Refiners Transport & Terminal Corp.

REFINERS TRANSPORT & TERMINAL CORP. 655 Refiners Transport & Terminal Corporation and Kenneth H. McKeel . Case 7-CA-5589. May 16,1967 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On January 25, 1967, Trial Examiner Abraham H. Mailer issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged and recommending that the complaint herein be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. The Respondent filed a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. called the Board, on August 2, 1966, issued on behalf of the General Counsel a complaint against the Respondent, alleging that the Respondent discharged said McKeel in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq.), herein called the Act. In its duly filed answer, the Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor practice. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before me at Detroit, Michigan, on October 5, 6, and 7, 1966. The General Counsel and the Respondent were represented and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral argument, and to file briefs with me. Briefs were filed by both parties. Upon consideration of the entire record, including the briefs of the parties, and upon my observation of each of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT At all times material herein, Respondent has maintained its principal office and place of business in the city of Hinsdale, Illinois, and maintains other places of business in the States of Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, engaged as an interstate and intrastate common carrier of bulk commodities. Respondent's terminal located at 3335 Greenfield, Melvindale, Michigan, is the only facility involved in this proceeding. During the year ending December 31, 1965, which period is representative of its operations during all times material herein, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, performed services valued in excess of $500,000, of which services valued in excess of $8 million were performed in the furnishing of transportation services of commodities in interstate commerce and for various enterprises located in States other than the State of Michigan. Accordingly, I find and conclude that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to assert jurisdiction here. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED I Without resolving the conflict in testimony occasioned by Terminal Manager Pretari's denial that he made certain statements attributed to him by three of the General Counsel's witnesses, the Trial Examiner found that such statements are "patently ambiguous" and do not constitute an admission that McKee) was discharged for engaging in concerted activity As we agree with the Trial Examiner's characterization of the statements allegedly made by Pretari, we find it unnecessary to determine the credibility issue Further, we find superfluous, and hereby disavow, the Trial Examiner's speculations as to why Pretan would have made those statements attributed to him Local No. 7-389 , Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union , AFL-CIO , herein called the Union, is and has been at all times material herein a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ISSUE Whether the Respondent discharged Kenneth H. McKeel because he had engaged in union or concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ABRAHAM H . MALLER , Trial Examiner : On June 8, 1966, Kenneth H . McKeel filed a charge against Refiners Transport & Terminal Corporation , herein called the Respondent . Upon said charge, the Regional Director for Region 7 of the National Labor Relations Board , herein A. The Contentions of the Parties McKeel was discharged on December 23, 1965. Respondent contends that McKeel was discharged because he had severely beaten another employee, Joseph R. Bonds, during worktime and while on company property. The General Counsel contends that McKeel's assault on Bonds was used as a pretext and that McKeel was discharged because of his leadership and 164 NLRB No. 99 656 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD participation in a concerted protected activity involving the efforts of McKeel and certain other employees to remedy what they considered to be an unjust deprivation of certain seniority rights. B. The Fight McKeel, at the time of the hearing, was 41 years old, 5 feet 11 inches in height and weighed 178 pounds. Bonds, on the other hand, was 53 years old, 5 feet 9 inches tall and weighed only 130 pounds. At the time of the altercation, Bonds was not in good health. He had previously undergone an operation in which one-half of his stomach had been removed. In addition, he was suffering from bursitis. It is a reasonable inference that McKeel knew of Bonds' physical condition because they had been working at the same terminal and Bonds had