Brown Specialty Co.

BROWN SPECIALTY CO. Brown Specialty Company and Local 221 of the Office and Professional Employees International Union, AFL-CIO. Case 38-CA-449 February 14, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On July 30, 1968, Trial Examiner James V. Constantine issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner further found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to those allegations. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed limited exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case, and adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the additions and modifications set forth below. 1. The Trial Examiner found that employee Jo Thomas was not an agent or supervisor of Respondent and that her statements to employees Rebecca Vannoy and Michele Swanson cannot bind Respondent. We do not agree. The record shows that on or about February 21, 1968, Company President Golofsky spoke to employee Michele Swanson about the Union. In the course of that conversation Golofsky mentioned that "all the girls had signed," and requested Swanson to ask them to "back out of it." He requested her to write a letter to Local 221 "asking for our cards back." When Swanson refused to write such a letter, Golofsky asked her if she would sign such a letter. Swanson replied that she "would go along with the majority of the girls." Golofsky then said, he would ask Jo Thomas, to write such a letter. In another conversation, Golofsky told employee Rossie Sargeant that his attorneys had advised him that if the Company "drew up a letter" stating that the employees did not want a union, and all the employees signed it, that would end it all and "these 519 cards wouldn't be any good;" that he "was having Jo Thomas draw it up;" "that employees Beverly Cossart and Michele Swanson were going to sign it, and that he would like Rossie (Sargeant) to sign it." Later that day, Jo Thomas told Michele Swanson that she had prepared a letter at Mr. Golofsky's request, that it could be rough for employees if they did not go along with her, and that she wanted Michele to sign it. Shortly thereafter Michele Swanson signed the letter. The record also shows that on or about February 23, Thomas solicited employee Rebecca Vannoy's signature to the letter. In doing so, Thomas told Vannoy, that Mitchell Rudman, Respondents' secretary-treasurer told her, that President Golofsky talked to everyone "and go ahead and have the rest. . .sign that". The foregoing clearly shows that Respondent solicited two of its employees in an attempt to have them draw up a letter asking for the cards back and requested them to solicit employee signatures to such letter. Although unsuccessful in having Swanson perform this request, Respondent was successful in gaining Thomas's cooperation in performing the task. On the basis of the above facts, we find that the Respondent constituted Jo Thomas its agent for this purpose and is legally responsible for her statements to the employees relating to the union matter and for the consequences of such statements.' We therefore find Thomas' statements to employees Swanson and Vannoy set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision to be coercive and in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. We find merit in the General Counsel's exception to the Trial Examiner's failure to find that Respondent was responsible for statements made by Susan Nyman's father attempting to induce her to withdraw from Union. The record shows that President Golofsky, relying on his long-standing friendship with Nyman, asked him to induce his daughter's withdrawal from the Union. Nyman did so, and the next day Susan withdrew from the Union. On that next day, Golofsky asked Susan to sign the withdrawal letter to be circulated by other employees and asked her if her father had spoken to her, explaining that he had asked her father to intercede on his behalf because he felt her father could talk to her better than he could. On these facts, it is apparent that Golofsky designated Nyman as Respondent's agent for the purpose of obtaining Susan's withdrawal from the Union 2 and advised Susan that her father had been speaking to her on Respondent's behalf. Respondent is thus responsible for Nyman's remarks. We find that Golofsky's utilization of Nyman as its agent to induce Susan's withdrawal from the Union interfered with her exercise of Section 7 rights and that Nyman's remarks to Susan constituted further 'Goodman Lumber Company , 166 NLRB No. 48 'Cramco, Inc, 162 NLRB No. 142 174 NLRB No. 77 520 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD interference and restraint with the exercise of such rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. We find merit in the General Counsel's exception to the Trial Examiner's finding that Golofsky's statement to employees Fell and Witherbee that "If the Union came in he would dock them if they were absent or came in late, whereas they were enjoying such privileges now" was not coercive. This statement was made to the employees during a discussion that included unlawful interrogation by Golofsky concerning their Union allegiance. It occurred in Golofsky's private office. It constituted a threat to take away benefits now enjoyed by the employees, hinged simply on the Union's coming into the plant. Contrary to the Trial Examiner, the threatened change in treatment was not tied to the provisions of a prospective Union contract. We find that by these statements Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Trial Examiner found that supervisor Ted Olson's interrogation of Linda Jackson, on or about February 19, as to whether she had signed a union card, to be coercive. He also found Olson's statement to Jackson that he knew that employee Jo Thomas had started the union business and knew where the meeting had been held, to be coercive as it gave the impression of surveillance of Thomas and of a union meeting. He further found that Olson's statement that if the Union got in he would be tougher to get along with to be coercive as it denotes that the advent of the Union will bring about more arduous working conditions; i,e., it contains a threat of reprisals. We agree with these findings. We additionally find coercive (1) Olson's statements subsequent to Jackson's affirmative reply that she had signed a union card, that; "within the next few days employees would probably be called to President Golofsky's office to be asked why they had been signing cards, and that it would not be a good idea to answer it was because everyone else had signed;" (2) his statement that, "the employees were underhanded and backward [and] were forcing Mr. Golofsky to take drastic measures," and, that, "if they had complaints they should go to Golfsky "instead of taking this manner," and (3) his statement that, "Mr. Golfsky could eliminate all of us" and still remain in business, to be coercive. 4. In agreement with the Trial Examiner, we find, on consideration of all the circumstances of this case, that Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union as the exclusive representative of its office clerical employees to be a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. We do so not only for the reasons given by the Trial Examiner but also for the additonal reason set forth below. The Union's efforts to organize Respondent's employees began in February 1967, and came to Respondent's attention on February 13, when it received the Union's letter demanding recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent for the above employees. The record shows that on February 13, 14 persons were employed in the appropriate unit. The Trial Examiner found that on February 13, the Union had in its possession 10 authorization cards from employees in the unit. He further found that 9 of said 10 cards are valid and that none of the 10 cards is tainted by coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation; and, that said 9 cards constitute a majority in a unit of 14. We agree that on February 13, the Union represented a majority of employees in the unit.3 In finding that Respondent did not have a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status at the time of receipt of the Union's demand on Febrary 13, the Trial Examiner relied on Respondent's failure to respond to the Union's request for recognition or to express a doubt as to its majority status; and - upon Respondent's subsequent commission of various unfair labor practices. We agree. There can be no reasonable doubt that Respondent sponsored the circulation of the letter providing for the employees' withdrawal of their membership applications because it believed the Union did, in fact, have its claimed majority and it wished to dissipate that majority. Accordingly, we find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to recognize or bargain with the Union on and since February 13, 1968. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders that respondent, Brown Specialty Company, Galesburg, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. 'Though the General Counsel has excepted to the Trial Examiner's refusal to count Thomas' card, and the Respondent has excepted to his counting of Cossart's card, we are not disposed to reverse of the Trial Examiner's finding . In any event, it is apparent that neither card is crucial for the Union's majority TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES V. CONSTANTINE, Trial Examiner- This is an unfair labor practice case brought pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act. 29 U S.C. 160(b). It was initiated by a charge filed against Respondent by Local 221 on February 26, 1968, and an amended charge on March 22, 1968. A complaint based on said charges was issued on March 28, 1968, by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board through the Officer-In-Charge of Subregion 38 (Peoria, Illinois), naming Brown Specialty Company as the Respondent. Said complaint, as amended at the hearing, in substance alleges that Respondent has engaged in conduct violating Section 8(a)(1) and (5), and that such conduct BROWN SPECIALTY CO. 521 affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7), of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act. Respondent has answered admitting some facts but denying that it committed any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to due notice, this cause came on to be heard, and was tried before me, at Galesburg, Illinois, on May 27 and 28, 1968. All parties were represented at and participated in the hearing, and had full opportunity to adduce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, offer oral argument, and submit briefs. At the hearing the complaint was amended by deleting the name of Michele Swanson as an employee illegally discharged. Respondent argued orally at the close of the case. Briefs have been received from the General Counsel and the Respondent. The Index to the Transcript at page 2 is hereby corrected by inserting between the words "Rossie Sargeant" and "Marian Witherbee" the words "Susan Nyman . . . Direct 91 . . . Cross 95." It is also corrected at page 111 to spell Riner's first name as Larry and not Lary. This case presents the issues of whether Respondent (1) Coercively interrogated its employees regarding their union activities; (2) Threatened employees with discharge or reprisals if they engaged in union activities; (3) Unlawfully created the impression among employees that it was keeping their union activities under surveillance; (4) Urged employees to disavow Local 221; and (5) Refused to recognize and bargain collectively with Local 221 as the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit when Local 221 had a majority. Upon the entire record in this case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. AS TO JURISDICTION Brown Specialty Company, herein called Respondent or the Company, an Illinois corporation, is engaged at Galesburg, , Illinois, in selling at wholesale groceries and sundry products. During the 12 months preceding the issuance of the complaint herein, it shipped goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 to, and received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from, points outside the State of Illinois. I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction over Respondent in this proceeding. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local 221 of the Office and Professional Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, herein called Local 221 or the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. GENERAL COUNSEL'S EVIDENCE REGARDING THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Alleged Refusal to Recognize and Bargain with Local 221 President Walter L. Bruner of Local 221 held a meeting of the Company's employees on February 3, 1968, at the home of one of them, Michele Swanson. Five employees attended. In speaking to them he explained that, if they signed an application card, they were authorizing the Union to act as their exclusive collective-bargaining representative and if a majority signed "in the clerical unit," the Union would write to the Company demanding recognition. Proceeding with his talk he added that if Respondent denied recognition the Union would petition for an election on the basis of the cards "as proof of interest." All five employees present signed cards and handed them to Michele Swanson. He also gave five additional blank cards to employee Michele Swanson, who attended the meeting. By letter dated February 12, 1968,' Walter L. Bruner, president of the Union, wrote John Golofsky, Respondent's president. (General Counsel's Exhibit 2(a)). Among other things, Bruner asserted that the Union had signed up "more than a majority of the office clerical employees" of the Company, requested recognition of Local 221 as the exclusive bargaining agent of a unit comprising office clerical employees, but excluding executive, professional, confidential employees, guards, supervisors, and all other employees; and requested a date for a meeting to negotiate a contract. This letter was received on February 13. At that time said unit consisted of 14 employees. Their names are enumerated in Joint Exhibit 1. At the time said letter was mailed 10 employees m the unit had signed authorization cards for Local 221. See General Counsel's Exhibits 3(a) through 3(1). Employee Michele Swanson had obtained signatures, including her own, to these 10 cards and turned them over on February 11 to President Bruner of the Union About Thursday or Friday of the week of February 11 employee Jo Thomas asked Michele Swanson whether she, Jo, could get her card back. That evening Michele called Union President Bruner. But he had already mailed all 10 cards, including Jo's, to the NLRB office in Peoria, Illmois. Thereafter Michele told Jo that Jo's card had already been "sent out" and therefore could not be retrieved. B. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion About February 21, Company President Golofsky spoke to employee Michele Swanson. After telling her that he did not like the Union and could not understand why the girls wanted one, he said that he was going to fight the Union. Then he asked Michele why the girls wanted a union. She replied that they wanted "more better benefits" which she enumerated. Then Golfsky stated that he could not understand why Michele and employee Linda Jackson had signed cards since they had received a good raise in the short time they had worked there. Continuing, Golofsky mentioned that "all the girls had signed," and requested Michele to ask them to "back out of it." He also requested her to write a letter to Local 221 "asking for our cards back." When Michele refused to write such letter, Golofsky asked her if she would sign such a letter. Michele replied she "would go along with the majority of the girls." Then he said he would ask one of the other girls, Jo Thomas, to write such a letter. Finally, he asked Michele why the girls did not quit and go elsewhere if they did not like it there. Later that day employee Jo Thomas told Michele that Jo had prepared a letter at Mr Golofsky's request, that it could be rough for employees if they did not go along 'All dates mentioned hereafter refer to 1968 except when otherwise specified ' 522 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with her, and that she wanted Michele to sign it. Michele said she would and did so shortly thereafter. This letter, dated February 21, is signed by the 10 employees signing union authorization cards, is addressed to the National Labor Relations Board, and provides that We, the employees of The Brown Specialty Company, wish to withdraw our application for membership in the Office and Professional Employees Union, and for an election. (General Counsel's Exhibit 4.) However, the words "and for an election" were not typed on General Counsel's Exhibit 4 at the time Michele signed it. About February 19, Ted Olson, who was in charge of the IBM department, spoke to employee