organizational campaign began. Nor does the fact that Respondent made an exception to the no-solicitation rule for the annual United Fund Campaign vitiate the no-solicitation rule. Cf. Nutone, supra, at page 363. Likewise, the fact that Foreman Pilak "looked the other way" when "sunshine" collections were taken in his department amount to discriminatory enforcement of the no-solicitation rule by the Respondent. The action of one supervisor in failing to enforce an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule is not sufficient ground to estop the Employer from its continued assertion of that rule. All that Pilak's action demonstrates is that Pilak was derelict in his duty. It does not attribute to the Respondent a discriminatory attitude in the enforcement of the rule. Accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed in this regard. 4. The revocation campaign Under date of April 27, Respondent sent a letter to all of its employees pursuant to advice of counsel. The letter reads as follows: A number of employees have advised the Company that they signed union authorization cards under extreme pressure. They wondered what effect their signing would have and they wondered how they could revoke the authorization. If you don't realize it, when you sign such a card you are giving the union a legally binding "power of attorney" to make a contract that may be legally binding upon you. In effect, you are signing a blank check. Before you sign such a card it would be a good idea to talk it over with your lawyer. He will be able to point out the extent of power that a union will have to legally bind you by reason of the authority which such a card gives a union. He will also be able to advise you how you can protect yourself by either limiting the power or by revoking it. We have been advised that such a power of attorney can be revoked by (1) promptly notifying the union that the power is revoked, and (2) sending a copy of the revocation notice to the employer. A sample form of letter of revocation is attached. A signed copy should be sent to the Union and a signed copy should be sent to the Company. Enclosed with the letter were two copies of a form addressed to the Union which reads as follows: Gentlemen: I hereby revoke any authorization or "power of attorney" that I may have given to the Union. Date:....... ...... (Signature) A copy of the letter, revocation forms, and an accompanying notice were posted on the bulletin board in the production area and on the bulletin board outside the ladies' restroom. The notice which is dated April 28, reads as follows: This letter and two copies of the half size sheet letter were mailed to your homes last night. It is important that you carefully read the letters. This is for your protection, now and in the future. If you want to take care of revoking any authorization you gave the Union RIGHT NOW, please see your Foreman and pickup additional copies of these documents. If you choose to take care of this matter from your homes, please remember to bring one signed copy of the form revoking authorization to your Foreman or your Personnel Office. It's Your Company and Your Future-Be Sure You Know What You Have Done. Between April 29 and May 2, Respondent received signed revocation forms from the following nine employees: Barbara Protasiewicz, Elvina Weis, Helen Storm, Florence Kubacki, Sharon Kainz, Leora Kainz, Hazel Engstrom, Tillie Ellis, and Arlene Cieklinski. Of the above, employees Engstrom, Ellis, and Storm mailed revocation letters to the Union. Foreman Gerald Pilak was active in speaking to employees generally and individually regarding revocation. According to employee Claudette Calenzo, Pilak addressed all of the employees in the electronics subassembly department before the employees received the revocation letter and told them that the revocation cards would be in the mail, because some of the employees have told him that they had signed union cards too quickly and had asked him whether there was anything they could do about it. He explained that the employees should read the cards carefully "and then sign them." Foreman Pilak admitted that he addressed the employees in his department while they were at their work stations and told them basically the contents of the letter that they would receive and that some people had complained to management that pressures were being exerted to get them to sign union authorization cards; and that if this was the case, if they wished to revoke, this would be the method to use. According to employee Calenzo, Foreman Pilak on the same day called employee Ruth Schulz to his desk and asked her if she remembered talking about jumping on the bandwagon too quickly. When Schulz replied in the 298-668 0-69-41 628 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD affirmative, Pilak told her that she would be receiving the revocation forms in the mail and this would be her way of "getting off the bandwagon." Foreman Pilak denied that this incident had occurred. However, employee Schulz, called as a witness for the Respondent, admitted that Pilak had said something to her "about people getting on a bandwagon too soon," although she denied that anything was said about her being on the bandwagon, because there was no reason in her case to do that. She testified further that this was merely a "friendly conversation" and that Pilak was already aware of her antiunion sentiments. Schulz' testimony not only corroborates partially that of Calenzo, but also impeaches Pilak's denial that the incident occurred. Foreman Pilak also had several conversations with Elizabeth Bolyard, an employee in the receiving inspection department. According to Bolyard, she was returning to her department from lunch on April 27, when Pilak stopped her, noticed her union button,io and said, "Oh Betty, not you too ... you're too nice a person to be involved in anything like this." Bolyard then pointed out to Pilak that management had not done much for her as far as her salary was concerned, that she was getting only 25 cents more per hour than when she had started 3 years before. To this, Pilak replied, "Well, which is better, your salary or no job?" Bolyard asked him what he meant, and Pilak said, "Well, let me rephrase that statement." However, Bolyard's lunch hour was over and she returned to her work station. Bolyard testified further that shortly thereafter Foreman Pilak called her over to a window separating the inspection department from the stockroom, reminded her of their friendship, and asked her if she minded whether he conferred with higher management about her salary. Later that afternoon, he met her again and asked her if she would sign one of the revocation forms, but she refused to do so. The next morning, during her break, Foreman Pilak called her over to a table where he was sitting in the plant cafeteria and asked her if she had signed one of the revocation forms. Bolyard replied that she had not and "wouldn't sign anything for anybody." Foreman Pilak's version of the foregoing incidents is entirely different. He testified that Bolyard had been crying and told him that she was about to lose her home and that she did not want to wear a union button, but felt that she had no alternative. Pilak told her that if she didn't really like the Union, she could revoke her authorization. Bolyard emphatically insisted that she did not want to do that. Pilak then asked her if she would mind his taking up her financial problem with her supervisor, and Bolyard said she would appreciate that. The next morning, in the cafeteria, Bolyard and Pilak again discussed her financial problems. Then, Bolyard very pointedly asked Pilak what would happen if she did not sign a revocation card. Pilak replied that he didn't care one way or the other, that it made no difference. On April 28, Pilak also discussed the revocation with employee Florence Kubacki. According to Kubacki, she was sitting in the department on her 3 o'clock break reading a book, when Pilak called her over to where he was working and asked her whether she had signed an authorization card. Before she had an opportunity to reply, Pilak told her that three employees had told him that she was one of the card signers. Kubacki replied that she was not sure whether she had signed a union card. Later that afternoon, Kubacki remembered that she had in fact signed an authorization card and went back to Pilak's desk and told him that she "thought" that she might have signed a card. Pilak asked her if she would sign a revocation form. Kubacki, angry