190 NLRB 133

Restaurant Association of the State of Washington, Inc.

Last amended: 1971Year: 1971Length: 10,044 wordsOfficial source
RESTAURANT ASSN. OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON Restaurant Association of the State of Washington, Inc., Pierce County Chapter, and its Member- Employers, Air Port Cafe, Holiday Inn, Pantry Caf- eteria Inc., Lee Restaurant, Steve's Gay Nineties, Brad's Restaurant, Busch's Round Table, Richards Restaurant, Cliff House, Top of Ocean, Winthrop, Cedar Inn, Zarelli's, Black Angus, Browne's, Flitter Inn, Galley West, Sherwood Inn, Western R, White Cap, Barcotts Seafood and Local Joint Executive Board of Tacoma, Washington; Hotel & Restaurant & Motel Employees, Local #61; and Bartenders Union Local #711. Case 19-CA-4477 April 27, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS On September 10, 1970, Trial Examiner Maurice Alexandre issued his Decision in the above-entitled case, finding that Respondents had engaged in certain unfair labor practices with the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondents filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a sup- porting brief.' The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex- aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi- cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Re- spondents, Restaurant Association of the State of Washington, Inc., Pierce County Chapter, and its member-employers, Air Port Cafe, Holiday Inn, Pan- ' Respondents have requested that the record be reopened to receive certain exhibits and testimony regarding business reasons for failure to reinstate certain employees Inasmuch as the exhibits constitute a reitera- tion of evidence already in the record and since the settlement agreement constituted a waiver of such business defenses, Respondent' s request is hereby denied ' In adopting the Trial Examiner's 8(a)(3) and (1) finding predicated upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel, we rely on the fact that the breach went to the very heart of the strike settlement agreement and involved one of its principal terms, pursuant to which about 95 percent of the Respond- ent's employees abandoned the strike and returned to work 133 try Cafeteria Inc., Lee Restaurant, Steve's Gay Nine- ties, Brad's Restaurant, Busch's Round Table, Rich- ards Restaurant, Cliff House, Top of Ocean, Winthrop, Cedar Inn, Zarelli's, Black Angus, Browne's, Flitter Inn, Galley West, Sherwood Inn, Western R, White Cap, Barcotts Seafood, their officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order. CHAIRMAN MILLER, concurring in result: Like my colleagues, I conclude that Respondents violated Section.8(a)(5) by refusing to sign the agreed collective-bargaining contract. But in my view, it is immaterial whether Respondents refused to sign be- cause of the Union's asserted breach of the strike settle- ment agreement, or because they hoped to induce with- drawal of the August 22 unfair labor practice charges, or for other reasons. Examination of the record satisfies me that the Union complied substantially with the con- ditions precedent to execution of the contract, and may compel signature by Respondents. That is especially true in light of the fact that the Union's president set aside all fines, thus nullifying any possible questionable conduct by local union officers which might be said to have breached the spirit if not the letter of the condi- tions regarding union discipline of nonstrikers. There is venerable precedent to support a finding of violation under these circumstances' without regard to whether the strike settlement also compelled Respondents to execute the new collective-bargaining contract. I have great difficulty, however, with the majority's conclusion which finds 8(a)(3) and (1) violations predi- cated upon the principle of equitable estoppel and or- ders reinstatement of replaced economic strikers based thereon. The danger of that finding is that it may be construed as precedent for the proposition that a refusal to reinstate any economic striker violates our Act merely because it violates a strike settlement agree- ment. That is clearly not the law. I concur in the result, nevertheless, because the record persuades me that Respondents repudiated the essence of their strike settlement agreement by not rein- stating all strikers. That, as the majority finds, went to the very heart of the settlement agreement and, in my view, is a violation of Section 8(a)(5) since it is tan- tamount to total repudiation of a collective-bargaining agreement.4 On such a conclusion, there is precedent in our deci- sions under Section 8(a)(5) for requiring a party who thus repudiates the essence of his collective-bargaining agreement to cease so doing and to honor the agree- ment he made. I H. J Heinz Co. v NIL R B, 311 U S 514 (1941), Beverage-Air Co., 164 NLRB 1127. ' Cf Retail Clerks v Lion Dry Goods, Inc, 369 U S 17 (1962) 190 NLRB No. 27 134 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION MAURICE ALEXANDRE, Trial Examiner: This case was heard in Tacoma, Washington, on April 13 and 14, 1970, upon a complaint issued on February 26, 1970,' alleging that Respondents had violated Section 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. In their answer, Respondents denied commission of the unfair labor practices alleged. Upon the entire record, my observation of the witnesses, and the memoranda filed by the General Counsel and the Respondents, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS' 1. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Sequence of Events Respondent Restaurants are engaged in business in and around Tacoma, Washington, and are members of Respond- ent Association, which inter alia represents its member- employers in matters of collective bargaining. In 1966, Re- spondent Association on behalf of its members and the Charging Unions entered into a collective-bargaining con- tract covering the employees in the following unit: All cooks, bartenders, kitchen helpers, pantry workers, cafeteria workers, bus boys, waitresses, and maids, em- ployed by member-employers of the Restaurant Associa- tion, excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.' On June 12, 1969,' during negotiations for renewal of the contract, the Charging Unions called an economic strike and established picket lines. On June 13, Respondent Association commenced an action for over $2,500,000 against the Charg- ing Unions, alleging a breach of the "no-strike" clause in the 1966 contract. During the strike, negotiations were conducted in an at- tempt to resolve the dispute. On August 8, the negotiating committees for the disputants executed a strike settlement agreement which was ratified by the members of Respondent Association on August 10, and by the members of Local 61 and Local 711 on August 13. Among other things, the agree- ment provided that all the strikers would be restored to their jobs; that none of the officers of the Charging Unions would file disciplinary charges against any employee-members who had worked behind the picket lines; and that the disputants, after making certain changes in the 1966 collective-bargain- ing contract, would extend the contract to June 1, 1972. Thereafter, approximately 1,000 strikers returned to work. However, 50 strikers employed by the 21 Respondent Restau- rants were not reinstated,' and the initial unfair labor practice charge herein was filed. The parties stipulated that the 50 strikers had made unconditional applications