Linda Jackson. First he asked her if she had signed a union card. When she replied that she had he asked her whether she knew anything of a meeting "held to sign the cards." Then he said that within the next few days employees would probably be called to President Golofsky's office to be asked why they had been signing cards, and that it would not be a good idea to answer it was because everyone else had signed. Continuing, he said that the employees were "underhanded and backward [and] were forcing Mr. Golofsky to take drastic measures," and that if they had complaints they should to to Golofsky "instead of taking this manner." Finally he stated that "Mr. Golofsky could eliminate all of us" and still remain in business. A few minutes after this Olson again spoke to Jackson. This time he told her that he knew that employee Jo Thomas had started the "union business" and "where the meeting had been held." Then he "explained" that "if the Union went through" Jackson stood to lose a lot because the work would become much harder, there would be more work, breaks would become shorter, and he himself would become tougher to get along with. Two or three days later Jackson overheard Olson tell employee Riner that "if the Union went through" things would "definitely change for the worse," that three times more work would be imposed on employees, and that Riner was jeopardizing his job by signing a union card. At the request of employee Jo Thomas, Jackson, on Febrary 22, signed the February 21 petition to revoke her union card. See General Counsel's Exhibit 4. However, when she signed General Counsel's Exhibit 4 the words "and for an election" were not on the petition. About February 19 Olson talked to employee Rossie Sargeant about the Union. When he asked her if she knew anything "about the union activities," and she replied that she did, he then inquired why she felt that she wanted a union. She answered that it would increase her wages. Thereupon Olson commented that if the Union got in things would be different. Approximately 2 days later President Golofsky asked Rossie Sargeant if she had signed a union card. As her reply was in the affirmative, he then asked her why she wanted a union. Her response was that her wages were not enough for the type of work which she performed. Then he observed that he might have done something about this but could not at the time "because of all this union movement" and as it might interfere with the election which the Union sought. Nevertheless, Golofsky promised nothing. However, he did express opposition to the Union and added that he would do "anything to keep from getting it." Continuing, Golofsky told Sargeant that his attorneys had advised him that if the Company "drew up a letter" stating that the employees did not want a union, and all employees signed it, that "would end it all" and "these cards wouldn't be any good"; that he "was having [employee] Jo Thomas draw it up"; that employees Beverly Cossart and Michele Swanson were going to sign it; and that he would like Rossie to sign it. The next day, February 22, such a letter or petition was circulated among the employees by employee Jo Thomas Presumably Jo Thomas prepared it. Rossie signed it voluntarily See General Counsel's Exhibit 4. However, the words "and for an election" were added to it subsequent to her subscribing General Counsel's Exhibit 4. During the evening of about February 20 employee Susan Nyman overheard President Golofsky telephoning her father. She was able to do this by listening in on a telephone extension in an upstairs room. Golofsky said that since Susan was a young girl he thought that Mr. Nyman could talk to her about getting her union card back because Golofsky did not want the Union. Golofsky added that he knew who started the Union at his establishment, and that it was some of the older, rather than the younger, girls Mr. Nyman did talk to Susan soon thereafter. The next day employee Jo Thomas presented a petition to Susan and requested her to sign it. Susan did so. See General Counsel's Exhibit 4. Ten or fiteen minutes later President Golofsky told Susan that he did not want the Union and requested her to sign a letter, to be drawn up by "one of the girls ... asking for our union cards back." When Susan replied that she had already done so, Golofsky responded that he was unaware that "it had gotten around that fast." Another employee with whom President Golofsky talked about the Union is Virginia Fell. About February 21, in the presence of employee Marian Witherbee, Virginia asked him if he had received a letter from the Union. He responded by asking if Virginia had signed a card and stated that he could see the cards of Virginia and Marian if he so desired. The two girls complained of the inadequacy of a nickel raise. Then he asked who had started the union movement , insisting that it had to be a "new girl" rather than "any of the older help" because the "older help" would have come to him. He also stated that, in case of an election, the girls would not win anyway because he would have his son-in-law and Charles Allen vote "against us." Then he mentioned that if the Union came in it would "control the office," and he also would dock them for being absent or late although he now paid them under such circumstances. Marian also signed the petition to withdraw her union card (General Counsel's Exhibit 4) at the request of employee Jo Thomas on February 21. She observed Jo Thomas carry the petition into President Golofsky's office on February 22. Some time in the middle of February Ted Olson asked employee Martha Dahl of the IBM department whether Dahl "would be for the Union." She replied that she probably would in order to obtain better wages. Mrs Dahl also signed General Counsel's Exhibit 4 about February 21. She did so voluntarily. About mid-February Ted Olson asked employee Larry Riner whether Larry knew anything about a union in the office. Thereafter Olson on several other occasions talked about the Union with Riner. Approximately in late February President Golofsky asked Rmer if Riner knew anything about the Union. BROWN SPECIALTY CO. 523 When Riner replied affirmatively, Golofsky asked Riner what he thought of it "in general." Riner answered that he did not believe it ' would work "in that office." Golofsky then observed that he was not in favor of the Union, and asked if Riner had received a union card. Upon River's replying that he did, Golofsky asked him if he had signed it. Riner answered that he did not expect to sign it. Employee Rebecca Vannoy, who had previously signed a union card (General Counsel's Exhibit 3(d)) on about February 3, signed a petition to withdraw it (General Counsel's Exhibit 4) upon being solicited by employee Jo Thomas. At this point Thomas told Vanr,oy that Mitchell Rudman, Respondent's secretary-treasurer, told Thomas that President Golofsky talked to everyone "and go ahead and have the rest . . . sign that." But since I find that Thomas is not an agent or supervisor of Respondent her statements to Vannoy cannot bind Respondent. Therefore no violation of the Act is disclosed in this conversation. A few days after February 21 Secretary-Treasurer Mitchell Rudman told Vannoy that he opposed unions in a smaller business whereas they might be needed in a larger corporation. Mentioning that General Counsel's Exhibit 4 was "too late" to "get the cards back," Rudman said that "in the end I'm sure you'll see it our way." I find Rudman is a supervisor under Section 2(11) of the Act. But I find that his statement is not coercive; at most it expresses antiunion hostility. C. The Status of Ted Olson According to President Golofsky, Ted Olson "is an understudy in [the] IBM department, being trained for the future as a supervisor." At the time of the hearing he had so served for about 2 years. Golofsky further testified that Olson "arranges" the billing and tabulating work and "allots" it to the employees. It is`Olson's responsibility to see that the work is done. When employee Linda Jackson was hired in January 1968, she was interviewed in President Golofsky's office by Golofsky, Ted Olson, and'Office Manager Bob Morris. She reported for work to Olson in the IBM department, who introduced her to some employees and then instructed her how to perform her duties. Thereafter he assigned her to various jobs and taught her how to perform those with which she was unfamiliar. However, other "people" sometimes also taught her how to run some machines after Olson had instructed her. In addition Olson corrected