Beyerl Chevrolet, Inc.

120 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Beyerl Chevrolet, Inc. and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No. 63, AFL-CIO. Case 6-CA-5441 FINDINGS OF FACT I THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT September 19, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND PENELLO On April 19, 1972, Trial Examiner Fannie M. Boyls issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt her recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Beyerl Chevrolet, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE FANNIE M. BOYLS, Trial Examiner: This case, initiated by a charge filed on March 29 and a complaint issued on October 29, 1971, was tried before me at Pittsburgh, Penn- sylvania, on January 11, 12, and 13, 1972. The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges that Respondent, Beyerl Chevrolet, Inc., violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act by engaging in numerous acts of interference with and restraint and coercion of its employ- ees in their organizational rights and by refusing to bargain with the Charging Party, International Association of Ma- chinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No. 63, AFL-CIO. Respondent filed an answer in which it denied that it had engaged in any of the unfair labor practices alleged. Subsequent to the hearing counsel for the General Counsel and for the Respondent filed helpful briefs. Upon the entire record in this case and my observation of the demeanor of the wintesses, and after due considera- tion of the briefs, I make the following: Respondent, a Pennsylvania corporation having an of- fice and place of business in Monroeville, Pennsylvania, is engaged in the retail sale and service of automobiles. During the 12-month period preceding the issuance of the com- plaint, Respondent had a gross volume of business in excess of $500,000 and received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 for use at its Monroeville dealership di- rectly from points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsyl- vania. On the basis of these admitted facts, I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Association of Machinists and Aero- space Workers, District Lodge No. 63, AFL-CIO (herein called the Union), is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Respondent's Admitted Refusal to Bargain: Contentions of the Parties Following an organizational campaign which started about October 1970, Union Representatives Ted Bold and Leonard Schloer, on February 10, 1971, approached Respondent's president, Jack McTigue, claimed that a ma- jonty of Respondent's service department employees had designated the Union to represent them, offered to show the authorization cards, and requested recognition and bargain- ing. McTigue declined to look at the cards or to recognize the Union as the employees' bargaining representative. He told the union representatives that any further discussions should be had with Respondent's legal department and gave the representatives the name and telephone number of an attorney (different from Respondent's present counsel). Union Business Agent Bold thereafter twice called the attorney's office but was unable to reach him. On February 11, February 24, and March 2, Bold wrote McTigue, renew- ing the Union's request for recognition and bargaining and claiming that it represented a majority of Respondent's em- ployees in an appropriate unit consisting of the following specifically defined category of employees: All automotive mechanics, body and fendermen, ap- prentices, helpers, lubricators, lot boys, reconditioners, partsmen, parts truck drivers, car jockeys, and other employees of the service department, excluding all of- fice clerical and professional employees, watchmen, guards, salesmen and supervisors. Although each of these letters was sent by certified 1 This is the unit which Bold testified he orally described to McTigue on February 10 as that which the Union was representing It is also the unit alleged in the complaint as appropriate and which is herein found to be appropriate 199 NLRB No. 24 BEYERL CHEVROLET, INC. mail, each was returned to the Union, marked "Refused" or "Unclaimed." Respondent admits that it refused to recognize and bargain with the Union on and after February 10, 1971. In defense of its action it makes several contentions. It asserts (1) that the Union never made a clear and unequivocal bargaining demand; (2) that the Union did not represent a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit at any time; and (3) that, in any event, Respondent should not be required to bargain with the Union in the absence of a representation election in which the Union establishes its majority status. The General Counsel contends, on the other hand, that the Union did, on February 10, 1971, make a clear and unequivocal request for bargaining, which Respondent de- clined; that the Union had in fact been designated by a majority of Respondent's employees in an appropriate bar- gaining unit as their representative; and that Respondent, commencing before and continuing after its initial refusal to bargain, engaged in numerous and serious independent violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act which would tend to undermine the Union's majority status and make it unlikely that an election could reflect an uncoerced desire of the employees. B. The Bargaining Demand Respondent's president, McTigue, testified that when Union Representatives Bold and Schloer came to his office on February, 10 and requested recognition, they said that the Union represented Respondent's "people" or its "shop" and asked McTigue how many employees were in each section and in the shop. McTigue did not think they spelled out the exact categories of the employees they purported to represent. Union Representative Bold, on the other hand, testi- fied that he told McTigue that the Union represented Respondent's service employees, listing their job classifica- tions substantially as spelled out in the demand letters which he sent Respondent on February 11, February 24, and March 3 and which Respondent refused to accept. Bold and Schloer acknowledged that they did not know the exact number of employees in each category but believed that the total number of service department employees was about 64 or 65. Bold asked McTigue the exact number. McTigue admittedly replied that he did not know the exact number. It is undisputed that Bold had in his possession at that time the cards of the employees who had designated the Union to represent them-all of them service department employees-and offered to let McTigue see them or have their authenticity checked by an impartial third party. Mc- Tigue did not then raise any question about the unit the Union was purporting to represent and I am satisfied that any question raised in this regard at the hearing was an afterthought and had no bearing on McTigue's refusal to recognize the Union and bargain with it. Moreover, I am satisfied from all the evidence that Bold did, as he testified, inform McTigue that the Union represented Respondent's service employees. Whether he named all the job classifica- tions in the service department is immaterial. C. The Union's Majority Status in an Appropriate Bargaining Unit 121 1. Unit placement of certain employees in service department unit Respondent and the Union, while agreeing in general that a unit of Respondent's service department employees is appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining, do not agree as to some of the specific inclusions or exclusions of individual employees or job classifications in that unit. At the hearing the parties submitted a list of employees (num- bered 1 through 76) grouped in job classifications which Respondent claims should be in the appropriate bargaining unit (Joint Exh. 1). The General Counsel prior to the hear- ing drew a line through 14 of these names, claiming that they were not appropriately included in the service depart- ment unit. He subsequently