190 NLRB 133
Restaurant Association of the State of Washington, Inc.
RESTAURANT ASSN. OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Restaurant Association of the State of Washington,
Inc., Pierce County Chapter, and its Member-
Employers, Air Port Cafe, Holiday Inn, Pantry Caf-
eteria Inc., Lee Restaurant, Steve's Gay Nineties,
Brad's Restaurant, Busch's Round Table, Richards
Restaurant, Cliff House, Top of Ocean, Winthrop,
Cedar Inn, Zarelli's, Black Angus, Browne's, Flitter
Inn, Galley West, Sherwood Inn, Western R, White
Cap, Barcotts Seafood and Local Joint Executive
Board of Tacoma, Washington; Hotel & Restaurant
& Motel Employees, Local #61; and Bartenders
Union Local #711. Case 19-CA-4477
April 27, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING,
BROWN, AND JENKINS
On September 10, 1970, Trial Examiner Maurice
Alexandre issued his Decision in the above-entitled
case, finding that Respondents had engaged in certain
unfair labor practices with the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending
that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondents filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a sup-
porting brief.'
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex-
aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi-
cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby
affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the
entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of
the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Re-
spondents, Restaurant Association of the State of
Washington, Inc., Pierce County Chapter, and its
member-employers, Air Port Cafe, Holiday Inn, Pan-
' Respondents have requested that the record be reopened to receive
certain exhibits and testimony regarding business reasons for failure to
reinstate certain employees Inasmuch as the exhibits constitute a reitera-
tion of evidence already in the record and since the settlement agreement
constituted a waiver of such business defenses, Respondent' s request is
hereby denied
' In adopting the Trial Examiner's 8(a)(3) and (1) finding predicated
upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel, we rely on the fact that the breach
went to the very heart of the strike settlement agreement and involved one
of its principal terms, pursuant to which about 95 percent of the Respond-
ent's employees abandoned the strike and returned to work
133
try Cafeteria Inc., Lee Restaurant, Steve's Gay Nine-
ties, Brad's Restaurant, Busch's Round Table, Rich-
ards Restaurant, Cliff House, Top of Ocean, Winthrop,
Cedar Inn, Zarelli's, Black Angus, Browne's, Flitter
Inn, Galley West, Sherwood Inn, Western R, White
Cap, Barcotts Seafood, their officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
CHAIRMAN MILLER, concurring in result:
Like my colleagues, I conclude that Respondents
violated Section.8(a)(5) by refusing to sign the agreed
collective-bargaining contract. But in my view, it is
immaterial whether Respondents refused to sign be-
cause of the Union's asserted breach of the strike settle-
ment agreement, or because they hoped to induce with-
drawal of the August 22 unfair labor practice charges,
or for other reasons. Examination of the record satisfies
me that the Union complied substantially with the con-
ditions precedent to execution of the contract, and may
compel signature by Respondents. That is especially
true in light of the fact that the Union's president set
aside all fines, thus nullifying any possible questionable
conduct by local union officers which might be said to
have breached the spirit if not the letter of the condi-
tions regarding union discipline of nonstrikers. There is
venerable precedent to support a finding of violation
under these circumstances' without regard to whether
the strike settlement also compelled Respondents to
execute the new collective-bargaining contract.
I have great difficulty, however, with the majority's
conclusion which finds 8(a)(3) and (1) violations predi-
cated upon the principle of equitable estoppel and or-
ders reinstatement of replaced economic strikers based
thereon. The danger of that finding is that it may be
construed as precedent for the proposition that a
refusal to reinstate any economic striker violates our
Act merely because it violates a strike settlement agree-
ment. That is clearly not the law.
I concur in the result, nevertheless, because the
record persuades me that Respondents repudiated the
essence of their strike settlement agreement by not rein-
stating all strikers. That, as the majority finds, went to
the very heart of the settlement agreement and, in my
view, is a violation of Section 8(a)(5) since it is tan-
tamount to total repudiation of a collective-bargaining
agreement.4
On such a conclusion, there is precedent in our deci-
sions under Section 8(a)(5) for requiring a party who
thus repudiates the essence of his collective-bargaining
agreement to cease so doing and to honor the agree-
ment he made.
I H. J Heinz Co. v NIL R B, 311 U S 514 (1941), Beverage-Air Co., 164
NLRB 1127.
' Cf Retail Clerks v Lion Dry Goods, Inc, 369 U S 17 (1962)
190 NLRB No. 27
134
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
MAURICE ALEXANDRE, Trial Examiner: This case was
heard in Tacoma, Washington, on April 13 and 14, 1970,
upon a complaint issued on February 26, 1970,' alleging that
Respondents had violated Section 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended. In their answer,
Respondents denied commission of the unfair labor practices
alleged.
Upon the entire record, my observation of the witnesses,
and the memoranda filed by the General Counsel and the
Respondents, I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS'
1. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Sequence of Events
Respondent Restaurants are engaged in business in and
around Tacoma, Washington, and are members of Respond-
ent Association, which inter alia represents its member-
employers in matters of collective bargaining. In 1966, Re-
spondent Association on behalf of its members and the
Charging Unions entered into a collective-bargaining con-
tract covering the employees in the following unit:
All cooks, bartenders, kitchen helpers, pantry workers,
cafeteria workers, bus boys, waitresses, and maids, em-
ployed by member-employers of the Restaurant Associa-
tion, excluding office clerical employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.'
On June 12, 1969,' during negotiations for renewal of the
contract, the Charging Unions called an economic strike and
established picket lines. On June 13, Respondent Association
commenced an action for over $2,500,000 against the Charg-
ing Unions, alleging a breach of the "no-strike" clause in the
1966 contract.
During the strike, negotiations were conducted in an at-
tempt to resolve the dispute. On August 8, the negotiating
committees for the disputants executed a strike settlement
agreement which was ratified by the members of Respondent
Association on August 10, and by the members of Local 61
and Local 711 on August 13. Among other things, the agree-
ment provided that all the strikers would be restored to their
jobs; that none of the officers of the Charging Unions would
file disciplinary charges against any employee-members who
had worked behind the picket lines; and that the disputants,
after making certain changes in the 1966 collective-bargain-
ing contract, would extend the contract to June 1, 1972.
