King Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.

KING CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH King Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. and Local 445, International , Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Cases 3-CA-3465, and 3-CA-3483 February 14, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On September 30, 1968, Trial Examiner Herbert Silberman issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended that such allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, except as modified below. 1. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by the efforts of general manager Rochford and sales manager Buckley to induce the salesmen to deal directly with it rather than through the Union. The Trial Examiner further found that certain interrogation engaged in by the Respondent during such efforts did not violate the Act. The record establishes that shortly after the Union's demand for recognition, Rochford told Buckley that the salesmen wanted to be represented by the Union. He then instructed Buckley to ask the salesmen what their grievances were and why they wanted to be represented by a third party. The following day, Buckley met privately with each of the Respondent's six salesmen and asked each one what his problem was, and why he wanted to be The Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner erred in refusing to disqualify himself from hearing this case. The Respondent 's contention is based solely on the ground that, from approximately 1961 to 1964, the Trial Examiner had been associated in the practice of law with an attorney who from time to time represents the Charging Party herein The above-mentioned attorney did not represent the Charging Party in this proceeding. We are satisfied upon the entire record that there was insufficient basis to warrant the Trial Examiner's disqualification 531 represented by a third party. Further, Rochford, 'during a conversation in which he threatened a salesman with reprisals , also asked him why he believed the salesmen needed a third party to represent them, as his door has always been open. Rochford also made a similar inquiry of another salesman. The Trial Examiner held that the Respondent, by the above questions was engaging in argument rather than interrogation , reasoning that a question is not unlawful unless it seeks to ferret out information concerning an employee' s union interest , attitudes , or activities . He then concluded that as the purpose of the Respondent 's questions was to express argument rather than to seek information , such questioning did not violate the Act. We do not agree . These acts of interrogation did not occur in isolation but in a context of the Respondent's other unfair labor practices . We find that these inquiries were made for the purpose of ascertaining the union sympathies and attitudes of each salesmen . Interrogation of this nature , engaged in by high ranking managers, without any assurances against reprisal , and in the context of other antiunion activity, reasonably tends to be coercive .2 In these circumstances , we find that the Respondent unlawfully interrogated its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1). 2. We also find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by promising a wage increase to induce a striking employee to return to work. In reaching a contrary conclusion , the Trial Examiner relied upon the fact that the Respondent was under no duty to bargain with the Union as the representative of the striking mechanics . The Board, however, has found individual solicitation to be unlawful irrespective of whether the employer is under a duty to bargain with the representative of the striking employees .3 In addition, the Trial Examiner relied upon his determination that the General Counsel failed to show that the Respondent's solicitation of one employee constituted an integral part of a pattern of illegal opposition to the purposes of the Act. However, the Board requires that such a showing be made only where the solicitation is not accompanied by any promise of special benefit or threat of detriment.4 As the strike activity of the mechanics was protected concerted activity , irrespective of the legal status of their representative, we find that the Respondent's offer of a wage increase to one of their number to refrain from such activity interfered with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1). 'Bryant Chucking Grinder Company, 160 NLRB 1526, 1543, 1544, enfd 389 F.2d 565 (C A 2). 'The W.T. Rawleigh Company, 90 NLRB 1924, 1925, 1926, enfd. in pertinent part 190 F.2d 832 (C.A 7) 'International Telephone, and Telegraph Corp, 159 NLRB 1757, 1781, 1782, enfd. in pertinent part 382 F.2d 366 (C.A. 3) 174 NLRB No. 80 532 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD THE REMEDY The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent's unlawful refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union was the immediate cause of the strike that began on March 22, 1968, and continues to be the reason for its prolongation. However, the Trial Examiner failed to include in his Recommended Remedy a provision for reinstatement for these unfair labor practice strikers, and the General Counsel excepted thereto. We find merit in this exception and shall make the following addition to the Trial Examiner's Remedy. Accordingly, we shall order that the Respondent, upon application by the striking salesmen, offer them reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make the above-mentioned employees whole for any loss of pay they may suffer as a result of the Respondent's refusal to reinstate them upon application. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner as modified herein and orders that the Respondent, King Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., Kingston, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Reletter paragraph 1(e) to 1(g) of the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order and insert the following as paragraphs 1(e) and 1(f): "(e) Interrogating employees concerning their union sympathies in a manner or under circumstances violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act." "(f) Promising wage increases to induce employees to abandon their participation in lawful concerted activities." 2. Add the following as paragraphs 2(b) and 2(c) respectively, the present paragraphs 2(b) and 2(c) and those subsequent thereto being consecutively relettered: "(b) Upon application, offer immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, to all those salesmen who engaged in the strike that began on March 22, 1968, and make whole such salesmen for any loss of pay they may suffer as a result of any refusal by the Respondent to reinstate them upon application." "(c) Notify the above-described employees, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces." 3. Insert the following after the last indented paragraph of the notice: WE WILL NOT question our employees concerning their union sympathies or attitudes. WE WILL NOT promise wage increases to induce our employees to abandon their participation in strikes or other lawful concerted activity. WE WILL, upon application, offer the salesmen who engaged in the strike that began on March 22, 1968; immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and will make the above-mentioned employees whole for any loss of pay they may suffer as a result of our refusal to reinstate them upon application. WE WILL notify the above-described employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not found herein. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HERBERT SILBERMAN , Trial Examiner- Charges and amended charges having been filed on various dates between March 25 and May 10, 1968, in the above-numbered cases by Local 445, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein called-the Union, on May 21, 1968, an order was issued consolidating the above-numbered cases and a complaint was issued in said consolidated cases alleging that the Respondent King Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., herein called the Company, has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. The complaint, as further amended at the hearing, in substance, alleges that: (a) Since March 20, 1968, the Company unlawfully has refused to recognize and to bargain collectively with the Union as the designated representative of the Company's salesmen; (b) since March 22, 1968, the Company has refused to pay commissions due to four employees named in the complaint because they had joined and had assisted the Union; (c) by the foregoing and by other conduct described in the complaint the Company has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act; and (d) on March 22, 1968, certain employees of the Company went on strike which strike was caused and was prolonged by the unfair labor practices on the part of the Company. Respondent by its answer generally denies that it has engaged in the alleged unfair labor practices. A hearing in this proceeding was held in Kingston, New York, on June 11 and 12, 1968. Thereafter, a brief was filed on behalf of KING CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH the General Counsel which has been carefully considered., Upon 'the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following. FINDINGS OF FACT L THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent, a New York corporation, sells and services new and used automobiles at its place of business in Kingston , New York. In the course and conduct of its business operations, during the past year , Respondent sold products of a gross value in excess of $1,500,000 . During the same period , Respondent received goods valued in excess of $50,000 at its place of business in Kingston, New York, directly from States other than the State of New York. Respondent does not deny, and I find, that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. IL THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Respondent's Refusal to Bargain Respondent operates a new- and used-car dealership in Kingston, New York, which was formally opened for business on April 10, 1967. In March of the following year the Company's salesmen sought union representation. These self-organizational efforts have been opposed by the Respondent and its conduct in resisting the Union's representation demands gave rise to the events which are alleged herein to constitute violations of the Act. During the times material hereto the Company employed six salesmen (Winfield Benoit, Lawrence Ranford, Timothy Straight, Charles DuVernoy, Donald Jessup, and Albert Mazziotta), a sales manager, Walter Buckley, and Richard Rochford, Respondent's vice president and general manager. The salesmen initiated the organizational effort. One of their number telephoned a union representative and arranged for a meeting which was held on the night of March 15, 1968, at the offices of the Union. Present at the meeting were Donald MacCollam, an -organizer for the Union, Anthony Alecca, business agent and president of the Union, and four of the Company's salesmen Among other things that were discussed at the meeting were the various ways by which the Union could obtain recognition. The salesmen indicated that they believed it would not be desirable to seek an NLRB election and that it would be preferable, if necessary, to picket the Company's premises in order to compel recognition. The meeting ended inconclusively. The salesmen did not make any commitments but said that they would contact the union representatives the next day after they had discussed the matter among themselves and with the absent salesmen. Before the salesmen left the meeting they took with them union authorization cards and applications for membership. The next evening MacCollam met with the Company's six salesmen at which time, they unanimously agreed to 'With his brief General Counsel filed a motion to correct the transcript of record. No opposition having been filed said motion is hereby granted. 533 designate the Union as their representative and MacCollam was given a union authorization card and a membership application signed by each of the salesmen.2 In the afternoon of March 20, 1968, Union Representatives MacCollam and Alecca called upon General Manager Rochford at his office. They told Rochford that the Union represented all the salesmen and that they were asking for recognition as the bargaining agent for the salesmen. This was the first knowledge Rochford had of any organizational interest on the part of the salesmen. At the hearing the parties stipulated that the Company's salesmen alone, and apart from all other employees, constitute an appropriate collective-bargaining unit. MacCollam placed the six authorization cards and membership applications on the desk in front of Rochford. The latter indicated there was no need to offer proof of majority saying, "If you say you represent them, there's no reason to lie."' Rochford was asked to sign a recognition agreement but responded that he first wished to see it in writing. MacCollam thereupon telephoned the Union's attorney and upon completing the telephone call dictated the wording of a recognition agreement to Rochford's secretary. Rochford declined to sign the proposed recognition agreement after it was typed explaining that he first wished to consult with the other principals of the Company. MacCollam and Alecca waited at the Company's premises for Rochford's answer. After they had waited for approximately 1-1/2 hours Rochford told them that he was unable to communicate with the persons he was seeking to reach. The Union's representatives informed Rochford that they would be in touch with him the next day and then left. On March 21 MacCollam telephoned Rockford and was informed by Rochford that the latter had been advised by the other principals of the Company not to sign the recognition agreement. MacCollam asked why and Rochford responded, "Well, we are not entirely convinced that you represent our people." This assertion, however, was inconsistent with the view Rockford expressed the previous day after the union representatives had left the Company's premises. According to the testimony of Sales Manager Walter Buckley, Rochford then had told him "[t]hat the salesmen wanted to be represented by a Union." The absence of any reasonable 'The authorization cards, in pertinent part, read as follows Hereby authorize the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 445, to represent me and, in my behalf, for the purposes of collective bargaining to negotiate and