withdrew his objection to the inclusion of two of these names, R. Lydic (#35) and Jerry Unck (#27).2 Among the remaining 12 deletions are 4 em- ployees listed as "Fire Guards (Watchmen)," 6 employees listed as "Custodians," 1 new-car conditioner, E. Fisher (#25) whose employee status on February 10 is in issue, and 1 service assistant, L. Pickens (#34) whose former supervisory position and special status with Respondent are alleged to cause him,to lack a community of interest with other unit employees. These contested inclusions will now be considered. a. "Fire guards (watchmen)" is the appellation given by Respondent at the hearing to four men whose duties and responsibilities, it was stipulated, are substantially the same as those described by one of them, John Gorazd, at the heanng.3 Gorazd is an elderly pensioner, who, during the period here relevant, worked 19-1/2 hours a week in the performance of watchman and custodial duties for Respon- dent. He worked principally in the main building which contains the sales offices, management offices, accounting department, and new-car showroom. The service area ad- joins the main building and both are enclosed by a fence having two access gates. It was the duty of Gorazd and the other three men in his category (all of whom worked at hours when most of the other employees were not present) to keep the doors and gates locked, to let the salesmen and other personnel working in the evenings or on Saturdays out of the doors, and to admit authorized personnel having passes or whom they recognized as having duties to perform after regular working hours. They carried no firearms but were instructed to call the fire department in case of a fire or the police department in case of anyone trying to break into the place. One of these men actually had called the police on one occasion. On another occasion, Gorazd com- plained to President McTigue and later to the night-shift foreman about a mechanic who was developing a habit- of staying around a half hour or an hour after his shift 2 At pages 315, 317 and 318 of the transcript of record the name Urick (#27) has erroneously been spelled "Vuick " The transcript has accordingly been corrected to reflect the proper spelling. Another employee named Jerry Vuick is listed as # 70 in Joint Exh I No one has questioned the propriety of his inclusion in the appropriate unit. 3 The other three men in this category are P . Turock, C. Saunders, and A Miezo 122 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ended.4 They stopped this practice. It was also the duty of these men to answer the telephone and to perform cleanup services in the offices, salesroom, and lavatory of the build- ing in which they worked. They spent 60 or 70 percent of their time on cleanup duties and 30 or 40 percent on watch- man duties. On the basis of all the evidence I am persuaded that a substantial part of the duties of the four men involved work as guards "to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons on the employer' s premises" and that they therefore may not, under Section 9(b) of the Act, be includ- ed with nonguards in a bargaining unit. Augusta Chemical Co., 124 NLRB 1021, 1023-25; St. Regis Paper Company, 128 NLRB 550, 551-552; W. W. Chambers Co., Inc., 124 NLRB 984, 988. Moreover, even their nonguard duties- their custodial work-is not performed in the service de- partment and they have little contact with service depart- ment employees. Accordingly, even if they should not be considered as guards within the meaning of the statute, they lack a community of interest with the service department employees and for that reason should be excluded from the service department unit. Helms Motor Express, Inc., 107 NLRB 132, 135; J. Heber Lewis Oil Company, Inc., 123 NLRB 1115, 1116. b. The "custodial employees" listed by Respondent among those employees Respondent claims are appropri- ately within the unit consist of five, Ottavian, Haines, Baird, Duschel, and Milne, who do cleanup work in the service department area and one, McCrea, who spends 1-1/2 or 2 hours of his 5-hour day at cleanup work in the showroom and conference room. McCrea's duties and responsibilities clearly differenti- ate him from the other employees in this group. He is a social security annuitant who normally works 5 hours a day and 4 days a week. On his way to work he picks up the mail at the post office and delivers it to McTigue's office. He then puts out the flags, opens the showroom doors, cuts ads from papers and posts them on a bulletin board in the office and in the showroom, sweeps the showroom floor and also cleans the conference • room if the salesmen have had a meeting there, again goes to the post office for mail, runs errands at a drugstore or bank for office personnel, and makes daily deposits for Respondent at the bank. He does no work in connection with the service department and sees a service department employee only rarely when the latter comes into the showroom to charge a battery or clean wind- shields. He is supervised by McTigue, by the showroom manager, Stockman, and by the auditor, Hann, and not by any service department personnel. His custodial duties con- sume only about 1-1/2 or 2 hours a day. Most of his time is consumed with clerical or messenger rather than custodial duties and all of his duties are closely related to those of the office and sales personnel . I find that McCrea does not share any discernible community of interest with the service department employees and should not be included in the same unit with them. The other five custodial employees are regular part- 4 Gorazd testified that he was apprehensive that the mechanic, working alone, might get hurt For safety reasons, Respondent's practice was to forbid employees to work any in department alone. time employees who work exclusively at custodial work. They clean the areas used by the service department em- ployees and would therefore fall within the general category of service department employees . Although the Charging Union has not sought to organize them, does not normally include them in units with other service department employ- ees, and does not want them in that bargaining unit, Union Business Representative Bold testified that he has consent- ed that one custodial employee be included in the service department unit where an employer has insisted upon such inclusion in connection with consent election agreements. The Board, however, noted in Somerville Buick, Inc., 93 NLRB 1603, that both the Teamsters and Machinists Un- ions have in numerous cases involving automobile dealer- ships claimed to represent this class of employees and they have been included in the unit with other service employees. Moreover, it does not appear that any other union is seeking to represent the custodial employees separately and this consideration, in addition to the fact that the service depart- ment custodial employees do have some community of in- terest with other service department employees, leads me to conclude that they should be included in the same unit. Ideal Laundry and Dry cleaning Co., 152 NLRB 1130, 1134 -35, enfd. 372 F.2d 307 (C.A. 10); The Sheffield Corporation, 134 NLRB 1101, 1105. c. Employee Fisher, listed by Respondent as an em- ployee of the service department on February 10, 1971, was first employed by Respondent in January 1969, was laid off in November 1969, and was recalled in February 1970 but then declined to return. At his request in March 1970, how- ever, he was taken back and worked until October 1970, when he was again laid off. He had not been recalled by Respondent by the date of the Union's bargaining request; nor was he thereafter recalled . In November 1970 he ob- tained higher paying employment at another location but did not inform Respondent of this. Respondent carried him on its records as an employee in layoff status and he was covered by its fringe benefit insurance program through May 31, 1971. Prior to that date Respondent had received no notice that he had taken employment elsewhere and would not