John Oster Manufacturing Co

JOHN OSTER MFG. CO. 503 John Oster Manufacturing Co. and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers , Local 1607, AFL-CIO. Case 30-CA-740 October 31, 1968 DECISION AND ORDER By CHAIRMAN MC CULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING AND ZAGORIA tio;.s be dismissed is adopted, pro forma, in the absence of exceptions thereto. 2 We agree with the Trial Examiner 's finding that employee Van Gysel in refusing to attend the "gripe session," and employee Cato in advising Van Gysel of her right so to refuse , were both engaged in activity protected by Section 7 of the Act, and that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by disciplining them for engaging in such conduct. We find it unnecessary , however, to pass on whether such disciplinary action was also violative of Section 8(a)(3), because, whether viewed as a violation of Section 8(a)(1) alone, or of both Section 8(a)(1) and (3), the remedial order would in either event be the same. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION On July 31, 1968, Trial Examiner George Turitz issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recom- mending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He also found that the Respondent had not engaged in other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended that such allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, I as modified herein.2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the Respondent, John Oster Manufacturing Co., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recoimm ilded Order, as herein modified: Substitute the following for the fourth indented paragraph of the notice: WE WILL make Gertrude Van Gysel whole for any loss of earnings, with interest at 6 percent, which she may have suffered as a result of her 3-day suspension for refusing to attend a gripe session and as a result of having been taken off incentive pay on the day of the gripe session. I The Trial Examiner 's recommendation that certain 8(a)(1) allega- 173 NLRB No. 82 GEORGE TURITZ, Trial Examiner On a charge filed on January 15, 1968 by International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1607, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, and served on January 16, 1968, upon John Oster Manufacturing Co., herein called Respondent and, at times, the Company, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, through the Regional Director for Region 30, on March 27, 1968, issued a complaint and notice of hearing against Respondent. Respondent filed its answer in which it denied all allegations of unfair labor practices The hearing on the Complaint was held before the Trial Examiner named above in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on May 13 and 14, 1968. The General Counsel, Respondent and the Union were each represented by counsel at the hearing. The General Counsel and Respondent have filed briefs with the Trial Examiner. Upon the entire record and from his observation of the witnesses the Trial Examiner makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is a Wisconsin corporation and maintains a plant and office at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of electrical appliances. It is a subsidiary of Sunbeam Corporation. In the course and conduct of its business operations Respondent purchases and receives goods and materials valued at in excess of $50,000 which are shipped to its Milwaukee plant directly from points outside the State of Wisconsin. It is found that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1607, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The issues litigated at the hearing were whether Respondent violated the Act by its attorney's interrogation of the Union's president, an employee, as to his justification for filing the charge, and by his request to employees for copies of affidavits given to the Board during the investigation; whether Respon- dent ordered an employee to attend a meeting between Respondent and employees for the purpose, in part, of discussing employee grievances without the Union's presence; 504 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD whether Respondent violated the Act by disciplining the employee for refusing to comply with such order and by disciplining the shop steward for counseling such refusal, and whether Respondent intimidated an employee by discrimina torily ordering her not to talk to other employees about union business on company time A Background Respondent and the Union had collective bargaining rela tions for a period of years For at least the 7 years prior to the hearing the contracts required union membership as a condi tion of employment and provided for the checkoff of union dues The contracts also contained a detailed grievance procedure, with provision for pay to union officials, stewards and other employees for time spent in union management activities and for training by the Company of a union member in time study procedures The Union's membership was con fined to Respondent' s Milwaukee plant, which had about 600 employees, and all officers of the Union were employed at the plant Until the events leading to the present case communica tion between the parties was effective Only four or five formal grievances were processed a year, and few went as far as arbitration In about 1965 or 1966 Respondent, without communi cating with the Union, instituted the practice of periodically holding meetings during working hours of top management with small groups of employees selected by the various foremen Coffee and doughnuts were served, the company officials spoke to the employees about problems of manage ment, such as scrap waste and the cost of light and heat, and the employees were then