her when she performed work incorrectly; so did other employees. Once he discussed her "attitude" towards her job with her, criticizing her performance. In this conversation they also discussed her quitting date, as she had given him notice that she was leaving. According to employee Rossie Sergeant of the Company's IBM department, Olson tells her and other employees in the department what to do, and has fired employee Sandy Berm. He also showed her what to do on those jobs unfamiliar to her. When office employee Martha Dahl was hired by the Company in about 1966 to work in the IBM department, Office Manager Bob Morris introduced her to Marlene Kessler as Martha's "boss" in that department. About 6 months later Kessler quit and was replaced by Ted Olson. Thereafter Olson was "over" the IBM employees and on two or.three occasions called them together to tell them that they were lagging in their work. In addition, she requested Olson for time off several times and he granted it. When Dahl quit she notified Olson of her intention to do so about 3 or 4 months in advance. Shortly after Martha Dahl quit Olson called on Dahl's husband at the husband's gas station and asked Mr. Dahl to request Martha to return to work for a week as Respondent was "in a pinch." Martha did so. Employee Larry Riner was hired by Respondent in June 1967. At that time President Golofsky introduced Riner to Ted Olson, mentioning that Olson "takes care of our IBM department," and that Olson would "explain the operation" to Riner. IV. RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE REGARDING THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES One of those employees signing union cards is Beverly Cossart, who subscribed on February 3. See General Counsel's Exhibit 3(g). She did so upon being solicited by employee Michele Swanson and the latter's husband. Beverly "knew" she should not have signed it. Beverly further testified that Michele told her and Beverly also "knew" that, by signing, "it would help to get a union started and if I wanted I could get the card back and there would be an election and [I could] change my mind at the election [and] vote no." Michele also said "we would make a lot more money." Later, she decided to get her card back and on February 21 signed General Counsel's Exhibit 4 for this purpose; she also wrote to Union President Bruner on February 20 to recall her card but he never answered her letter. On cross-examination Beverly asserted that she signed the card "to help them get [the Union] started." She also claimed on cross that "it even said on the card there would be an election," then she added, "or on something I read." But she stated that whatever she read about an election did not precede her signing the card on February 3 or before February 20 when she attempted to revoke her card. In her affidavit given to the Board (General Counsel's Exhibit 5, read into record at p. 170-A of Transcript), Beverly gave an account of Michele's statement soliciting Beverly to sign a card. Nowhere in said affidavit is an election mentioned; when examined on cross about this, she replied, "I thought there was going to be an election." Employee Mary Bragg Thomas, also known as Jo Thomas, was solicted on February 9 to sign a union card by employee Michele Swanson and the latter's husband. Jo did sign one on the same day. See General Counsel's Exhibit 3(j). Prior to signing, Jo told Michele that Jo did not believe in unions and wanted no part of a union. Nevertheless, Michele assured her "all we need is your signature [to get a union in the office]. You will not be involved in any way." Jo replied, "If that's what you girls want ... if it would help ... to have something [Michele] wanted . . . you can use my name. But I want no part of it ... leave me out ... I would not be involved." The next working day, February 12, Jo asked Michele to return the card. Although she tried to reach Michele the evening of February 9, Michele had already surrendered it to someone and all cards "had been sent in." Notwithstanding that Michele offered to obtain it for Jo, she never did. Jo then wrote on February 20 to Union President Bruner to return her card to her. See Respondent's Exhibit 1. Receiving no response from Bruner, Jo then solicited employees to sign a withdrawal petition. See General Counsel's Exhibit 4. It was signed by all 10 employees who had previously executed union cards in evidence as General Counsel Exhibit 3(a) through 3(j). 524 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD General Counsel's Exhibit 4 was prepared by Jo voluntarily, and no other person suggested it or instructed her to prepare it. However, she did ask Respondent's president, John Golofsky, "if it was permissible." He replied that it was Jo's "privilege " and that Jo could do as she liked. While she added the words "and for an election" at the end of General Counsel's Exhibit 4 after it was originally typed by Jo, these words appeared thereon before any one signed said document . Then she mailed it to the National Labor Relations Board "to get my card back." In pertinent part the Board replied, by letter dated February 26, that it lacked authority to act upon an employee's request for the return or revocation of an authorization card. See Respondent's Exhibit 2. At no time did Jo take General Counsel's Exhibit 4 to President Golofsky's office, and she never told Michele Swanson that he told Jo to write a letter or prepare one which revoked union cards signed by the employees. On February 19 an RC petition for an election accompanied by 10 union cards (General Counsel's Exhibits 3(a) through 3(j)), was filed by the Union with the National Labor Relations Board Subregional office in Peoria, Illinois. Official NLRB notices of an impending election were then posted by Respondent on its bulletin boards. Jo Thomas obtained the address of the NLRB from these notices and used this address in mailing General Counsel' s Exhibit 4. Said petition was withdrawn on March 22, so that no election was ever conducted pursuant to said RC petition. Ted Olson was hired in February 1966, as a trainee in the IBM department to become office manager eventually. The present office manager is Robert Morris. Ted starts work at 6 a.m. and quits at 3 p.m. He does not punch a timeclock, whereas other office clerical employees do Other office employees work from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. He has never hired or fired anyone , although he fired Sandra Berm pursuant to instructions from Bob Morris and President Golofsky. He also operates IBM machines during working hours. Olson replaced Marlene Kessler in the IBM department when she left about a month after he was hired and thereafter he performed her duties. She ran machines, told others "what to do," pointed out and corrected mistakes which employees made, and instructed employees how to operate machines in the department . Olson has since performed these functions in addition to others enumerated herein. Olson also "supposes" he could recommend to President Golofsky that a person be hired. Olson is a salaried employee, receives no pay for overtime , has no "regular scheduled number of hours a week," and is paid more than any employee in the IBM department. He also makes more than any employee in the office clerical unit who works regular hours, but three in the unit make more than he when they work overtime. Besides operating machines , Olson also performs other functions . In the absence of Office Manager Morris, Olson calls a repairman when a machine breaks down. Also he collects orders taken by the Company's salesmen and transmits them to the IBM department employees to be processed there. He also checks accounts "for the minimums" and "writes up receivables " In addition, all merchandise received in Respondent' s warehouse is posted by IBM department employees at Olson' s direction after it is recorded on appropriate cards by employee Riner. It is true that Olson called a meeting of employees at which he criticized their work. But he did so pursuant to instructions from Office Manager Bob Morris, after Olson had reported to Morris that "we were having trouble." Linda Jackson reported to Olson when she was hired simply because he was the only one in the office at the time, i.e., at 6 a.m. But Olson was "told to introduce [Linda] to everybody . . . familiarize her with everything in the department and assign her to someone [who] could show her the work to do." And he authorized Linda to take off for 2 weeks only