return . In these circumstances , it would appear that he had a reasonable expectancy of recall on the date of the bargaining request and should be considered as in the appropriate bargaining unit as of that date. d. Employee Pickens who, prior to 1967, worked for Respondent as a body shop foreman and as its service man- ager, is listed by Respondent as one of its three service assistants . The General Counsel, while not contending that the other two service assistants are improperly included in the bargaining unit, contends that Pickens ' status and duties are different from those of the other two and that he should be excluded from the unit because he does not share a community of interest with the other service department employees . Pickens is now an elderly man who regularly works for Respondent about 2 days a week and about 5 hours each of those days . He works with the warranty clerk, Sullivan, handling the orders on warranty work by drawing the record cards from Respondent's files, attaching them to the repair orders, and giving them to Sullivan for transmittal to the men who perform the repair work . Pickens works at a desk and does not normally have much contact with the BEYERL CHEVROLET, INC. men who actually service the cars. By reason of his past experience as body shop foreman and service manager, however, he offers advice to the men at times when an emergency or unusual situation arises. Also, because of his past valuable services, Respondent granted his request for the use of a company car when he started working part-time as one of the service assistants. The record does not show the duties of the other service assistants, who are concededly in the bargaining unit. I find that there is a sufficient com- munity of interest between Pickens and the other service department employees to warrant his inclusion in the same bargaining unit with them. I do not regard his past supervi- sory status or Respondent's loan to him of a company car for his personal use as factors justifying his exclusion from the unit to which the other service assistants belong. 2. The Union's majority status The list of service department employees with the in- clusions and exclusions noted in the preceding subsection of this Decision shows 10 body shop employees; 9 parts de- partment employees; 8 new- and used-car conditioner em- ployees; 3 service assistants; 4 service consultants; 32 mechanical shop employees; and 5 custodians-a total of 71 employees in the unit herein found to be appropriate. Union authorization cards signed by 38 of these 71 employees prior to February 10, 1971, were duly authenti- cated at the hearing by the employee who signed his card or by an employee who witnessed his signature on the card and received in evidence.5 The Union, therefore, had been designated by a majority of Respondent's employees in the unit herein found appropriate for purposes of collective 5 Thirty-one of these employees whose cards were not in controversy were received in evidence as G C. Exh. 5(1) through 5(3 I) The cards of the remaining employees are identified in the transcript of the record as follows. Carl Polhamus-GC 5 (32) (Polhamus credibly testified that his card, dated February 1, 1970, was in fact signed on February 1, 1971 ) Anthony Palanno, Jr.-GC 5 (32) (It was stipulated that this card, dated January 5, 1970, was in fact signed on January 5, 1971 ) Edwin Spiegel-GC 5 (34) (Respondent initially challenged the authen- ticity of the signature of this card but later withdrew its objection after talking to Spiegel ) Robert Brosius-GC 5 (35). (Respondent also initially challenged the authenticity of the signature on this card but later withdrew its objec- tion ) Ronald Salsgiver-GC 5 (36). (Employee Pyle witnessed the signature on this card and it was stipulated that the signature is authentic The name on this card does not appear from the transcript and has been supplied by the Trial Examiner from a descriptive list of the exhibits made at the hearing.) Harry Hadden-GC 5 (37) (This card is undated but employee Fannin credibly testified that he saw Hadden sign it at a union meeting in late December 1970 or early January 1971.) Robert Kowalczuk-GC 5 (38) (Kowaiczuk credibly testified that he initially signed a union card about January 15, 1971, at the request of employee Campbell, and that on September 22, 1971, upon being in- formed by Campbell that the card had been lost, signed another card- the one received in evidence-dating it January 15, 1971 His testimony was corroborated by Campbell, by employee Stahovic who received the card from Campbell and listed it on a slip of paper with other employees' cards received by him and turned over to Union Representative Schloer poor to February 10, 1971, and by Union Representative Schloer who received the original card from Stahovic ) All 38 cards were arranged in alphabetical order and marked by the reporter, seriatim, GC 5(A) through 5 (LL). The identity of these cards in the folder of exhibits has been corrected to conform to the transcript of record as above described. 123 bargaining by the date the Union requested recognition and bargaining and Respondent refused such request. D. Respondent's Acts of Interference, Restraint, and Coercion Prior to his layoff between December 3 and December 27, 1970, employee Ralph Stahovic had talked to his fellow mechanics about organizing and had taken a poll among the service department employees which convinced him that a majority of them wanted representation by the Union. Dur- ing the period of his layoff, he called the Union's business representative, Ted Bold, and they set up a union meeting for December 17. Only Stahovic and three other employees, Pyle, Green, and Fannin, attended the meeting. They signed union authorization cards and were given cards to distribute to other employees. Thereafter, as shown below, Respon- dent through a number of its management representatives engaged in numerous acts' of interference, restraint, and coercion designed to discourage the employees in their un- ion affiliation or adherence and to preclude a free choice in any representation election. 1. Interrogation, giving impression of surveillance, and threats of reprisal On December 27, 1970, Service Manager Coyne tele- phoned Stahovic, asking him to return to work on the next day. Either during the telephone conversation or when Sta- hovic returned the next morning, Coyne asked him if he was the "instigator" or "organizer, trying to organize a union." Stahovic replied, "not me," and inquired where Coyne got "that idea." Coyne replied that he just happened to hear it from someone but did not believe it. He refused to reveal the source of his information. Shortly thereafter, around the first of January 1971, Coyne called employees Green and Pyle to his desk, told them that he had heard they were trying to organize the shop, and asked them if they were the organizers. Green replied that he was not the organizer but was definitely prounion. Coyne told them that he understood they were passing out union cards. Green acknowledged that he was passing out cards. Coyne then asked if Green had a card. Green gave Coyne a card and asked if he wanted to sign it but Coyne declined. Pyle appeared upset by the questions Coyne was' asking. He assured Coyne that although he was not the instigator, he was definitely in favor of a union and asked Coyne who told him that he, Pyle, was one of the organizers. Coyne refused to divulge the source of his infor- mation and Pyle told him he did not like anyone "going behind [his] back" and making such an accusation. Coyne stated that of all people, he did not think that Pyle and Green would be involved with anything like that.6 Around that time, in late December or early January, Coyne called together about 18 or 19 shop employees. Ac- cording to employee Gunther's credited testimony, the fol- lowing took place: Well, he started out by saying that he heard rumors of 6 There is no substantial dispute concerning the facts set forth in the two preceding paragraphs, which are based