conclude all agreements in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment in accordance with the provisions of the, National Labor Relations Act 'At some point during the visit Rochford picked up the cards and application forms and inspected them Rochford testified that he inspected only one card, contrary to the testimony of MacCollam and Alecca that Rochford inspected all the cards . I credit MacCollam and Alecca and do not credit Rochford in this respect. In giving his testimony as a witness in this hearing Rochford was evasive when questioned by General Counsel; he sought to avoid giving direct answers to questions asked him by pretending that he did not understand the questions asked or by affecting a poor memory In general, Rochford impressed me as being an unreliable witness. In any event, whether Rochford inspected one card, no card, or Mall the cards is unimportant. The authorization cards were present and available for Rochford's inspection . If he had any doubt as to whether the Union had cards from a majority of the salesmen or whether the cards which they had were genuine the opportunity was conveniently present for him to satisfy these doubts. The fact that he did not question either the number of cards the Union claimed to have (the Union's claim was that they had cards from all the salesmen ) 'or their authenticity at a time when it would have been appropriate for him to raise such questions suggests only that Rochford had no doubt concerning the Union's representation claim. 534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD basis for the Company's expressed doubt of the Union's majority claim was further demonstrated when on March 22 all six salesmen went on strike and all participated in picketing the Company's premises. During the morning of that day Union Business Agent Alecca went into the Company's showroom and said to Rochford who was standing there, "I understand that your boss does not believe we have the majority of employees." Rochford responded, "Not the boss, me. I don't believe it." To this Alecca said, "Well, is there any doubt about it now? We have the six men on the picket line." Rochford did not reply to Alecca's last remark. At the hearing Rochford testified that despite the fact that he saw all six salesmen picketing he doubted the Union's majority because at some time during the strike DuVernoy, Ranford, and Jessup told him that they would rather be selling cars than striking and, in addition, on the first or second day of the strike DuVernoy and Jessup told him they did not need the strike and that it was something that they had not anticipated, and a day or two thereafter Ranford made a similar statement. As Rochford's testimony indicates that these statements were made after the strike had begun he could not have relied upon them when he informed the union representatives on March 21 and 22 that he and/or the Company doubted the Union's majority. Furthermore, at the time the salesmen made the remarks referred- to by Rochford they were engaged in a strike against the Company and were actively picketing its premises. The salesmen continued the 'strike and the picketing for a substantial period of time thereafter. In these circumstances, statements by the salesmen to the effect that they would rather be selling cars than striking, that they did not need a strike, or that they had not planned upon a strike when they designated the Union indicate neither that the salesmen had failed to designate the Union as their representative in the first instance nor that they thereafter had repudiated their designations of the Union. I discredit Rochford's testimony that when the union representatives demanded recognition on behalf of the Company's salesmen on March 20,' 1968, he doubted the Union's claim of majority. For reasons stated elsewhere in this decision I find that Rochford was not a truthful witness. The record is barren of any evidence suggesting any basis for such alleged doubt. Moreover, his conduct during the March 20 meeting with the union representatives was inconsistent with his later assertion of doubt of, majority. Then he specifically stated that he did not question the union's representative status. His failure to contest the authenticity of the authorization cards when they were readily available for his inspection further indicates his acceptance of the Union's majority claim. In addition, when a recognition agreement was proposed, Rochford requested that it should be reduced to writing, which was done. Although be did not sign the agreement his refusal was not because he questioned the Union's majority but only because he first wished to consult with the other principals of the Company. Not until his telephone conversation with,MacCollam the next day did Rochford voice any doubt concerning the Union's majority. Even then he gave no reason for such doubt. If on March 21 he had any question about the Union's majority it was assuredly dissipated the next day when all six salesmen joined in a strike against the Company and actively picketed the Company's premises. Of further significance respecting the Company's refusal to recognize the Union are the efforts, discussed more fully below, made by Rochford and Sales Manager Buckley on March 21 to persuade the salesmen to repudiate their union designations. Such conduct suggests that the Company refused to recognize the Union in order to gain time within which to try to dissipate the Union's majority. Additionally, the Company's failure to pay certain commissions to the salesmen, discussed below, in reprisal for their strike activity is still another demonstration of the Company's' opposition to its employees' organizational aspirations. I find that at no relevant time did the Company have any good-faith doubt concerning the Union's majority. On March 20, 1968, when the Union requested recognition it had been designated as bargaining representative by all the employees in an appropriate unit of salesmen. Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union as such representative, in the circumstances, constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.' B. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion Following the departure of the union representatives on March 20, 1968, Plant Manager Rochford and Sales Manager Buckley on that day and the next day had conversations with the salesmen individually during which, according to General Counsel, they made statements or asked questions which infringed upon employees' statutory rights. Rochford testified that he spoke with the salesmen one at a time and told them that "We had always maintained an open door policy and that any problem that any of them had we were always willing to assist them in anyway we could and that I personally had nothing against Unions, but because of our size and our intimacy, I saw no reason to deal with a third party." Buckley testified that Rochford spoke to him briefly about the union representatives' visit and told him that "the salesmen wanted to be represented by a Union Rochford instructed Buckley to ask the salesmen what their grievances were and why they wanted to be represented by a third party. The next day, March 21, Buckley spoke to each salesman privately and inquired of them "[w]hat their problem was, why they wanted to be represented