Thereafter, approximately 1,000 strikers returned to work.
However, 50 strikers employed by the 21 Respondent Restau-
rants were not reinstated,' and the initial unfair labor practice
charge herein was filed. The parties stipulated that the 50
strikers had made unconditional applications for reinstate-
ment as provided in the strike settlement agreement, and
Based on an original and an amended charge filed respectively on Au-
gust 22 and October 23, 1969, by Local Joint Executive Board of Tacoma,
Washington, and its affiliated local unions: Hotel & Restaurant & Motel
Employees, local 61, and Bartenders Union, Local 711.
No issue of commerce is presented. The complaint alleged and the
answer admitted facts which, I find, establish that the Respondents are
employers engaged in operations which affect commerce within the meaning
of the Act. I further find that the Charging Unions are labor organizations
within the meaning of the Act.
The complaint alleged, the answer admitted, and I find that the said unit
is an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the mean-
ing of the Act.
All dates referred to hereafter relate to 1969 unless otherwise stated.
See Appendix A.
either that they were permanently replaced or that their jobs
were eliminated.
Sometime between September 1 and 15, the board of direc-
tors of Respondent Association met, at which time some
members expressed the opinion that officers of the Charging
Unions had breached the settlement agreement by filing the
unfair labor practice charge herein, and by encouraging no-
nofficers to file disciplinary charges. A consensus was reached
that Respondent Association should not execute a renewal
collective-bargaining contract until the breaches of the agree-
ment had ceased and all the charges had been dismissed. On
October 2, representatives of the disputants met and agreed
on the language of a renewal collective-bargaining contract.
The parties in effect stipulated that the obligations contained
in the strike settlement agreement were a part of the consider-
ation for the renewal contract.'
Despite the oral agreement, the representatives of Re-
spondent Association stated that they would not execute the
renewal contract until all the charges had been dismissed.
The amended charge and the complaint herein followed.
B. Allegations of the Complaint
and Respondents' Defenses
The complaint alleges that under the strike settlement
agreement between the Charging Unions and the Respondent
Association, the latter was required to execute the renewal
collective-bargaining contract agreed to by their representa-
tives, and that the 21 Respondent Restaurants were required
to reinstate the 50 strikers; that the Charging Unions re-
quested the Respondent Association to execute the renewal
contract on or about August 14; that since that time the
Association has refused to execute such agreement on behalf
of itself and its employer-members, and that Respondents
have thus refused to bargain with the Unions in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act; that since on or about
August 16, the 21 named Respondent Restaurants have
refused to reinstate the 50 strikers, following their uncondi-
tional request for reinstatement, because such employees had
engaged in protected activity; and that the said Respondent
Restaurants have thus violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act.
Respondents' defenses are as follows:
1. The strike settlement agreed is not binding upon Re-
spondents because the Charging Unions negotiated the agree-
ment in bad faith and because there was no true meeting of
the minds.
6 On direct examination, the General Counsel asked the following lead-
ing question, and Joinette, one of the Unions' representatives, testified as
follows:
Q. [By Mr. McIntyre] Now, does Joint Exhibit 3 [the renewal con-
tract], with the exception of the wage scale and the difference of a
couple of words in the preamble of the contract , constitute anything
different than the strike settlement agreement plus the 1966 contract?
A. This, with the exception of the wages, this contract here [indicat-
ing] is identically the same as the 1966.
Counsel for Respondents stated that "as Mr. McIntyre and I were both
saying before, [Joint Exhibit] No. 3 is really Joint Exhibits I and 2 com-
bined." (Joint Exhibits 1 and 2 are the 1966 contract and the strike settle-
ment agreement, respectively.) In addition, the General Counsel stated at
the hearing that "if there is no strike settlement , then there is no case," i.e.
that Respondent Association is not required to execute the renewal con-
tract. And Counsel for Respondents stated that if the settlement agreement
is a valid and binding contract, Respondent Association is "under an obliga-
tion to execute Joint Exhibit 3."
The Act requires the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached. Community Market, Inc., 179 NLRB No. 2. If the
renewal contract which was orally agreed to had not been dependent upon
the settlement agreement, it would have been unnecessary for the General
Counsel to ask the question and make the statement quoted above.
RESTAURANT ASSN. OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
2. Even if the agreement was binding, it was breached by
the Unions, and Respondents were accordingly excused from
any further obligation to perform the agreement.
3. Even if Respondents were obligated to perform the
agreement, they have not waived their right to assert as a
defense the replacement of any of the 50 strikers or the elimi-
nation of any of the jobs which they had occupied.
4. In any event, there is no evidence to show that the refusal
to reinstate the 50 strikers was discriminatory.
For the reasons noted below, I find that Respondents vi-
olated the Act.
C. Analysis
It is undisputed that although they had orally agreed
thereto, Respondents' representatives refused to execute a
renewal collective-bargaining contract consisting of the strike
settlement agreement and the 1966 contract with certain
modifications. Such refusal constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice (Community Market, Inc., 179 NLRB No. 2), unless
there is merit to any of Respondents' defenses relating to the
strike settlement agreement.
With respect to the 50 strikers herein, it is undisputed that
they participated in a lawful economic strike,' that they made
timely and unconditional applications for reinstatement, and
that the 21 Respondent Restaurants rejected such applica-
tions. However, since it is also undisputed that the strikers
were replaced or their jobs abolished, they were not entitled
to immediate reinstatement (N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333; N.L.R.B. v. Fleetwood Trailer
Co., 389 U.S. 375), unless they acquired a right thereto by
reason of the strike-settlement agreement. Accordingly, the
legality of the refusal to reinstate must be considered in the
light of Respondents' defenses relating to the strike-settle-
ment agreement.
Such defenses are discussed immediately below.
1. The defense that the strike-settlement
agreement is not binding
a. The evidence
The principal strike settlement negotiators for the dispu-
tants were Lester J. Green, International representative and
vice-president of the Charging Unions, and Thomas S.