on the testimony of Stahovic, Green, Pyle, and Coyne 124 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD trying to organize the union in the shop, he knew the guys that were behind it, and he knew the guys who signed cards and the ones who didn't, he told us at that time of the GM strike and we were slow and we could probably operate with four or five less men. He said you know that will affect the younger guys, they would have to go and that was about the extent of all that was said that day. Coyne denied threatening employees with a layoff if they brought the Union in and testified that he merely asked the employees whether they preferred a layoff or a short week. Respondent had already laid off some employees, including Stabovic, because of the GM strike which adversely affected its business and had recalled Stahovic. Coyne's mention of further layoffs or a reduction in hours at the same time he told the employees he knew who had signed union cards plainly warranted an inference by the employees that there might be a connection between the two events. In January, as employee Campbell was walking toward the timeclock at quitting time, Coyne approached him and said, "you know lust between you and I I think we got a union organizer down there." When Campbell asked who, Coyne named Ralph Stahovic. Campbell replied "Well I don't know" and left the shop. In February, Coyne approached employee Coudriet at his work station and remarked, "I understand that you are a union instigator." When Coudriet did not reply imme- diately, Coyne stated that he was surprised to learn that Coudriet was involved. Coudnet then told Coyne that he did not know what Coyne was talking about. On June 3, during Coyne's employment interview with- John Johns and while introducing him to Foreman Andy Rudolf, with whom it was expected Johns might be working on the following day, Coyne told Johns that Respondent's establishment was a nice place to work and Rudolf agreed. Coyne added, however, that Respondent was "having a little trouble right now" and had "a few troublemakers" who were trying to get a union started. He told Johns, "if you want some advice from me you will just stay away from these guys as much as you can and you won't get into any trouble." Foreman Rudolf volunteered, "if it was up to me, and if I knew who these fellows were ... you know what I would do" and at that point he made a gesture with his thumb. Coyne stated that he "had a pretty good idea" as to who some of them were but did not name anyone.' I find that the conduct of Service Manager Coyne in asking individual employees whether they or named fellow employees were the instigators or organizers of the Union and in telling some of them that he heard they were the 7 The above account is based on Johns' credited testimony Coyne denied mentioning the Union during this conversation and testified that he merely told Johns, "We're having some problems in the shop. Now, what I want you to do is do your work, mind your own business. If you have any problems, you come and see me." He did not recall Rudolf giving Johns "the thumb " He further testified that he did not know at that time who was trying to organize for the Union. Rudolf confirmed Johns' testimony to the extent that he agreed with the statement that Respondent was "a pretty good outfit to work for" but testified that to his "knowledge" he, Rudolf, had not made any gesture like giving someone the thumb and that no mention of the Union was made during that conversation Johns testified in a straightforward and convincing manner and I am satisfied that his recollection of the conversa- tions with Coyne and Rudolf was more accurate than theirs I credit Johns' account. organizers and expressing disappointment about their ac- tion when they acknowledged support or sympathy for the Union constituted coercive interrogation of the employees. I further find that Coyne's statements that he had heard certain employees were the organizers and knew the identity of those who had signed union cards, along with his refusal to divulge the source of his information, were designed to and did give the employees the impression that Respondent was engaging in surveillance of the employees' union activi- ties.8 I also find that Coyne's statement to the 18 or 19 assembled employees that Respondent could probably get along with 4 or 5 less men, at the same time he told the employees that the Respondent knew which employees had signed union cards, and Foreman Rudolf's statement to new employee Johns that he would give the thumb to the employee organizers if he knew who they were, after Coyne had advised the new employee to stay away from the "trou- blemakers" who were trying to get a union started, consti- tuted veiled threats of reprisal against employees for engaging in union activities. All this conduct was clearly in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. Foreman Giles' threatened loss of benefits and other coercive conduct In February, Donald Giles, foreman over used-car body reconditioning, told employees Lawrence and Burton that Respondent had been good to them and that if the Union became their bargaining representative, they would have to pay for their hospitalization and uniforms. He ad- vised them not to sign union cards if they had not already done so. Respondent currently pays the cost of its employ- ees' uniforms and hospitalization and life insurance. Later, in September, Giles approached a group of em- ployees who were standing in the used-car department about lunchtime and asked one of them, Thompson, what he thought of the union situation. Thompson replied that he was not very well informed about the situation. Giles then stated that it was his understanding that if the Union came in, the employees would be required to pay half the cost of their uniforms and their hospitalization and life insur- ance.9 Giles also told employee Kowalczuk the same thing later in September. I find, as alleged in the complaint, that Respondent through Foreman Giles threatened employees with a loss of benefits if they selected the Union as their bargaining repre- sentative and that this constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In about April Foreman Giles was sitting at the bar in a restaurant talking about the Union to employee Stanger- one when employee Coudriet joined them. After Stangerone 8 American National Stores, Inc, 195 NLRB No 3, Associated Mills, Inc, 190 NLRB No 8 9 The above findings are based upon the credited testimony of employees Campbell and Thompson Giles admitted asking Thompson, "What's hap- pening with the Union9" and adding, "Paid uniforms and paid hospitaliza- tion," but testified that he said nothing further and that both of them laughed He testified that he did not remember what he said to Campbell but denied telling any employee he would have to pay a portion of the cost of his insurance or uniforms. It does not sound reasonable to me that Giles would merely have said "Paid uniforms and paid hospitalization," as he testified, without any explanation as to what he meant. I find the testimony of Campbell and Thompson more convincing and I credit it BEYERL CHEVROLET, INC. 125 left, Giles told Coudriet that a mutual friend of theirs was mad at him for being antiunion. He explained to Coudriet that he was not in fact antiunion but did not want to get involved. He added, "you know, the company has the names of all the people that signed cards and ... there is five or six guys that had better watch their step."" I find, as alleged in the complaint, that Respondent through Fore- man Giles on this occasion indicated to Coudriet that Re- spondent was keeping its employees' union activities under surveillance, and that his statements, particularly in warn- ing that five or six of the employees had better watch their steps, were clearly coercive and in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. The meetings called by Vice President Grimes Within a few days after the union representatives, on February 10, had called upon Respondent's