invited to speak about any problems they had Among matters complained of or suggested by employees at the meetings and discussed with them by management were plant ventilation , distribution of piecework, food in the plant cafeteria , eating and recreation facilities on plant property used by the employees at lunch and breaktime, plant parking facilities for employees, and incentive standards In October 1966 the meetings came to the attention of union officials when employees asked why they were being held The officials brought the matter up with Respondent informally, intending to register objection However Radle, the plant superintendent, explained that the Company knew employees had "gripes" and that it wanted to find out what they were for purposes of rectification The union officials stated that so long as attendance at the meetings was voluntary and foremen would not harass employees for what they said, there would be no objection by the Union Radle gave assurance to that effect and the meetings continued to be held B Intimidation of Employees Gertrude Van Gysel was an employee for 13 years with an excellent employment record She was prominent among a group of employees who initiated a suit against the Company on behalf of all women employees for back wages based on allegations of discrimination because of sex In December 1967 she was a candidate for member of the Union's Executive Board Her foreman, De Tarville, who had been a union member until his promotion 2 years before, told her at that time that Frank Mars, an official of Respondent's, called her a "barracks lawyer " From time to time during the pnor 2 years De Tarville had told Sherwood, then the union president, that he hoped Sherwood would never appoint her shop steward, and in December 1967 he told Sherwood that she would not make a good executive board member, since she was too loud mouthed On December 20, 1967, when Josephine Schultz complained to De Tarville that something was not being done in accordance with the Union's contract De Tarville told her not to be like Gertie, that one in his department was enough, and that he did not want his girls to come to the attention of the front office' On January 5, 1968, Van Gysel was engaged in conversation by an employee from the next shift who had arrived early The employee had been laid off and she questioned Van Gysel about layoff procedures The conversation was observed by Radle, who instructed Redding, the division superintendent, that the employees be ordered to "break it up " Redding passed the instruction on to De Tarville, who told Van Gysel sharply to get back to work and to conduct her union business on personal time, not company time Van Gysel asked De Tarville why was he angry He replied that thenceforth when anyone came by to talk to her, she was to tell him to keep walking C The Disciplining of Van Gysel and Cato On January 12, 1968, at about 10 30 De Tarville informed Van Gysel that she had been designated to go to the employee meeting scheduled for that morning She said that she did not want to go De Tarville told her that he would check to ascertain whether she was obliged to go He consulted Redding, who told De Tarville that she was required to go to the meeting De Tarville returned to Van Gysel and took her machine "off production," so that she would be paid on the basis of time rather than the amount she produced He gave her permission to go to see Redding with her shop steward, Charles Cato Shortly thereafter Redding himself came to Van Gysel and shouted at her to get up to the meeting Van Gysel replied that she did not have to go, since attendance was voluntary Redding replied, "Mr Radle says for you to get up there and you get up there " Van Gysel replied that the Union said that she did not have to attend With force she threw a handful of small shafts she was about to process back into the box from which she had taken them and went to see Cato Cato, and later Sherwood, the Union's acting president, confirmed that she did not have to go to the meeting The three then proceeded to Redding's office Redding, who was returning from the employee meeting, where he had informed Radle of Van Gysel's persistence , refused to discuss the matter at that time He said that Van Gysel was supposed to be at the meeting and that she had damaged some shafts so that they were scrap He ordered that if she would not go to the meeting she should get back to work He went into his office, slamming the door At Van Gysel's request Cato and Sherwood accompanied her to her machine so that she could show them that the shafts she had thrown down were not scrap In a few minutes Redding, very angry, came and ordered the three to ' The General Counsel while contending that these incidents show a they were violative of the Act They are not passed upon in this discriminatory attitude towards Van Gysel does not contend that Decision JOHN OSTER get to work. They followed his instructions. At 1.30 that afternoon Van Gysel was summoned to Radle's office At her request Cato was also called. Redding, Radle and Herberer, Respondent's personnel manager, were there. Radle asked Van Gysel if she had been asked to attend the meeting and whether she had refused. She answered yes to each question, and both times Radle said to Herberer and Redding, "Did you hear9" Asked why she refused, Van Gysel explained that she had been to one of those meetings and made complaints but had accomplished nothing. Redding contra- dicted her, saying that she had raised question about incentive jobs which had been retimed as a result of her comments. Cato admitted that he had told Van Gysel not to attend the meeting, explaining that it was his impression that attendance was not mandatory. Radle replied that Van Gysel had received a direct