McCulloch, a labor negotiator retained by Respondent As-
sociation. On August 8, the negotiating committees for the
Charging Unions and for the Association met at McCulloch's
office and were housed in separate rooms while Green and
McCulloch conferred and reported back to their respective
committees from time to time.
During their negotiations, McCulloch informed Green
that Association members had promised employees who had
worked behind the picket lines that they would not sign a
settlement agreement which failed to protect the employees
from reprisals, and requested Green to accept a provision
similar to that agreed upon in settling a strike in Seattle,
prohibiting the filing of disciplinary charges by any member
of the Charing Unions against a member who worked behind
the picket lines. Green pointed out that the International
constitution of the Charging Unions guaranteed to all mem-
bers the right to file disciplinary charges against other mem-
bers, and stated that this right could not be abridged by
contract. Green testified that he further stated that the offic-
ers could not refuse to accept charges filed by members, but
that he could agree that the officers would not "have any part
' At the hearing, Respondents disavowed any claim that the strike was
unlawful
135
of filing any charges or anything to do with them." McCul-
loch testified that he and Green did not discuss the subject of
preparation of charges by officers on behalf of members, and
that they did not talk about whether or not officers should be
permitted to encourage members to file charges. According
to Green, during the course of the negotiations, he told the
union officers that "they would not actively participate in the
filing of charges."'
Green and McCulloch reached tentative agreement on a
strike settlement which, among other things, provided as
follows:
All employees involved in the dispute are to return to
work and be reemployed by the Employers at the classifi-
cation of employment worked prior to the labor dispute.
All employees are to be called by the Employer for re-
turn to work within (48) forty-eight hours after the
agreement has been approved by the members of the
Union. It is agreed that the employees shall have (7)
seven days from the date of the approval of the agree-
ment to present themselves for reemployment.
No discrimination, disciplinary action, demotion or
discharge, etc. of employees shall result because of the
said labor dispute.
The Union agrees that none of the officers of the Local
Joint Executive Board and its affiliated unions, Local 61
and 711 , will file charges against any members who
worked behind a picket line during the labor dispute
effective August 8, 1969.
The parties to this agreement mutually agree to waive
any and all civil claims, if any, which either party may
have against the other arising out of or connected with
the labor dispute. All pending suits or legal proceedings
between the parties, if any, arising out of or connected
with the dispute shall be forthwith dismissed with preju-
dice. The Association and the Union agree to withdraw
any charges that may be filed against each other with the
National Labor Relations Board arising out of or con-
nected with the labor dispute.
In addition, the agreement provided that the signers thereof
would recommend certain wage increases to the membership
of their respective organizations, that certain changes would
be made in the 1966 collective-bargaining contract, that the
other provisions of such contract would be continued un-
changed, and that such contract would be extended to June
1, 1972. Finally, the agreement provided that it was subject
to approval by the membership of Respondent Association
and of the Charging Unions.
Green testified that after he reached agreement with
McCulloch, no issues were left undecided, and that the ex-
ecuted strike-settlement a reement was "the full and com-
plete understanding that [he] and Mr. McCulloch were to
present to [their] respective groups."
Green and McCulloch then presented the proposal to their
respective negotiating committees with a favorable recom-
mendation. The record does not disclose exactly what Green
told his committee. McCulloch testified that he could not
recall any discussion, during his presentation to Respondents'
negotiating team, concerning refraint by officers from prepar-
ing charges or from encouraging nonofficers to file charges.
He did recall discussion to the effect that "the officers would
have nothing to do with charges," except that if a Union
member "insisted on filing a charge," the officers "would
When asked to define the term `actively participate," Green testified-
"Preparing them and questioning the members as to their wishes and desires
and things like that " He further testified that he did not discuss with the
officers the matter of their encouraging members to file charges, but that it
was his opinion that they would not engage in such encouragement.
136
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
have to receive it and process it." Anderson, then president
of Respondent Association and a member of Respondents'
negotiating team, testified as follows:
.In further discussions I believe Mr. McCulloch
talked to Mr. Green again, I couldn't say for sure, came
back and, the agreement as I understood it, from what
Mr. McCulloch told me, that the unions could not give
us complete no reprisal clause because of their bylaws,
but this would be the wording in the agreement with the
understanding that the union officers would not file
charges, would not encourage charges, but would dis-
courage filing of charges by their members and if there
were charges brought by members of the union, that the
union officers would do everything possible to, shall we
say, clear up or strike these charges. And that if they
could not do that, if it went through all the channels,
that eventually it could be appealed to the international
president at which spot the charges would be taken care
of in favor of the person in charge.
The members of the negotiating teams for Respondents
and the Charging Unions executed the strike-settlement
agreement on the same day, August 8. On August 10 a meet-
ing of employer-members of Respondent Association was
held and the agreement was ratified. McCulloch testified that
he explained the reasons for the language in the provision
prohibiting Union officers from filing disciplinary charges,
and that it was understood that Union officers would take no
part in filing such charges. Anderson testified that he pre-
sented the proposal to the Association membership, that the
members objected to the said provision as written, and that
he made the following explanation to them:
And I told them the same basic thing, that Mr.
McCulloch told me, that it was impossible to take away
the rights of the members to file charges against a mem-
ber because of their bylaws and that was the reason that
this was worded the way that it is. But, that they could
rest assured that if there were charges brought against
people, that during the course of their appeals, et cetera,
that they would be eventually dropped, taken care of.
Q. What did you tell your membership regarding the
role that the officers of the union would play insofar as
these reprisals were concerned?
A. The same, that they would not file charges, they
would not encourage changes, but would actually dis-
courage the filing of charges by their members.
At several meetings on August 13, the membership of the
Charging Unions ratified the agreement. Green testified that
he presented the agreement to the members; and that because
many members were unfamiliar with the procedures set forth
in the Union constitution, he advised them that "they had the
benefit of the services of the clerical staff and headquarters
who in turn would asist them with the proper wording of the
charge that they wanted to initiate." However, he testified
that he did not state that the officers would "help" them file
charges.
b. Concluding findings
Respondents have identified, and I am aware of, no evi-
dence supporting their claim that the Charging Unions nego-
tiated the strike-settlement agreement in bad faith. That the
Unions later breached the agreement does not establish that
they never intended to abide by its provisions, or serve as a
basis for treating the agreement as a nullity.