after discussing the matter with President Golofsky and Office Manager Morris. On one occasion Olson granted time off to employee Martha Dahl, but only after he was authorized to do so by Bob Morris, the office manager. Olson also discussed Martha's notice to quit with Morris and conveyed to Martha what Morris told him. And Olson also asked Martha's husband to ask her to return to work for a couple of weeks after she quit because "we're in a bind, ' but only after he cleared this with Bob Morris, who, in turn, cleared it with President Golofsky. Olson once inquired of Linda Jackson "if she heard anything about a union." When she replied that she had, he asked her to what extent and "why did you go behind John [Golofsky's] back?" But he denies that he told her that President Golofsky could eliminate all of them or could take drastic measures Although Olson did discuss unions with employee Larry Riner, Olson made no derogatory remarks concerning them. Respondent's president is John Golofsky. He was unaware of a union movement among the office employees until he received a registered letter about 3 or 4 p.m on February 13. Since he was due to leave town soon on a business trip, he did nothing about the letter until the following Monday, February 19, when he consulted his counsel , Burrell Barash . The letter stunned Golofsky and he also doubted that the Union had a majority. Counsel Barash advised Golofsky that the latter could talk to the employees, saying anything he wished, but that he could not threaten or coerce them. Later that day Golofsky spoke to employee Mary (Marian?) Witherbee and Virginia Fell. After asking them if they were underpaid or mistreated by the Company, he inquired if they signed a union card, but Marian did not answer and Virginia made a remark which he has forgotten. That ended the conversation. On that or the next day he also asked employees Josephine (Jo?) and Beverly Cossart the same questions. Each one answered "it was a mistake." Additionally he asked these questions of employee Michele Swanson and "maybe" other employees Golofsky denies that he told Michele Swanson that he would ask Jo Thomas, an employee, to write a letter of withdrawal, and asserts that he never asked any employee to prepare such a letter. He did call Susan Nyman's father to tell him that Susan, a young girl dust out of high school, was active in the union movement, that Golofsky was in no position to advise her, and that Mr. Nyman, as Susan's father, "may wish to counsel her." Further, Golofsky denies he discussed the Union with Susan Nyman, but admits that he did ask some employees "who started all of this?" In late February or early March, Mitchell Rudman, Respondent's secretary-treasurer, asked employee Leonard McMillion if McMillion had signed a union card. He replied that he had' not. At no time after February 12 did the Union offer to produce any proof of majority in the unit. And President Golofsky never saw the withdrawal petition (General Counsel's Exhibit 4) until it was shown to him when he was cross-examined at the hearing. However, he "probably" saw it before the hearing. Nevertheless, he did 1 BROWN SPECIALTY CO. 525 "hear about it" when employee Jo Thomas asked for his permission to prepare it and he replied, "that's up to you.,, V. CONCLUDING FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION A. As to the Supervisory Capacity of Ted Olson Section 2(11) of the Act defines a supervisor for the purposes of the Act. Whether a person in a specific case exercises or is vested with supervisory authority necessarily depends on the facts peculiar to that case, so that prior Board decisions generally offer no controlling precedent. Each case must be decided on its own facts. It is my opinion, and I find, that Olson is a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(II) of the Act. This ultimate finding or conclusion is based on the entire record and the following subsidiary findings, which I find as facts: 1. Olson's duties require him to work closely with top management officials. He is also allied with management as a trainee. Thus he was present and interviewed applicant for work Linda Jackson. Further, he has no regular hours, he is the only one in the IBM department who is paid a salary, he receives nothing for overtime, and his pay is higher than that of any office clerical who does not work overtime. While these facts alone do not necessarily elevate Olson to the stature of a supervisor, they constitute relevant indicia of his rank above employees, some of whom have been employed much longer than he. International Metal Specialties, Inc., 172 NLRB No. 39. 2. New hires in the IBM department report directly to him. For example, Linda Jackson reported directly to him for work, rather than to Office Manager Bob Morris. Olson also called a repairman during the absence of Office Manager Bob Morris I attach no significance to this aspect of his functions, as I regard it as routine or perfunctory, and not calling for the use of independent judgment. 3. Olson introduces new employees to the other employees (as in the case of Linda Jackson), assigns employees to their daily tasks, and teaches employees how to perform their duties. In assigning employees Olson exercises his own judgment, as President Golofsky's testimony reveals. I do not credit Olson's testimony to the extent that it indicates his assignments of work are routine or clerical in nature. 4. Olson rectifies employees who perform their work incorrectly, and criticizes those whose work is unsatisfactory. In addition, he also occasionally called meetings of employees in the IBM department to inform employees as a group that their performances were below par. 5. He also was the person to whom notices to quit were given, and discharged at least one employee, viz., Sandy Berm. The fact that Olson cleared this discharge with his supervisors, which I find, does not detract from the fact, which I find, that he effectively recommended this action. 6. He granted time off whenever employees requested it. And employees intending to quit or out ill notified him thereof, rather than to Office Manager Bob Morris. 7. In at least one instance, i.e., in the case of Martha Dahl, he effectively recommended that an employee who had quit be temporarily rehired because Respondent at the time was short of help. It is true that any employee is at liberty to suggest that a friend be hired without thereby becoming a supervisor. But when the suggestion is coupled with an appraisal of the work requirements of a department, the exercise of independent judgment becomes operative. Such judgment involves more than routine or clerical functions, and I so find. 8. Olson replaced Marlene Kessler as "boss" of the IBM department. That Marlene was "boss" is derived from Martha Dahl's testimony, which I credit, that when Office Manager Morris introduced Martha to Marlene he referred to Marlene as Martha's "boss" in the IBM department. Thus, I find that Olson succeeded Kessler as the "boss" of the IBM department. El Cananazo Supermarket, Inc., 171 NLRB No. 15. 9. In exercising the foregoing authority I find that Olson did so in the interest of his employer, that his duties required him to use independent judgment, and that such work was not of a routine or clerical nature. Hence it is of no consequence that Olson also operated machines occasionally, as I find that the great bulk or majority of his time was devoted to acting in a supervisory capacity. Hence his functions are essentially dissimilar to those of floorladies whom the Board found not to be supervisors in G. C. Murphy Company, 171 NLRB No. 45. Evidence by Respondent and the General Counsel relating to Olson's duties is in the main not in controversy. However, on those minor points on which differences may exist, I credit the General Counsel's witnesses, including President Golofsky, and do not credit Olson's testimony to the extent that it collides with that of the witnesses for the General Counsel. B. As to the Refusal to Recognize and Bargain with the Union , When a labor organization requests an employer to recognize and bargain collectively with it as the exclusive representative of his employees, he is under a statutory onus to honor said request if, but only if, all three of the following conditions have been fulfilled: (a) Said request relates to employees in an appropriate unit, (b) Said labor organization represents an uncoerced majority of the employees in the appropriate unit; and (c) The employer does not entertain a good-faith doubt of such majority. The burden of establishing that all three conditions have been met rests upon the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board. 