order from management and had disobeyed it He told her that she would be informed later what would be done and sent her back to her job. The meeting was moved to the office of Hopkins, Respon- dent's assistant vice president for employee relations. Schaffer, an International representative of the Union, who chanced to be in the plant, and Sherwood were asked to come. Hopkins reviewed the facts as he said Respondent understood them. The union representatives took issue with his claim that the order Van Gysel had disobeyed was merely to see Radle; they said that the order had been to go to the meeting. Hopkins said that in any event it was undisputed that she had refused to comply with what she understood was an order, and that insubordination was a serious matter for which the penalty would normally be immediate discharge. Schaffer said, "You certainly can't be considering discharge." Hopkins replied that they were. Van Gysel's employment record was then exam- ined. It was found clear of warnings or disciplinary action of any kind and showed good attendance, and Redding added that she was a good producer. Respondent conceded that she was a good employee whom they would not want to lose, but insisted that something had to be done about her disobedience of an order and her manner, namely, in throwing the shafts down angrily. After the management representatives had caucused, they announced to the union representatives that Van Gysel would be given a 3-day disciplinary layoff and Cato a written warning to cease advising employees to be insubordi- nate. The union representatives protested, there was further discussion, and another caucus by management, after which it was announced that the stated disciplinary action would stand. Both employees received "Disciplinary Action Reports." Cato's warned of "more severe disciplinary action" in case of recurrence, Van Gysel's of termination of employment. Van Gysel was suspended for 3 days and then returned to work. Cato and Sherwood testified that Radle insisted at the conference that attendance at the meetings was mandatory. Except insofar as he stated that he assumed that attendance was voluntary, Hopkins did not testify directly as to what was said at the conference on that point. Radle, when asked at the hearing whether employees had to go to the meetings, answered, "No, not necessarily," and went on to recount how he had excused employees upon presentation of reasons. Asked whether attendance at the meetings was mandatory at any time, he replied, "No, not from my standpoint." Neither he nor Redding testified as to what was said on the subject at the January 12 conference, and Cato's specific testimony that Radle there said that attendance was mandatory stands undenied. Cato impressed the Trial Examiner as a truthful MFG. CO. 505 witness. It is found that at the January 12 conference Respondent maintained its prior position that attendance at the meetings was mandatory. Hopkins testified that he was the one who made the decision to discipline Van Gysel and Cato. He stated that basically the reason Van Gysel had been disciplined was that she had disobeyed Redding's order, and that Cato had been disciplined because he counseled her that she could disobey the order of a superior. He stated that he thought that the order to Van Gysel had not been to go to the meeting but to go to see Radle, but he said that this difference as to the nature of the order did not matter, except as to the degree of penalty He explained that if she had disobeyed an order to go to the meeting he would have disciplined her, although he speculated that the penalty would then probably have been milder than the 3-day suspension that had been imposed. Van Gysel's rate of pay was $2.17 per hour, but on incentive she normally earned about $1.35 per hour more. She testified that this loss of earnings was not the reason she refused to go to the meeting but rather the fact that the meeting she had attended had been useless. D. Interrogation, the Request for Affidavits On January 15, 1968, the charge, signed by Sherwood, was filed. A week or two later Hopkins brought it before the executive board of the Union. He read the charge, including the following allegations. Since on or about January 12, 1968, and thereafter, the above-named employer has in order to discourage member- ship in Local 1607 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment and to the terms and conditions of employment of Gertrude R. Van Gysel by suspending Van Gysel for 3 days because of her union and/or protected concerted activities. He then read the statement, just above Sherwood's signature, "I declare that I have read the above charge and that the statements therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief," and remarked that when he had previously discussed the charge with Sherwood, the latter had admitted that he did not think that Respondent had taken action against Van Gysel because of her union or protected activities. Hopkins urged that this was wrong. He said that he was not acquainted with Board regulations but that he had never heard of regulations requiring a person to sign a statement to the effect that he believed true something which he did not believe true. He requested the committee to review the charge and withdraw it. The committee agreed to discuss the matter. On May 3, 1968, 10 days before the hearing, Mallien, Respondent's attorney, met at the plant with Hopkins, Herberer, and Housfeld, assistant in industrial relations. Cato and Grabow, the Union's vice president, and De Tarville, Van Gysel's foreman, were summoned. Mallien told Cato that the charge which had been filed alleged discrimination because of union activities. He asked Cato whether he felt that he or any other employee had been