I further find that Respondents have failed to sustain their
contention that a binding settlement agreement never arose
because the contracting parties did not have a meeting of the
minds. Although not entirely clear, Respondents' supporting
argument appears to be that they ratified the settlement
agreement in the belief that it prohibited Union officers from
encouraging the filing of disciplinary charges by nonofficers,
and in the further belief that there was a private understand-
ing with the Unions that their officers would discourage such
filing and that the Unions would dismiss any charge filed; that
the Charging Unions, on the other hand, merely voted on the
agreement as written; and hence in ratifying the agreement,
the Unions and Respondents "were not dealing with the same
problem." (Resp. brief 4.)
This argument is without merit. Unquestionably, the set-
tlement agreement impliedly prohibited Union officers from
encouraging others to file charges, since it cannot be inter-
preted as permitting them to do by indirection what it ex-
pressly forbade. I find nothing in the record which even sug-
gests that there was any misunderstanding in this regard.
As for the asserted private understanding, Respondents do
not and indeed cannot properly contend that it existed.' Their
claim is that their membership ratified the settlement agree-
ment in the mistaken belief that there was such a private
understanding. This argument overlooks the fact that Re-
spondents' mistaken belief resulted either from a misrepre-
sentation by McCulloch to Anderson which the latter inno-
cently transmitted to the Association members, or from a
misrepresentation by Anderson directly to the membership.
There is not a shred of evidence to show that there was any
mention of a private understanding during the negotiations
between McCulloch and Green. Nor does the record establish
that McCulloch told Repondents' negotiating team that he
and Green had the private understanding in question. Al-
though Anderson attributed to McCulloch a statement that
there was a private understanding, Anderson was admittedly
unsure of his recollection and, in any event, did not testify
that McCulloch's statement was made to the negotiating
team. His testimony was that it was made to him personally.
There is thus no basis for a finding that at the time they
executed the settlement agreement, Respondents' negotiating
team was under any misapprehension regarding the matter of
officer discouragement of charges and their disposition if
filed. If, thereafter, the Association members ratified the
agreement because of a misstatement by McCulloch or An-
derson, and without fault or knowledge on the part of the
Charging Unions, this did not prevent a valid and binding
settlement agreement from coming into existence. Cf. Homer
Gale, et al., 176 NLRB No. 147.1°
' Green testified without contradiction that the executed settlement
agreement contained the entire understanding reached with McCulloch.
10 In their brief, Respondents rely on certain letters, dated September 9,
1969, and February 19, 1970, and signed by Miller, the Charging Unions'
general president, in which he dismissed the disciplinary charges filed
against several union members who had worked behind the picket line.
However, Respondents do not explain how these letters support their con-
tention that a binding settlement agreement did not come into existence.
The letter of September 9, addressed to President Passanante of Local
711, stated that Miller was dismissing the disciplinary charges against cer-
tain employees because, among other things, the charges violated the no-
reprisal clause of the settlement agreement. But since, as the letter also
reveals, such charges were filed by President Passanante himself, it is appar-
ent that Miller's action was entirely consistent with the provisions of the
settlement agreement as executed. Moreover, in a letter dated October 20,
1969, and addressed to Local 61 (a copy of which was apparently sent Local
711), Miller stated that disciplinary charges filed by nonofficers should take
their normal course. Although his letter of February 19, 1970, suggests that
Miller may have changed his mind, this shows only a belief on the part of
Miller that there had been a breach of the settlement agreement, not that
there was no binding agreement. Thus, Miller's letters, if anything, militate
against Respondents' contention.
RESTAURANT ASSN OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
2. The defense that Respondents were excused
from further performance of the settlement
agreement because of material breach
thereof by the Charging Unions
a. The evidence
(1) The disciplinary charges
The parties stipulated that one disciplinary charge was filed
by a nonofficer member of Local 711 on August 13, that three
such charges were filed on August 14, and that no action had
been taken in connection with those charges.
The parties further stipulated that a total of 92 disciplinary
charges were filed against members of Local 61; that all were
filed by nonofficer members; that about 16 of such charges
were filed on July 28, i.e. before the strike-settlement agree-
ment; that about 32 of the charges were filed between August
8 and 13; and that the balance (about 44) of the charges were
filed between August 18 and 31. Land, a business agent for
Local 61 and one of the signers of the stnke-settlement agree-
ment, testified that on August 12 one Stillwell and three other
Local members came to the Union office to file disciplinary
charges; that Land helped them by suggesting the wording to
be used; that when the approximately 22 charges were typed
subsequent to that date, Land informed Stillwell by telephone
that the charges were ready for signature; and that the
changes were signed and filed. The record does not show
precisely how many members of Local 61 were found guilty
as charged. According to Joinette, the secretary-treasurer of
Loca 61, only a few were found not guilty. On appeal by
approximately six members, the penalties imposed upon them
were set aside by General President Miller on the ground that
the charges violated the settlement agreement.
(2) The Kerrigan columns
During the period from August 15 through November 7,
six issues of the Tacoma Labor Advocate, a local newspaper,
included columns over the byline of one Stu Kerrigan, an
officer of the Charging Unions. In his column of August 15,
Kerrigan stated that he had been asked by several nonofficer
members of Local 61 and Local 711 regarding their right to
file disciplinary charges, and he cited the provision of the
International bylaws granting that right. The August 29 col-
umn reported on the punishments given to a number of mem-
bers who had worked behind the picket lines and stated that
additional charges by nonofficer members would be forth-
coming. The column of September 19 criticized the action of
General President Miller in reversing his earlier decision to
punish several members who worked behind the picket line.
The column of October 10 reported that the members
would discuss Miller's action at a forthcoming meeting and
would decide whether they could be deprived of their consti-
tutional rights, particularly in view of the fact that they had
ratified the strike-settlement agreement after reassurances
that nonofficer members "could most certainly file charges
with the secretary of their respective Unions against those
`scabs' that worked behind the picket lines." The column in
effect urged members to not give up without a fight and to
come to the meeting. In his October 31 column, after report-
ing that Miller had stated that members would not be de-
prived of their constitutional right to file charges, Kerrigan
stated:
Any other members who wish to file charges against
the turncoats may do so at our union office or write them
out and present them to Secretary Elmer Holbrook at
our next meeting, Sunday, Nov. 9....