president, Mc- Tigue, and requested recognition and bargaining, manage- ment representatives decided that Vice President Grimes should call meetings of the service department employees to inform them of the demand and to ascertain the basis of the employees' dissatisfaction. The employees were called to the lunchroom in the early afternoon by Service Manager Coyne and told that Grimes had heard something from some union people and wanted "to get ideas as to what it [was] all about." Grimes then took charge of the meeting and told the employees about the visit of the two union representatives to Mc- Tigue's office, claiming to represent the employees, and McTigue's referral of the matter to Respondent' s counsel. He stated that Respondent had always operated in a family atmosphere and wanted to keep it that way. He gave as an example of the family atmosphere that if an employee had a friend or relative who needed work, he could sometimes get the friend or relative a job with Respondent, but that if the Union came in, it would be harder to do so. I t Grimes asked the employees why they were dissatisfied or unhappy and whether they and management could not settle things among themselves. The complaints then aired by the em- ployees and management's disposition of the complaints is described below: Respondent's pay system: Respondent's standard prac- tice was to pay a higher rate of pay for what was termed productive time (for which the customer could be billed) than for nonproductive time. In early December 1970, due to economic hardships caused by the General Motors strike then in progress, the employees were told that they would be paid only for productive time. This meant that the em- ployees might be paid for only part of their 8-hour workday. At the meeting with Grimes, employee Brinley asked, "Are we on the productive rate system or do we go back to our 10 The above finding is based upon the credited testimony of Coudriet, not specifically denied by Giles 11 Coyne at first testified that Gnmes told the employees that if the Union came in, Respondent "would not be able" to give an employee 's friend or relative a job when an opening was available but he later corrected his testimony by stating that Gnmes said it "would be harder" to do this In any event, it would appear, as the General Counsel contends, that Grimes' state- ment constituted a threat of loss of benefit if the Union became the employ- ees' bargaining representative and was therefore in violation of Sec 8(a)(l) of the Act. standard system of being paid our hourly rate." Gnmes replied that he did not know and asked Service Manager Coyne to answer this question. Coyne assured Brinley, "don't worry, it has all been taken care of." Brinley never- theless insisted on a more precise answer, whereupon Grimes said, "I don't care what it was before ... right now, if you work 8 hours you get paid for 8 hours."12 Parts department problem: Another employee com- plained that mechanics were having to lose too much pro- ductive time lining up and waiting for parts in the parts department while employees there were answering the tele- phones or waiting on customers. Grimes agreed that this was an unsatisfactory situation and asked Parts Manager Ottavian if something could not be done about it. Ottavian said that the situation could be improved some if there was only one telephone line to the parts department and a man was assigned to answering that phone. This suggested im- provement was instituted during the following week. Al- though the problem of mechanics having to wait for parts has not been entirely solved yet, the situation has improved some. Diesel fumes: Employee Carlson complained about the diesel fumes in the shop and the inadequate exhaust system for drawing the fumes out, a problem about which the em- ployees had theretofore complained and on which Respon- dent had been working intermittently for years. Grimes asked Mechanical Service Foreman Baird what could be done about the problem. Baird replied that he had ordered larger hose or pipes which would fit over the exhaust pipes of the diesels and would have them installed. The pipes had arrived shortly after the first of the year 1971 or at least prior to the meeting but had not yet been installed, according to Baird, because he would have to use his own maintenance men to make the adapters required to install the pipes and the men would have to do this in between production sched- ules. Grimes told the men that the exhaust problem would be taken care of and the pipes were installed within 10 days or 2 weeks thereafter. Electrical outlets: Employees Carlson and Pyle brought out the fact that all the welding on tractors and trailers was having to be done inside the shop, even in good weather, because outside electrical outlets, which at one time had been started, had never been completed. They complained of the welding flashes in the shop. Grimes promised to get the electrical contractor back on the premises to finish this work and the work was in fact done about a week later. Toolroom problem: Employee Pyle complained that the mechanics were having a hard time making a full productive 8-hour day because they had to spend too much time hunt- ing needed tools in the toolroom. Grimes asked if there was not a toolman in the toolroom to take care of this problem and when Pyle explained that Respondent no longer had a toolroom employee, Grimes asked Baird and Coyne to see about getting such an employee back. Within about a week thereafter a toolroom employee was supplied. Movement of tractors. and trailers in and out of the shop: 12 It is not clear from the record whether Respondent before the meeting had gone back to its standard system of paying employees. Those employees who had recently been working 8 hours a day on productive work would have had no occasion to know if the system had changed. In any event, it is clear that no announcement had been made prior to the meeting that Respondent was back on its standard system 126 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Pyle also complained that for about the last month, since Respondent had fenced in its premises and kept the lower gate locked, the employees were unable to turn their trucks and trailers around and get them in and out of the shop without backing them onto the highway-an obviously un- safe practice. Grimes promised to see what could be done about this movement problem and shortly thereafter the lower gate was opened so that the trucks and trailers could make a loop around the building to get in and out. Prior to the meeting, Pyle had complained to Foreman Baird, Service Manager Coyne, and Showroom General Manager Stockman about the problem but nothing had been done to alleviate it. The ladder problem: Employee Green told Grimes that he had been asking for 4 or 5 years that management furnish a good strong ladder on which the men could climb to the top of the trailers on which it was necessary that they fre- quently weld and that the maintenance man's ladder which they had been using was extremely unsafe to use. Grimes instructed Foreman Baird to furnish the men with a good wooden ladder and this was furnished within about 3 days after the meeting. Vacuum cleaner: Green also suggested that Grimes pro- vide "black lung benefits" for the shop employees because of the clouds of dust arising and polluting the air throughout the shop whenever the high -pressure airhose was used in connection with cleaning around the rear wheels when they were removed from the tractor trailers . Green explained that a vacuum cleaner was needed for this cleaning job. Baird or Coyne promised to furnish such a vacuum cleaner and it was brought to the shop from the used-car depart- ment that same day or, the next . Other mechanics had com- plained to Baird and Coyne about the dust problem on prior occasions but nothing had been done about it. Pension plan: Employee Stahovic complained that Respondent's pension plan was inadequate and mentioned that one employee who was about to retire would receive only $32 a