for reinstate- ment as provided in the strike settlement agreement, and Based on an original and an amended charge filed respectively on Au- gust 22 and October 23, 1969, by Local Joint Executive Board of Tacoma, Washington, and its affiliated local unions: Hotel & Restaurant & Motel Employees, local 61, and Bartenders Union, Local 711. No issue of commerce is presented. The complaint alleged and the answer admitted facts which, I find, establish that the Respondents are employers engaged in operations which affect commerce within the meaning of the Act. I further find that the Charging Unions are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act. The complaint alleged, the answer admitted, and I find that the said unit is an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the mean- ing of the Act. All dates referred to hereafter relate to 1969 unless otherwise stated. See Appendix A. either that they were permanently replaced or that their jobs were eliminated. Sometime between September 1 and 15, the board of direc- tors of Respondent Association met, at which time some members expressed the opinion that officers of the Charging Unions had breached the settlement agreement by filing the unfair labor practice charge herein, and by encouraging no- nofficers to file disciplinary charges. A consensus was reached that Respondent Association should not execute a renewal collective-bargaining contract until the breaches of the agree- ment had ceased and all the charges had been dismissed. On October 2, representatives of the disputants met and agreed on the language of a renewal collective-bargaining contract. The parties in effect stipulated that the obligations contained in the strike settlement agreement were a part of the consider- ation for the renewal contract.' Despite the oral agreement, the representatives of Re- spondent Association stated that they would not execute the renewal contract until all the charges had been dismissed. The amended charge and the complaint herein followed. B. Allegations of the Complaint and Respondents' Defenses The complaint alleges that under the strike settlement agreement between the Charging Unions and the Respondent Association, the latter was required to execute the renewal collective-bargaining contract agreed to by their representa- tives, and that the 21 Respondent Restaurants were required to reinstate the 50 strikers; that the Charging Unions re- quested the Respondent Association to execute the renewal contract on or about August 14; that since that time the Association has refused to execute such agreement on behalf of itself and its employer-members, and that Respondents have thus refused to bargain with the Unions in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act; that since on or about August 16, the 21 named Respondent Restaurants have refused to reinstate the 50 strikers, following their uncondi- tional request for reinstatement, because such employees had engaged in protected activity; and that the said Respondent Restaurants have thus violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Respondents' defenses are as follows: 1. The strike settlement agreed is not binding upon Re- spondents because the Charging Unions negotiated the agree- ment in bad faith and because there was no true meeting of the minds. 6 On direct examination, the General Counsel asked the following lead- ing question, and Joinette, one of the Unions' representatives, testified as follows: Q. [By Mr. McIntyre] Now, does Joint Exhibit 3 [the renewal con- tract], with the exception of the wage scale and the difference of a couple of words in the preamble of the contract , constitute anything different than the strike settlement agreement plus the 1966 contract? A. This, with the exception of the wages, this contract here [indicat- ing] is identically the same as the 1966. Counsel for Respondents stated that "as Mr. McIntyre and I were both saying before, [Joint Exhibit] No. 3 is really Joint Exhibits I and 2 com- bined." (Joint Exhibits 1 and 2 are the 1966 contract and the strike settle- ment agreement, respectively.) In addition, the General Counsel stated at the hearing that "if there is no strike settlement , then there is no case," i.e. that Respondent Association is not required to execute the renewal con- tract. And Counsel for Respondents stated that if the settlement agreement is a valid and binding contract, Respondent Association is "under an obliga- tion to execute Joint Exhibit 3." The Act requires the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached. Community Market, Inc., 179 NLRB No. 2. If the renewal contract which was orally agreed to had not been dependent upon the settlement agreement, it would have been unnecessary for the General Counsel to ask the question and make the statement quoted above. RESTAURANT ASSN. OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 2. Even if the agreement was binding, it was breached by the Unions, and Respondents were accordingly excused from any further obligation to perform the agreement. 3. Even if Respondents were obligated to perform the agreement, they have not waived their right to assert as a defense the replacement of any of the 50 strikers or the elimi- nation of any of the jobs which they had occupied. 4. In any event, there is no evidence to show that the refusal to reinstate the 50 strikers was discriminatory. For the reasons noted below, I find that Respondents vi- olated the Act. C. Analysis It is undisputed that although they had orally agreed thereto, Respondents' representatives refused to execute a renewal collective-bargaining contract consisting of the strike settlement agreement and the 1966 contract with certain modifications. Such refusal constituted an unfair labor prac- tice (Community Market, Inc., 179 NLRB No. 2), unless there is merit to any of Respondents' defenses relating to the strike settlement agreement. With respect to the 50 strikers herein, it is undisputed that they participated in a lawful economic strike,' that they made timely and unconditional applications for reinstatement, and that the 21 Respondent Restaurants rejected such applica- tions. However, since it is also undisputed that the strikers were replaced or their jobs abolished, they were not entitled to immediate reinstatement (N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333; N.L.R.B. v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375), unless they acquired a right thereto by reason of the strike-settlement agreement. Accordingly, the legality of the refusal to reinstate must be considered in the light of Respondents' defenses relating to the strike-settle- ment agreement. Such defenses are discussed immediately below. 