137
The November 31 column contained similar language.
(3) Respondent's refusals to continue further
performance of the settlement agreement
The strike-settlement agreement provided that Respondent
Restaurants were required to recall the strikers to their jobs
within 48 hours after the settlement agreement was ratified by
the Unions, and that the strikers were to report for work
within 7 days after such ratification. Since the date of Union
ratification was August 13, the strikers were required to re-
port for duty on or before August 20. The record establishes
that the 50 strikers presented themselves within the required
time, but does not disclose the exact date or dates when they
did so. Accordingly, the refusal to reinstate them by the 21
Respondent Restaurants must have taken place on or before
August 20.
The former president of Respondent Association, Ander-
son, testified that although he had been aware of the filing of
the initial unfair labor practice charge herein and of the disci-
plinary charges against Union members who worked behind
the picket lines," he could not recall having discussed these
matters with the Unions in late August or early September.
However, he further testified that sometime between Septem-
ber 1 and 15, Respondent Association's board held two meet-
ings; that the 12 board members were present, including An-
derson and Norma Tien, who succeeded him as president of
Respondent Association sometime during the first part of
September; and that it was the consensus of those present that
the Association members should not sign a renewal collec-
tive-bargaining contract with the Charging Unions for the
following reasons:
Q. What was discussed regarding, what did you say
regarding the charges both NLRB charges and reprisal?
What was the discussion regarding these two?
A. There was much discussion. I know the gist of the
conversation was that the unions were not living up to
their agreement by filing charges. We were of the opinion
that the union officials were encouraging the charges in
direct violation and we felt that they were breaking the
agreement.
TRIAL EXAMINER This was said at those meetings?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
TRIAL EXAMINER Who said it?
THE WITNESS I couldn't say. It was just conversa-
tion. I know it was discussed. I probably said it myself.
Q. (By Mr. Cohan) This is what you were-do you
recall having said this at these meetings?
A. I know I have said it, yes.
Q. At the meetings?
A. Yes.
Q. And did the board come to any conclusion regard-
ing the signing of any overall contract as a result of these
violations?
A. At that state of the game, the decision was that we
would not sign the contract till such time as the viola-
tions were stopped and that the charges that had been
brought were dismissed.
On further interrogation, Anderson testified as follows:
TRIAL EXAMINER I am a little bit puzzled by some-
thing. You testified that at some Association meeting
you took the position that there had been a breach of a
strike-settlement agreement by the union and therefore
you decided that you would not sign the collective-bar-
gaining agreement , is that right?
" On cross-examination , Anderson was unable to furnish any details
regarding such disciplinary charges
138
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
THE WITNESS: No, I wouldn's say that it was officially
decided. It was the feeling of the group that we should
not sign the contract, but it was never, shall we say, put
on the floor and voted upon.
TRIAL EXAMINER: It was a consensus?
THE WITNESS: A consensus.
TRIAL EXAMINER: What was the basis for this feeling
of the group that the union had violated the strike-settle-
ment agreement?
THE WITNESS: Because of NLRB charges and the fact
that there were charges being brought against union
members.
TRIAL EXAMINER: What evidence would the group
have of these charges against union members at that
time?
THE WITNESS: If my memory doesn't fail me, I believe
we had copies of documents from these people being
notified they were being charged. I would have to go
back to my records.
On October 2, representatives of the Charging Unions and
of Respondent Association met to discuss the language of a
renewal collective-bargaining contract. When they had set-
tled all differences, Tien, one of the Association representa-
tives, stated that the Unions were not complying with the
terms of the strike-settlement agreement, and that the As-
sociation would not sign the renewal collective-bargaining
contract until the disciplinary charges and the unfair labor
practice charges had been dismissed.
b. Concluding findings
Respondents assert that the Unions breached the strike-
settlement agreement in three respects. First, they contend
that by filing unfair labor practice charges herein, the Union
breached the provision of the settlement agreement requiring
the contracting parties to "withdraw any charges that may be
filed against each other" with the Board connected with their
labor dispute. I do not believe that that provision prohibited
the subsequent filing of any unfair labor practice charges
against each other in connection with their labor dispute. If
the contracting parties meant to prohibit the filing of such
charges, a provision requiring them to "withdraw" charges
was an odd way to say so. In addition, I find it difficult to
believe that they would give each other carte blandhe to
commit unfair labor practices subsequent to the settlement
agreement with impunity. Rather, I am of the opinion that
the provision required the contracting parties to withdraw
any unfair labor practices then pending. This conclusion is
buttressed by Respondents' admission in their brief (p. 2) that
the Unions had filed an earlier unfair labor practice charge
on July 24 alleging that Respondent Association had failed
to bargain in good faith. The contention is without merit.
Respondents next contend that the disciplinary charges
filed by nonofficer Union members violated the provision of
the settlement agreement prohibiting "discrimination, disci-
plinary action, demotion or discharge, etc. of employees" as
a result of the labor dispute. This contention is similarly
without merit. For one thing, the said provision refers to
reprisals against "employees' and prohibits only reprisals
which affect employment status. Moreover, it is clear from
the record that Respondents knew that the Unions could not
enter into an agreement prohibiting nonofficers from filing
disciplinary charges, and accepted the Unions' offer to in-
clude in the strike-settlement agreement a provision which
forbade only officers from filing such charges. There is no
warrant for concluding that a prohibition which the parties
expressly reject may nevertheless be found in the agreement.
I therefore find that the no-discrimination provision relied on
by Respondents prohibited reprisals by Respondents, that it
did not apply to intraunion disciplinary charges, and that the
filing of such charges by nonofficers did not breach the agree-
ment.'Z
The third breach asserted by Respondents involves con-
duct by Land and Kerrigan, officers of Locals 61 and 711,
respectively. Land helped several nonofficer Union members
to file disciplinary charges on August 12, i.e. 2 days after
Respondents ratified the strikesettlement agreement, but 1
day before its ratification by the Unions. If such conduct was
not technically a breach because the agreement was not yet
binding, it undoubtedly violated the spirit of the tentative
agreement already reached. That agreement required neutral-
ity by Union officers. Land's assistance in the filing of charges
constituted a departure from neutrality.