by a third party." Both Rochford and Buckley in their conversations with the individual salesmen did more than merely express their views about union representation. Their remarks constituted undisguised suggestions to the employees to repudiate the Union as their representative. Additionally, at a time when, the Union had already demanded recognition and had demonstrated its majority status they sought to persuade the employees to deal individually with management by advising the salesmen that the Company "always maintained an open door policy" and was ready to assist the employees with any "problem" they might have. This endeavor to induce the employees to bypass the Union and to treat directly with management at a time when the Company was under an obligation to deal with the employees' designated exclusive bargaining representative tends to undermine the collective-bargaining relationships which the Act seeks to foster. As the Supreme Court observed in Medo Photo Supply Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678, 684, "Bargaining carried on by the employer directly with the employees, whether a minority or majority, who have not revoked their designation of a bargaining agent, would be subversive of the mode of collective bargaining which the 'Easton Packing Company, 171 NLRB No 183, International Harvester Company, 170 NLRB No 134 KING CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH statute has ordained. . Such conduct is therefore an interference with the rights guaranteed by Section 7 and a violation of Section 8(1) of the Act." Accordingly, I find that by reason of the activities of Rochford and Buckley summarized above the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' General Counsel relies upon certain uncontradicted testimony by one of the salesmen, Timothy Straight, as evidence of further violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act on the part of Respondent. The first incident about which Straight testified occurred in the morning of March 21. In connection with the sale of a new automobile which he was trying to negotiate, Straight asked Buckley to appraise the old automobile the customer was offering as a trade-in. Buckley appraised the car at a figure which Straight considered " a little low." Straight did not dispute the figure with Buckley because , according to Straight, "I kind of agreed with him at the time, if we can get it, we might as well get it right " Later Straight informed Buckley that he and the customer were apart by the amount of $50. Buckley asked whether he had made the deal, and when Straight responded that he had not Buckley answered, "Well, that's the way it's going to be from now on." According to Straight, prior to the incident in question he had had very few differences with Buckley about appraisals. General Counsel contends in his brief that the foregoing incident constitutes a threat of withdrawal of privileges and the imposition of more onerous working conditions if the Kingston dealership should become unionized . He does not clearly explicate how the facts support such argument. Presumably, General Counsel infers from Straight's testimony that Buckley deliberately set a low appraisal for the trade-in in order to impede the sale Straight was negotiating. Straight's testimony does not support such inference. First, there is no proof that the appraisal fixed by Buckley in fact was low. The evidence is limited merely to Straight's opinion that he considered the appraisal "a little low."6 Second, the rather sparse evidence concerning the incident is hardly sufficient to support the inference that General Counsel makes. The Company is in the business of selling cars, it would be abnormal for the sales manager deliberately to obstruct sales in order to deny its salesmen the opportunity for earning commissions. An indefinite statement such as Buckley purportedly made to the effect, "that's the way it's going to be from now on," is, in my opinion, insufficient to support a conclusion that the Company deliberately was going to reduce its sales in order to retaliate' against its salesmen 1 find, contrary to General Counsel, that the above-described testimony on the part of Straight does not prove any violation of the 'Cactus Petroleum , Inc, 134 NLRB 1254, 1261, reversed on other grounds 355 F 2d 755'(C.A 5); Stanley Air Tools, 171 NLRB No. 48, sec III, E, 2, of TXD. See also Agway Petroleum Corporation , 170 NLRB No. 95. I do not agree with General Counsel that Buckley 's inquiries constituted unlawful interrogation. His remarks, although in an interrogatory form, were argumentative rather than questioning. This is reflected by the employees ' responses which were affirmative declarations of position rather than answers to questions . In order to constitute interrogation which violates Section 8(a)(1) a question must seek to ferret out information concerning union interest, attitudes , or activities Here Buckley was not seeking information from the salesmen but rather was trying to persuade the employees to give up union representation General Counsel contends that testimony by various salesmen concerning their conversations with Rochford or Buckley constitute further violations of Section 8(a)(1). However, such testimony merely corroborated the testimony of Rochford and Buckley , which I found above evidenced violations of Section 8(a)(l), and did not furnish proof of additional unfair labor practices 535 Act. In the afternoon of March 21, Straight had a conversation with Rochford during which Rochford mentioned that the Company was seeking managers and that three of the salesmen, including Straight, were in line for such promotions and Rochford expected that they would be moved up shortly the way the Company was putting additional dealerships into operation.' Later in the same afternoon Rochford had another conversation with Straight during which Rochford asked Straight why he believed the salesmen needed a third party to represent them as his door has always been open. Rochford said further that anytime Straight had a problem Straight could take it up with him. Rochford also said that it was impossible for the six salesmen to "carry on a strike." Referring to the salesmen's designation of a bargaining representative, Straight testified that Rochford said, "[I]f I wanted to use the personal touch, it's out. If I wanted to use the truck some evening . . . borrowing money from the Company, would be strictly out also...." Rochford also said that salesmen would be permitted to use demonstrators only to discharge company business. Finally, Rochford said that if Straight thinks there is regimentation now, "wait until the Union gets in here." In these conversations Rochford was using the carrot and stick tactic to discourage Straight from supporting the Union. First, Rochford held before Straight the promise of a promotion. Although in this conversation Rochford made no mention of the Union, because of the timing of the conversation, i.e., the day following the Union's demand for recognition, and the subsequent conversation with Straight in the same afternoon, it could not have been lost upon Straight that the promotion Rochford was dangling before him was dependent upon his renunciation of the Union. In the second conversation Rockford made direct threats of