Lahey's of Muskegon

I. M. JAFFE AND SONS I. M. Jaffe and Sons, d/b/a Lahey 's of Muskegon and Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO. Case 7-CA-7020 June 10, 1969 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS BROWN AND ZAGORIA On March 28, 1969, Trial Examiner Jerry B. Stone issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner 's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the entire record in this case, including the Trial Examiner's Decision , the exceptions and brief, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby orders that the Respondent, I. M. Jaffe and Sons, d/b/a Lahey's of Muskegon, Muskegon, Michigan, its officers , agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. We agree with the Trial Examiner 's finding that a reasonable period for bargaining following the July 26, 1968, settlement had not elapsed before the Respondent's refusal to bargain , and we are satisfied that he applied the proper legal test in reaching that conclusion . However, we do not adopt the apparent view in footnote 8 that Board cases accord controlling weight to the presence or absence of an impasse in determining the reasonable time for bargaining under settlement agreements , as the Trial Examiner himself recognized in arriving at his decision . Such determinations are governed by all relevant facts surrounding the postsettlement bargaining TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JERRY B. STONE, Trial Examiner: This proceeding, under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 537 as amended, was tried pursuant to due notice on February 17 and 18, 1969, at Muskegon, Michigan. The charge was filed on November 4, 1968. The complaint in this matter was issued on November 25, 1968. The issue in this case is whether the Respondent has refused to bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act since October 24, 1968. The critical question is whether a bargaining relationship created after a settlement agreement executed on July 26, 1968, had had a reasonable time to function. All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate in the proceeding, and the General Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs which have been considered. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of witnesses, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER' Lewis Jaffe, Arthur Jaffe, and Sidney Jaffe are, and have been at all times material herein, copartners doing business in Muskegon under the trade name and style of Lahey's of Muskegon. The copartnership of Lewis Jaffe, Arthur Jaffe, and Sidney Jaffe, which has its principal office at 131 South Main Street, Butler, Pennsylvania, operates as a single-integrated enterprise engaged in the retail sale and distribution of women's ready-to-wear accessories, sportswear, and related goods at its several stores located in various States, and going under different trade names, such as "Lahey's of Muskegon," which is located in Muskegon, Michigan, and is the store involved herein During the calendar year ending December 31, 1967, which period is representative of their operations at all times material herein, the copartnership of Lewis Jaffe, Arthur Jaffe, and Sidney Jaffe referred to above, in the course and conduct of their business operations, attained a gross revenue in excess of $500,000 from the sale and distribution of women's apparel and related goods at their various stores. During the year ending December 31, 1967, which period is representative of its operations during all times material hereto, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, purchased and caused to be transported and delivered at its Muskegon store, women's apparel and other goods and materials valued in excess of $100,000, which goods and materials were transported and delivered to its store in Muskegon, Michigan, directly from points located outside the State of Michigan. As conceded by the Respondent and based upon the foregoing, it is concluded and found that Respondent is now and has been at all times material herein an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED2 Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, is and has been at all times material herein a labor organization within the The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein. 'The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein 176 NLRB No. 66 538 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Preliminary Facts' Supervisory Status At all times material herein Lewis L. Jaffe has been a manager and partner of Respondent, and has been and is now a supervisor and agent of the Respondent , within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. the unit described below, concerning any proposed changes in group insurance or the method of adjusting grievances, and concerning wages, hours, and any other term or condition of employment. The settlement agreement also set out the appropriate bargaining unit. Such unit as set forth is the same as previously has been set out herein as the appropriate bargaining unit. The settlement agreement further contained language to the effect that the execution of the settlement agreement did not constitute an admission that the Respondent had violated the National Labor Relations Act. Appropriate bargaining unit All full-time and regular part-time employees of 1. M. Jaffe and Sons, d/b/a Lahey's, Muskegon , Michigan, including all sales employees , markers, alterations employees, and janitors, but excluding professional employees, office clerical employees, guards and all supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 1964 Certification of the Union On or about February 12, 1964, a majority of the employees in the unit described above in paragraph 10, by secret-ballot election conducted pursuant to an agreement for consent election in Case 7-RC-6084, which election was conducted under the supervision of the Acting Regional Director for Region 7 of the National Labor Relations Board , designated and selected the Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, as their representative for the purpose of collective bargaining with the Respondent. On February 20, 1964, a Board certification of representative issued to the Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO. Event of May 6, 1968 - Unfair labor practice charges - alleging refusal to bargain On or about May 6, 1968, the Charging Party filed an unfair labor practice charge against Respondent in Case 7-CA-6730, alleging, inter alia, that Respondent had refused to bargain in good faith. Event of July 26, 1968, - settlement agreement Re: Alleged refusal to bargain charges On or about July 26, 1968, the Charging Party, Respondent, and the aforementioned Regional Director executed a settlement agreement in Case 7-CA-6730, in which agreement the Respondent agreed , inter alia, that: WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit described below. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein. B. The Exclusive Representative Status of the Union The General Counsel contends in effect that the settlement agreement in Case 7-CA-6730, referred to above, established the Union as the representative of all the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, established the Union as exclusive representative of all employees in said unit for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and created an obligation upon Respondent to bargain for a reasonable time with the Union. Although the General Counsel had pled, and the Respondent had admitted, that the Union received certified status in 1964, the General Counsel first said such evidence was only for background purposes, and later disavowed any reliance upon the certification to establish the majority status of the Union as of July 26, 1968. The Respondent in his pleadings and at the hearing did not attack the validity or lawfulness of the settlement agreement as such . The Respondent contended that, absent a finding of unfair labor practices prior to the settlement agreement , no obligation to bargain for a reasonable time ensued as a result of the settlement agreement. The Respondent introduced some evidence and made some offers of proof of employee dissatisfaction prior to July 26, 1968, as bearing upon the question of "reasonable time" for bargaining after the execution of the settlement agreement on July 26, 1968. I reject the Respondent's contention that absent unfair labor practices prior to the settlement agreement there was not an obligation to bargain for a reasonable time after the execution of the settlement agreement. A settlement agreement of the type referred to herein creates several obligations. One obligation is to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement. Another obligation is one created by the commencement of a recognized bargaining relationship . As to the latter, such obligation is to recognize and bargain with the other party for a reasonable period of time. During this reasonable period of time for bargaining, the status of the Union as exclusive bargaining representative can not be lawfully attacked. The Board with court approval has clearly set forth that after a settlement agreement there is an obligation to bargain for a reasonable time and that during such reasonable period of time the status of the recognized exclusive bargaining representative is free from attack.' 'Mid-City Foundry Co.. 167 NLRB No. 108, Poole Foundri• and Machine Company, 95 NLRB 34, 35-36, enfd . 192 F.2d 740 (C.A. 4), cert. denied 342 U.S. 954; W. B. Johnston Grain Company , 154 NLRB 1115, enfd. 365 F . 2d 582 (C.A. l0); N J. MacDonald & Sons, Inc, 155 NLRB 67, enfd. 62 LRRM 2296 (C.A 1) I. M. JAFFE AND SONS 539 As indicated later in this Decision, I conclude and find that the bargaining relationship created on July 26, 1968, had not had a reasonable time to function for a fair chance to succeed as of October 24, 1968. As indicated, there has been no attack upon the validity and lawfulness of the settlement agreement of July 26, 1968. It must be presumed therefore that the underlying prerequisites for a bargaining obligation existed as of July 26, 1968. Accordingly, I conclude and find that the facts reveal that at a time on or prior to July 26, 1968, a period of time properly representative of the employees' desires, a majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit had selected the Union as collective-bargaining representative of such employees. I further conclude and find that, by virtue of such facts, as of July 26, 1968, the Union was and has been at all times since the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.' C. The Refusal To Bargain The facts are clear that the Respondent has refused to bargain with the Union as exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit at all times since October 24, 1968. The critical issue is whether the Union on October 24, 1968, enjoyed as of that time an irrebuttable status as exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit . The parties in their pleadings and in statements at the hearing join issue on whether as of October 24, 1968, a reasonable time had been allowed the bargaining relationship created or confirmed by the settlement agreement of July 26, 1968. There is no issue as to majority status or exclusive representative status of the Union on July 26, 1968. The Union was selected by a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit as bargaining representative on February 14, 1964, and on February 20, 1964, the Union became the certified exclusive collective-bargaining representative of said employees. On July 26, 1968, the Respondent and the Union entered into a settlement agreement of alleged unfair labor practices in Case 7-CA-6730, and the Regional Director for Region 7 of the National Labor Relations Board approved such settlement agreement. The settlement agreement , referred to above , provided in effect that the Respondent would recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit. Shortly thereafter the Respondent and the Union agreed to an initial bargaining meeting, and thereafter met on August 29 , September 11 and 17, and October 8, 1968 . On these dates the parties met and bargained between 6 and 7 hours. The events relating to scheduling of bargaining sessions and to the bargaining sessions themselves are not in material dispute . Thus , it is clear that on August 2, 1968, the parties agreed to commence the bargaining sessions on August 29, 1968, primarily because Carter, for the Union, 'Respondent's counsel in the litigation of the issues and in his brief recognizes the basic legal issue herein as being one of reasonable time for bargaining after the settlement agreement . Some of his arguments however relate to an argument that employee expression of dissatisfaction should be considered in evaluating the question of "reasonable time ." I reject such argument. Furthermore, such contentions have clearly been rejected by the Board and the courts . See W. B. Johnston Grain Company. 