Kerrigan's conduct consisted of writing certain columns
which appeared under his byline in a Tacoma newspaper
during the period from August 15 through November 7.
Respondents contend in their brief (p. 7) that "[a]ll of the
articles were inflamatory and indicate that the officers were
doing a great deal to encourage the filing of charges." Specifi-
cally, Respondents point to the columns published on Octo-
ber 10, October 31, and November 7.
The columns published on August 15, August 29, and
September 19 contain only factual reports, and I find little in
them which can be considered a breach of the agreement by
the Unions. Perhaps Respondents share this view since their
brief quotes only the material in the three later columns. It
might perhaps be argued that the mere mention of discipli-
nary charges in the three earlier columns served as a reminder
and thus operated to encourage the filing of such charges. But
I do not believe that the settlement agreement imposed on
Union officers an obligation to refrain from all mention of
disciplinary charges, including straight factual reporting.
There is, however, no doubt and I find that the columns
published on October 10, October 31, and November 7
clearly breached the settlement agreement by encouraging
the filing of disciplinary charges."
Respondents contend that under well-recognized princi-
ples of contract law, the breach of the settlement agreement
by the Unions excused Respondents from further perform-
ance of their obligation under the agreement. It may be that
if the Unions brought suit against Respondents for breach of
the agreement, Respondents could plead the Unions' breach
as a defense. But technical rules of contract law are not
necessarily controlling in cases arising under the Act" and,
I find, should not be applied here for several reasons.
Although Respondents seek to create the impression that
they refused to continue performance of the agreement be-
cause of the Unions' breach, the record does not so establish.
As noted, Respondents refused to reinstate the 50 strikers on
or before August 20, decided not to sign the renewal collec-
tive-bargaining contract sometime between September 1 and
15, and so informed the Unions on October 2. There is noth-
ing to show that Respondents complained to the Unions
about any breach prior to October 2. On the contrary, Ander-
son testified that although he was aware of both the unfair
" A contrary conclusion is not required by President Miller's letter of
February 19, 1970, dismissing certain disciplinary charges filed by nonoffic-
ers (see fn. 10, supra). That letter shows that Miller believed, erroneously,
that such charges violated the spirit of a wholly different provision, i.e. the
section prohibiting disciplinary charges by officers . In this connection, I note
that Miller had theretofore taken the position that charges by nonofficers
should take their normal course. (ibid.)
" It is of passing interest that these three columns did not result in
additional disciplinary charges since, as the record shows, no charges were
filed after August 31.
F. W. Means & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 377 F. 2d 683 (C.A. 7); Lozano
Enterprises v. N.L.R.B., 327 F. 2d 814 (C.A. 9).
RESTAURANT ASSN OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
labor practice charge and the disciplinary charges, all of
which he assertedly regarded as breaches of the settlement
agreement, he could not recall having discussed them with
the Unions. Such delay in remonstrating with the Unions
raises doubt as to whether Respondents truly believed that
the Unions had breached the settlement agreement.
Such doubt is reinforced by the lack of evidence showing
that Respondents knew of Land 's conduct at the time they
refused to continue performing the agreement. Absent evi-
dence from which it can at least be inferred that Respondents
had timely knowledge of Land's conduct, I cannot conclude
that such conduct played a part in Respondents' refusal fur-
ther to perform the agreement . Moreover, as noted, the Ker-
rigan columns published on August 15, August 29 , and Sep-
tember 19 contained little to justify a conclusion by
Respondents that the Unions had breached the agreement.
And when the subsequent Kerrigan columns which did
breach the agreement were published, Respondents had al-
ready denied reinstatement to the 50 strikers and had decided
not to renew the collective-bargaining contract.
On this record, I find that Respondents, for reasons best
known to themselves, decided to discontinue further perform-
ance of the settlement agreement; that their decision was not
motivated by the Unions' subsequent breach; but that Re-
spondents have seized on that breach as an excuse for their
own breach." In such circumstances , I further find that tech-
nical principles of contract law are not dispositive of the
problem, and that the validity under the Act of Respondents'
refusals to reinstate the 50 strikers and to execute the renewal
contract should be decided without regard to the Unions'
subsequent breach of the settlement agreement . Such breach,
although not to be condoned , should not be used to deprive
Respondents' employees of their right to the benefits of the
renewal contract which was orally agreed to, or to deprive the
50 strikers of whatever reinstatement rights of the Act affords
to them . Cf. Confectionary and Tobacco Drivers and Ware-
housemen 's Union, Local 805 v. N.L.R. B., 312 F. 2d 108
(C.A. 2). i6
3. The defense of replacement
and/or job elimination
As noted, the parties stipulated at the hearing that the 50
strikers had been replaced or that their jobs had been elimi-
nated. Ordinarily, where strikers have been replaced or their
jobs have been eliminated, the employer is not obligated to
give them immediate reinstatement upon their application
therefor. N. L.
N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., supra,
304 U.S. 333, supra; N.L.R.B. V. Fleetwood Trailer Co., supra,
389 U.S. 375, supra, but this is not an ordinary case. For here
Respondent Restaurants contracted to reinstate all the strik-
ers. Nothing in the strike-settlement agreement suggests, and
Respondents do not contend, that the reinstatement provi-
sions thereof excluded any of the strikers.