that someone had told Pilak that she had signed an authorization card, signed a revocation form and gave it to him. Pilak's version of the incident differs substantially from that of Kubacki. He testified that employees Ann Schauble, Mary Froncek, and Kubacki were having a conversation and he overheard Froncek say to Kubacki, "What do you think about this, ain't it the nuts?" Kubacki replied that she was "getting pretty sick of it," at which point Foreman Pilak "piped up" that he'would "second that," that he was "getting pretty tired of this constant conversation and division in the people." Kubacki then said that she had signed some card last fall, because someone had told her that the work was being moved to Hurley and she should sign to protect her job. Pilak then said, "If you don't feel you would want them to have your authorization you could sign a revocation." Kubacki indicated that she was uncertain as to whether the card she had signed applied to this particular union. Later in the day, Kubacki came back to Pilak and said that she would like to sign a revocation because "she wasn't going to pay for any union official to sit in a plush office with his feet on the desk, smoking a cigar." Pilak denied that he told Kubacki that some girls had told him that Kubacki had signed a union card. On cross-examination, Kubacki admitted that she had made a remark to Pilak about the union official in the plush office, but explained that she had made the remark "long before" when the Union was coming in. Employees Schauble and Froncek were not called to corroborate Pilak. On or about May 2, according to employee Barbara Protasiewicz, Foreman Pilak called her from her work station to his desk and asked her if she had received the revocation forms in the mail. Protasiewicz replied that she had, but had thrown them away. During the conversation she mentioned that she had signed an authorization card and asked Pilak whether she should sign a revocation form. Pilak explained the revocation form and asked her to sign it to "unauthorize" herself from the Union. She thereupon signed two of the revocation forms and returned them to him. Foreman Pilak testified that he did not remember how the conversation started, but that Protasiewicz volunteered the information that she had signed a union card but did not know what it was for. Pilak replied that he did not want to know anything about it. Protasiewicz then asked him what she should do about it. Pilak replied that he was not very much up on unions, knew very little about unions, and that he could not advise her what to do. He suggested that she discuss the matter with her father who worked at Louis Allis "and was in some way connected with the Union." The following morning Protasiewicz presented him with the signed revocation forms. Protasiewicz admitted that she had discussed the matter with her father, but stated that she had done so before discussing the matter with Foreman Pilak. Protasiewicz testified further that she overheard Foreman Pilak call employee Essie Jones over to his desk during the afternoon of May 2 and asked her whether she had signed one of the revocation forms. Pilak denied 10 This was the first day that Bolyard wore a union button. ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA discussing the matter with Jones. Neither party called Jones as a witness. Resolving the conflicts in the foregoing testimony, I credit the versions of Calenzo, Bolyard, Kubacki, and Protasiewicz who appeared to be credible witnesses.'' As noted above, Calenzo's testimony was partially corroborated by Schulz, a witness for Respondent, whose testimony contradicted Pilak's denial of the Schulz incident . It is also significant that four different witnesses testified that Pilak had asked them individually to sign revocations, and Pilak admitted having had conversations with them. To credit Pilak's versions would require me to find that all four had testified falsely, and that only Pilak had told the truth. I find it impossible to do so. Respondent in its brief apparently recognizes the significance of the fact that the four employees testified to Pilak' s activities and asks: "Why should four different individuals each present a picture which is contrary to fact?" Respondent answers the question by saying that "Pilak apparently is not as adept as he might be with his female employees," and points out that Pilak had been accused of sarcasm in situations totally unrelated to the Union. I find the answer singularly unpersuasive. There is no evidence in the record that these witnesses bore any malice toward Pilak. In sum, I find that Foreman Pilak actively sought to implement Respondent's campaign to secure revocations of union authorizations. I conclude that Respondent's letter and posted notice and Foreman Pilak's efforts to secure revocations constituted restraint , coercion, and interference within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Cumberland Shoe Company, 160 NLRB 1256: Movie Star, Inc., 145 NLRB 319; Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 128 NLRB 574, 580, 588; The Jefferson Company, Inc., 110 NLRB 757, 771. In its brief, Respondent concedes "that it is, generally speaking, a violation of the Act for an employer to solicit the withdrawal of union authorizations." Respondent argues, however, that where there is evidence of a union campaign to obtain authorizations by coercion, the employer is entitled to explain to the employees how they may protect themselves from such coercion and how they may nullify the effect of authorizations they may have granted as a consequence of such coercion. There is no evidence in this case of any coercion by the Union, except that Production Manager Tackes testified that he had received some reports either from some employees directly or indirectly from his supervisors. None of the employees testified to any coercion by the Union. Moreover, Respondent concedes that it has been unable to find any authority to support its proposition. It relies on two decisions in which the Board, in another context, has held that an employer may advise employees as to how to revoke union membership, even to the point of supplying them with appropriate instructions and forms. The cases relied on by Respondent, Warrensburg Board & Paper Corporation, 143 NLRB 398, and Perkins Machine Company, 141 NLRB 697, are inapposite. In both cases there was a contract between the 11 However, I do not credit that portion of Protasiewicz' testimony that she conferred with her father regarding revocation before she discussed the matter with Pilak Except for this, her version is credited 12 Respondent cites Bolyard 's statement on cross -examination to the effect that "this was strictly on a personal basis, this had nothing to do with the Union " However, this statement is taken out of context It was made in regard to Pdak's inquiry whether Bolyard minded "if he went higher up to ask questions" about her failure to receive a higher wage 11 The record discloses that prior thereto, on June 10, the 629 employer and the union which provided an escape period during which employees could withdraw from the Union. It was in this context that the Board held that an employer may notify the employees of the existence of the escape period and how they may exercise their privilege of withdrawing from the Union. 