discriminated against because of union activity, or whether he felt that Respondent had taken the action it took against Van Gysel because of union activity. Cato answered no to all the questions. Mallien then discussed with him the January 12 incident, asked whether Cato had signed an affidavit, whether Cato could get a copy, and 506 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD whether he objected to Mallien's reading it Cato said that he could probably get a copy and did not object to Mallien's reading it. Mallien asked who had signed the charge. Informed that it was Sherwood, he asked to see him and that individual was summoned Malhen told Sherwood that he was preparing for the hearing in this case. He took out the charge and asked Sherwood why he had signed it-did he think that Van Gysel had been discriminated against. Sherwood said that he thought so, but when asked why, refused to state his reason at that time. Mallien persisted in asking Sherwood why he felt that way and why he had signed the charge. Sherwood evaded the issue and after a time said, "I don't feel that I have to answer these questions at this time." Mallien agreed, but he said, . . but you must have your reasons." Sherwood finally said that he did not feel that Van Gysel had been discriminated against because of union activities. He said that the only reason the charge had been filed was that Respondent was making the "gripe" meetings mandatory. Mallien then asked if he could get a copy of Sherwood's affidavit, and Sherwood replied that he probably could. Sherwood and Cato both agreed that they would see if they could get copies of their affidavits and submit them to Malden. Concluding Findings Intimidation. The General Counsel makes no contention that Respondent would have been acting illegally by prohi- biting employees while at work from carrying on discussions, including discussions of alleged contract violations. His theory is that (a) Respondent in its past practice had condoned such discussions, and (b) on January 5, 1968, Respondent departed from such practice with respect to Van Gysel because she was more zealous than other employees in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection, as demonstrated by her candidacy for executive board, her prominent part in the pending lawsuit alleging discrimination based on sex, and by her reputation as a "barracks lawyer." On the basis of Josephine Schultz' explana- tion to De Tarville that employees often brought their problems to Van Gysel, it may be inferred that Respondent thought that she was involved in such discussions more than most employees That Van Gysel was somewhat argumentative appears from her own testimony at one point, "I always have some kind of comment to make but I don't remember offhand " The fact that Respondent was less ready to condone violation of its rule against worktime discussions in the case of an argumentative and discussion-prone employee does not, standing alone, establish a purpose or intent to discourage zeal in concerted activities. It could mean that in such circum- stances the employee's conduct could not be tolerated because it had a more significant impact upon production. It is found that the General Counsel has failed to prove by a preponder- ance of the evidence that Respondent, in the incident involving Van Gysel on January 5, 1968, applied its rules in a discriminatory manner or otherwise intimidated employees concerning union or other protected concerted activity. The disciplining of Van Gysel and Cato • At the hearing Respondent attempted to establish that Van Gysel's suspen- sion was imposed because she had disobeyed an order to go to see Radle. The evidence is uncontradicted that Redding told De Tarville that Van Gysel had to go to the meeting and that De Tarville passed that order on to Van Gysel. No claim is made that this order was at any time countermanded or withdrawn expressly. What Respondent attempted to establish is that Van Gysel was later given an order in slightly different form, i.e., to go to see Radle. As Radle concededly was then at the meeting place and the meeting was getting under way, such an order, assuming for purposes of discussion that it had been given, would have amounted to the same thing, that is, to go to the meeting. If Redding had intended otherwise, he would have told Van Gysel that she did not have to go to the meeting as previously directed, but that Radle nevertheless wanted to see her. In fact, at the afternoon conference on January 12 Respondent insisted that attendance at the meetings was mandatory and did not press the question of what the order was that Van Gysel had disobeyed. Moreover, Respondent imposed its disciplinary action upon Cato without any attempt to establish whether he ever heard of the allegedly revised form of order. Respondent's attitude at the conference disclosed its recognition that the claim that Van Gysel was ordered to see Radle was an afterthought It is found that Van Gysel was not ordered to see Radle but was ordered to attend the meeting. It is further found that Respondent disciplined Van Gysel for refusing to attend the meeting and disciplined Cato for advising her that, notwithstanding such order, she did not have to attend. During the conference mention was made of the fact that when Van Gysel refused to comply with Redding's order she angrily threw down the shafts in her hand. Redding testified that the shafts were ground to a high finish and that Van Gysel's action made them defective. Hopkins testified that the company officials on January 12 mentioned among themselves that Van Gysel's gesture had been witnessed by 100 employ- ees. The value of the shafts, 7 or 8,000 of which Van Gysel processed in a day, was not proved at the hearing, and no