" Perhaps the 21 Respondent Restaurants did not approve of the settle-
ment agreement and wished to avoid its provisions relating to reinstatment
of strikers. Possibly, Respondents hoped to exert pressure on the Unions to
dismiss the disciplinary charges filed by nonofficers There may be other
reasons for Respondents refusal to continue performing the agreement
" The Unions will not necessarily profit form their own breach of the
settlement agreement For one thing, the courts may refuse to enforce a
Union fine imposed pursuant to a disciplinary charge filed in breach of the
settlement agreement. In addition, the imposition of such a fine might con-
ceivably constitute an unfair labor practice under the doctrine of N.LR B.
v Allis-Chalmers Mfg Co., 388 U S. 175 and Scofield v. N.LR B., 394 U.S
423
139
The stipulation does not state when Respondent Restau-
rants replaced the 50 strikers or eliminated their jobs. Al-
though I am inclined to believe that these events took place
before the settlement agreement," it is unnecessary to resolve
that question. If these events occurred after the settlement
agreement was ratified, then the strikers' jobs were still open
at the time of ratification. If, on the other hand, the said
events took place before the settlement agreement, the mem-
bers of Respondent Association, at their meeting on August
10, nevertheless accepted the settlement agreement with
knowledge, actual or attributable to them, that the strikers
had been replaced or their jobs eliminated." Irrespective of
the time of the replacement and job elimination, the record
fails to disclose a legitimate business reason for the refusal by
Respondent Restaurants to abide by their agreement to rein-
state the 50 strikers. In such circumstances, the doctrine of
equitable estoppel applies, and Respondent Restaurants are
"estopped to renege on [their] agreement." Beverage-Air Co.,
164 NLRB 1127, 1155-1156. Accordingly,
Respondents
must be deemed to have waived the defense of reinstatement
and job elimination."
D. Concluding Findings
1. Discrimination
In Lamb-Weston, Inc., 170 NLRB No. 186, the Board
stated:
It is well established that economic strikers are enti-
tled, upon unconditional application, to be reinstated to
their former or substantially equivalent positions, unless
some valid reason is established for denying them rein-
statement. The burden of proving such valid reason is on
the employer.' Thus, in a recent opinion' involving the
reinstatement rights of economic strikers the Supreme
Court stated that:
If, after conclusion of the strike, the employer
refuses to reinstate striking employees, the effect is
to discourage employees from exercising their
rights to organize and to strike guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 and 13 of the Act ... Under Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) ... it is unfair labor practice [sic] to inter-
fere with the exercise of these rights. Accordingly,
unless the employer who refused to reinstate strik-
ers can show that his action was due to "legitimate
and substantial business justifications ," he is guilty
of an unfair labor practice. N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane
Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967). The burden of
proving justification is on the employer. Ibid....
[Emphasis added by the Board.]
' Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (December 18, 1967)
' Ibid. at p 378
The Board further stated (fn. 8):
Contrary to Respondent's contention, "proof of antiun-
ion motivation is unnecessary when the employer's con-
duct 'could have adversely affected employee rights to
"Respondents stated in a preheanng stipulation received in evidence
that "all the employees named in the complaint were economic strikers and
were permanently [re]placed [sic] during the course of the strike "
`i In view of such knowledge, the settlement agreement must be regarded
as a voluntary commitment to restore the abolished jobs.
" The decision in N.L.R.B. v Confectionary and Tobacco Drivers and
Warehousemen 's Union, Local 805, 312 F 2d 108 (C A 2), on which Re-
spondents rely, is distinguishable There, the employer merely condoned the
misconduct of strikers, thereby waiving only his right to refuse to reinstate
them on the ground of their misconduct He did not waive that right based
on other reasons such as replacement Here, Respondents expressly agreed
to reinstate all the strikers, including the 50 in question , thereby waiving the
right to refuse reinstatement
140
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
some extent' and when the employer does not meet his
burden of establishing `that he was motivated by legiti-
mate objectives.' " Fleetwood Trailer Co., supra, citing
Great Dane Trailers, supra. [Emphasis added by the
Board.]
Applying these principles here, I find that Respondents
have failed to sustain their burden of showing adequate jus-
tification for the refusal to reinstate the 50 strikers. For, as
found above, the defense of replacement and job elimination
are not open to Respondents, and they have not established
any other legitimate reason for the refusal to reinstate. Under
such circumstances, proof of antiunion motive is unnecessary
and, I find, the refusal by the Respondent Restaurants to
reinstate the 50 strikers constituted discrimination violative
of Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act. The discrimination is
not negated by the fact, to which Respondents point, that
approximately 1,000 other strikers were reinstated, Cf. Nach-
man Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 337 F. 2d 421, 424 (C.A. 7).
2. Refusal to bargain
The record does not support the General Counsel's conten-
tion that Respondent Association refused to execute the
renewal collective-bargaining contract as early as August 14.
Indeed, the language of that contract was not finally for-
mulated and agreed to until October 2. The record does show,
however, that such refusal occurred on the latter date.
As already noted, the parties agreed at the hearing that if
Respondents were not obligated to perform the strike-settle-
ment agreement, they were not required to execute the
renewal contract and their refusal to do so was not an unfair
labor practice; and conversely, if the settlement agreement
was binding, they were obligated to execute the renewal con-
tract. Since I have concluded that the settlement agreement
was binding and that Respondents were not excused from
performance thereof, I find that Respondents' refusal to exe-
cute the renewal contract which they agreed to on October
2 violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Community
Market, Inc., supra, 179 NLRB No. 2.
II. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondents engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that they cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action necessary to
remedy and remove the effects of the unfair labor practices
and to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Affirmatively, I shall recommend that Respondents forth-
with sign the renewal collective-bargaining contract which
they and the Unions agreed to on October 2, 1969, and give
retroactive effect to the terms and conditions of that contract.
I shall further recommend that the Respondent Restau-
rants offer to their respective employees named in Appendix
A attached hereto immediate and full reinstatement to the
positions which they held prior to the settlement agreement
herein, or to substantially equivalent positions, without preju-
dice to their seniority and other rights and privileges."
I shall also recommend that the Respondent Restaurants
make each of their respective employees named in Appendix
A, attached hereto, whole for any loss of earnings or other
employment benefits he may have suffered by reason of Re-
spondents' failure to sign the renewal collective-bargaining
'° If any of such positions were abolished subsequent to the ratification
of the strike settlement agreement, the compliance stage of this proceeding
is the appropriate time to litigate such questions as whether or not the
abolition was for legitimate reasons and was permanent or temporary, and
whether or not the discriminatees formerly occupying such jobs should be
placed on a preferential hiring list. Quick Stop Markets, Inc., 168 NLRB No.