5. Interrogation and threats As previously detailed, Foreman Pilak had a conversation with employee Bolyard on April 27, the first day that some employees started to wear "IBEW Organizing Committee" buttons. Pilak expressed surprise at Bolyard's wearing a button. When she replied that her salary was unsatisfactory, Pilak asked her, "Well, what is better, your salary or no job?" Foreman Pilak's remark, in the context of his opening remark about the union button, clearly carried an implication which was coercive in character and as such was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' ' In the early part of April, as Foreman Pilak was instructing employee Rose Christ how to paint header sets, he remarked to her that "anybody that signed a union card, and the Union got in, there would be a lot of sorry people." About 2 weeks later, he asked Christ if Caroline Cade, another employee, had ever talked union to her. Christ replied in the negative, and Pilak walked away. Pilak admitted having the first conversation with Christ, but testified that he was discussing the Union "in generalities" and that "as to the campaign, there had been the division in the plant and everything, and it was a shame that the atmosphere had changed so drastically, and I said that if the Union might get in, they might be sorry, because there would be a further, there could be a further change in the atmosphere." He denied the latter conversation about employee Cade. Respondent argues that Christ's version should not be credited because of her admission that after May 26, she did not get along too well with Foreman Pilak because "he was kind of picking on me." Respondent also cites the fact that Christ learned on May 27 that she was not getting a raise for which she blamed Pilak who was her foreman. Respondent, therefore, argues that there is an element of retribution toward Pilak in Christ's testimony. I have heretofore found that Foreman Pilak was active in securing revocations of union authorizations. His interrogation and statements to employee Christ are consistent with his other antiunion activity. I did not credit Pilak's versions of his conversations with the four employees whose revocations he had solicited. Nor do I credit his testimony with regard to the foregoing incidents. I, therefore, find and conclude that Foreman Pilak interrogated and threatened Christ in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 6. Respondent's letter of June 15 Under date of June 15,1•1 Respondent sent another letter to all of its employees. The letter informed the employees Respondent enclosed a letter in the pay envelopes of the employees, which read in pertinent part as follows "If the Union wins they will demand that we deduct each month a substantial part of your pay and transmit it to them as dues So you can appreciate this fact, we have made such a deduction this week This time you are getting the difference back in the separate check enclosed with this letter If the Union wins, you can plan on that amount going to them " It is unnecessary to decide whether the foregoing was violative of the Act, since it is not alleged as a violation in the complaint, nor does the General Counsel so contend in his brief 630 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that there would be a Board-conducted election on June 22. The letter continued in pertinent part as follows: In considering the choice you will make, I want to reaffirm that the company is definitely opposed to unionization . We do not believe that an outside organization is either necessary or desirable .... Employees voting in this kind of election sometimes mistakenly assume that a union victory is bound to mean higher wages and benefits. Nothing could be further from the truth . Under the law , an employer is not required even to continue in effect its existing benefits if a union wins. Bargaining is a two-way street and it starts from scratch . What wages and conditions will prevail thereafter depends on what both parties agree. Our company most certainly will not agree , merely because there is a union , to raise our costs out of line with our competition . Our aim is to provide a stable operation with , good, steady employment , and this goal we would not jeopardize. * * * * * We realize that we have not performed miracles and that we have our faults, but we are trying to do our best. As a young company, we all have reason to be proud of our accomplishments in our short history. I sincerely believe that our friendly and peaceful relationships will be better maintained without intervention of a union and that we can accomplish more for the mutual benefit of the company and the employees without interference from a union, and that our employees will find only disappointment and disillusionment in union The General Counsel argues that the letter constituted a threat to discontinue existing benefits if the Union got in, pointing particularly to the language that "under the law, an employer is not required even to continue in effect its existing benefits if a union wins. Bargaining is a two-way street and it starts from scratch ." The contention must be rejected . Squarely in point with the instant case is Trent Tube Company, Subsidiary of Crucible Steel Company of America, 147 NLRB 538 In that case the Regional Director recommended setting aside an election because the employer in letters to the employees had: (1) made reference to various benefits currently enjoyed by the employees ; (2) made the statement that the union could not guarantee that such benefits could continue under a collective-bargaining contract and that "bargaining starts from scratch ": and (3 ) stressed the possibility of strikes and their adverse effect upon the employees if the union were certified. A majority of the Board , after reading the letters in their entirety and considering not only the contents but the timing , and the opportunity of the union to respond and its actual responses thereto, rejected the Regional Director's recommendation and held The pertinent issues of existing benefits , future benefits , strikes, union administration , and the requirement of good-faith bargaining were fully brought to the attention of the employees by the respective electioneering of the Employer and the counterelectioneering of the petitioner. In our opinion , the Employer's letter could clearly be evaluated by the employees as partisan electioneering. (Id. at 540)14 In the instant case, the Union not only had an opportunity to reply to the Respondent's letter of June 15, but actually did so. In the Union's letter of June 20, it explicitly referred to the employer's statement that under the law an employer is not required even to continue in effect its existing benefits if a union wins, and said: Now, winning this election does not guarantee higher wages and benefits. However, I know ofNOI.B.E.W. contract signed in the last 5 years which has not encompassed a great increase in wages and benefits than the so-called annual review made available to you .... As long as the Company has chosen to speak of the law, I wonder if their high priced labor attorney has advised them that it is a direct violation of the National Labor Relations Act for an employer to threaten to withhold benefits or wages or to take away benefits and/or wages because employees might choose to vote for a union; and what other meaning could you read in the Company's letter of June 15, 1966. Half of the second page of their letter is used to scare you into voting against the union because of an implied fear of strikes. And let us look at the record here. First of all no strike is ever called in the I.B.E.W. unless the members involved voted in favor of the strike. Secondly there is no union in existence today whose record in collective bargaining and attaining collective justice for its members on the job can closely compare with the I.B.E.W. record when it comes to good settlements without a strike. I therefore conclude that "the employer's letters could clearly be evaluated by the employees as partisan electioneering" (Ibid.). Accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed in this regard. 7. The wage increases Respondent began operations in 1959 with five employees. It has grown to the point where at the time of the hearing it had approximately 175 employees.'' It has had a regular policy of granting wage increases in June of each year. This is the only time of the year that wage adjustments are made, except in the case of new employees who are given an increase at the end of the 90- day probationary period, if they prove to be satisfactory. During the prior 3 years, its total increases amounted to 8 percent of its payroll, 12.5 percent, and 6 percent, respectively. Salary increases are initially proposed by Production Manager Tackes after consultation with the various foremen, and are reviewed by the salary and wage committee which during this past year consisted of President Zelazo, Vice President Paige, and Captain David R. Hull, U.S.N.R. The recommendations of the salary and wage committee are then submitted to the board of directors for final approval. Sometime during 1965, Respondent had applied to the Milwaukee Employers Association for a wage and insurance survey The wage survey provided by the Milwaukee Employers Association classified that various jobs in Respondent's plant according to skills and provided Respondent with a statement of the wage scales prevalent in the Milwaukee area for the various job classifications. Based upon the survey, Production 14 See also Jacob Brenner Company, Inc ,160 NLRB 131 "As previously noted, at the time of the election in April, there were 137 eligible employees in the appropriate unit ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA 631 Manager Tackes in May prepared a recommendation to the salary and wage committee in which he set up job classification, listed the employees in each job classification, graded the performance of each employee within each job classification (after a conference with the various foremen) and made recommendations for individual wage increases. The total increases recommended by Tackes amounted to 13.8 percent of the payroll. Fearing the possiblity that the granting of a wage increase, or the failure to grant a wage increase contrary to the regularly established practice, during an organizational campaign might be charged as an unfair labor practice, the Respondent consulted its counsel who advised that, while there was no way of preventing the Union from charging an unfair labor practice, the Respondent should nevertheless continue its past practice of granting annual wage increases in June, but that the Respondent would be well advised to stay reasonably within the range of the wage increases granted during prior years. Tackes' recommendations were then considered by the salary and wage committee. Captain Hull was adamant in insisting that the total increases granted should not exceed 9.9 percent of the payroll. His view prevailed and Tackes was directed to prepare revised recommendations within this guideline. Tackes complied under protest, and the committee approved the revised recommendations which were adopted by the board of directors. The wage increases granted were effective June 10. Approximately 116 employees received wage increases ranging between 5 cents and 70 cents per hour, half of them 20 cents or less. Ten employees received no wage increases. Insofar as union affiliation or sympathy is concerned, no pattern of discrimination can be discerned. Some employees who were observed wearing union buttons received wage increases, others did not. Conversely, some employees who had not been identified as union sympathizers did not receive an increase. That union affiliation was not the test in determining who would receive the wage raise is demonstrated by the fact that employee Agnes Snyder who wore an organizer's button was given a raise, while employee Barbara Protasiewicz who had earlier signed a revocation card for Respondent did not get one. I therefore find and conclude that the wage increases granted by Respondent were not violative of the Act. Accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed in this regard. 8 The meeting of June 21 On June 21, Respondent held a meeting of its employees in the cafeteria during working hours. "' Attendance was voluntary. At the outset, President Zelazo told the employees that those who did not wish to attend could return to their work stations, or if it was their breaktime, they could return to that." Nobody left the room. President Zelazo told the employees that on the following day there would be an NLRB election at the company plant. He urged all of the employees who were eligible to vote to do so. He told the employees that he had been out of the State in an effort to secure additional business for the Company and that when he had returned he found a considerable amount of correspondence on his desk, including some letters from the IBEW. The IBEW letters, he continued, presented a picture that the Company might have done wrong. He wanted to have the air cleared so that if any of the employees had any questions that they might wish to ask him or if anybody desired to tell him what was wrong he would welcome their doing so. At this point, employee Charlotte Murphy asked why she was given such a small increase. President Zelazo said that he did not know about the increase, whereupon Vice President Paige turned to Personnel Manager Methenitis and asked him why Murphy had not received a larger increase. Methenitis replied that he did not think it was appropriate to discuss publicly confidential personnel matters. Vice President Paige replied that since the question had been asked in public, Murphy wanted an answer then and there. Methenitis replied that he did not have Murphy's file, whereupon Vice President Paige directed him to get the file. Upon his return, Methenitis explained that the employees had been classified into grades by virtue of their skills and training and that there was a maximum and minimum wage established for each grade and the employee's performance evaluated by the supervisor. Murphy's rating was below the middle rating for the grade. During the discussion of Murphy's question regarding her pay raise, President Zelazo spoke generally regarding the pay raises that had been granted in June. According to Vice President Paige, Zelazo said substantially as follows: This year when the board of directors met, we knew we had a tough problem on our hands, because there was a union campaign, and our attorneys had informed us that this was a sensitive period. Now, we knew that our employees all were expecting at this time, June 1, increases, and we were worried that if we granted increases to our employees we might be subject to an accusation that we were buying votes, and if we didn't grant increases, we'd be subject to an unfair labor practice charge, that we withheld increases because this organizational campaign was going on. So we called up our attorney, and he told us that increases could be granted at this time, because we had done so in the past, and he also suggested to the board that we stay within the range of our past practice for the past 3 years ... this company has grown a great deal, as a result the classifications had to be made more specific .... And as a result of this, and the fact that maximum and minimum salaries had been established for each grade level, the result was that some of the old employees who had been receiving wages which were close to the top of their grade, or the top of their grade, wound up with exactly 0. 5 This meeting was held in the morning of the day before the election, and ended at 12 30 in the afternoon The record does not disclose what time on the following day the election was held It is, therefore, not possible to determine whether the meeting was held within 24 hours before the election See Peerless Plywood Company, 107 NLRB 427 In any event, neither the Union in its objection to conduct affecting the results of the election, nor the General Counsel in the instant proceeding, has raised the issue that the meeting of June 21 violated the 24-hour rule Accordingly, that issue is not before the Board 17 The ensuing account of the meeting is based upon the credited testimony of Vice President Paige, corroborated as to various portions by President Zelazo, Personnel Manager Methenitis, and Production Manager Tackes Except in one regard, discussed infra, it was not contradicted 632 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Employee Marge Cerny then took the floor and pointed out that it took a lot of courage to stand up and ask a question . She cited the example of employee Jean Ilgenfritz who had asked a question at the meeting which occurred in March as to why two employees had been discharged , and that since then Ilgenfritz ' life at the plant had never been the same-that she had been taunted by her supervisors and had been transferred from her job to another. 