1. The defense that the strike-settlement agreement is not binding a. The evidence The principal strike settlement negotiators for the dispu- tants were Lester J. Green, International representative and vice-president of the Charging Unions, and Thomas S. McCulloch, a labor negotiator retained by Respondent As- sociation. On August 8, the negotiating committees for the Charging Unions and for the Association met at McCulloch's office and were housed in separate rooms while Green and McCulloch conferred and reported back to their respective committees from time to time. During their negotiations, McCulloch informed Green that Association members had promised employees who had worked behind the picket lines that they would not sign a settlement agreement which failed to protect the employees from reprisals, and requested Green to accept a provision similar to that agreed upon in settling a strike in Seattle, prohibiting the filing of disciplinary charges by any member of the Charing Unions against a member who worked behind the picket lines. Green pointed out that the International constitution of the Charging Unions guaranteed to all mem- bers the right to file disciplinary charges against other mem- bers, and stated that this right could not be abridged by contract. Green testified that he further stated that the offic- ers could not refuse to accept charges filed by members, but that he could agree that the officers would not "have any part ' At the hearing, Respondents disavowed any claim that the strike was unlawful 135 of filing any charges or anything to do with them." McCul- loch testified that he and Green did not discuss the subject of preparation of charges by officers on behalf of members, and that they did not talk about whether or not officers should be permitted to encourage members to file charges. According to Green, during the course of the negotiations, he told the union officers that "they would not actively participate in the filing of charges."' Green and McCulloch reached tentative agreement on a strike settlement which, among other things, provided as follows: All employees involved in the dispute are to return to work and be reemployed by the Employers at the classifi- cation of employment worked prior to the labor dispute. All employees are to be called by the Employer for re- turn to work within (48) forty-eight hours after the agreement has been approved by the members of the Union. It is agreed that the employees shall have (7) seven days from the date of the approval of the agree- ment to present themselves for reemployment. No discrimination, disciplinary action, demotion or discharge, etc. of employees shall result because of the said labor dispute. The Union agrees that none of the officers of the Local Joint Executive Board and its affiliated unions, Local 61 and 711 , will file charges against any members who worked behind a picket line during the labor dispute effective August 8, 1969. The parties to this agreement mutually agree to waive any and all civil claims, if any, which either party may have against the other arising out of or connected with the labor dispute. All pending suits or legal proceedings between the parties, if any, arising out of or connected with the dispute shall be forthwith dismissed with preju- dice. The Association and the Union agree to withdraw any charges that may be filed against each other with the National Labor Relations Board arising out of or con- nected with the labor dispute. In addition, the agreement provided that the signers thereof would recommend certain wage increases to the membership of their respective organizations, that certain changes would be made in the 1966 collective-bargaining contract, that the other provisions of such contract would be continued un- changed, and that such contract would be extended to June 1, 1972. Finally, the agreement provided that it was subject to approval by the membership of Respondent Association and of the Charging Unions. Green testified that after he reached agreement with McCulloch, no issues were left undecided, and that the ex- ecuted strike-settlement a reement was "the full and com- plete understanding that [he] and Mr. McCulloch were to present to [their] respective groups." Green and McCulloch then presented the proposal to their respective negotiating committees with a favorable recom- mendation. The record does not disclose exactly what Green told his committee. McCulloch testified that he could not recall any discussion, during his presentation to Respondents' negotiating team, concerning refraint by officers from prepar- ing charges or from encouraging nonofficers to file charges. He did recall discussion to the effect that "the officers would have nothing to do with charges," except that if a Union member "insisted on filing a charge," the officers "would When asked to define the term `actively participate," Green testified- "Preparing them and questioning the members as to their wishes and desires and things like that " He further testified that he did not discuss with the officers the matter of their encouraging members to file charges, but that it was his opinion that they would not engage in such encouragement. 136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD have to receive it and process it." Anderson, then president of Respondent Association and a member of Respondents' negotiating team, testified as follows: .In further discussions I believe Mr. McCulloch talked to Mr. Green again, I couldn't say for sure, came back and, the agreement as I understood it, from what Mr. McCulloch told me, that the unions could not give us complete no reprisal clause because of their bylaws, but this would be the wording in the agreement with the understanding that the union officers would not file charges, would not encourage charges, but would dis- courage filing of charges by their members and if there were charges brought by members of the union, that the union officers would do everything possible to, shall we say, clear up or strike these charges. And that if they could not do that, if it went through all the channels, that eventually it could be appealed to the international president at which spot the charges would be taken care of in favor of the person in charge. The members of the negotiating teams for Respondents and the Charging Unions executed the strike-settlement agreement on the same day, August 8. On August 10 a meet- ing of employer-members of Respondent Association was held and the agreement was ratified. McCulloch testified that he explained the reasons for the language in the provision prohibiting Union officers from filing disciplinary charges, and that it was understood that Union officers would take no part in filing such charges. Anderson testified that he pre- sented the proposal to the Association membership, that the members objected to the said provision as written, and that he made the following explanation to them: And I told them the same basic thing, that Mr. McCulloch told me, that it was impossible to take away the rights of the members to file charges against a mem- ber because of their bylaws and that was the reason that this was worded the way that it is. But, that they could rest assured that if there were charges brought against people, that during the course of their appeals, et cetera, that they would be eventually dropped, taken care of. Q. What did you tell your membership regarding the role that the officers of the union would play insofar as these reprisals were concerned? A. The same, that they would not file charges, they would not encourage changes, but would actually dis- courage the filing of charges by their members. At several meetings on August 13, the membership of the Charging Unions ratified the agreement. Green testified that he presented the agreement to the members; and that because many members were unfamiliar with the procedures set forth in the Union constitution, he advised them that "they had the benefit of the services of the clerical staff and headquarters who in turn would asist them with the proper wording of the charge that they wanted to initiate." However, he testified that he did not state that the officers would "help" them file charges. b. Concluding findings Respondents have identified, and I am aware of, no evi- dence