contention was made there or at the January 12 conference that such value played any part in the decision to discipline Van Gysel or that it was even mentioned. Hopkins testified that he would have disciplined Van Gysel even if he had understood that she had disobeyed an order to go to a meeting at which attendance was supposed to be voluntary. At no time did he indicate that if her refusal to attend the meeting had been expressed with courtesy she would not have been deemed insubordinate. He testified in Hart Q. And specifically the problem as you came to know it, related to Van Gysel having disobeyed the order of a superior? A. Yes. Q. I believe several times in your direct testimony you used those words "disobeyed the order of a supervisor or Mr Redding? A. Yes. Q. And that basically is the reason why Van Gysel was disciplined, is that correct? A. Yes. As the "gripe sessions" were devoted in part to discussion of employees' complaints about terms and conditions of employ- ment, it would have been an invasion of the employees' rights under the Act to conduct that part of the meetings in the absence of the Union without the Union's consent. There is no JOHN OSTER MFG. CO. 507 evidence that the Union gave its consent to mandatory meetings The employees' statutory right to bargain collective- ly through a representative extends to all aspects of collective bargaining, including the presentation of grievances. At no time was the order to Van Gysel qualified so as to limit it to her attendance at the meeting during the time devoted to Respondent's problems, the order which she disobeyed in- cluded a requirement that she lend her presence to the presentation of the employees' "gripes", it was plainly unreasonable. As the employees had the right to the Union's participation in such a presentation, her refusal to attend was a right protected under the Act It is inherently discouraging of union membership when employees who have designated a labor organization as statutory bargaining representative are disciplined for refusing to engage in individual bargaining. Cf Aluminum Extrusions, Inc, 148 NLRB 1662, 1669, Franklin Brass Products, 159 NLRB 800, 808. Specific proof that Respondent intended to discourage membership in the Union is not needed. See Radio Officers' Union v. NL R.B., 347 U S. 17, 45. In any event, however, Respondent did intend to discourage employees from refusing to engage in individual bargaining, a plain interference with their right to engage in meaningful collective bargaining through a labor organization of their own choosing and discouraging of union membership. It is found that by disciplining Van Gysel and Cato Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3). It is also found that by the disciplinary reports issued to them and by the accusations of insubordination and other statements during the January 12 conference Respondent threatened Van Gysel and Cato with discharge and other reprisals because they exercised rights guaranteed in Section 7, and that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Unilateral change of rules. The Complaint alleges that on January 12, 1968, Respondent, through Redding, unilaterally changed the rules as to the "gripe" sessions by making attendance mandatory instead of voluntary. The General Counsel's theory at the hearing was that attendance had always been voluntary up to January 12. Thus the alleged change on that day was really a "one-shot affair." There is no basis for finding that Respondent's action on January 12 was taken for the deliberate purpose of evading its contractual obligations On the contrary, Respondent's long relationship with the Union, the contractual provisions for union security with checkoff, payment for time spent on union-management activities, and for training by the Company of union members for incentive-standards work, and the absence of evidence of friction or of attempts by Respondent to undermine the Union all tend to establish that Respondent's position on January 12 was taken in good faith. At the hearing Respondent took the same position as the General Counsel, namely, that attendance was voluntary. That matter is thus settled as between the parties; no useful purpose would be served in the circum- stances of this particular relationship in deciding whether Respondent's actions on January 12 included what would be a unilateral change in terms and conditions of employment However, the Trial Examiner does find that Respondent's order to Van Gysel to attend the meeting and its action in taking her off incentive in aid of such order were violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3). 2 In denying enforcement of W. T. Grant the court emphasized a factor not present in this case, namely, that the attorney who requested Interrogation- The Trial Examiner credits Cato's testimony that he was asked for a copy of his affidavit and that he acceded to the request without being told that he did not have to furnish the statement. It is not necessary to resolve the question of whether Mallren "prefaced" his request for Sherwood's affidavit with the statement that he had the right not to let him see it, by the time Sherwood gave his answer. Mallren had made that clear It was also clear to Cato by the time the meeting was over. An employer's request for statements given to Board agents constitutes illegal interroga- tion tending to interfere with the employees' free exercise of their rights under the Act even though the request is placed on a voluntary basis. See W. T. Grant Company, 144 NLRB 1179, 1181, enforcement denied in relevant part 337 F.2d 447, 448449 (C A 7),2 Braswell Motor Freight Lines, 156 NLRB 671, enfd. 386 F.2d 190 (C.A. 6). Any request that such affidavits be turned over to an employer interferes with