18 Zelazo said he did know of Ilgenfritz because her name had come to his attention; that he had received a telephone call from Martin , the union organizer, concerning her and had made a memorandum of the call. He asked Ilgenfritz if she would like to have him read the memorandum , and she indicated her approval. The memorandum which Zelazo read is as follows: During dinner at home in the evening of 21 April 1966 Mr. Thomas E. Martin , organizer of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, local union 494, phoned me on behalf of Mrs. Jean Ilgenfritz. He made an appeal not to fire Mrs. Ilgenfritz. He felt it was not her fault that during her visit to the union she had taken more time than she was allowed by the company , and therefore broke company rules. He appealed on the basis that if Jean's work is up to par the foremen should not subject her to harassment. He thought the company should overlook the fact that this girl did not call in, and she was not aware that the union was making an appeal on her behalf because he had been asked to do so by other employees. Throughout this telephone conversation Mrs. Zelazo was listening. I indicated to Mrs. Zelazo that I believed Mr. Martin was desperately trying to provoke me to fire the young lady. I advised Mr. Martin that although I did not know the circumstances I would look into the matter and do my utmost to be helpful.19 Vice President Paige then suggested that an explanation be given as to what happened with respect to the two employees about whom Ilgenfritz had inquired . Personnel Manager Methenitis replied that he had had a conference with Ilgenfritz when she first raised the question and had told her why the two employees were discharged. Paige then directed Methenitis to give the information to all of the employees . Methenitis went to his office , obtained the files, and then reported that the employees in question whom he identified as employee 1 and employee 2 rather than using their names were discharged for the following reasons: 1 was not doing her work properly, and 2 was discharged either because she was working slowly or could not work with her colleagues.20 Paige then turned to Production Manager Tackes and asked him to address himself to Cerny's contention that Ilgenfritz had been mistreated since she had spoken out at the March meeting. Tackes had some notes with him and after obtaining Ilgenfritz' permission he read some data with respect to her performance record, pointing out that certain instruments which she had worked on had been damaged, referred to the quantity of her production and her record of tardiness and absenteeism . Ilgenfritz disputed Tackes' recital of her record and held up a book, saying , "I want you to know , Mr. Tackes , I kept my own records too about what I did on those days ." Tackes asked Ilgenfritz whether she would like to tell what her records indicated. Ilgenfritz replied , "All in due course and at the proper time and place." At one point during the meeting , President Zelazo observed that it was getting close to the lunch hour and asked the employees whether it would not be better to end the meeting at 12 o'clock . The employees generally asked him to continue the meeting , so Zelazo indicated that the meeting would end at 12:30. During his presentation , President Zelazo spoke about the fact that Respondent was a new business . According to Vice President Paige, he continued as follows: . he said that he is accustomed to working with a third party, for example there's a full -time resident inspector of the Government housed in the plant .... Now, when you have a third party, like this Government inspector , in the plant, many times there are problems which arise, for example, products may have been completed and ready for shipment, but because the Government inspector is not around, or cannot sign off on it, shipments have been held up, and not sent out, although they were ready . Likewise, he said , if you want the union and the union comes into the plant , I am concerned that a union may not understand the nature of our business , and the union may likewise , although I know I can work with them, but they may likewise , similar to the Government inspector situation , may get more difficult for me to do what in my opinion may be best for the Company. Let me take a very wild example ... and I don't want anybody here ... to think that the example I'm taking is in any way something which the union will ask me to do, because I know it won 't, but just to use it as an illustration , I'm setting it forth. For example ... we have a parking lot right next to the alley , next to our plant . Now, let 's say the union would ask me and the company, and I am not saying it would , but let's make believe ... that the union asks me to build out into the parking lot in order to make more working space available for production people. Well, in my opinion we may require this ... space for visitors who are coming to inspect the plant, in order to give business to us. Well, this is a difference of opinion which the union and I would have; and if the union were to come in, I would not any longer have the freedom to do what I see fit in every single instance , it would be something like working with the Government inspector , a third i" Respondent's treatment of Ilgenfritz is alleged to have been discriminatory in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act Her treatment by Respondent is more fully discussed infra i" Organizer Martin denied that he had ever called President Zelazo Also, Zelazo admitted that he had never talked to Organizer Martin before and did not recognize his voice It is unnecessary for the purpose of this proceeding to determine whether Martin did, in fact, make the call that Zelazo received I am satisfied that Zelazo testified credibly regarding this incident, and I conclude that someone who identified himself as Organizer Martin did call Zelazo about Ilgenfritz 2" Paige testified that she did not remember which of the two reasons was given by Methenitis, that her memory was not certain as to this point ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA party. But if a union is elected, I know I could and would work with the union.21 Vice President Paige then spoke and said substantially as follows: . whether or not you decide to elect a union into this plant is your decision, nobody else's. Now, the union in its letters to you has written that we "should shut up and mind our own business and let you make up your own minds", because you are adult. Now, I don't think that ... if we express our outlook on the situation , we are not stopping you from making up your own minds, but we are just presenting our outlook to you, for your consideration. Now, if you believe what the union said in its letters to you, that this company desires "stooges and so- called faithful employees" to spy on you, then you should vote for a union, and ... if you believe as the union has written in its letters that we are vicious, then you certainly need a union. You should join and you should vote for a union to protect you from us .. But it is difficult to stand up and speak at a time when you are accused of the type of thing which the union wrote to you about .... If you believe that we discriminate against our employees, then you should go out and vote for a union, and if you believe as the union wrote in its letters to you that "you have been denied your just . portion of the fruits of your labor," . . . then you should vote for a union. Paige then spoke of the financial difficulties that the Company had experienced in the past. She continued as follows: We can't make any promises to you like the union can. There's only one way that you can judge us, and that is our past performance, what you yourself have seen with your own eyes in this company, and since I know many of you are new here, I can only suggest that you speak to your fellow employees, those who have been working here longer, to find out about the times when you may not have been here. She then referred to the profit-sharing plan and the insurance benefits program that the Company had instituted in the past and suggested that the employees bear it in mind when they vote, and concluded as follows: Irrespective of whether or not a union comes into the plant, Mr. Zelazo and I will not change in character and your managers will not change in character. We are going to continue to be the same type of people that we were in the past. Before the meeting concluded President Zelazo asked the employees whether they liked this sort of meeting, and the employees responded in favor of it. Zelazo then said, "Well, can I promise to continue to have these sorts of meetings ?" Paige cautioned him not to promise anything. Zelazo then said, "Well, I don't care, I'm going to promise to continue to have these sorts of meetings, I have the right to talk to my employees ... union or no union," and he pointed to Plant Manager Jefferson and directed him to see to it that such meetings be held every 2 months. The foregoing recital of Zelazo's statement as to the effect of unionization is the testimony of Vice President Paige, corroborated by President Zelazo Employees Miller and Calenzo testified to a different version The matter is more fully discussed Infra 22 Employees Miller and Calenzo who testified to the prediction 633 Of the numerous things said at this meeting, the General Counsel contends that two statements were violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. They are Zelazo's promise to hold bimonthly meetings with the employees, union or no union, and an alleged statement by Zelazo, not contained in either Paige's or Zelazo's account of the meeting. Thus, employee Gertrude Miller, corroborated