reprisals ^ against the employees if they persisted in their organizational endeavors. He told Straight that union representation would be met by the withdrawal of employees' privileges such as the use of company vehicles and the opportunity to borrow money from the Company. Rochford also made subtle threats such as his remark that the salesmen could not carry on a strike which implied that their persistence in seeking union representation would lead to a strike. These promises of benefits and threats of reprisal made by Rochford to discourage employees' union activities constitute' violations of Section 8(a)(1). In the evening of March 21 most of the salesmen were instructed to turn in their demonstrators contrary to the Company's normal practice of permitting the salesmen to use the demonstrators for travel to and from their homes and for other personal, travel. Buckley explained that about 2 p in. on that day, March 21, he was informed by Rochford_ that the latter had received a telephone call from MacCollam advising that there would be a picket line in front of the Company's offices the following `Straight also testified that a Mr. Robert Baumont, a wholesaler, "got on the intercom, I imagine with Mr. Buckley I did hear him mention the name. I could go the other fifty And I don't know what the other reply was on the other end, but when Bob put down the phone , he came out and said, `Sorry , I can't do it.' So it blew the deal." Assuming that Straight accurately testified as to what occurred it remains that he does not know to whom Baumont spoke or about what they were speaking This testimony does not amount to proof that the trade -in car had been given a low appraisal by Buckley 'The previous day, during his meeting with the union representatives, Rochford said that the Company was planning to discharge three salesmen, one of whom was Straight 536 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD morning. Buckley spoke separately to three salesmen and told them not to take the demonstrators when they left work that night. Benoit's testimony regarding the incident substantially corroborates Buckley. According to Benoit, about 5:30 p.m. on March 21 Buckley began a conversation by asking, "Why are you doing this to me?" Benoit replied that the men decided we should get together to do something to protect our jobs. Buckley then said, "Well, you fellows are going on strike tomorrow... . The Company had been very good to you. . . . They let you use the car for personal reasons. . . . Tonight, when you close up, turn in your demonstrator and place the keys in the car." Mazziotta testified that in the evening of March 21 he was informed by Straight and DuVernoy_ that Rochford was asking the salesmen to turn in their demonstrators. Because Mazziotta was concerned about transportation home he asked Rochford whether he was required to turn in his demonstrator. Rochford said, "[A]s long as we weren't using them for work, we would have to leave them at the place." Rochford then continued the conversation by asking why the salesmen needed other representation, why the men cannot come in and see him "on their own," his door is always open and one should be "man enough to come in." Rochford then discussed the hardships of striking mentioning that a striker cannot obtain unemployment insurance benefits for 7 weeks and that Mazziotta should think of his wife and four children. General Counsel contends that the Company instructed the salesmen to turn in their demonstrators on the night of March 21 in retaliation for their union activities While the testimony kindles a suspicion that such was the case, I find that the fact has not been proved by a preponderance of the evidence particularly because of Buckley's testimony, corroborated by Benoit, that the instructions were issued because of the Company's belief that there would be a salesmen's strike the next day, which in fact did occur. C. The Strike On Friday morning, March 22, Union President Alecca was waiting outside the Company's premises when Benoit, Mazziotta, and Straight arrived..Alecca informed the men that nothing was happening, presumably referring to the Union's request for recognition. He then distributed picket signs to them and established a picket line. The other salesmen as they came to work joined the strike and participated in the picketing. The strike is still in progress although picketing was discontinued on April 22, 1968.8 General Counsel requests a declaration in this case that the strike of the salesmen is an unfair labor practice strike. I so find as the Company's unlawful refusal to recognize and to bargain collectively wtih the Union was the immediate cause of the strike and is responsible for its prolongation. 'Alecca testified that on April 22, 1968, he had conversations with representatives of the Company looking towards the reinstatement of the strikers and the discontinuance of the strike However, when he spoke to Benoit and Mazziotta about the subject they refused to abandon the strike and return to work. He did not consult the other four salesmen because, according to Alecca, Jessup was no longer around; Straight had accepted temporary employment elsewhere, DuVernoy had already returned to work;, and Ranford had sent word that he had another job D. The Strike by the Mechanics In the morning of March 25, 1968, all eight mechanics then employed by the Company left the premises together. During their coffeebreak, which preceded the walkout, the mechanics, who previously had been talking among themselves about joining the Union, decided that this was the time "instead of talking to do what we planned on." As they were leaving, Fred Kelsey, one of the mechanics, told Service Manager Joseph Dodd that "they were walking out to join the Union." The mechanics then met with a union representative, Joe Amato, in a tavern and all eight signed union authorization cards. The mechanics returned to the Company's premises and began picketing. General Counsel does not contend that during any time relevant hereto the Union was the statutory collective-bargaining representative of the mechanics. There is no evidence of any demands having been made upon the Company on behalf of the mechanics as a group and no direct evidence as to why the mechanics went on strike. Although the strike of the mechanics began after the salesmen's strike there is no evidence that the mechanics struck in support of the salesmen or otherwise made common cause with the salesmen. All the mechanics except Anton Refrigier have returned to work and in each case at a higher salary than he was paid before the strike. General Counsel contends that the increase given to Donald O'Connor, one of the mechanics, and the conversations had with him preceding his return to work constitute violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In respect to the abandonment of the strike by the mechanics the evidence shows. Frank Banks returned to work on March 27 after applying to Rochford for reinstatement. Banks' weekly salary was increased from $92 to $100. Two weeks later Harold Quick requested reinstatement and returned to work after reaching an agreement with Rochford for an increase in his hourly rate from $2.25 to $2.50. Likewise, Edward Krum requested reinstatement and returned to work on April 8 after having