month . Grimes replied that he and President McTigue were constantly researching and trying to improve on such matters. Although it may be true, as Respondent asserts, that Respondent had in the past occasionally held meetings of its employees and invited a discussion of their problems or grievances, this practice had been abandoned and no such meeting had been held during the period of about 6 months prior to the Union's bargaining demand . Respondent had discontinued such meetings because of a lack of participa- tion by the employees in them . The record leaves no room for doubt that the February meeting called by Vice Presi- dent Grimes only a few days after the Union's request for recognition and bargaining, and prefaced by Grimes' in- quiry whether Respondent and the employees could not settle their differences among themselves rather than through a union, was motivated by Respondent 's desire to discourage the employees' interest in or allegiance to the Union. Respondent sought to do this by soliciting their complaints and promising to eliminate, insofar as it could, the dissatisfaction which had caused a majority of the em- ployees to join the Union. It is well settled that conduct of this type constitutes unlawful interference with the employ- ees' organizational rights protected by the statute and was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act . N.L.R.B. v. Ex- change Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 ; Olin Conductors, 185 NLRB No. 56; Jerry Davidson Buick Sales & Service, Inc., 172 NLRB No. 203. Moreover, to the extent that Respondent remedied these solicited complaints by actually making changes in the employees ' working conditions, its conduct was additionally and independently violative of Section 8(a)(1). Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 171 NLRB 293. 4. President McTigue's speech and distribution of rule books on March 25, 1971 On March 25 President McTigue called meetings of the service department employees immediately after work. Af- ter presenting some of the employees with Chevrolet techni- cian awards and service pins , he distributed to all the employees a manual or rule booklet in which was set forth certain company policies and rules, most of which McTigue testified were already being followed, but some of which were new or revised rules. He read to the employees a pre- pared speech on the subject of the Union's attempt to get the employees to sign authorization cards and warned the employees, inter alia, that an employee who signs such a card "relinquishes numerous rights and privileges which he has as an individual to deal with his employer , as he may see fit, concerning his job and his future," and "puts his individual rights in the hands of third parties or strangers." He also referred to or read from that part of "Beyerl Chev- rolet Policy Statement" on page 1 of the booklet in which the employees were warned "that where unions are , is where strikes happen" and were told that five other named Chev- rolet dealerships had suffered long strikes or had closed because of unions . The written speech and policy statement, though not alleged to be unlawfully coercive, are definitely antiunion in tone and warranted the employees in inferring an antiunion motivation for some of the policies or rules included in the booklet . The General Counsel has pointed out several provisions which he contends constitute unlaw- ful interference with the employees' organizational rights. These are considered below: Good Friday: Prior to 1971, it had been Respondent's practice to grant employees 3 hours off , at their request, to attend church services on Good Friday without any loss of pay. In the policy, statement booklet, employees were given a half day (4 hours) paid holiday on Good Friday and those employees who preferred to work were paid double for the 4 hours they worked. In prior years if they worked on Good Friday during the 3 hours they could have taken off, they were paid only for the 3 hours. It is a fair inference, and I find, that the grant of this benefit to the employees follow- ing the Union's demand for recognition and in the context of Respondent's expressed opposition to the Union had the natural effect of chilling unionism among the employees and was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act . N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405. Rule restricting movement of employees: Rule No. 3, Group I, page 16, of the booklet prohibits "Leaving own department during working hours without permission of supervisor, except for use of restrooms or lunch ." The pen- alties provided for violations of this rule were : "First Of- fense: Written reprimand and/or suspension for a period of BEYERL CHEVROLET, INC. one week without pay" and "Second Offense: Termination of employment." It is clear from the credited and undisput- ed testimony of employees Stahovic and Green that no such rule had existed prior to March 25 and that employees had freely moved from one department to another for personal or other reasons without requesting permission from their supervisors and without being reprimanded for doing so. Rule restricting use of bulletin boards: Rule No. 7, Group I , page 16, prohibited "Posting or removal of notices, signs or writing in any form on any bulletin boards on company property without permission of the management." The same penalties were provided for violations of this rule as were provided for violations of the rule restricting the movement of employees . It is clear from the record that no such restrictions had been placed upon the employees' use of the bulletin boards prior to March 25 . The employees had freely used these bulletin boards for the posting of cartoons, letters, the listing of items for sale, and other matters. Al- though McTigue had occasionally removed matters which he considered offensive , he concededly had not in the past attempted to censor matters before they were posted. By imposing upon employees these restrictive rules, Respondent not only violated its duty to bargain with the Union about these changes in working conditions of its employees but otherwise tended to chill unionism by requir- ing management's permission to post such things as union notices and to move from one department to another on union business, contrary to prior practice. Respondent's institution of these rules were therefore in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent 's establishment of an employee committee to handle grievances and other employee problems: Respondent's rule book also established a formal grievance procedure which had theretofore been nonexistent at the dealership. It provided for a Step One in which the employee was to present his grievance within a prescribed time directly to his immediate supervisor and for a Step Two in which the griev- ance, if not settled at the first step, would be presented within a prescribed time to higher management. A griev- ance form to be used for Step One was attached to the back of the rules booklet . McTigue conceded that Respondent had never prior to March 25 had any formal grievance procedure . He testified that his door has always been open to anyone wanting to discuss any grievance or problem and is still open and that no employee has yet used the formal grievance procedure but that it is available to him if he wants to use it. The rules booklet at page 19 provides: Indirectly allied to the grievance procedure is an em- ployee committee representing all departments . Infor- mal, 30-minute meetings are held once a month with the service manager . The six committee men (rotated every month) by seniority in each department bring up whatever individual or shop problem they choose. There is no formal agenda . The objective is not to supplant the grievance procedure , but to supplement it. Minutes from each meeting are posted on company bulletin boards. One representative from the following groups will attend. There are then listed the six service employee departments and the "Service Manager and