by employee Calenzo, testified that Zelazo said. If there wasn't a third party involved he could get more contracts, therefore more employment, more profit, there would be more money in the profit- sharing plan, and as we became eligible for it, we would all be gaining, by what he could attain without the third party. No authorities were cited by the General Counsel to substantiate his contention that the foregoing statements were violative of the Act. With regard to the promise to hold bimonthly meetings, I find and conclude that the statement did not constitute a promise of benefit which would be accorded the employees if the union lost the election. Zelazo made it plain to the employees that these meetings would be held "union or no union." I am unaware of any authority which holds that an employer is prohibited from holding meetings of employees. Compare S. & H. Grossinger's Inc., 156 NLRB 223, where the Board held that a promise of a more effective grievance procedure to be set up in the future was held to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. However, unlike the promise in the Grossinger case, Zelazo's statement in the case at bar was not presented as action to be taken by the employer in lieu of a union; rather, Zelazo made it clear that he would take such action even if there were a union. With regard to the prediction made by Zelazo, assuming arguendo that he made the statement attributed to him by employees Miller and Calenzo,22 I am satisfied that it was nothing more than an economic prediction of what business the Respondent could enjoy if there were no union. It was not a promise of a benefit which Respondent was in a position to carry out. On the contrary, it was a prediction that Respondent could get more business from parties over whom it had no control. A prediction of future benefits cannot be considered as a promise of benefits, unless the promise is unconditional and not contingent on the obtaining of profitable business from customers. Here, the statement attributed to Zelazo was not an unconditional promise of benefit, but was not only indefinite, but, in addition, explicitly contingent on Respondent's getting more contracts and making more profit. As noted earlier in connection with the General Counsel's contention that Respondent's letter of June 8 contained a promise of benefit, "a vague suggestion of the possibility that at some indeterminate date the Employer might evolve a formula whereby ... benefits could be increased . falls short of the type of promise contemplated by the Act" (American Laundry Machinery Company, 107 NLRB 511, 513, quoted with approval in James A. Pearson, d/b/a Crystal Lake Broom Works, 159 NLRB 429). quoted above impressed me as credible witnesses, as did Paige and Zelazo However, it is unnecessary to determine which version is correct , inasmuch as I conclude infra, that even the statement attributed to Zelazo by employees Miller and Calenzo was not violative of the Act 634 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Accordingly, I find and conclude that the complaint should be dismissed in this regard. C. The Alleged Discrimination Against Jean Ilgenfritz Employee Jean Ilgenfritz was a member of the organizing committee and a leading advocate of the Union. She wore her organizer's button openly and passed out union buttons. Prioi to April, she did assembly work and was considered to be a good producer. On or about April 20, the work on her regular job ran out, and she was assigned to soldering two leads on an instrument known as a "meter movement."23 Ilgenfritz worked on the meter movements until approximately 11 a.m., when she was directed to go to Foreman King's department where she worked the remainder of the day. The next day, Foreman King assigned her to staking pins in terminal boards, a process which involved the operation of a press that seated the terminals in the plastic terminal boards.24 Ilgenfritz had not previously performed either of the two operations described above. Foreman King showed her how to place the pins on the board and operate the press, but from the outset Ilgenfritz experienced difficulty in that the tips of the terminal pins bent when she operated the press. Recognizing the difficulty, Ilgenfritz on several occasions called it to the attention of Foreman King and Forrest Broadhead, a technician. On one occasion, Broadhead told her not to worry about it; that if the pins were bent they could be repaired. On one occasion, Foreman King told her that when the terminal pin was not properly located, she should hit it twice, but this only resulted in more bent pins. On another occasion, Foreman King observed that a nut was loose on the press and the machine was not functioning properly. Ilgenfritz finally realized that she was suppose to pull down the plunger on the press manually to insure that each terminal pin fitted properly prior to actually staking it. She admitted that King had demonstrated this procedure to her, but stated that she understood that he meant that she should do it only once in a while to test the terminals. On April 21, Production Manager Tackes was called to the stockroom to see a quantity of meter movements which were damaged. The two foremen from the production area involved were also called in. By checking the timesheets, the men were able to identify the two employees who had worked on these instruments. One was Ilgenfritz; the other was an employee by the name of Simms who worked on the second shift. Tackes inquired of Foreman Hesse why Ilgenfritz had been put on this job, and was told that he chose her because, although she had never worked on the meter itself, she had worked on portions of the instrument adjacent to the meter, so that she knew the delicacy of the particular part involved. Her normal job was soldering; consequently, she was deemed to be a logical person to solder the wires on the meter movements. Ilgenfritz was called in and asked to identify the meter movements upon which she had worked. She identified some, among which were instruments that were damaged, in that the wires on which the flags were mounted were bent. Ilgenfritz suggested that somebody else might have caused the damage. However, Tackes did not accept that 21 A meter movement is a delicate instrument approximately 4 inches in diameter The leads referred to are two thin wires of approximately three-quarters of an inch in length upon each of which is mounted a tiny flag The terminal boards are about 1/2 by 1-1/2 inches in size explanation because each meter movement is mounted in the cap of a jar, comes to the operator in a glass jar after having been inspected, and is immediately replaced in the jar by the operator after the wires are soldered. The jar then goes to the stockroom without further handling. Employee Simms was also interviewed separately in the same manner when he came to work. Ilgenfritz then returned to work on the terminal boards. Later that day, Tackes was called to Foreman King's area because King had discovered a large number of damaged terminal boards. Approximately 90 of the 455 units that Ilgenfritz had worked on were damaged in that the pins were bent. Ilgenfritz was then called to Tackes' office and asked if she was aware of the damage. She admitted that she was aware, but explained that she had difficulty with the job. Because Ilgenfritz had always been a good worker, Tackes suspected that her sudden poor performance was deliberate. He thereupon attempted to call the Respondent's attorney who earlier had cautioned against any precipitous action against any union adherent. He learned that the attorney was out and would not be available until the following Wednesday. He thereupon asked Ilgenfritz to stay out of the plant until he had an opportunity to confer with Respondent's attorney. Ilgenfritz asked Tackes if this was a layoff or dismissal, or disciplinary action. Tackes answered in the negative. She then asked him if it was because of her union activities, and Tackes again said, "No." Later the same day, Simms was also told to stay home until Wednesday. On Monday, April 25, Ilgenfritz came to the plant with Union Representative Martin and attempted to see Tackes. Tackes explained to Ilgenfritz by telephone that there was nothing further to discuss at that time because he had not yet been able to get in touch with the Respondent's attorney. That afternoon, at the end of the normal workshift, there were two representatives from the Union on the outside of the plant handing out a circular alleging that Ilgenfritz