been absent from work for an extended period of time because of the surgery. On December 17, Bonds had completed his deliveries and returned to the terminal to refuel the truck he drives before parking it and making out his waybills.' When he drove into the terminal, the fuel islands were blocked by other trucks, and he was unable to get to the gas pumps. After waiting about 10 minutes, Bonds went to the drivers' room to find out whose trucks were parked near the pumps. John McLaughlin, another driver, told Bonds that one of the trucks was his and one was McKeel's. Shortly thereafter, McLaughlin moved his truck, but at that point another driver, Martin Becker, came through the terminal gate, and, not knowing that Bonds was waiting for the space, pulled directly up to the fuel island, again blocking Bonds. Bonds then got out of his truck and drove McKeel's truck out of the way. He then proceeded to fuel his truck and check the tires and oil. Finding that oil was needed, he picked up an oil can and started for the garage. About this time, McKeel came out of the drivers' room and asked who moved his truck. Bonds replied that he had. As McKeel drew close to Bonds, he pointed his finger at him and said, "Who do you think you are moving my truck?" Bonds pointed his finger at McKeel, intending to ask him who he thought he was parking his truck in front of the pump and leaving it there. However, all he was able to say was, "Who .. " when McKeel said, "Don't point your finger at me," and proceeded to beat Bonds with his fists and his knee. Bonds was severely beaten on the head and chest. He testified that there was a big patch of skin torn from his cheekbone, that his eye was black and blue, his nose was bleeding, his upper and lower lips were cut, that he had a bruise on the right shoulder blade that was about the size of a baseball, black and blue and very sore, and had a knot on his head as big as a hen's egg. Bonds was knocked flat by the onslaught. He made an effort to rise but was apparently unable to do so and fell back. McKeel with the assistance of Becker picked him up. As he did so, McKeel ' It was the duty of the drivers to service their trucks and make out the waybills before leaving work each day 2 The foregoing account is based upon the credited testimony of Bonds, supplemented and corroborated in various respects by employees Becker, McLaughlin , and Hoffman , none of whom witnessed the entire incident McKeel admitted striking Bonds, but claimed he acted in self-defense, testifying that Bonds had "doubled up his fist and he started to draw it back, and when he did, I hit him I did this to protect myself." I do not credit McKeel's testimony. Considering the comparative size and physical condition of the two men and the severity of the beating administered by McKeel, I find it impossible to believe that McKeel was acting in self-defense or even thought so McKeel's told Bonds that he was sorry. Becker said to McKeel, "Go ahead and I will take care of him." McKeel replied, "I'm afraid now if I leave go, he will hit me." To this Becker replied, "He isn't going to hit you, just go ahead and I will take care of him." Becker then helped Bonds into Foreman Steinseifer's office. He testified, "I didn't exactly carry him but ne stumbled along like a man in a drunken stupor." Becker asked Bonds if he wanted a doctor, and Bonds replied in the negative . He said that he had more work to do on his truck, that he had not put oil into it, and Becker replied that he would take care of that for him.2 Some time later Bonds, accompanied by Becker, drove to the Melvindale police department, where Bonds filed a complaint against McKeel. The fight was reported to John Pretari, Respondent's Detroit operations manager, about 7 p.m. that day, by either Foreman Steinseifer or Union Steward Leonard Grauman, who telephoned Pretari and told him that there had been a fight and that Bonds wanted to talk to him. Bonds told Pretari that he had been "pretty badly beaten." Pretari asked to talk to McKeel, but the latter had already left the premises. The next morning, at approximately 8 a.m., Pretari saw Bonds at the terminal garage and noted that the latter's face "was pretty well beaten." Pretari then telephoned Respondent's main office in Hinsdale and spoke with George Lesley, safety director and personnel manager of the Respondent. They agreed that the matter should be held over until Monday when they could discuss it with Donald H. Weddle, vice president in charge of operations. The next day, Saturday, Pretari discussed the matter with some of the employees and expressed the opinion that "as it stacked up at the present time I would have to say that Ken McKeel was in line for a reprimand." On the following Monday, Vice President Weddle telephoned Pretari and instructed him to suspend both drivers until there could be a hearing and