1. The appropriate unit Patently the Union requested that the Company recognize and bargain collectively with it when Respondent admittedly received on February 13 the Union's letter of February 12. See General Counsel's Exhibit 2(a). I so find. I further find, since Respondent does not challenge the unit described in said letter and reiterated in the complaint (see Respondent's answer admitting the appropriateness of said unit), that a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining under Sections 9 and 8(a)(5) of the Act consists of All office clerical employees located at the Respondent's Galesburg, Illinois, plant, but excluding executive, professional, confidential employees, guards, supervisors as defined in the Act, all other represented employees, and all other employees. 526 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. Whether the Union had an uncoerced majority No dispute exists that on February 13, 14 persons, as enumerated in Joint Exhibit 1 and General Counsel's Exhibit "Mar 7," were employed in the appropriate unit on February 13. This latter exhibit is not numbered. The February date, when the Union's request was received, is the crucial date, and the rights of the parties are determined as of then. McEwen Manufacturing Company, 172 NLRB No. 99. 1 find that on February 13 the Union had in its possession 10 authorization cards (General Counsel's 3(a) through 3(j) from employees in said unit. I further find that 9 of said 10 cards are valid and that none of the 10 cards is tainted by - coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation. Levi Strauss & Co., 172 NLRB No. 57; McEwen Manufacturing Company, 172 NLRB No. 99. Finally, I find that said nine cards constitute a majority in a unit of 14. Certain cards attacked by Respondent as invalid deserve brief comment. Beverly Cossart who signed a card (see General Counsel's Exhibit 3(g)) at the request of Michele Swanson testified, and I credit her, that Michele told her that, by signing, "it would help get a union started," that "there would be an election," and that "we would make a lot more money." None of these remarks infects Cossart's card, and I so find, since there was no assertion that the card would be used only for an election, and since the reference to more money is not a guarantee of a wage raise but, rather, a statement of union goals sought to be attained. Levi Strauss & Co., 172 NLRB No. 57; Phil-Modes, Inc., 159 NLRB 944, 950, 951; McEwen Manufacturing Company, 172 NLRB No. 99; Koehler's Wholesale Restaurant Supply, 139 NLRB 945, 946; U-Tote M of Oklahoma, Inc., 172 NLRB No. 21. In Conren, Inc., 156 NLRB 592, the Board held that a guarantee of a wage increase amounts to misrepresentation which will invalidate a card. Cossart also testified that she knew she should not have signed the card and that she "thought there was going to be an election." But this does not contaminate it because mental reservations do not destroy the effectiveness of a card. McEwen Manufacturing Company, supra, at p.10; Levi Strauss & Co., 172 NLRB No. 57. Similarly, I find that the card of Mary Bragg Thomas was valid when executed. She was not coerced into signing, and no misrepresentations were made to her' to induce her to sign. Phil-Modes, Inc., 159 NLRB 944, 955. When the card is unequivocal on its face, as this card is, and no improper statements were made to her about it, the employee signing the card may not repudiate it at a later date solely on the basis that subjectively she opposed unions. McEwen Manufacturing Company, 172 NLRB No. 99. Even if she signed to get the girls off her back, such annoyance will not negative the overt act of having signed a card designating a union as bargaining agent, although she was told she did not have anything to lose by signing the card. Joy Silk Mills v. N.L.R B., 185 F.2d 732, 743 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914. However, I find that Thomas on February 12 asked that the card be returned to her. This repudiation of the card of Thomas became effective because it was communicated to President Bruner of the Union shortly after February 12. Since Thomas succeeded in withdrawing her designation of the Union her card may not be counted in computing the Union's majority. Phil-Modes, Inc., 159 NLRB 944, 950, and court cases there cited. Nor does the withdrawal petition dated February 21 (General Counsel's Exhibit 4) destroy the Union's majority. Even if, contrary to the fact hereafter found, said petition was not sponsored or initiated by Respondent, so that it was inspired solely by employee sentiment, it cannot affect the Union's majority on February 13. This is because the Union's representative status must be determined on February 13 (McEwen Manufacturing Company, 172 NLRB 99); and, since the Union enjoyed a majority on that date, it had a reasonable time thereafter to conclude a contract as the statutory exclusive representative of the employees. .. an employer [must] bargain exclusively with the particular union which represented a majority of the employees at the time of the wrongful refusal to bargain despite that union's subsequent failure to retain its majority . . . a bargaining relationship once rightfully established must be permitted to exist and function for a reasonable period in which it can be given a fair chance to succeed." Franks Bros. Company v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702, 705. I find that no reasonable time had elapsed between February 13 and February 21, so that Respondent could not lawfully rely upon the Union's loss of majority on February 21 as a reason for refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with it. See Ruffalo's Trucking Service, Inc., 114 NLRB 1549; N.L R.B. v. Shurtenda Steaks, Inc., 397 F.2d 939, (C.A 10). However, as hereinafter set forth, I find that said withdrawal petition does not affect the Union's majority because it was sponsored by the employer. Phil-Modes, Inc., 159 NLRB 944, 958. For this additional reason I find that the withdrawal petition did not undermine the Union's majority on and after February 13. Finally, I find that President Bruner's remarks to employees that cards would be used to support a petition for an election if the Company refused to grant recognition does not impeach the cards of those subscribers who heard him. For he did not thereby mislead employees into believing that the sole purpose of the cards was to obtain an election N.L.R.B. v. H & H Plastics, 389 F.2d 678, 682 (C.A. 6); N L.R.B. v. Southbridge Sheet Metal Works, Inc, 380 F.2d 851, 855-856 (C.A. 1). See NL.R.B. v. Atco-Surgical Supports, Inc, 394 F.2d 659 (C A 6); American Cable Systems, Inc., 161 NLRB 332, 334. 3. Respondent's doubt of the Union's majority Even when a labor organization in fact has obtained signed cards from a majority of employees in an appropriate unit an employer need not recognize or bargain with it if he doubts or questions that majority in good faith. Aaron Brothers Company of California, 158 NLRB 1077, 1078. Respondent contends that it entertained a good-faith doubt of majority when it received the Union's request for recognition on February 13. On this issue the burden of proof is upon the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board to establish that the employer in bad faith declined to recognize and bargain with the Union. Aaron Brothers Company of California, 158 NLRB 1077, 1079; John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 NLRB 99, 100; N L.R B. v. Ben Duthler, Inc., 395 F.2d 28, 68 LRRM 2324, 2326 (C.A. 6). It is my opinion, and I find, that Respondent did not have a good-faith doubt of majority. This finding is based on the entire record and the following additional findings of fact. BROWN SPECIALTY CO. 527 (a) Respondent at no time informed the Union that Respondent questioned the Union 's majority . Indeed Respondent at no time since February 13 has responded to the Union's request for recognition . Failure to announce a doubt of majority is significant . Graham Ford, Inc., 172 NLRB No. 50 (TXD). (b) Respondent did nothing about the cards Thus it "chose not to learn the facts, [and] it took the chance of what they might be." James H. Matthews & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 354 F.2d 432 (C.A. 8). See Irving Air Chute v. N.L.R.B., 350 F.2d 176, 182 (C.A 2). It is therefore immaterial that the Union did not proffer the cards. Respondent's argument that Respondent could ignore the Union's request for recognition until such cards were proffered is not well taken in my opinion . N.L.R.B. v. The Sinclair Company, 397 F.2d 157, 68 LRRM 2720, 2723. (C.A. 1). (c) Respondent committed unfair labor practices contemporaneously with the Union's request for recognition . This indicates a desire to dissipate the Union's majority . Joy Silk Mills v. N.L .R.B., 185 F.2d 732, 741 (C.A.D C.), cert. denied 341 U.S . 