154 NLRB 1115, enfd . 365 F.2d 582 (C.A. 10), for an excellent discussion of virtually the same contentions and the rejection thereof. had plans for a 3-week vacation. There is testimonial conflicts as to whether Stokes made certain statements indicative of bad-faith bargaining. It is not necessary to resolve such conflict since the issue and contention in this case does not concern context or bad-faith bargaining. There is also testimonial conflict as to whether Carter made statements to Stokes on the telephone and at the hearing indicative of bad-faith bargaining with respect to the question of union security. Similarly it is not necessary to resolve this conflict. The pleadings did not place in issue a defense to the effect that Respondent was refusing to bargain on such grounds. Nor does the evidence reveal that Respondent's refusal to bargain was on such grounds. Furthermore, Carter's and Jaffe's testimony clearly reveals that Carter' s statements in the bargaining sessions were to the effect that he would negotiate on "union security." Carter set forth in the bargaining sessions his reasons for his contended union-security proposals and his opposition to Respondent's proposal, and Carter made concessions on his total proposals as quid pro quo for requested concessions by the Respondent. For the first two bargaining sessions , constituting around half of the total bargaining time of the entire bargaining, the parties discussed certain specific employee grievances and records pertaining thereto. As to the rest of the time the parties discussed matter pertaining to the respective proposals and positions of the parties. The Union's contract proposal was tendered on August 29, 1968. The Respondent orally presented its position on dues deductions and union-security problems at the August 29 and September 11 sessions, presented a written proposal on union security on September 17, 1968, and presented its total proposal in effect on October 8, 1968. The Union made certain modifications and deletions in its proposals on October 8, 1968. The Union's contract proposal was in effect the terms of the expired contract' with certain modifications and new proposals. Thus many of the paragraphs in the proposed contract were the same as had been. However, there were a substantial number of provisions in the contract which constituted a change from the old contract. Among items of change were wages and other provisions. The Company's position on union security and dues deductions involved a change from the expired contract. The Company's October 8, 1968, proposal provided in effect acceptance of the terms of the old contract except for new . proposed union-security and dues-deductions provisions and for a wage-and merit-increase proposal. It is clear that the parties were apart as of the end of the October 8, 1968, bargaining session on proposals relating to union security and dues deductions, on wage proposals, and on various other proposals included in the Union's proposed contract which differed from the old contract. There was no indication by the parties on October 8, 1968, that they considered themselves at an impasse in bargaining. Stokes' letter of November 1, 1968, reveals that the Respondent did not consider bargaining to be at an impasse. And the facts clearly reveal that an impasse in bargaining had not been reached on October 8, 1968. Furthermore, it is clear that there remained many open issues at the conclusion of the October 8, 1968, sessions. Bargaining as to wages had just seriously begun when the issue had been joined with Respondent's proposal of October 8, 1968. It is noted that Carter, on October 8, 1968, made certain economic concessions which bear 'The old contract had expired on July 1, 1968. 540 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD relationship to wages. Subsequent to the October 8, 1968, session , the parties agreed on October 15 , 1968, to meet on October 24, 1968. On October 24, 1968 , Stokes told Carter that the Respondent would not meet on that date or thereafter because an RD petition (to decertify the Union ) had been filed by employees and that legally the Respondent cound not bargain .' Henceforth the Respondent has continued to refuse to bargain with the Union. Although the Respondent indicated its reason for refusal to bargain on October 24, 1968 , as being because of the RD petition , it did not offer to resume bargaining after said petition was dismissed by the Regional Director for Region 7 of the NLRB on November 21, 1968, or after the time to appeal such dismissal had expired. The Respondent contends that the Union 's request for bargaining around 60 days prior to the contract's expiring on July 1, 1968, indicates that 60 days was a reasonable period of time for bargaining . I note that the contract required such notice for the purpose of reopening contract negotiations. I find no value in this contention. The bargaining revealed issues that obviously had not been considered by the Union as bargaining issues at the time of said letter . The reasonable period of time therefore has to be determined by the bargaining issues and circumstances involved. The Respondent also contends that a letter from Regional Director Brooks (for NLRB Region 7), relating to the unfair labor practice settlement agreement case, 7-CA-6730, constitutes evidence of what is a reasonable time for bargaining . This letter, dated October 9, 1968, advised that the provisions of the settlement agreement had been carried out and that the case had been closed. The letter further advised however , "Please note