supporting their claim that the Charging Unions nego- tiated the strike-settlement agreement in bad faith. That the Unions later breached the agreement does not establish that they never intended to abide by its provisions, or serve as a basis for treating the agreement as a nullity. I further find that Respondents have failed to sustain their contention that a binding settlement agreement never arose because the contracting parties did not have a meeting of the minds. Although not entirely clear, Respondents' supporting argument appears to be that they ratified the settlement agreement in the belief that it prohibited Union officers from encouraging the filing of disciplinary charges by nonofficers, and in the further belief that there was a private understand- ing with the Unions that their officers would discourage such filing and that the Unions would dismiss any charge filed; that the Charging Unions, on the other hand, merely voted on the agreement as written; and hence in ratifying the agreement, the Unions and Respondents "were not dealing with the same problem." (Resp. brief 4.) This argument is without merit. Unquestionably, the set- tlement agreement impliedly prohibited Union officers from encouraging others to file charges, since it cannot be inter- preted as permitting them to do by indirection what it ex- pressly forbade. I find nothing in the record which even sug- gests that there was any misunderstanding in this regard. As for the asserted private understanding, Respondents do not and indeed cannot properly contend that it existed.' Their claim is that their membership ratified the settlement agree- ment in the mistaken belief that there was such a private understanding. This argument overlooks the fact that Re- spondents' mistaken belief resulted either from a misrepre- sentation by McCulloch to Anderson which the latter inno- cently transmitted to the Association members, or from a misrepresentation by Anderson directly to the membership. There is not a shred of evidence to show that there was any mention of a private understanding during the negotiations between McCulloch and Green. Nor does the record establish that McCulloch told Repondents' negotiating team that he and Green had the private understanding in question. Al- though Anderson attributed to McCulloch a statement that there was a private understanding, Anderson was admittedly unsure of his recollection and, in any event, did not testify that McCulloch's statement was made to the negotiating team. His testimony was that it was made to him personally. There is thus no basis for a finding that at the time they executed the settlement agreement, Respondents' negotiating team was under any misapprehension regarding the matter of officer discouragement of charges and their disposition if filed. If, thereafter, the Association members ratified the agreement because of a misstatement by McCulloch or An- derson, and without fault or knowledge on the part of the Charging Unions, this did not prevent a valid and binding settlement agreement from coming into existence. Cf. Homer Gale, et al., 176 NLRB No. 147.1° ' Green testified without contradiction that the executed settlement agreement contained the entire understanding reached with McCulloch. 10 In their brief, Respondents rely on certain letters, dated September 9, 1969, and February 19, 1970, and signed by Miller, the Charging Unions' general president, in which he dismissed the disciplinary charges filed against several union members who had worked behind the picket line. However, Respondents do not explain how these letters support their con- tention that a binding settlement agreement did not come into existence. The letter of September 9, addressed to President Passanante of Local 711, stated that Miller was dismissing the disciplinary charges against cer- tain employees because, among other things, the charges violated the no- reprisal clause of the settlement agreement. But since, as the letter also reveals, such charges were filed by President Passanante himself, it is appar- ent that Miller's action was entirely consistent with the provisions of the settlement agreement as executed. Moreover, in a letter dated October 20, 1969, and addressed to Local 61 (a copy of which was apparently sent Local 711), Miller stated that disciplinary charges filed by nonofficers should take their normal course. Although his letter of February 19, 1970, suggests that Miller may have changed his mind, this shows only a belief on the part of Miller that there had been a breach of the settlement agreement, not that there was no binding agreement. Thus, Miller's letters, if anything, militate against Respondents' contention. RESTAURANT ASSN OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 2. The defense that Respondents were excused from further performance of the settlement agreement because of material breach thereof by the Charging Unions a. The evidence (1) The disciplinary charges The parties stipulated that one disciplinary charge was filed by a nonofficer member of Local 711 on August 13, that three such charges were filed on August 14, and that no action had been taken in connection with those charges. The parties further stipulated that a total of 92 disciplinary charges were filed against members of Local 61; that all were filed by nonofficer members; that about 16 of such charges were filed on July 28, i.e. before the strike-settlement agree- ment; that about 32 of the charges were filed between August 8 and 13; and that the balance (about 44) of the charges were filed between August 18 and 31. Land, a business agent for Local 61 and one of the signers of the stnke-settlement agree- ment, testified that on August 12 one Stillwell and three other Local members came to the Union office to file disciplinary charges; that Land helped them by suggesting the wording to be used; that when the approximately 22 charges were typed subsequent to that date, Land informed Stillwell by telephone that the charges were ready for signature; and that the changes were signed and filed. The record does not show precisely how many members of Local 61 were found guilty as charged. According to Joinette, the secretary-treasurer of Loca 61, only a few were found not guilty. On appeal by approximately six members, the penalties imposed upon them were set aside by General President Miller on the ground that the charges violated the settlement agreement. (2) The Kerrigan columns During the period from August 15 through November 7, six issues of the Tacoma Labor Advocate, a local newspaper, included columns over the byline of one Stu Kerrigan, an officer of the Charging Unions. In his column of August 15, Kerrigan stated that he had been asked by several nonofficer members of Local 61 and Local 711 regarding their right to file disciplinary charges, and he cited the provision of the International bylaws granting that right. The August 29 col- umn reported on the punishments given to a number of mem- bers who had worked behind the picket lines and stated that additional charges by nonofficer members would be forth- coming. The column of September 19 criticized the action of General President Miller in reversing his earlier decision to punish several members who worked behind the picket line. The column of October 10 reported that the members would discuss Miller's action at a forthcoming meeting and would decide whether they could be deprived of their consti- tutional rights, particularly in view of the fact that they had ratified the strike-settlement agreement after reassurances that nonofficer members "could most certainly file charges with the secretary of their respective Unions against those `scabs' that worked behind the picket lines." The column in effect urged members to not give up without a fight and to come to the meeting. In his October 31 column, after report- ing that Miller had stated that members would not be de- prived of their constitutional right to file charges, Kerrigan stated: Any other members who wish to file charges against the turncoats may do so at our union office or write them out and present them to Secretary Elmer Holbrook at our next meeting, Sunday, Nov. 9.... 