the employees' rights. The Board is better able to carry on its investigative function and thereby secure vindication of em- ployees' rights under the Act if employees with information possibly relevant to a charge can feel assured that their statements to Board agents will remain confidential unless and until they are called to testify. Such assurance is not possible if they are to be subject to the necessity of refusing to comply with their employer's wishes. Employees whose future ad- vancement depends upon maintaining their employer's good will cannot have such 'assurance if confidentiality can be maintained only at the cost of refusing to comply with his wishes that they turn over copies of their statements. Many, to avoid having to take such a position vis-a-vis the person controlling their jobs, would prefer not to give the statements to the Board in the first place. Mallien's interrogation went farther than a mere quest for facts, he attacked the charge as containing untrue statements. He put Sherwood on the defensive, asked him, in the presence of Respondent's high officials, whether he believed the charge, and then, after eliciting from Sherwood the admission that he knew of no instances where employees had been discriminated against by Respondent because of union activities, demanded that he justify signing a charge which contained such an allegation. The question of what constitutes discrimination which encourages or discourages membership in a labor organization within the meaning of the Act is a technical, legal question as to which our highest courts have had differences of opinion and which had to be resolved by the Supreme Court. See Radio Officers' Union etc. v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17. Respondent's questions to Sherwood placed him in a difficult position. On prior occasions Hopkins had specifically pointed to the words on the charge just above Sherwood's signature, "I declare that I have read the above charge and that the statements therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief." Sherwood was undoubtedly aware also of the further legend printed on the form in capital letters, "Willfully false statements on this charge can be punished by fine and imprisonment (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001)." Assuming arguendo that Mallien, for trial preparation, needed informa- tion as to whether Sherwood knew of any instances of discrimination because of union activities, that was not the purpose of his questions to Sherwood. When Sherwood the affidavits was relying upon the Board 's dismissal of an earlier case and followed "ground rules " laid down by the Board in the earlier case 508 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD admitted that he knew of no such instances, Mallien did not stop, but proceeded, in the presence of Sherwood's superiors, to ask why he had signed the charge, implying that Sherwood had acted improperly in doing so. By these actions Respondent showed doubt as to Sherwood's integrity, based upon his exercise of his right to file charges with the Board, a manifestation of doubt which carried with it a threat at least to Sherwood's future advancement. An employee under interrogation such as that to which Respondent subjected Sherwood could not help but have some second thoughts about the advisibdity, from the point of view of his own personal interests, of filing such a charge. Plainly the interroga- tion tended to have a chilling effect on the exercise of employees' right to file charges with the Board for vindication of their rights under Section 7 of the Act.' It is found that by requesting Sherwood and Cato for copies of their affidavits and by questioning Sherwood in the manner described above as to his signing and filing the charge, Respondent interfered with the Board's processes and inter- fered with, restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act 4 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE 6 percent per annum computed from the normal payday for that payroll period. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent, John Oster Manufacturing Co., is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent is, and at all times material has been, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. 3. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1607, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4. By discriminatorily suspending an employee from work and by discriminatorily issuing disciplinary action reports to employees Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act 5. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. The unfair labor practices described above are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. It is found that the activities of Respondent set forth above in section III, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce V. THE REMEDY As it has been found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it is recommended that the Board issue the Recommended Order set forth below requiring Respondent to cease and desist from said unfair labor practices and to take certain affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act. The presence of adverse notations in the personnel records of Van Gysel and Cato constitute a constant threat that they may suffer some disadvantage in the future from those notations. In order to ensure that this does not occur, and to give them and other employees assurance that it will not occur, it is recommended that Respondent be required to expunge from its records the notations that Van Gysel was guilty of insubordination and that Cato counseled such insubordination, as well as all other adverse notations with respect to the incident of January 12, 1968. It is also