investigation. Pretari thereupon suspended both drivers and set up a meeting for Thursday, December 23 at 11 a.m. McKeel asked for, and obtained, permission to bring witnesses. Union Steward Grauman also asked and received, permission for himself and J. Roy Johnston, secretary- treasurer of the Union, to attend the meeting. On December 23, McKeel, Bonds, and the witnesses and observers appeared at Pretari's office. McKeel was accompanied by drivers McLaughlin and Hoffman, and one Jerry Morrow. Pretari asked McKeel who Morrow was and, on learning that Morrow was there as a character witness for McKeel, told Morrow that he "didn't think it would be necessary that he testify because he was actually not connected with this at all."3 Prior to the hearing Pretari told McKeel and Bonds that he would interview each person separately without confrontation by the principals . Both agreed to this later statement , when Becker told him to let go of Bonds, that he was afraid Bonds would hit him, indicates a fear of retribution rather than self-defense McKeel's alleged fear that Bonds would hit him after having been severely beaten is somewhat incomprehensible in the light of McKeel's own testimony that when Bonds "attempted to get up again , he was dizzy, or appeared to be dizzy, groggy, and I thought possibly he fell back and hit his head and had a concussion " 3 According to McKeel, Pretari told him that Morrow's testimony would be unnecessary because "there would be nothing coming out of this investigation" and told the same thing to Morrow Morrow did not testify in the instant proceeding I do not credit McKeel's testimony in this regard. REFINERS TRANSPORT & TERMINAL CORP. 657 procedure.' Pretari took notes of the testimony of each witness and then transcribed them on a typewriter. Following the hearing, Pretari called Vice President Weddle in Hinsdale, read his notes to him and discussed the matter. During the telephone conversation, it was decided that Bonds be reinstated and that McKeel be discharged. Pretari then announced the Respondent's decision to McKeel, Bonds, and the Union's representatives. Pretari also told McKeel that the union officials were still present and that McKeel could confer with them if he desired. McKeel met with them for about 10 to 15 minutes and then left. Subsequently, McKeel called Johnston and requested arbitration. Thereupon Johnston wired the Respondent to that effect. Later, at a statewide meeting, the Union, the membership, by secret ballot voted not to arbitrate McKeel's grievance, and Johnston so notified the Respondent. As previously indicated, Bonds filed criminal charges against McKeel in the Melvindale Municipal Court. After a trial, McKeel was convicted of assault and battery and fined $25 and $2 50 costs. McKeel appealed the conviction to the circuit court. Bonds appeared at the Wayne Circuit Court and after talking to Detective Green, assigned to the case, withdrew the charges for the reason that he had no desire to cause any trouble to McKeel. C. The Seniority Dispute McKeel had been employed as a truckdriver by the L. A. Smith Company for a number of years when, on March 1, 1959, the Respondent purchased the assets of the L. A. Smith Company and took over its operations. From March 1, 1959, until December 1, 1963, McKeel was employed at a terminal site in River Rouge, Michigan, which had served as a terminal site of the L. A. Smith Company. After the 1959 acquisition, McKeel and the other drivers formerly employed by L. A. Smith Company continued to perform their duties in essentially the same manner, except that they were now in the employ of the Respondent. The Union continued to represent the Smith employees as their collective-bargaining agent. During November 1963, the Respondent initiated operations at a new terminal in Melvindale, Michigan. At that time, Respondent closed an old terminal located at Dearborn, Michigan, and transferred to the new Melvindale terminal approximately 35 of the employees formerly stationed there. On or about December 1, 1963, the Respondent terminated its operations at the River Rouge terminal and transferred the former L. A. Smith employees to the Melvindale terminal, thus effectuating a combined work force of both former L. A. Smith employees and Refiners Transport employees. Prior to December 1, 1963, the former L. A. Smith employees were given full credit for their seniority obtained during the employment with the L. A. Smith Company. However, when notified of their transfer to the Melvindale terminal, they were informed by the Respondent that they would carry seniority relating back to March 1, 1959, only. This announcement was in accord with the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement entered into between the Respondent and the Union, effective November 12, 1962.5 Subsequently, a grievance was filed by employee Gerald Lamoureux