137 The November 31 column contained similar language. (3) Respondent's refusals to continue further performance of the settlement agreement The strike-settlement agreement provided that Respondent Restaurants were required to recall the strikers to their jobs within 48 hours after the settlement agreement was ratified by the Unions, and that the strikers were to report for work within 7 days after such ratification. Since the date of Union ratification was August 13, the strikers were required to re- port for duty on or before August 20. The record establishes that the 50 strikers presented themselves within the required time, but does not disclose the exact date or dates when they did so. Accordingly, the refusal to reinstate them by the 21 Respondent Restaurants must have taken place on or before August 20. The former president of Respondent Association, Ander- son, testified that although he had been aware of the filing of the initial unfair labor practice charge herein and of the disci- plinary charges against Union members who worked behind the picket lines," he could not recall having discussed these matters with the Unions in late August or early September. However, he further testified that sometime between Septem- ber 1 and 15, Respondent Association's board held two meet- ings; that the 12 board members were present, including An- derson and Norma Tien, who succeeded him as president of Respondent Association sometime during the first part of September; and that it was the consensus of those present that the Association members should not sign a renewal collec- tive-bargaining contract with the Charging Unions for the following reasons: Q. What was discussed regarding, what did you say regarding the charges both NLRB charges and reprisal? What was the discussion regarding these two? A. There was much discussion. I know the gist of the conversation was that the unions were not living up to their agreement by filing charges. We were of the opinion that the union officials were encouraging the charges in direct violation and we felt that they were breaking the agreement. TRIAL EXAMINER This was said at those meetings? THE WITNESS: Yes. TRIAL EXAMINER Who said it? THE WITNESS I couldn't say. It was just conversa- tion. I know it was discussed. I probably said it myself. Q. (By Mr. Cohan) This is what you were-do you recall having said this at these meetings? A. I know I have said it, yes. Q. At the meetings? A. Yes. Q. And did the board come to any conclusion regard- ing the signing of any overall contract as a result of these violations? A. At that state of the game, the decision was that we would not sign the contract till such time as the viola- tions were stopped and that the charges that had been brought were dismissed. On further interrogation, Anderson testified as follows: TRIAL EXAMINER I am a little bit puzzled by some- thing. You testified that at some Association meeting you took the position that there had been a breach of a strike-settlement agreement by the union and therefore you decided that you would not sign the collective-bar- gaining agreement , is that right? " On cross-examination , Anderson was unable to furnish any details regarding such disciplinary charges 138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD THE WITNESS: No, I wouldn's say that it was officially decided. It was the feeling of the group that we should not sign the contract, but it was never, shall we say, put on the floor and voted upon. TRIAL EXAMINER: It was a consensus? THE WITNESS: A consensus. TRIAL EXAMINER: What was the basis for this feeling of the group that the union had violated the strike-settle- ment agreement? THE WITNESS: Because of NLRB charges and the fact that there were charges being brought against union members. TRIAL EXAMINER: What evidence would the group have of these charges against union members at that time? THE WITNESS: If my memory doesn't fail me, I believe we had copies of documents from these people being notified they were being charged. I would have to go back to my records. On October 2, representatives of the Charging Unions and of Respondent Association met to discuss the language of a renewal collective-bargaining contract. When they had set- tled all differences, Tien, one of the Association representa- tives, stated that the Unions were not complying with the terms of the strike-settlement agreement, and that the As- sociation would not sign the renewal collective-bargaining contract until the disciplinary charges and the unfair labor practice charges had been dismissed. b. Concluding findings Respondents assert that the Unions breached the strike- settlement agreement in three respects. First, they contend that by filing unfair labor practice charges herein, the Union breached the provision of the settlement agreement requiring the contracting parties to "withdraw any charges that may be filed against each other" with the Board connected with their labor dispute. I do not believe that that provision prohibited the subsequent filing of any unfair labor practice charges against each other in connection with their labor dispute. If the contracting parties meant to prohibit the filing of such charges, a provision requiring them to "withdraw" charges was an odd way to say so. In addition, I find it difficult to believe that they would give each other carte blandhe to commit unfair labor practices subsequent to the settlement agreement with impunity. Rather, I am of the opinion that the provision required the contracting parties to withdraw any unfair labor practices then pending. This conclusion is buttressed by Respondents' admission in their brief (p. 2) that the Unions had filed an earlier unfair labor practice charge on July 24 alleging that Respondent Association had failed to bargain in good faith. The contention is without merit. Respondents next contend that the disciplinary charges filed by nonofficer Union members violated the provision of the settlement agreement prohibiting "discrimination, disci- plinary action, demotion or discharge, etc. of employees" as a result of the labor dispute. This contention is similarly without merit. For one thing, the said provision refers to reprisals against "employees' and prohibits only reprisals which affect employment status. Moreover, it is clear from the record that Respondents knew that the Unions could not enter into an agreement prohibiting nonofficers from filing disciplinary charges, and accepted the Unions' offer to in- clude in the strike-settlement agreement a provision which forbade only officers from filing such charges. There is no warrant for concluding that a prohibition which the parties expressly reject may nevertheless be found in the agreement. I therefore find that the no-discrimination provision relied on by Respondents prohibited reprisals by Respondents, that it did not