all foremen." It was also 127 provided that "Management will sit in whenever request- ed." It is undisputed that no employee committee had ex- isted prior to the publication of the rules booklet . McTigue told the employees at the March 25 meeting that the griev- ance procedure and the employee committee were some- thing new and that the employees would have a committee of six in each department . He asked them to take the book- let home and study it and stated that he would have another meeting shortly thereafter "for any explanations that were necessary." On advice of his present counsel, however, Mc- Tigue did not call another meeting of the employees and the committeemen provided for in the rules booklet had not been appointed by the date of the hearing. The provisions for this committee, as well as the formal grievance proce- dure, however, remain in the rules booklet as a part of Respondent's policy to deal with its employees through an employer sponsored and dominated committee rather than through a freely chosen labor organization . This Respon- dent clearly could not lawfully do. And its attempt to foist such a committee upon its employees was a clear violation of Section 8(a)(1). N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203; N L.R.B. v. Norfolk Southern Bus Corporation, 159 F.2d 516, 517-518 (C.A. 4), cert. denied 330 U.S. 844. 5. The alleged restrictive change in policy regarding work by employees on own cars It is the general Counsel's contention that in March 1971 in order to make the employees' working conditions more onerous because of their union sympathies , Service Manager Coyne started requiring the employees to obtain a work or repair order before being permitted to work in the shop on their own cars during their nonworking time. It is undisputed, however, that Respondent did have a policy, announced and posted on its bulletin boards on February 6, 1967, which required employees to obtain written permis- sion from Service Manager Coyne before doing any work in the shop on their own cars and which forbade any em- ployee (for safety reasons) to work in the service department alone at any time. The written permission was usually in the form of a work order . I have no doubt, as employee Stahovic testified, that he and other employees had in fact in more recent times worked on their own cars in the shop without a work order, but this fact, I am convinced, was merely the result of a careless laxity in the enforcement of Respondent's policy and not a deliberate nonenforcement or abandonment of the policy. In these circumstances, I do not infer any antiunion motivation in Coyne 's statement to several of the employees in March 1971 that they must obtain repair orders for work on their own cars. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent has violated Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act by coercively interrogating employees about their own and their fellow employees' union leadership or sympathies; by making statements designed to give the employees the im- pression that Respondent was engaging in surveillance of their union activities ; by making veiled threats of layoff or other reprisals because of the employees' selection of the 128 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Union; by threatening a loss of paid uniforms and hospitali- zation and life insurance if the employees selected the Un- ion to represent them; by soliciting employee complaints which had caused the employees to select a union to repre- sent them; by promising to remedy the complaints and by actually remedying most of them; by granting its employees an additional holiday pay on Good Friday in order to dis- courage their union allegiance; by inaugurating rules re- stricting the normal movement of its employees from one department to another and their customary use of company bulletin boards in order to impede the employees' union activities; and by providing for its employees, as a part of its published employer policy, a committee to be created by the Respondent, and in which employees were to partic- ipate, to handle employee grievances and other problems. 2. At all material times, the Union has been the exclu- sive bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in the following appropriate bargaining unit: All service department employees at Respondent's Monroeville, Pennsylvania, dealership including all auto mechanics, body and fendermen, apprentices, helpers, lubricators, lot boys, reconditioners, partsmen, parts truck drivers, and car jockeys; but excluding all office clerical employees, salesmen, watchmen and guards, professional employees, and supervisors as de- fined in the Act. 3. By refusing on February 10, 1971, and at all times thereafter to bargain collectively with the Union as the ex- clusive representative of all the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in and is engag- ing in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 4. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY, NECESSITY FOR A BARGAINING ORDER It having been found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, my recommended Order will require that Re- spondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain af- firmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. Respondent, while conceding that it has refused to bar- gain with the Union, asserts that a bargaining order, under the criteria spelled out by the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Company, 395 U.S. 575, is not warranted. I do not agree. In refusing to bargain with the Union on and after February 10, 1971, Respondent, I am convinced, was not motivated by any good-faith doubt as to the Union's major- ity status in an appropriate bargaining unit but, rather, by a rejection of the principle of collective bargaining and a desire to dissipate the Union's strength. Respondent not only refused the Union's offer to prove its majority status through a card check by an impartial third party and failed to file any representation petition with the Board to resolve any doubts it belatedly asserted at the hearing but also immediately intensified its campaign to interfere with, re- strain, and coerce its employees in the exercise of their organizational rights. It did this by the use of both the carrot and the stick. Thus, while continuing to give the impression that it was engaging in surveillance of the employees' union activities, it made veiled threats of reprisals against employees for engaging in union activities, warned a new employee to stay away from the union troublemakers, threatened that if the Union was their bargaining representative, employees would have to pay all or parts of the cost of their uniforms and their hospitalization and life insurance, the total cost of which Respondent was then itself paying, threatened that with the advent of the Union it would be harder for employ- ees to get jobs with Respondent for their friends and rela- tives, and inaugurated rules prohibiting the employees, on the penalty of reprimand, suspension, or discharge, from continuing their long established practice of moving freely from department to department and of using company bul- letin boards without prior permission from management. At the same time, as an inducement to the employees to reject union representation, Respondent solicited its employees to air the complaints which had caused them to want a union to represent them and promised to try to do something about the complaints. It did soon thereafter remedy the complaints in whole or in part-though the employees had theretofore sought, without success, to have them resolved. Respondent also granted its employees an extra 4-hour paid holiday on Good Friday and presented them with a formal grievance procedure and a plan for an employee committee to handle their grievances and other problems-an obvious attempt to furnish a substitute for the Union which the employees had already chosen as their bargaining repre- sentative. The cumulative effect of this wide range of unfair