that the closing is conditioned upon continued observance of the said settlement agreement and does not preclude further proceedings should subsequent violations occur." Since the facts reveal that the parties , as of October 15, 1968, had bargaining issues unresolved and planned further bargaining sessions , it is obvious that a conclusion from the Regional Director's letter cannot be drawn that a reasonable time for bargaining had expired. The reference of the closing's being conditioned upon continued observance of the said settlement agreement clearly reveals the closing of the case to be administrative and not determinative of the end of the obligation to bargain. Considering all of the foregoing, I conclude and find (1) that the Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit on July 26, 1968, (2) that the Union as the recognized exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit on July 26, 1968, was entitled to have a reasonable period of time with such status, being free from attack so as to afford it a fair chance to achieve successful fruition to bargaining, (3) that the type and degree of the bargaining issues, the limited time actually devoted to bargaining , the pending of the open issues in bargaining on October 24, 1968 , and the lack of impasse in bargaining as of October 24, 1968, require a conclusion that the Union and the bargaining relationship had not been afforded a reasonable period of time to accord the relationship a fair chance to succeed,' (4) that since the Union and the bargaining relationship was entitled to a reasonable period of time to achieve fruition in bargaining and such time had not been afforded 'An RD petition had been filed on October 21, 1968 , in Case 7-RD-784. as of October 24, 1968, the Union has at all times since July 26, 1968, continued its status as exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit, and the Respondent was obligated as of October 24, 1968, to recognize and bargain with the Union as collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit, and (5) that the Respondent, by its refusal to bargain with the Union on October 24 and thereafter, including November 21, 1968, and thereafter, has engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III above, occurring in connection with the Respondent operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that Respondent cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the 'appropriate unit described herein. It will therefore be recommended that the Respondent bargain collectively, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. I. M. Jaffe and Sons, d/b/a Lahey's of Muskegon, the Respondent, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All full-time and regular part-time employees of I. M. Jaffe and Sons, d/b/a Lahey's, Muskegon, Michigan, including all sales employees, markers, alterations employees, and janitors, but excluding professional employees, office clerical employees, guards and all supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 'See various Board cases holding that where an impasse had not been reached a reasonable time for bargaining had not occurred. N J MacDonald & Sons. Inc. 155 NLRB 67; Frank Becker Towing Co. 151 NLRB 466; Mid-City Foundry Co., 167 NLRB No. 108. Poole Foundry and Machine Company. 95 NLRB 34, 35-36, enfd 192 F 2d. 740 (C.A. 4). These cases involved various time periods of bargaining from 3 to 6 months It is noted that in The Daily Press. Incorporated. 112 NLRB 1434, 1441-44, a case cited by Respondent as holding that 2 months was a reasonable time for bargaining , an "impasse" had occurred. I. M. JAFFE AND SONS 541 4. Retail Clerks Union Local 807, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, was on July 26, 1968, and at all times since has been the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of the Act. 5. By refusing on October 24, 1968, and at all times thereafter to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the above-described appropriate unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 6. By the foregoing, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.1° 'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." "In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read - "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 'RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in this case, it is recommended that Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Retail Clerks Union , Local 807, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of employment , and other terms and conditions of employment . The appropriate unit is: All full-time and regular part-time employees of I. M. Jaffe and Sons, d/b/a Lahey' s, Muskegon, Michigan, including all sales employees , markers, alterations employees, and janitors, but excluding professional employees, office clerical employees, guards and all supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request bargain collectively with Retail Clerks Union , Local 807, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit and embody any understanding reached in a signed contract. (b) Post at its store in Muskegon , Michigan, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix ."' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7 , after being duly signed by an authorized representative , shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all our employees in the appropriate unit described below. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with the Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of all our employees in the appropriate unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an agreement is reached, embody such understanding in a signed contract. The appropriate unit is. All full-time and regular part-time employees of I. M. Jaffe and Sons, d/b/a Lahey's, Muskegon, Michigan, including all sales employees, markers, alterations employees, and janitors, but excluding professional employees, office clerical employees, guards and all supervisors as defined in the Act. Dated By (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 500 Book Building, 1249 Washington Boulevard, Detroit, Michigan 48226, Telephone 313-226-3200