apply to intraunion disciplinary charges, and that the filing of such charges by nonofficers did not breach the agree- ment.'Z The third breach asserted by Respondents involves con- duct by Land and Kerrigan, officers of Locals 61 and 711, respectively. Land helped several nonofficer Union members to file disciplinary charges on August 12, i.e. 2 days after Respondents ratified the strikesettlement agreement, but 1 day before its ratification by the Unions. If such conduct was not technically a breach because the agreement was not yet binding, it undoubtedly violated the spirit of the tentative agreement already reached. That agreement required neutral- ity by Union officers. Land's assistance in the filing of charges constituted a departure from neutrality. Kerrigan's conduct consisted of writing certain columns which appeared under his byline in a Tacoma newspaper during the period from August 15 through November 7. Respondents contend in their brief (p. 7) that "[a]ll of the articles were inflamatory and indicate that the officers were doing a great deal to encourage the filing of charges." Specifi- cally, Respondents point to the columns published on Octo- ber 10, October 31, and November 7. The columns published on August 15, August 29, and September 19 contain only factual reports, and I find little in them which can be considered a breach of the agreement by the Unions. Perhaps Respondents share this view since their brief quotes only the material in the three later columns. It might perhaps be argued that the mere mention of discipli- nary charges in the three earlier columns served as a reminder and thus operated to encourage the filing of such charges. But I do not believe that the settlement agreement imposed on Union officers an obligation to refrain from all mention of disciplinary charges, including straight factual reporting. There is, however, no doubt and I find that the columns published on October 10, October 31, and November 7 clearly breached the settlement agreement by encouraging the filing of disciplinary charges." Respondents contend that under well-recognized princi- ples of contract law, the breach of the settlement agreement by the Unions excused Respondents from further perform- ance of their obligation under the agreement. It may be that if the Unions brought suit against Respondents for breach of the agreement, Respondents could plead the Unions' breach as a defense. But technical rules of contract law are not necessarily controlling in cases arising under the Act" and, I find, should not be applied here for several reasons. Although Respondents seek to create the impression that they refused to continue performance of the agreement be- cause of the Unions' breach, the record does not so establish. As noted, Respondents refused to reinstate the 50 strikers on or before August 20, decided not to sign the renewal collec- tive-bargaining contract sometime between September 1 and 15, and so informed the Unions on October 2. There is noth- ing to show that Respondents complained to the Unions about any breach prior to October 2. On the contrary, Ander- son testified that although he was aware of both the unfair " A contrary conclusion is not required by President Miller's letter of February 19, 1970, dismissing certain disciplinary charges filed by nonoffic- ers (see fn. 10, supra). That letter shows that Miller believed, erroneously, that such charges violated the spirit of a wholly different provision, i.e. the section prohibiting disciplinary charges by officers . In this connection, I note that Miller had theretofore taken the position that charges by nonofficers should take their normal course. (ibid.) " It is of passing interest that these three columns did not result in additional disciplinary charges since, as the record shows, no charges were filed after August 31. F. W. Means & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 377 F. 2d 683 (C.A. 7); Lozano Enterprises v. N.L.R.B., 327 F. 2d 814 (C.A. 9). RESTAURANT ASSN OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON labor practice charge and the disciplinary charges, all of which he assertedly regarded as breaches of the settlement agreement, he could not recall having discussed them with the Unions. Such delay in remonstrating with the Unions raises doubt as to whether Respondents truly believed that the Unions had breached the settlement agreement. Such doubt is reinforced by the lack of evidence showing that Respondents knew of Land 's conduct at the time they refused to continue performing the agreement. Absent evi- dence from which it can at least be inferred that Respondents had timely knowledge of Land's conduct, I cannot conclude that such conduct played a part in Respondents' refusal fur- ther to perform the agreement . Moreover, as noted, the Ker- rigan columns published on August 15, August 29 , and Sep- tember 19 contained little to justify a conclusion by Respondents that the Unions had breached the agreement. And when the subsequent Kerrigan columns which did breach the agreement were published, Respondents had al- ready denied reinstatement to the 50 strikers and had decided not to renew the collective-bargaining contract. On this record, I find that Respondents, for reasons best known to themselves, decided to discontinue further perform- ance of the settlement agreement; that their decision was not motivated by the Unions' subsequent breach; but that Re- spondents have seized on that breach as an excuse for their own breach." In such circumstances , I further find that tech- nical principles of contract law are not dispositive of the problem, and that the validity under the Act of Respondents' refusals to reinstate the 50 strikers and to execute the renewal contract should be decided without regard to the Unions' subsequent breach of the settlement agreement . Such breach, although not to be condoned , should not be used to deprive Respondents' employees of their right to the benefits of the renewal contract which was orally agreed to, or to deprive the 50 strikers of whatever reinstatement rights of the Act affords to them . Cf. Confectionary and Tobacco Drivers and Ware- housemen 's Union, Local 805 v. N.L.R. B., 312 F. 2d 108 (C.A. 2). i6 3. The defense of replacement and/or job elimination As noted, the parties stipulated at the hearing that the 50 strikers had been replaced or that their jobs had been elimi- nated. Ordinarily, where strikers have been replaced or their jobs have been eliminated, the employer is not obligated to give them immediate reinstatement upon their application therefor. N. L. N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., supra, 304 U.S. 333, supra; N.L.R.B. V. Fleetwood Trailer Co., supra, 389 U.S. 375, supra, but this is not an ordinary case. For here Respondent Restaurants contracted to reinstate all the strik- ers. Nothing in the strike-settlement agreement suggests, and Respondents do not contend, that the reinstatement provi- sions thereof excluded any of the strikers. " Perhaps the 21 Respondent Restaurants did not approve of the settle- ment agreement and wished to avoid its provisions relating to reinstatment of strikers. Possibly, Respondents hoped to exert pressure on the Unions to dismiss the disciplinary charges filed by nonofficers There may be other reasons for Respondents refusal to continue performing the agreement " The Unions will not necessarily profit form their own breach of the settlement agreement For one thing, the courts may refuse to enforce a Union fine