labor practices had a natural effect of dissipating the Union's majority status and was, in my view, sufficiently serious to make it doubtful, if not impossible, that a fair election can be held in the near future at which the employees can ex- press a free choice as to bargaining representation. Al- though some of Respondent's unfair labor practices can readily be remedied by compliance with the traditional cease-and-desist type of order, some of Respondent's other unlawful conduct-such as its improvement of the employ- ees' working conditions in response to their complaints which Respondent had solicited and its grant of the extra one-half day holiday-is not so easily susceptible to reme- dy. As a practical matter, the Board does not normally require an employer to take back from employees the bene- fits it has unlawfully granted them in order to defeat a union and I shall not in this case require Respondent to do so.13 Under all the circumstances, I find that the employees' choice of a bargaining representative as evidenced by the cards which they signed is more likely to reliably reflect 13 Respondent will, however, be required by my recommended Order to rescind and delete from its rules booklet those provisions setting up a formal grievance procedure and an employee committee to handle the grievances and other employee problems. It will also be required to rescind and delete from its rules booklet the rules restricting movements of its service depart- ment employees and their use of company bulletin boards. BEYERL CHEVROLET, INC. their free choice than would an election and that a bargain- ing order is necessary to remedy Respondent's unlawful refusal to bargain with the Union . But independently of the necessity of such an order to remedy the 8(a)(5) violation, I find that a bargaining order is necessary and appropriate to remedy the serious 8(a)(1) violations herein found . Ameri- can National Stores, Inc., 195 NLRB No. 3; General Stencils, Inc., 195 NLRB No. 173. Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law, and the entire record herein , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, it is recommended that there be issued the following.14 ORDER Beyerl Chevrolet, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a)Coercively interrogating employees about their own or their fellow employees' union activities or sympathies. (b) Making statements designed to give the employees the impression that Respondent is engaging in surveillance of their union activities. (c) Threatening layoffs or other reprisals against em- ployees because of their selection of International Associa- tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No. 63, AFL-CIO, to represent them. (d) Threatening loss of paid uniforms, paid hospitaliza- tion and life insurance premiums, or other benefits because of the selection by employees of the Union to represent them. (e) Soliciting, or promising to remedy, employee com- plaints for the purpose of influencing its employees to reject representation by the Union. (f) Granting extra paid holiday time or other improve- ments in working conditions for the purpose of influencing employees to reject the Union as their bargaining represent- ative, provided, however, that nothing herein shall be con- strued as requiring Respondent to withdraw, change or abandon any benefits or improved working conditions cur- rently enjoyed by its employees. (g) Inaugurating rules restricting the movement of em- ployees at Respondent's dealership and their use of Respondent's bulletin boards in order to impede the em- ployees' union activities. (h) Presenting or suggesting to its employees a plan for a formal grievance procedure or an employee committee to handle their grievances and other problems. (i) Refusing to bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the following unit found to be appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining: All service department employees at Respondent's Monroeville, Pennsylvania, dealership including all auto mechanics, body and fendermen, apprentices, helpers, lubricators, lot boys, reconditioners, partsmen, parts truck drivers, and car jockeys; but excluding all office clerical employees, salesmen, watchmen and guards, professional employees and Supervisors as de- fined in the Act. (j) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaran- 129 teed under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Rescind and delete from its rules booklet issued on March 25, 1971, those provisions which set up a formal grievance procedure and an employee committee to handle employee grievances and other problems and also those rules which restrict the movement of its service department employees and their use of Respondent's bulletin boards. (b) Upon request, bargain collectively with Interna- tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge No. 63, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargain- ing representative of its employees in the unit set forth above. (c) Post at its Monroeville, Pennsylvania, dealership copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."15 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 6, shall, after being duly signed by the Respon- dent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to em- ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify said Regional Director in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply here herewith.16 14 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided Sec. 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, con- clusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all yurposes 1 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " i6 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with International Association of Machinists and Aero- space Workers, District Lodge No. 63, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of our employees in the following appropriate unit: All service department employees at our Monroe- ville, Pennsylvania, dealership including all auto me- chanics, body and fendermen, apprentices, helpers, lubricators, lot boys, reconditioners, partsmen, parts truck drivers, and carjockeys; but excluding all of- fice clerical employees, salesmen, watchmen and 130 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL rescind and delete from our rules booklet issued on March 25, 1971, those provisions which set up a formal grievance procedure and an employee committee to handle employee grievances and other problems; WE WILL also rescind and delete from that booklet those rules which restrict the movement of our employees and their use of our bulletin boards. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees about their own or their fellow employees' union activi- ties or sympathies. WE WILL NOT make statements designed to give our employees the impression that we are engaging in sur- veillance of their union activities. WE WILL NOT threaten layoffs or other reprisals against our employees because of their selection of the Union to represent them. WE WILL NOT threaten loss of paid uniforms, paid hospitalization and life insurance premiums, or any other benefits because of the selection by our employ- ees of the Union to represent them. WE WILL NOT solicit or promise to remedy employee complaints for the purpose of influencing our employ- ees to reject representation by the Union. WE WILL NOT grant improvements in the working conditions of our employees for the purpose of influ- encing them to reject representation by the Union, pro- vided, however, that nothing herein shall be construed as requiring us to withdraw, change, or abandon any benefits or improved working conditions currently en- joyed by our employees. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their organizational rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. Dated By BEYERL CHEVROLET, INC (Employer) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 1536 Federal Building, 1000 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222, Telephone 412-644-2977.