had been laid off for union activity. That evening, Tackes was able to reach Respondent's attorney at his home. The attorney advised Tackes that there was insufficient evidence of sabotage and that it would be best to call the people back to work as soon as possible and to place them on tasks in which they could do little damage. Upon receiving this advice, Tackes telephoned Ilgenfritz and told her that she could return to work as soon as she desired. He also tried to reach Simms by telephone but was unsuccessful. Ilgenfritz returned to work the following day, April 26, and was assigned to making gaskets. She was paid for the day that she had been away from work. The General Counsel contends that Ilgenfritz' layoff was because of her union activity. The facts do not support the contention. I am satisfied that Ilgenfritz' activity for the Union was not the basis for Production Manager Tackes' action. The work done by her on the meter movements and the terminal boards was patently unsatisfactory. Moreover, there were numerous other employees wearing organizer's buttons openly. No action was taken against any of them. Conversely, Simms who was not known to be a union adherent was also asked to stay away from the Thirteen small metal posts or pins are mounted on the terminal board Of these, nine do not go all the way through Four, one near each corner, go all the way through the board and protrude about three -eighths of an inch on each side of the board. ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA 635 plant until Wednesday. In sum, there was a reasonable basis for Tackes' action, and there has been no showing that it was discriminatorily motivated. In the alternative, the General Counsel argues that assuming, arguendo, that Tackes had a good-faith belief that Ilgenfritz had engaged in sabotage, her suspension was nevertheless discriminatory because she had not, in fact, engaged in such conduct In support of this contention, the General Counsel relies on N.L.R.B. v. Burnup and Sams, Inc., 379 U.S. 21. The case is inapposite. There, two employees were discharged because the em- ployer was informed that, while soliciting another em- ployee to join the Union, they had told him that the Union would use dynamite to get in if the Union did not acquire the authorizations. At the hearing, it developed that the alleged threat was not made and the employer's information was untrue. In upholding the Board, the Supreme Court said: In sum , §8(a)(1) is violated if it is shown that the discharged employee was at the time engaged in a protected activity, that the employer knew it was such, that the basis of the discharge was an alleged act of misconduct in the course of that activity, and that the employee was not, in fact, guilty of that misconduct. (Id. at 23) In the instant case, Ilgenfritz was not engaged in any concerted or protected activity when she produced the defective work. It is true that Production Manager Tackes erroneously thought that her defective workmanship was caused by her attitude toward the Respondent, which in turn, was based on her prounion feelings. But an antiemployer attitude is not equivalent to being engaged in a protected activity. I therefore recommend that the complaint be dismissed in this regard. D. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(4) On May 11, Respondent issued a written reprimand to employee Jean Ilgenfritz. The complaint alleges that the reprimand was issued to her because of her membership in, sympathy for, and activities on behalf of the Union and because she had previously given testimony in a hearing conducted by the Board. There is no substantial dispute as to the facts. On May 9, Ilgenfritz asked Foreman King for permission to be absent from work the following day to attend the hearing in Case 30-RC-434. Foreman King gave her permission, but admittedly instructed her to call in the next morning to advise that she would be absent that day. Ilgenfritz attended the hearing, but in her excitement forgot to call in. Shortly after she returned to work the following morning , Foreman King approached her and asked her why she had not called in the day before. Ilgenfritz replied that she had completely forgotten about it King admitted that she "genuinely" appeared to have forgotten his instructions Nevertheless, he gave her a written warning notice for failing to call in her absence. Foreman King testified credibly that the Respondent has a rule generally applicable that employees who are to be absent should call in as close to 8 a.m. as possible. The Respondent does not have a rule to the effect that an employee must also call in on the day of absence if, on a prior day, he has already received permission to be absent Foreman King, however, in his own department does maintain a rule requiring the employee to call in in the morning of the day of absence even though the employee has previously received permission to be absent. He explained the reason for his rule as follows: It's the duty of the receptionist to receive and record all these calls, and, myself, I had been ill at the time, and I wasn't sure just when I would be available, if I were available, and with a call-in, this makes the man who is taking over in my absence, it gives him an idea of who's going to be there and who isn't. That Foreman King did in fact have such a rule in his department is substantiated not only by the testimony of employees of his department, but by the testimony of Ilgenfritz herself. Thus, she testified that she had received advance permission from Foreman King to attend a conference in the representation case on May 2, and that she did call in at approximately 8 a.m. of the day of her absence.'' It is also clear from the record that Foreman King enforced his rule. Thus employee Dekeyser received a written warning on May 19 for failure to call in his absence. In late 1965, four different employees received disciplinary suspensions on that account. In two of these cases, suspensions were issued even for a first offense. It was not established whether in these instances, prior permission to be absent had been granted. However, since Foreman King imposed the same requirements, it appears that Ilgenfritz was not subjected to disparate treatment. There is one instance that might possibly be construed as disparate treatment in the enforcement of Foreman King's rule. Employee Banks testified that on one occasion she asked permission to be absent the following morning, and although aware of Foreman King's requirement that she call in her absence the following morning failed to do so. When she returned to work the day after her absence she was given a verbal reprimand by Foreman King for her failure to call in. The General Counsel argues that on the basis of the foregoing I must draw the inference that Ilgenfritz received a written reprimand as distinguished from an oral one, because of her union activity. I cannot draw this inference on the basis of an isolated instance, particularly when before the beginning of the Union's organizing campaign, other employees had received suspensions-a much more stringent punishment than Ilgenfritz received-for violating the rule. Accordingly, I recommend that the complaint be dismissed in this regard. E. The Discharge of Phyllis Flikeid Phyllis Flikeid was hired by the Company on April 1, and was discharged on May 13. The General Counsel contends that her discharge was discriminatory; the Respondent contends that she was discharged for cause. Flikeid was hired as a probationary employee'' for production assembly, because she had a background in Foreman King testified that he instructed her to call in on May 2, while Ilgenfritz testified that King said nothing about her being required to call in I credit King's testimony in this regard, as there would appear to be no reason for Ilgenfritz ' calling in on May 2, unless she was either aware of Foreman King's rule or had been instructed by him to call in 2' New employees are hired by the Respondent for a probationary period of 3 months, during which time they are judged by their supervisor as to whether they can do the -b properly Flikeid denied that she was aware of the fact that she was a probationary employee However, the credited testimony of employee Calenzo, witness for the General Counsel, reflects Flikeid's awareness of the fact that she was a probationary employee 636 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that type of work , and the Respondent was anticipating commencement of production pursuant to a new contract. The