914; American Cable Systems, Inc, 161 NLRB 332, 335. In my opinion N.L.R.B. v. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, (C.A. 4), and N.L.R.B. v. Ben Duthler, Inc., 395 F.2d 28 (C.A. 6) are distinguishable. (d) Respondent claims good faith as a defense. However , good faith is not established by merely asserting it. N.L. R.B v. Superior Sales, Inc., 366 F.2d 229, 237 (C.A. 8); Johnnie's, Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770, 773. Hence, such assertion does not rebut the General Counsel' s prima facie case. N.L.R.B. v. The Sinclair Company, supra , at 2723. (e) President Golofsky testified he did not know whether any employees had signed cards. This negatives an affirmative basis for a good-faith doubt of majority. N.L.R B. v. Superior Sales, Inc., 366 F.2d 229, 237, (C. A. 8). (f) President Golofsky interrogated at least five employees, all of whom told him they had signed union cards. Hence the only information Respondent possessed indicated that employees had signed cards Absent knowledge that any employees had not so signed, the record does not support a reasonable foundation for questioning the Union's claim of majority. (g) Finally, at no time did Respondent request an election to ascertain whether the employees wanted a union. While this is not conclusive it tends, along with other facts found above on this branch of the case, to demonstrate that Respondent lacked a basis for challenging the Union's claim of majority. Accordingly , I conclude and find that the General Counsel has made out a prima facie case, and that Respondent has not overcome it by the defenses it has interposed . N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Company, 398 F.2d 336 (C.A. 4), does not compel a contrary -result. C. As to Interference, Restraint , and Coercion About February 21, President Golofsky spoke to employee Michele Swanson. I credit Swanson's account of this conversation and do not accept Golofsky's version to the extent it is inconsistent with Swanson's. I do so because Golofsky admits systematically interrogating employees after receiving the Union's February 13 request for recognition and that one of the questions he asked each girl, including Swanson, is whether she signed a union card. Since Swanson also testified that he asked her this question, which constitutes an unfair labor practice, I find that it is likely that he also mentioned the other subjects recited by Swanson . That conversation is set out above in section III B, above, and need not be reiterated here. Accordingly, I find that the questions asked by Golofsky amount to coercive interrogation . While I recognize that an employer who is confronted with a union's demand for recognition may inquire among his employees to ascertain whether it has acquired a majority, nevertheless he must assure them that no reprisals will be taken because of their answers . Struksnes Construction Co., Inc., 165 NLRB No. 102; Automotive Warehouse Distributors , Inc., 171 NLRB No. 101. But Golofsky admittedly failed to give such assurances . Hence, his inquiries are coercive within the contemplation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Heck's, Inc, 171 NLRB No. 112; Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770, 773, 775, enforcement denied 344 F.2d 617 (C.A. 8); Blue Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 591, 593-594. In this conversation Golofsky alluded to the fact that all the girls had signed cards. I find that this creates an impression of surveillance of union activities, and is therefore coercive. In addition , he asked Michele to write a letter to recall cards by,employees . This is coercive, as it interferes with an employee' s right freely to join or withdraw from a union . Finally, Golofsky told Swanson that he would ask employee Jo Thomas to prepare such a letter. Since Jo did do so later (see General Counsel' s Exhibit 4) and circulated it, I find that said letter written by Jo Thomas is not a valid withdrawal of cards because • it was sponsored and circulated at Golofsky' s request, and that such request is an unfair labor practice. Phil-Modes, Inc., 159 NLRB 944, 958. Later that day Joe Thomas made some remarks to Michele Swanson. Since Thomas is not a supervisor or agent of the Company, her statements may not be attributed to it. Hence, I find no unfair labor practices in Jo's utterances to Michele. President Golofsky about February 21 asked employee Rossie Sargeant if she had signed a union card . I Find this interrogation is coercive since he gave no assurances that reprisals would not be taken. In this conversation he also mentioned that he was having Jo Thomas draw up a letter for employees to sign that they did not want a union, that employees Cossart and Swanson would sign it, and that he wanted Rossie to sign it. Golofsky's denial thereof is not credited. This statement is coercive, and I so find. The reminder of Golofsky' s conversation with Sargeant indicates antiunion animus on his part, but I find nothing therein which is coercive because it contains no threats of reprisals. About February 20 Golofsky talked to Susan Nyman's father requesting him to attempt to induce Susan to withdraw from the Union . The father did so; but the record is barren of evidence that the father told Susan that he was prompted to speak to her. Hence, I find that the father's talk to Susan is not coercive And I futher find that Golofsky' s request to the father is not coercive as the latter at the time was not employed by Respondent. However, Susan overheard Golofsky's request to her father by eavesdropping on an extension telephone at the Nyman home. I find no violation of the Act in Susan's overhearing this conversation as her conduct in listening did not alter the private nature of the talk. President Golofsky about February 21 asked Virginia Fell and Marian Witherbee if they had signed union cards 528 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and who had started the union movement. These inquiries are prohibited by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as coercive interrogation, and I so find. He also stated he could see their cards if he so desired. In my opinion this is not coercive, and I so find. Next he observed that the girls would not win an election if one were held. This is not coercive because I find i(does not reasonably imply that the girls should vote against the Union or that it would be futile to have a union in the plant. Then he mentioned that if the Union came in it vould control the office. I find this is not coercive. Finally, Golofsky told Fell and Witherbee that if the Union came in he would dock them if they were absent or came in late, whereas they were enjoying such privileges now. But I find this is not coercive, as I find that he was correctly stating the law. It is my opinion that an employer has a right to say that he will adhere to the terms of a union contract. This is because an employer may not unilaterally alter the provisions of a collective-bargaining contract he has executed with a recognized union, and thus he may not unilaterally grant working privileges unless they are contained in the contract. About February 21 President Golofsky asked Susan Nyman to sign a withdrawal petition to be prepared by one of the employees. His contrary testimony is not credited. I find this is soliciting an employee to withdraw from the Union, and that it violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The remainder of his talk to Susan is innocuous and does not transgress said Section 8(a)(1). In late February President Golofsky asked employee Riner if he knew anything about the Union and what he thought of it. I find these questions are not coercive. Cf. Mel Croan Motors, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 395 F.2d 154-(C.A. 5). However, he also asked Riner if the latter had signed a union card. This question is coercive as it was not accompanied by assurances that no reprisals would be taken. Struksnes Construction Co., Inc., 