imposed pursuant to a disciplinary charge filed in breach of the settlement agreement. In addition, the imposition of such a fine might con- ceivably constitute an unfair labor practice under the doctrine of N.LR B. v Allis-Chalmers Mfg Co., 388 U S. 175 and Scofield v. N.LR B., 394 U.S 423 139 The stipulation does not state when Respondent Restau- rants replaced the 50 strikers or eliminated their jobs. Al- though I am inclined to believe that these events took place before the settlement agreement," it is unnecessary to resolve that question. If these events occurred after the settlement agreement was ratified, then the strikers' jobs were still open at the time of ratification. If, on the other hand, the said events took place before the settlement agreement, the mem- bers of Respondent Association, at their meeting on August 10, nevertheless accepted the settlement agreement with knowledge, actual or attributable to them, that the strikers had been replaced or their jobs eliminated." Irrespective of the time of the replacement and job elimination, the record fails to disclose a legitimate business reason for the refusal by Respondent Restaurants to abide by their agreement to rein- state the 50 strikers. In such circumstances, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies, and Respondent Restaurants are "estopped to renege on [their] agreement." Beverage-Air Co., 164 NLRB 1127, 1155-1156. Accordingly, Respondents must be deemed to have waived the defense of reinstatement and job elimination." D. Concluding Findings 1. Discrimination In Lamb-Weston, Inc., 170 NLRB No. 186, the Board stated: It is well established that economic strikers are enti- tled, upon unconditional application, to be reinstated to their former or substantially equivalent positions, unless some valid reason is established for denying them rein- statement. The burden of proving such valid reason is on the employer.' Thus, in a recent opinion' involving the reinstatement rights of economic strikers the Supreme Court stated that: If, after conclusion of the strike, the employer refuses to reinstate striking employees, the effect is to discourage employees from exercising their rights to organize and to strike guaranteed by Sec- tion 7 and 13 of the Act ... Under Section 8(a)(1) and (3) ... it is unfair labor practice [sic] to inter- fere with the exercise of these rights. Accordingly, unless the employer who refused to reinstate strik- ers can show that his action was due to "legitimate and substantial business justifications ," he is guilty of an unfair labor practice. N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967). The burden of proving justification is on the employer. Ibid.... [Emphasis added by the Board.] ' Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (December 18, 1967) ' Ibid. at p 378 The Board further stated (fn. 8): Contrary to Respondent's contention, "proof of antiun- ion motivation is unnecessary when the employer's con- duct 'could have adversely affected employee rights to "Respondents stated in a preheanng stipulation received in evidence that "all the employees named in the complaint were economic strikers and were permanently [re]placed [sic] during the course of the strike " `i In view of such knowledge, the settlement agreement must be regarded as a voluntary commitment to restore the abolished jobs. " The decision in N.L.R.B. v Confectionary and Tobacco Drivers and Warehousemen 's Union, Local 805, 312 F 2d 108 (C A 2), on which Re- spondents rely, is distinguishable There, the employer merely condoned the misconduct of strikers, thereby waiving only his right to refuse to reinstate them on the ground of their misconduct He did not waive that right based on other reasons such as replacement Here, Respondents expressly agreed to reinstate all the strikers, including the 50 in question , thereby waiving the right to refuse reinstatement 140 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD some extent' and when the employer does not meet his burden of establishing `that he was motivated by legiti- mate objectives.' " Fleetwood Trailer Co., supra, citing Great Dane Trailers, supra. [Emphasis added by the Board.] Applying these principles here, I find that Respondents have failed to sustain their burden of showing adequate jus- tification for the refusal to reinstate the 50 strikers. For, as found above, the defense of replacement and job elimination are not open to Respondents, and they have not established any other legitimate reason for the refusal to reinstate. Under such circumstances, proof of antiunion motive is unnecessary and, I find, the refusal by the Respondent Restaurants to reinstate the 50 strikers constituted discrimination violative of Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act. The discrimination is not negated by the fact, to which Respondents point, that approximately 1,000 other strikers were reinstated, Cf. Nach- man Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 337 F. 2d 421, 424 (C.A. 7). 2. Refusal to bargain The record does not support the General Counsel's conten- tion that Respondent Association refused to execute the renewal collective-bargaining contract as early as August 14. Indeed, the language of that contract was not finally for- mulated and agreed to until October 2. The record does show, however, that such refusal occurred on the latter date. As already noted, the parties agreed at the hearing that if Respondents were not obligated to perform the strike-settle- ment agreement, they were not required to execute the renewal contract and their refusal to do so was not an unfair labor practice; and conversely, if the settlement agreement was binding, they were obligated to execute the renewal con- tract. Since I have concluded that the settlement agreement was binding and that Respondents were not excused from performance thereof, I find that Respondents' refusal to exe- cute the renewal contract which they agreed to on October 2 violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Community Market, Inc., supra, 179 NLRB No. 2. II. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondents engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action necessary to remedy and remove the effects of the unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the Act. Affirmatively, I shall recommend that Respondents forth- with sign the renewal collective-bargaining contract which they and the Unions agreed to on October 2, 1969, and give retroactive effect to the terms and conditions of that contract. I shall further recommend that the Respondent Restau- rants offer to their respective employees named in Appendix A attached hereto immediate and full reinstatement to the positions which they held prior to the settlement agreement herein, or to substantially equivalent positions, without preju- dice to their seniority and other rights and privileges." I shall also recommend that the Respondent Restaurants make each of their respective employees named in Appendix A, attached hereto, whole for any loss of earnings or other employment benefits he may have suffered by reason of Re- spondents' failure to sign the renewal collective-bargaining '° If any of such positions were abolished subsequent to the ratification of the strike settlement agreement, the compliance stage of this proceeding is the appropriate time to litigate such questions as whether or not the abolition was for legitimate reasons and was permanent or temporary, and whether or not the discriminatees