30.
contract and for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the
discrimination against him, by paying to each a sum of money
equal to that which would have been paid to him, had he been
reinstated and had Respondents executed the renewal collec-
tive-bargaining contract, as aforesaid, during the period from
the date of the discrimination against him to the date on
which he is offered reinstatement or the date on which Re-
spondents execute the said renewal contract, whichever is
later, less his net earnings, if any, during the said period. Since
representatives of Respondent Association share responsibil-
ity for the refusal to execute the renewal contract, I shall
recommend that the Association be jointly and severally lia-
ble with Respondent Restaurants for backpay liability arising
out of such refusal to execute. Cf. Holme & Seifert,
102
NLRB 347, 375; Pacific American Shipowners Assn.,
98
NLRB 582, 600-601. Backpay shall be computed and bear
interest in accordance with F W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB
289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. By unlawfully refusing to execute the renewal collec-
tive-bargaining contract which they orally agree to on Octo-
ber 2, 1969, as found herein, Respondents engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act.
B. By unlawfully refusing to reinstate their respective em-
ployees named in Appendix A, as found herein, Respondent
Restaurants engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
C. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Respondent, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
A. Cease and desist from:
1. Failing or refusing to sign the renewal collective-bar-
gaining contract which they orally entered into on October
2, 1969, with the Joint Executive Board of Tacoma, Washing-
ton, on behalf of its affiliated Locals, Hotel & Restaurant &
Motel Employees, Local No. 61, and Bartenders Union, Lo-
cal No. 711.
2. Unlawfully refusing to offer to their respective em-
ployees named in Appendix A attached hereto immediate and
full reinstatement, to the extent set forth in the section herein
entitled "The Remedy," or otherwise unlawfully discriminat-
ing in regard to their hire, tenure of employment, or any term
or condition of employment.
3. In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.
B. Take the following affirmative action:
1. Forthwith sign the renewal contract described above.
2. Upon the execution of the aforesaid contract, give re-
troactive effect to the provisions thereof.
3. To the extent set forth in the section entitled "The
Remedy," offer to their respective employees named in Ap-
pendix A immediate and full reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions, and make them whole for
any loss of earnings by reason of the discrimination against
them.
4. Make whole each of the employees named in Appendix
A for any loss of earnings or other employment benefits he
may have suffered by reason of Respondents' failure to exe-
cute the renewal collective-bargaining contract, to the extent
set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy."
RESTAURANT ASSN OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
5. Notify their said employees, if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States, of their right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selec-
tive Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed
Forces.
6. Preserve and make available to the Board or its agents
on request, for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due and the right of reinstatement under
the terms of this Recommended Order.
7. Post at their respective restaurants in and around
Tacoma, Washington, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix B."21 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 19 shall, after being signed
by Respondents' representatives, be posted by the Respond-
ent Restaurants immediately upon receipt thereof and main-
tained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicu-
ous places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
8. Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision
and Recommended Order, what steps have been taken to
comply herewith.22
" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, recommendations , and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes . In the event
that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board "
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respond-
ents have taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX A
Employees denied reinstatement and their respective
Respondent Employers
Employee
Iona V. Whitefoot
Gayle Wanda Smith
Sim Bitonio
Nellie Parker
Patricia Hoerling
Patricia L. League
Roberta Canfield
Gatha L. King
Wanita Bottom
Lois Morris
Shirley McCallum
Claudia Vermeulen
Kenneth McCabe
Martha Bengston
Cora E. Scott
Yoshie Eckhmart
Yukie Steadman
Donna Downs
Respondent Employer
Air Port Cafe
Holiday Inn
Holiday Inn
Pantry Cafeteria Inc.
Pantry Cafeteria Inc.
Pantry Cafeteria Inc.
Pantry Cafeteria Inc.
Lee Restaurant
Steve's Gay Nineties
Steve's Gay Nineties
Brad's Restaurant
Busch's Round Table
Busch's Round Table
Richards Restaurant
Cliff House
Cliff House
Cliff House
Top of Ocean
Warren Church
Joanne Murray
Donna J. Cummings
Eula Yardbrough
Ina White
Cora von Berks
Karoline Jensen
Ellen Lengele
Katheryn Ramsdell
Beatrice Menge
Amelia Bonwell
Erma E. Peck
Mabel Wagner
Josie Wallace
Robina Longmuir
G. Jackson
Robert A. Hall
Dan Lucich
Duane Lee
Betty L. Essor
Linda Felix
Patty Godfrey
Ward Dunn
Paddy A. Haggard
LaDona Schleif
Lillian Irene Lavine
Irene Krueger
James Jay Jowett
Dan Johnson
Marianne Taylor
Ella M. Perells
Viola Baker
Top of Ocean
Top of Ocean
Top of Ocean
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Winthrop
Cedar Inn
Zarelli's
Black Angus
Black Angus
Browne's
Flitter Inn
Galley West
Sherwood Inn
Sherwood Inn
Western R
White Cap
Barcotts Seafood
141
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
We hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to sign the collective-bar-
gaining contract reached on October 2, 1969, by our
representatives and Local Joint Executive Board of
Tacoma, Washington, acting on behalf of its affiliated
Locals: Hotel & Restaurant & Motel Employees, Local
No. 61, and Bartenders Union, Local No. 711.
WE WILL forthwith sign the above contract.
WE WILL give retroactive effect to the terms and con-
ditions of said contract.
(Name of undersigned Respondent Restaurant) WILL
offer to (Names of discriminatees employed by under-
signed Respondent Restaurant) immediate and full rein-
statement to (his)(her)(their) old job(s), with backpay,
and WILL NOT unlawfully discriminate against the said
employee(s) or any other striker.
WE WILL pay the above-named employee(s) for all
back earnings lost as a result of our failure to sign the
above contract.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act.
(NAME OF RESPONDENT
RESTAURANT)
(Employer)
Dated
By
(Representative)
(Title)
142
Dated
By
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
RESTAURANT
ASSOCIATION OF
THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON,
INC.
(Employer)
(Representative)
(Title)
Note: We will notify the above-named employees if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their
right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from
the Armed Forces.
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-
one.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Republic
Building, Tenth Floor, 1511 Third Avenue, Seattle, Washing-
ton 98101 Telephone 583-4532.