recommended that Respondent make Van Gysel whole for any loss of pay she suffered as a result of her suspension from work and also for such loss of her usual earnings as she suffered on January 12 as a result of being taken off incentive during part of that day. Such backpay shall be paid with interest thereon at the rate of RECOMMENDED ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclu- sions of law, and upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, Respondent, John Oster Manufacturing Co., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from (a) Ordering or otherwise requiring employees to attend meetings with Respondent for the discussion of grievances or complaints by employees with respect to terms or conditions of employment in the absence of their bargaining representa- tive. (b) Suspending, laying off, discharging, warning, issuing disciplinary action reports to, or otherwise disciplining, em- ployees, or threatening to discharge them, because they refuse to attend meetings with Respondent for the presentation or discussion of grievances or complaints by employees with respect to terms or conditions of employement in the absence of their bargaining representative, or because they counsel other employees that such attendance might or should be refused. (c) Threatening to discharge or visit other reprisals upon employees because they exercise their rights to discuss grievances with Respondent exclusively through their bargain- ing representative or under the procedure set forth in the collective agreement. (d) Interrogating employees as to why they had filed charges with the Board or as to the content of affidavits or other statements given by them to agents of the Board. (e) Requiring or requesting employees to furnish copies of affidavits given by them to agents of the Board. 3 It is not material whether Respondent thought that the charge had of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and its merit. The right of employees to be free from actions of employers or Local 22 (Holder), 391 U.S. 418, fn. 2. labor organizations tending to chill the exercise of their right of access 4 As the similar interrogation of Sherwood by Hopkins and of Van to the Board for the vindication of Section 7 rights extends to cases Gysel by Mallien is not alleged in the Complaint, it is not passed upon in where the charges they file lack merit . See N L R.B v. Industrial Union this Decision. JOHN OSTER MFG. CO. (f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain- ing or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Expunge from the personnel records of Gertrude Van Gysel and Charles Cato and from all other company records the disciplinary action reports against them dated respectively January 18, 1968, and January 22, 1968, and all references to such documents or action in the Company's records. (b) Make Gertrude Van Gysel whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against her in the manner described above in section V of this Decision, entitled the Remedy. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying all production records, work records, payroll records and all other data necessary to analyze and compute the backpay required by this Order (d) Post at its office and place of business copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix.s5 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 30, after being duly signed by its representative, shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Recommended Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.6 IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED that the allegations that Re- spondent intimidated employees by the conduct of Kenneth De Tarville on or about January 5, 1968, and that Respondent unilaterally changed the rules as to attendance at group meetings be dismissed. 5 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice. In the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of the United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 6 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 509 Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT order employees to attend meetings with us for the presentation or discussion of grievances in the absence of their bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT suspend, issue disciplinary action reports to, or otherwise discipline employees, or threaten to discharge or take any other action against them, because they refuse to attend such meetings or because they advise other employees that such attendance should be refused WE WILL expunge from the personnel records of Gertrude Van Gysel and Charles Cato the disciplinary action reports issued against them because of Gertrude Van Gysel's refusal to attend a gripe session and of Cato's having advised her that she did not have to attend. WE WILL make Gertrude Van Gysel whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered as a result of her 3-day suspension for refusing to attend the gripe session and as a result of having been taken off incentive on the day of the gripe session. WE WILL NOT require or request employees to furnish us with copies of affidavits given to agents of the National Labor Relations Board. WE WILL NOT interrogate employees as to why they had filed charges with the Board or as to content of affidavits or other statements given by them to agents of the Board. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. JOHN OSTER MANUFACTURING CO. (Employer) Dated By (Representative (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting , and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate direct- ly with the Board's Regional Office, 2nd Floor Commerce Building, 744 North 4th Street, Milwaukee , Wisconsin 53203, Telephone 272-3879.