formerly occupying such jobs should be placed on a preferential hiring list. Quick Stop Markets, Inc., 168 NLRB No. 30. contract and for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against him, by paying to each a sum of money equal to that which would have been paid to him, had he been reinstated and had Respondents executed the renewal collec- tive-bargaining contract, as aforesaid, during the period from the date of the discrimination against him to the date on which he is offered reinstatement or the date on which Re- spondents execute the said renewal contract, whichever is later, less his net earnings, if any, during the said period. Since representatives of Respondent Association share responsibil- ity for the refusal to execute the renewal contract, I shall recommend that the Association be jointly and severally lia- ble with Respondent Restaurants for backpay liability arising out of such refusal to execute. Cf. Holme & Seifert, 102 NLRB 347, 375; Pacific American Shipowners Assn., 98 NLRB 582, 600-601. Backpay shall be computed and bear interest in accordance with F W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW A. By unlawfully refusing to execute the renewal collec- tive-bargaining contract which they orally agree to on Octo- ber 2, 1969, as found herein, Respondents engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. B. By unlawfully refusing to reinstate their respective em- ployees named in Appendix A, as found herein, Respondent Restaurants engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(3) and (1) of the Act. C. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Respondent, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: A. Cease and desist from: 1. Failing or refusing to sign the renewal collective-bar- gaining contract which they orally entered into on October 2, 1969, with the Joint Executive Board of Tacoma, Washing- ton, on behalf of its affiliated Locals, Hotel & Restaurant & Motel Employees, Local No. 61, and Bartenders Union, Lo- cal No. 711. 2. Unlawfully refusing to offer to their respective em- ployees named in Appendix A attached hereto immediate and full reinstatement, to the extent set forth in the section herein entitled "The Remedy," or otherwise unlawfully discriminat- ing in regard to their hire, tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment. 3. In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. B. Take the following affirmative action: 1. Forthwith sign the renewal contract described above. 2. Upon the execution of the aforesaid contract, give re- troactive effect to the provisions thereof. 3. To the extent set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy," offer to their respective employees named in Ap- pendix A immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, and make them whole for any loss of earnings by reason of the discrimination against them. 4. Make whole each of the employees named in Appendix A for any loss of earnings or other employment benefits he may have suffered by reason of Respondents' failure to exe- cute the renewal collective-bargaining contract, to the extent set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy." RESTAURANT ASSN OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 5. Notify their said employees, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selec- tive Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. 6. Preserve and make available to the Board or its agents on request, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due and the right of reinstatement under the terms of this Recommended Order. 7. Post at their respective restaurants in and around Tacoma, Washington, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."21 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19 shall, after being signed by Respondents' representatives, be posted by the Respond- ent Restaurants immediately upon receipt thereof and main- tained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicu- ous places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 8. Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision and Recommended Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.22 " In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations , and Recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes . In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " " In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respond- ents have taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX A Employees denied reinstatement and their respective Respondent Employers Employee Iona V. Whitefoot Gayle Wanda Smith Sim Bitonio Nellie Parker Patricia Hoerling Patricia L. League Roberta Canfield Gatha L. King Wanita Bottom Lois Morris Shirley McCallum Claudia Vermeulen Kenneth McCabe Martha Bengston Cora E. Scott Yoshie Eckhmart Yukie Steadman Donna Downs Respondent Employer Air Port Cafe Holiday Inn Holiday Inn Pantry Cafeteria Inc. Pantry Cafeteria Inc. Pantry Cafeteria Inc. Pantry Cafeteria Inc. Lee Restaurant Steve's Gay Nineties Steve's Gay Nineties Brad's Restaurant Busch's Round Table Busch's Round Table Richards Restaurant Cliff House Cliff House Cliff House Top of Ocean Warren Church Joanne Murray Donna J. Cummings Eula Yardbrough Ina White Cora von Berks Karoline Jensen Ellen Lengele Katheryn Ramsdell Beatrice Menge Amelia Bonwell Erma E. Peck Mabel Wagner Josie Wallace Robina Longmuir G. Jackson Robert A. Hall Dan Lucich Duane Lee Betty L. Essor Linda Felix Patty Godfrey Ward Dunn Paddy A. Haggard LaDona Schleif Lillian Irene Lavine Irene Krueger James Jay Jowett Dan Johnson Marianne Taylor Ella M. Perells Viola Baker Top of Ocean Top of Ocean Top of Ocean Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Winthrop Cedar Inn Zarelli's Black Angus Black Angus Browne's Flitter Inn Galley West Sherwood Inn Sherwood Inn Western R White Cap Barcotts Seafood 141 APPENDIX B NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government We hereby notify you that: WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to sign the collective-bar- gaining contract reached on October 2, 1969, by our representatives and Local Joint Executive Board of Tacoma, Washington, acting on behalf of its affiliated Locals: Hotel & Restaurant & Motel Employees, Local No. 61, and Bartenders Union, Local No. 711. WE WILL forthwith sign the above contract. WE WILL give retroactive effect to the terms and con- ditions of said contract. (Name of undersigned Respondent Restaurant) WILL offer to (Names of discriminatees employed by under- signed Respondent Restaurant) immediate and full rein- statement to (his)(her)(their) old job(s), with backpay, and WILL NOT unlawfully discriminate against the said employee(s) or any other striker. WE WILL pay the above-named employee(s) for all back earnings lost as a result of our failure to sign the above contract. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act. (NAME OF RESPONDENT RESTAURANT) (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) 142 Dated By DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, INC. (Employer) (Representative) (Title) Note: We will notify the above-named employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces. This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any- one. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Republic Building, Tenth Floor, 1511 Third Avenue, Seattle, Washing- ton 98101 Telephone 583-4532.
190 NLRB 133: Restaurant Association of the State of Washington, Inc. | Justis AI