work on the anticipated contract , however, was delayed and after a short period , Flikeid was transferred to the data processing area. At that time the Respondent was putting its accounting records into the data processing system and required proofreading of IBM cards at the initial stages. Flikeid indicated that she had done IBM sorting in her previous employment and knew essentially what was required in proofreading. Flikeid's new job also required the filing of cards. Flikeid did not prove to be a satisfactory employee. As a proofreader she failed to catch errors in the punchcards.s' Also, Flikeid who admitted to being a talkative person was on a number of occasions talking with other employees away from her work station when she should have been filing IBM cards .211 The General Counsel's contention that Flikeid was discharged because of union membership is based upon her testimony that she wore a union button the day before she was discharged and had had a conversation with the Production Manager Tackes in which she complained that employee Ilgenfritz was being discriminated against. I am satisfied that Flikeid was discharged because she was an unsatisfactory employee and not because of her union membership . As I have previously indicated, there were many employees who openly wore union buttons and who were not discriminated against. Nor was Flikeid particularly active in the Union 's organizational campaign. The fact that an employee is a union member will not shield him from discharge for good cause. E.g.,N.L.R.B. v. Mylan-Sparta Co., Inc., 166 F.2d 485, 490-491 (C.A. 6); Wellington Mill Division, West Point Manufacturing Co. v. N.L.R.B.,330 F.2d 579, 586, cert denied 379 U.S. 882. Accordingly, I recommend that the complaint be dismissed in this regard. against a leading union adherent , Jean Ilgenfritz, because of her activities in support of the Union, and then used a captive audience meeting on June 21, 1966, to capitalize upon its discriminatory program by a campaign of character assassination and personal vilification of the leading union instigator. 7. By like and related conduct, the Employer had interfered with the free choice of its employees as to the question of union representation. Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, I recommend that objections 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7, be overruled. With regard to objection 6, I have not previously discussed the allegation that the Employer used a captive audience meeting on June 21 to capitalize on its discriminatory program by a campaign of character assassination and personal vilification of the leading union instigator (Ilgenfritz). With regard to this allegation, I find and conclude that the meeting of June 21 was not a captive audience meeting, in that attendance at the meeting was voluntary and was so announced to, and understood by, the employees. With reference to the alleged character assassination and personal vilification of Ilgenfritz, the matter of her treatment was not raised by the Employer, but was raised by another employee, and before the Employer discussed Ilgenfritz' work record and the alleged telephone call from Union Organizer Martin, it secured the permission of Ilgenfritz to discuss these matters openly. Accordingly, I find that the allegation has not been substantiated. Based upon my findings and discussion above, I find and conclude that objection 2 has been proved by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole and should be sustained by the Regional Director. VI THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON OBJECTIONS IN CASE 30-RC-434 As noted at the outset, the following objections filed by the Union to conduct affecting the results of election were consolidated with the complaint cases herein for the purpose of eliciting evidence pursuant to which the Board may discharge its duties under Section 9(c) of the Act: 1. Since on or about April 20, 1966, the Employer has promulgated and enforced invalid and discriminatory no-solicitation rules. 2. Since on or about April 20, 1966, the Employer has coercively interrogated employees concerning their union preference and activities , and unlawfully assisted , induced and encouraged employees to repudiate their union designation. 3. Since on or about April 20, 1966, the Employer has announced and granted wage increases to certain and selected employees designed to reward anti-union sympathizers and penalize union adherents. 4. On or about June 21, 1966, the Employer openly promised to grant wage increases and "take care of" the other problems if the employees rejected the Union. 6. Since on or about April 20, and more particularly on May 11 , the Employer discriminated " According to Production Manager Tackes , he spoke to Flikeid three times about her failure to catch errors while proofreading Flikeid admitted that Tackes spoke to her once The activities of the Respondent set forth in section IV, above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate , and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. VII. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in the case, I recommend that the Respondent, its officers , agents, successors , and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interrogating employees concerning their or other employees' membership in, or activities on behalf of, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of its about errors I credit Tackes ' testimony " The credited testimony of Tackes and Warren Klemmick, his assistant , who was assigned to data processing at that time ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA employees, in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (b) Threatening employees with reprisals and retribution if the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local494, AFL-CIO or any other labor organization of its employees, is selected as the collective- bargaining representative of the employees. (c) Soliciting employees to revoke authorizations given to International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, or suggesting that they draft or sign written revocations of authorizations given to any union, or assisting in the drafting of such revocations. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right is affected by the proviso of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act- (a) Post at its Milwaukee, Wisconsin, plant copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix.""' Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 30, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Respondent, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by said Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith .31) I FURTHER RECOMMEND that the complaint herein be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not heretofore found. I FURTHER RECOMMEND that Case 30-RC-434 be severed from the consolidated complaint in Cases 30-CA-384 and 30-CA-397, and that Case 30-RC-434 be remanded to the Regional Director for Region 30 for such action as he may deem appropriate.' I 2" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " "' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " " Collins & Aikman Corp ,143 NLRB 15,16 APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 637 Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning their or other employees' membership in or activities on behalf of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of our employees, in a manner constituting interference, restraint , or coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with reprisals and retribution if the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of our employees, is selected as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees. WE WILL NOT solicit employees to revoke authorizations given to International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, or suggest that they draft or sign written revocations of authorizations given to any union, or assist in drafting of such revocations. WE WILL -NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right is affected by the proviso of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. All of our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above-named Union or any other labor organization. ASTRONAUTICS CORPORATION OF AMERICA (Employer) Dated By (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Second Floor Commerce Building, 744 North Fourth Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203, Telephone 272-8600.