165 NLRB No. 102; Heck's, Inc., 171 NLRB No. 112. Supervisor Ted Olson about February 19 asked employee Linda Jackson if she had signed a union card I find this is coercive. Although the remainder of Olson's talk may be labelled as antiunion, I find that it is protected as free speech under Section 8(c) of the Act. Hence, I find it does not transgress Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. A few minutes later Olson told Jackson that he knew that employee Jo Thomas had started the union business and knew where the meeting had been held. His denial is not credited. I find this is coercive as it gives the impression of surveillance of Thomas and of a union meeting. The remainder of this talk, except as narrated in the next sentence, may be characterized as antiunion, but it does not transgress Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. However, Olson also said that if the Union got in he would be tougher to get along with This is coercive as it denotes that the advent of the Union will bring about more arduous working conditions, i.e., it contains a threat of reprisals. About February 22 or 23 employee Linda Jackson overheard Olson tell employee Riner that if the Union "went through" working conditions would be worse, more work would be imposed on employees, and that Riner was jeopardizing his job by signing a union card. I find these statements are coercive within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. About February 19 Olson asked employee Rossie Sargeant if she knew about the Union's activities and why she wanted a union. I do not credit his denial thereof. These questions constitute coercive interrogation. He also mentioned that if the Union got in "things would be different." I find this last statement is too indefinite and ambiguous to be construed as a threat of reprisals and thus coercive, and therefore find it does not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In the middle of February Olson asked employee Martha Dahl if she would be for the Union. I do not credit his denial. I find that this is coercive interrogation. About mid-February Olson also asked employee Larry Riner whether Riner knew anything about a union in the office. Olson's contrary testimony is not credited. This question is not coercive under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act On February 22 employee Marian Witherbee observed Jo Thomas while carrying General Counsel's Exhibit 4 enter President Golofsky's office. But I find that this is not an unfair labor practice not only because it was part of Jo's duties to confer with Golofsky, but also because the record is silent as to whether they discussed said document. A few days after February 20 Supervisor Mitchell Rudman asked employee Leonard McMillion if the latter had signed a union card. Since this has not been contradicted, I credit McMillion. I find this constitutes coercive interrogation proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. VI. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE - Those activities of Respondent set forth in section V, above, found to amount to unfair labor practices, occurring in connection with its operations described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. VIL THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices prohibited by Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take specific affirmative action, set forth below, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It appears that a bargaining order is necessary to remedy the unfair labor practices found herein. Graham Ford, Inc., 172 NLRB No. 50, fn. 4. However, as I find that Respondent has not demonstrated a proclivity to violate the Act (see Mel Croan Motors, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 395 F.2d 154 (C.A. 5), a broad order, i.e., one prohibiting any unfair labor practices, is unwarranted. Hence an order will be recommended limited to enjoining Respondent from repeating only the unfair labor practices found herein and like or similar acts. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. Respondent is an employer as defined in Section 2(2), and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7), of the Act. 3. By engaging in the following conduct Respondent has committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of BROWN SPECIALTY CO. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act: coercively interrogating employees concerning their union membership, activities, or desires; soliciting employees to withdraw their union authorization cards; threatening to make working conditions more onerous if the Union got into Respondent's plant; and warning employees they were jeopardizing their jobs by signing union authorization cards. 4. A unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and 9 of the Act consists of all office clericals located at Respondent's Galesburg, Illinois, plant, but excluding executive, professional, confidential employees, guards, supervisors as defined in the Act, all other represented employees, and all other employees. 5. On or about February 13, 1968, and at all material times thereafter, the Union has represented a majority, and has been the exclusive bargaining representative, of all the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and 9 of the Act; and Respondent was on that date, and has been since, legally obligated to recognize and bargain with the Union as such. 6. By refusing to recognize or bargain with the Union for the employees in said appropriate unit on and since February 13, 1968, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 7. Respondent has not committed any other unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this case, it is recommended that the National Labor Relations Board enter an Order that Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively interrogating its employees as to their union membership, activities, or desires. (b) Soliciting its employees to withdraw their union authorization cards. (c) Threatening to make working conditions more onerous if the Union got into Respondent's plant. (d) Warning employees they were jeopardizing their jobs by signing union authorization cards. (e) In any like or similar manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights safeguarded to them by Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a written, signed agreement. (b) Post at its Galesburg, Illinois, plant , copies of the notice attached hereto as "Appendix."2 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Officer-In-Charge for Subregion 38, after being signed by a representative of Respondent thereunto duly authorized, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, 529 including all places where notices to employees are customarily displayed. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Officer-In-Charge for Subregion 38, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.' IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found herein. 'If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 'If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Subregional Officer-In-Charge, in writing within 10 days from the date of this Order , of the steps which Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees as to their union membership , activities, or desires. WE WILL NOT solicit our employees to withdraw their union authorization cards. WE WILL NOT threaten to make working conditions more difficult if a union represents our office employees. WE WILL NOT warn employees they are jeopardizing their jobs by signing union authorization cards. WE WILL NOT in any like or similar manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights safeguarded to them by Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with Local 221 of the Office and Professional Employees International, Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a written , signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All office clerical employees located at the Company's Galesburg, Illinois, plant, but excluding executive, professional, confidential employees , guards, supervisors as defined in the Act, all other represented employees, and all other employees. 530 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining , members of said Local 221, or any other labor organization. Dated By BROWN SPECIALTY COMPANY (Employer) (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 4th Floor, Citizens Building 225 Main Street , Peoria, Illinois 61602, Telephone 673-9282.