negotiated a wage increase for himself with Rochford. Anton Refrigier testified that during the second week of the strike he had a conversation with Service Manager Joe Dodd when he went into the shop to pick up his tools. Dodd suggested that he should see Rochford and that he might be able to get his job back. During the conversation Dodd said that the men were probably wasting their time with the Union because he did not think the Union "would help." About a week later Dodd again suggested to Refrigier that he speak to Rochford about returning to work. However, Refrigier did not return to work. Finally, Donald O'Connor testified that while he was on strike, every now and then, Dodd asked him whether he was ready to return to work. On one occasion Dodd told O'Connor that Rochford had made a good offer to Fred Kelsey and if O'Connor would talk to Rochford, Rochford would give him a good deal also. O'Connor further testified that about April 19 Dodd again asked him to return to work. O'Connor refused with the comment that he probably would be dismissed anyway. A few minutes later Rochford appeared and told O'Connor that if he returned to work and did a good job he would not have to worry about being dismissed. Later in the same afternoon Rochford told O'Connor that if he was ready to go back to work he would get more money. The increase mentioned was $15 per week. O'Connor answered that he would think it over. Ultimately O'Connor accepted the offer and returned to work. KING CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH General Counsel argues that "although the service employees were not in the salesmen' s unit, they were engaged with the salesmen in the Union's concerted picketing of Respondent. Respondent was a single-location auto agency, and, in these circumstances, its unlawful conduct with one classification cannot be isolated from the other. In the context of its course of unlawful conduct, its offer and grant of a wage increase to O'Connor to induce him to abandon the strike and picketing, constituted a calculated effort to undermine and discredit the concerted union action, in violation of Section 8(a)(1)." I am not persuaded by General Counsel's argument. It is largely structured on assumptions which have insubstantial record support. General Counsel first states that the mechanics "were engaged with the salesmen in the Union's concerted picketing of Respondent." This assertion is gratuitous; it is based on nothing more than the fact that the mechanics were picketing at the same time as were the salesmen. Such fact does not prove that the picketing by the mechanics was related to the picketing by the salesmen. Although the mechanics carried the same Local 445 signs as did the salesmen, there is no evidence that the picketing by the mechanics was coordinated with the picketing by the salesmen or that any attempt was made to represent the two groups as being involved in a joint strike. Furthermore., there is no evidence that the mechanics went on strike in aid of the salesmen's strike, that the mechanics had indicated any support or sympathy for the objectives being pursued by the salesmen, or that the mechanics had in any way associated themselves with the salesmen's cause.' As all the mechanics but one returned to work while the salesmen's strike was still in progress the reasonable inference is that the mechanics struck to achieve their own objectives and not to support the salesmen. Except for the coincidence that both groups were picketing at the same time, there is no proof that the mechanics "were engaged with the salesmen in the Union's concerted picketing of Respondent." General Counsel's second point is that Respondent's "unlawful conduct with one classification cannot be isolated from the other." As a general proposition this statement is true, but General Counsel does not explain its applicability to this case. If by this statement General Counsel intends to say that it may be presumed that Respondent's unlawful treatment of the salesmen had a coercive impact upon the mechanics, he does not further explain the bearing such presumption has upon the issue under consideration." He argues that the increase which Respondent gave to O'Connor to induce him to abandon the strike was unlawful because "in the context of [Respondent's] course of unlawful conduct" (presumably referring to Respondent's activities involving the salesmen) it constituted "a calculated effort to undermine and discredit the concerted union action." I am uncertain to what General Counsel refers by the expression "the concerted union action." If the phrase is intended to refer to the strike and to the picketing by the -mechanics, he does not explain why the increase given to O'Connor should be treated differently than the increases given to 'Although all the mechanics had signed union authorization cards and Alecca testified that on March 25 he told Rochford that the Union represented the mechanics, the complaint does not allege that at any time material hereto the Union was the statutory representative of the mechanics and, at the hearing and in his brief, General Counsel specifically has affirmed that he is not making any such contention Thus, for the purposes of this proceeding the Company was under no duty to recognize or to bargain with the Union on behalf of the mechanics. 5 37 the other mechanics which General Counsel does not contend were unlawful. Just as in the case of O'Connor, Quick and Krum did not abandon the strike until they were first offered increases. If the phrase is intended to refer to the strike by the salesmen, General Counsel does not explain how the solicitation of O'Connor, one of the mechanics, to return to work tended "to undermine and discredit" the "concerted union action," that is, the salesmen's strike. To the contrary, it would seem that the Company's purpose in soliciting its mechanics to return to work was the normal desire of an employer whose operations have been interrupted by a strike to settle the strike and to resume work rather than to "undermine and discredit" the salesmen's strike. The evidence here does not show a sufficient nexus between the Company's unlawful conduct and the inducement offered O'Connor to abandon the strike to support a finding that the increase given to O'Connor "constituted an integral part of a pattern of illegal opposition to the purposes of the Act"" and thus was unlawful.' 