on behalf of the former Smith employees. The grievance was rejected by the Respondent, and the Union by a vote of its members at a statewide meeting voted against taking the grievance to arbitration. A meeting was then held of all former Smith employees who decided to pursue their seniority rights through legal proceedings. To carry out this object, a committee consisting of McKeel as chairman, and Lamoureux and William S. Keeley, was elected. The committee retained an attorney, Dee Edwards, who on February 20, 1964, wrote to the Respondent requesting processing of the grievance and expressing the willingness of the employees to go to arbitration. The letter, inter alta, named the committee. In due course, the letter came to the attention of Vice President Weddle. On or about April 1, 1964, Attorney Edwards filed a class action in the name of William S. Keeley, as plaintiff, against the Respondent and the Union, alleging a breach of contract by the Respondent and conspiracy with the Union, by its action in reducing the seniority credit of the Smith employees. Subsequently, the suit was transferred to the United States district court where it is still pending. Attorney Edwards was later replaced by Attorney Ellsworth K. Hanlon. McKeel participated in the legal proceedings, attending deposition hearings, court proceedings, meetings in the judge's chambers, and settlement conferences which were attended by representatives of both the Respondent and the Union, at which conferences he acted as spokesman for the Smith group. A pretrial conference was set for December 22, the day before McKeel's discharge. With regard to the attempts to settle the lawsuit, I am satisified that the Respondent took the position that the seniority question was an intraunion matter in which it had no real interest other than refusing to accept a solution which would require two separate dispatch systems. Thus Abraham L. Zwerdling, attorney for the Union in the lawsuit, testified as follows: . it was the position of Mr. Butler [attorney for the Respondent], as he stated it to me, probably a couple of times, as I remember it, it was his position they didn't care how we sliced it, the only thing was ... about one proposal which related to what is described as having two separate boards, he said the company couldn't go for that but short of that, they didn't care how it was worked out so long as it was worked out internally, which is a typical employer position in a seniority situation. The uncontradicted testimony of Pretari The pertinent provisions are set forth in article IV, seniority, section 1 , as follows (b)(1) in accordance with the Successor and Assignees' Clause from the former L A Smith Company contract, it is mutually agreed and understood that the former employees of the L A. Smith Company (purchased by Refiners Transport & Terminal Corporation in March 1959), at its River Rouge and Napoleon , Michigan, terminals, who are presently employed under the terms and conditions of this Agreement , shall retain all past seniority and benefits accrued while being employed by said L A Smith Company (2) It is further agreed and understood that the River Rouge and Napoleon, Michigan, employees shall not use their seniority to displace Refiners Transport & Terminal employees on a local or state-wide basis, except employees who were hired on or after March 1, 1959 658 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD This was substantially corroborated by Attorney Hanlon who testified that the Respondent rejected two settlement proposals because it would not accept any proposal which would require two dispatch systems, that the Union rejected two other settlement proposals, and that the Respondent had no objection to the fifth proposal of settlement in which the Smith group offered to take half of the seniority. D. Concludtng Findings The record is devoid of any evidence of animus on the part of the Respondent toward McKeel. The litigation had been pending for more than a year and a half before he was discharged. I find it strange to believe that, had the Respondent desired to discharge McKeel because of the seniority dispute or the litigation, it would have waited so long to find a pretext to accomplish that purpose. There are only two events adduced by the General Counsel which it is contended relate McKeel's discharge to the seniority dispute and/or the litigation. These involve alleged admissions by Manager Pretari to that effect. One is alleged to have occurred on February 15, 1966, under the following circumstances: Subsequent to his discharge, McKeel filed a claim for unemployment compensation under the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESC). The MESC hearing was scheduled for on or about February 15 at its offices in Detroit. Representing McKeel was Attorney Hanlon. Only Manager Pretari appeared on behalf of the