2 More importantly, General Counsel ignores completely the question of what course of action was available to Respondent to effect a settlement of the mechanic's strike. The mechanics had no statutory representative. Although their strike was a concerted activity the mechanics took no other collective action. Neither before nor during the strike were any demands on behalf of the mechanics as a group presented to the Respondent. They did not designate a spokesman for themselves. , In these circumstances the only practical way the Respondent could initiate settlement efforts was to approach and to deal with the mechanics individually. Actually, in this case, the initiative was taken by some of the mechanics who first requested reinstatement. In the absence of a statutory representative the Company had a right to treat with the striking mechanics individually." General Counsel inferentially acknowledges that the Respondent was privileged to bargain with the mechanics individually and was under no obligation to deal with the Union on their behalf because, except for the case of O'Connor, General Counsel does not contend that the increases which the Company negotiated with and gave to the mechanics who returned to work were unlawful Why then is the case of O'Connor any different. Except by talking with the mechanics, Respondent had no way of ascertaining why they were on strike and what it could do to settle the strike. Respondent's experiences with some of the mechanics such as Banks, Quick, and Krum undoubtedly suggested that the mechanics had struck to obtain higher wages. By offering O'Connor a wage increase Respondent, in effect, was capitulating to his demand as Respondent had already done in the cases of other mechanics who had returned to work Respondent in giving increases to the mechanics was not bypassing the Union because the Union was not their collective bargaining representative. "The gist of General Counsel's argument seems to be that but for Respondent's other unfair labor practices the wage increase given to O'Connor to induce him to abandon the strike and to return to work would be lawful. However, General Counsel does not explain why or how the unfair labor practices which directly affected only the salesmen operated to change the increase given to O'Connor from a lawful act to an unlawful act. "See I Spiewak & Sons, 71 NLRB 770, 772, enfd. as modified 179 F 2d 695 (C A. 3), "See W T. Rawleigh Company, 90 NLRB 1924, 1925-26, enfd. as modified 190 F.2d 832 (C.A. 7); Hornick Building Block Co., 148 NLRB 1231, 1237. W. I . C a s e C o m p a n y v. N.L.R.B, 321 U S 332, 336-337; Insular Chemical Corporation , 128 NLRB 93, 101. 538 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD It would seem that the mechanics had succeeded in their individual strike objectives. I do not perceive any merit to General Counsel's thesis that, under the facts in this case, where there was no statutory representative for the striking mechanics; it was lawful for the Company to accede to the strike demands of the mechanics who initiated reinstatement negotiations but it was unlawful for the Company to bargain with O'Connor' about his reinstatement. Contrary to General Counsel, I find that the increase offered to O'Connor to induce him to abandon the strike was not an unfair labor practice.14 E. Refusal to Pay Commissions to Striking Salesmen During the times relevant hereto the Company paid its salesmen on the basis of a small salary plus a commission for each car sold by them. The commission is paid on the Friday following the day on which the automobile is delivered to the purchaser. Four salesmen, Winfield Benoit, Albert Mazziotta, Lawrence Ranford, and Charles Straight had made sales of automobiles prior to March 22, 1968, but were not paid commissions for such sales because the cars were delivered while they were on strike. According to General Manager Richard Rochford a salesman does not earn a commission for a sale made by him unless he is "present to deliver the car" to the purchaser.'s Rochford was corroborated by Sales Manager Walter Buckley who testified that the practice of the Company with regard to the payment of commissions to salesmen is that in order to earn a commission the salesman "has to sell the car and deliver the car. When the car is delivered and the money is in the office, they'll be paid for it." "We never pay . until the car is delivered. The people may cancel." The explanation for the practice according to Buckley, is that "the most important factor in selling the car is the delivery, to let the people know you are the selling salesman and if you want to do repeated business, this is what you want to imbed in their minds. It's to their advantage that you are delivering the car."16 Benoit testified that the Company "did frown upon the salesman making the sale and not making the delivery because that's not considered good business. Salesman should be there at the time of delivery." Mazziota also testified that the Company wanted the salesmen to deliver the cars sold by them because it was good business to see that the customers were properly taken care of. However, contrary to Rochford and Buckley, Benoit testified that "there has never been a policy that a salesman would not be paid if he wasn't there at the time of delivery." Neither Rochford nor Buckley testified that any salesman was informed that he would not be paid a commission if he was not present to deliver the car to the purchaser nor is there evidence of any communication whether written or oral to the "The cases cited by General Counsel in his brief are inapposite The applicable rule is summarized by the Board in Family Bargain Centers, Inc., 160 NLRB 816, fn. 1, as follows (W)e disavow any possible implication that direct dealing or bargaining with employees who are not represented by a collective-bargainmg representative is necessarily violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. However, where such direct dealing is undertaken for the purpose of encouraging employees to reject union representation and involves the promising and granting of benefits . it restrains, coerces, and interferes with employees' exercise of Section 7 rights and therefore violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See also Webb Wheel Division, 121 NLRB 1410, 1411, General Electric Company v. N.L.R.B., 400 F.2d 713 (C.A. 5). salesmen to such effect. Rochford testified that prior to the strike no salesman had been denied a commission because he did not deliver the car sold by him. According to Rochford, if a salesman is unable to deliver a car sold by him normally he makes arrangements with another salesman to attend to the delivery for him. Such arrangements may involve splitting the commission. However, these arrangements are made by the salesmen themselves and do not involve the management of the Company. The salesmen who testified about the subject generally corroborated Rochford that it was their practice, if unable to deliver the car sold by them, to make arrangements with another salesman to attend to the delivery for them and on occasion they would arrange for splitting the commission. The testimony of Rochford and Buckley show that the Company paid full commissions to a salesman, Tom Kearney, who voluntarily quit its employ for sales made by Kearney before he left but where the cars were delivered after his employment terminated. I do not credit the testimony of Rochford and Buckley that the practice and policy of the Company was to deny commissions to salesmen who were not present to deliver the cars sold by them. There is no evidence that such practice or policy had ever been communicated to the salesmen and, indicating the contrary, prior to the strike, no salesman had ever been denied his commission because he was not present when delivery of the car was made. I find, contrary to Respondent, that the four salesmen named in the complaint were denied commissions by the Company in retaliation for having designated the Union as their collective-bargaining representative and for having engaged in a strike against the Company. Respondent's withholding commissions from the salesmen in such circumstances constitute violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that the Respondent unlawfully refused to pay commissions to Winfield Benoit, Albert Mazziotta, Lawrence Ranford, and Charles Straight with respect to "When questioned further about the subject Rochford testified that to earn the commission the salesman had "to be physically present and working" at the time of the delivery "In connection with the delivery of a car Buckley explained that the salesman has certain duties to perform in addition to accepting payment for the car. He must transfer the license plates , see that luggage from the car being traded in, if there is a trade-in , is removed, dispose of any problems that might arise such as a discrepancy in extra equipment between what was ordered by the customer and what was installed in the car at the factory, and fill out such papers as are required KING CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH cars sold by them prior to the strike which began on March 22, 1968, but which were delivered to the customers during the strike, I shall recommend that the Respondent pay to each of them the full commission due to him for each such sale plus interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the date on which the commission became payable. Having found that the Respondent unlawfully has refused to bargain collectively with the Union, I shall recommend that it be ordered to bargain collectively with the Union, upon request, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment for the employees in the appropriate unit described below and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following- CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. All salesmen employed by Respondent at its Kingston, New York, dealership, excluding all shop employees, office clerical employees, and all professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 2. At all times since March 16, 1968, Local 445, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, has been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act of the employees in the above-described unit. 3. Since March 20, 1968, by failing and refusing to recognize the Union as such exclusive collective-bargaining representative and by failing and refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act 4. Since March 22, 1968, by refusing and failing to pay to Winfield Benoit, Albert Mazziotta, Lawrence Ranford, and Charles Straight commissions earned by them because they were engaged in a strike against the Company, Respondent has discriminated against employees to discourage membership in the Union, and thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 5. By the foregoing conduct, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. By seeking to induce employees to bypass the Union and treat directly with management at a time when the Respondent was under an obligation to deal with the employees' designated exclusive bargaining representative, Respondent, since March 21, 1968, has interfered with and restrained employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and thereby has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. By promising employees benefits and threatening them with reprisals in order to discourage their support and affiliation with the Union, Respondent, since March 21, 1968, has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor 539 practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 9. The strike by Respondent's salesmen which began on March 22, 1968, was caused by and has been prolonged by Respondent's unfair labor practices. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby recommend that King Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local 445, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit: All salesmen employed by King Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., at its Kingston dealership, excluding all shop employees, office clerical employees, and all professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Discouraging membership in any labor organization of its employees by discriminating against any employees in regard to the payment of commissions earned by them or in regard to any other term or condition of their employment. (c) Offering to deal directly with employees in disregard of the employees' duly chosen bargaining representative. (d) Making promises of promotions or of other benefits or threats to withdraw privileges or threats of other reprisals to employees in order to discourage their support of or affiliation with the above-named Union or any other labor organization. (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment with Local 445, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit described above and, if an agreement is reached, embody it in a signed contract. (b) Make whole Winfield Benoit, Albert Mazziotta, Lawrence Ranford, and Charles Straight in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy" for the commissions which were not paid to them because of Respondent's discrimination against them. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all sales records and other records necessary to analyze the amounts due under the terms of this Recommended Order. (d) Post at its premises in Kingston, New York, copies 540 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 3, after being duly signed by its representative, shall be posted by Respondent, immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.18 "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner " in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order " "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with Local 445, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as exclusive representative of all employees in the unit described below, with respect to wages, hours, and other working conditions and, if an understanding is reached, embody it in a signed contract. The appropriate unit is: - All salesmen employed by King Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc , at its Kingston dealership, excluding all shop employees, office clerical employees, and all professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the above-named Union, or,any other labor organization of our employees, by discriminating against any of our employees in regard to the payment of commissions earned by them or in regard to any other term or condition of their employment. WE WILL NOT offer to deal directly with employees in disregard of the employees' duly chosen bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT promise employees benefits or threaten employees with reprisals to discourage their support of or affiliation with the above-named Union or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named Union or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. WE WILL pay to Winfield Benoit, Albert Mazziotta, Lawrence Ranford, and Charles Straight the commissions earned by them but which were not paid to them because they were engaged in a strike at the time said commissions became due and payable with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum. KING CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If members have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Fourth Floor, The 120 Building, 120 Delaware Avenue, Buffalo, New York 14202, Telephone 842-3100.