Respondent. The initial hearing was very brief, as Pretari did not bring certain records requested by Attorney Hanlon, and a postponement of the hearing was agreed to in order that Pretari could bring in the requested records. After the hearing was adjourned, Pretari, Attorney Hanlon, and McKeel proceeded from the hearing room toward the elevator. According to Attorney Hanlon and McKeel, the following then occurred: As the three men were waiting for an elevator, Attorney Hanlon placed his hand on Pretari's shoulder and said: "You must feel pretty proud of yourself, Mr. Pretari, firing a man with 15 years service with your Company for something which you have never fired anybody before ... You have to shave in the morning and you have children. How do you look in the morning and how do you justify this to you conscience?" After they got into the elevator and as the elevator descended, Attorney Hanlon continued in the same vein. As he left the elevator, Manager Pretari said, "I have taken my lumps in this 15 years or so that I have been with the Company." Hanlon then said, "Mr. Pretari, I understand these things, somebody makes these balls and you have to fire them." Pretari responded, "Look, I will tell you why McKeel lost his job. It wasn't the fight. It was over the lawsuit. Hell, the people in Chicago knew all about this when I called them. I hadn't even told them about it but they knew all about it. I never would have fired McKeel. McKeel is one of the best workers I ever had. McKeel is above average in everything he does and he has been a responsible, level-headed man, and I would have never fired him." When Pretari left, Hanlon took a pad of paper from his briefcase and made notes of Pretari's alleged remarks. In this connection, it may be noted that Attorney Hanlon's memorandum differs from his testimony. In his testimony detailed above, Hanlon quoted Pretari as saying: "I will tell you why McKeel lost his job. It wasn't the fight. It was over the lawsuit." However, the pertinent part of the memorandum reads: "I'll tell you what cost Ken McKeel his job. It's the argument between the two groups." It thus appears that Attorney Hanlon's testimony is exaggerated in this regard. Clearly, his memorandum made shortly after the event is more reliable. Moreover, McKeel's version of the incident agrees with Hanlon's memorandum, rather than with his testimony. According to McKeel Pretari attributed McKeeFs_discharge to "the argument between the two groups." Pretari's version of the incident was substantially different. According to Pretari, Attorney Hanlon said, "You have to look yourself in the mirror when you shave ... you and your company should be ashamed of yourselves for depriving a man of making a living." To this Pretari replied, "Hanlon, you are not blaming me for what Ken McKeel did." Hanlon answered "Yes, I am." As they walked from the elevator to the street, Attorney Hanlon asked several questions and answered them himself. Before they parted, Pretari asked McKeel whether he was working. Hanlon said, "Don't worry about Ken McKeel. He will get along." Pretari then said, "Well, I don't doubt that at all because I have always classified Ken McKeel as one of the better drivers and as far as I am concerned Ken McKeel is better than average in anything he ever done for me, driving, records and appearance. I have never had anything to say about Ken, and as far as that goes, Ken, anytime you want my recommendation I will go as far as I can for you." Pretari specifically denied saying that McKeel lost his job because of the argument between the two groups. He also denied saying that his superiors in Chicago knew about the fight before he told them. The other alleged admission involves a statement allegedly made by Pretari to employee William S. Keeley, a member of the Smith group and the plaintiff in the litigation. During his cross-examination , Pretari denied that he had ever told any employee that, if the decision were left up to him, he would never have discharged McKeel. On rebuttal, Keeley testified that on or about December 27, shortly after McKeel's discharge, Pretari was talking to him about certain contract negotiations that were then in progress. During the conversation Keeley remarked, "That was some Christmas present McKeel got, wasn't it, and he got fired 2 days before Christmas." According to Keeley, Pretari said, "Yes I feel real had about that," and continued: I want you to understand that this wasn't my decision, that if it was left up to me Mr. McKeel would have gotten a reprimand or possibly three days off at the most but that's all, that the Company is the one that discharged Mr. McKeel . you know the real problem behind this whole thing is the seniority problem ... I wish they would let me take a couple of you guys and a couple of guys from the other side and go into a room and I guarantee we could thrash this thing out and come out with a solution. The key language in the foregoing statement: "the real problem behind this whole thing is a seniority problem," is patently ambiguous. If by the phrase "this whole thing," Pretari was referring to the discharge alone, his statement would constitute a damaging admission . However, I believe that "this whole thing" implied something more than the discharge, that Pretari meant that the assault by McKeel, a member of the Smith group , upon Bonds, a member of the Refiners group, was caused by the deep- seated antagonism between the two groups of employees resulting from the seniority dispute. To say the least, the statement attributed to Pretari is ambiguous , and this ambiguity detracts from the force of the statement. REFINERS TRANSPORT & TERMINAL CORP. 659 Normally, I would attach great weight to admissions. However, these statements must be weighed against the following considerations: (1) The seniority dispute and the litigation had been pending for more than a year and a half; (2) the Respondent during all that time had never exhibited any animus toward McKeel or any of the members of the Smith group; (3) in view of great probability that none of the members of the Smith group was perfect, the Respondent could have found some reason to discipline or discharge one or more of them during- that period, if it sought a pretext to weaken the group's efforts; (4) the Respondent took a neutral attitude toward a dispute which was purely an intraunion matter; (5) McKeel viciously assaulted Bonds during working time and on company premises, an event which, in itself, justified his discharge; and (6) Respondent did not discharge McKeel out of hand; rather, it suspended both McKeel and Bonds immediately and then held a hearing during which it heard from the participants and the witnesses and then discharged McKeel only after a telephone conference between Pretari and Vice President Weddle, in which Pretari read his notes of the hearing to Weddle.6 In these circumstances, I cannot believe that Pretari's admissions represented the truth. One might therefore appropriately ask: What would prompt Pretari to make admissions which were contrary to fact? The answer probably lies in the surrounding circumstances. Thus, the statements made to Attorney Hanlon appear to be the conduct of a man who sought to escape Hanlon's badgering by shifting the blame from himself to his superiors. In the case of the statement to Keeley, even if arguendo it is construed most favorably to the General Counsel's case, it might well have been prompted by a desire to maintain a good personal relationship with the Smith group with whom Pretari would have to continue to work. This is evidenced by his concluding statement to Keeley: "I wish they would let me take a couple of you guys and a couple of guys from the other side and go into a room and I guarantee we could thrash this thing [the seniority dispute] out and come out with a solution." In view of all the foregoing, I find and conclude that McKeel was discharged because of his assault upon Bonds and not by reason of the seniority dispute and/or the lawsuit. "The Act does not protect violence, and fighting is not a protected activity even if union activity gives rise to it." (Continental Can Company, Inc., 136 NLRB 1135, 1137.) Even if the Respondent had desired to discharge McKeel because of the seniority dispute and/or the lawsuit, his discharge for fighting would not constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. In Klate Holt Company, 161 NLRB 1606, the Board said: The mere fact that an employer may desire to terminate an employee because he engages in unwelcome concerted activities does not, of itself, establish the unlawfulness of a subsequent discharge. If an employee provides an employer with a sufficient cause for his dismissal by engaging in conduct for which he would have been terminated in any event, and the employer discharges him for that reason, the circumstance that the employer welcomed the opportunity to discharge does not make it discriminatory and therefore unlawful. I therefore find and conclude that the Respondent did not violate the Act by discharging McKeel. RECOMMENDED ORDER For the reasons above set forth and on the entire record, it is hereby recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. 6 In his brief, the General Counsel casts some aspersion upon the nature of the hearing conducted by Pretan in that Pretari did not confront McKeel or Bonds with the contradictory version given by each and did not question any witness as to conflicting or inconsistent statements The General Counsel's position is without merit Respondent was not required to hold a hearing. Moreover, the nature of the hearing and the procedure adopted by Pretari had been agreed to in advance by both McKeel and Bonds. 298-668 0 -69-43