202 NLRB 335
State Radiator Co.
STATE RADIATOR COMPANY
David E. Weber, d/b/a State Radiator Company and
International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, District Lodge No. 94, AFL-CIO.
Cases 21-CA-10923 and 21-CA-11116
March 12, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On November 16, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
David E. Davis issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent David E. Web-
er, d/b/a State Radiator Company, filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and counsel for General
Counsel filed a brief in answer to the exceptions
thereto.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board, has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified
herein.
We find merit in General Counsel's exception that,
though the Administrative Law Judge recited the
pertinent testimony of employees Burke, Alexander,
Able, and Ball, he failed to make a specific finding
that these conversations constituted coercive interro-
gation in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
Amended Conclusions of Law
1.
Add to Conclusion of Law 3 immediately after
the word "Respondent," the following: "in violation
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act."
2.
Add to Conclusion of Law 4 the following: "(e)
Interrogation of employees concerning their union
activities a4d sympathies."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, David E. Weber,
d/b/a State Radiator Company, Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Administrative
Law Judge's recommended Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
335
DAVID E. DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge: This
consolidated proceeding was heard by me on September
20, 1972, at Los Angeles, California, on a consolidated
complaint issued on August 25, 1972,1 by the Regional
Director for Region 21 of the National Labor Relations
Board, herein called the Board, pursuant to charges filed
by International Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers District Lodge No. 94, AFL-CIO, herein called
IAM or Charging Party, on May 4,2 in Case 21-CA-10923,
and on July 17,3 in Case 21-CA-11116. The charges, as
amended, alleged that State Radiator Company, Respon-
dent herein, had engaged in unfair labor practices since
March by refusing to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)
(1) and (5) and had, on or about April 23, discharged Lee
Burke, an employee, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3).
Respondent's answer admitted certain allegations of the
consolidated complaint, but denied it had engaged in any
unfair labor practices.
Upon the entire record,4 my observation of the witness-
es, and upon careful consideration of General Counsel's
brief and Respondent Counsel's oral argument, I make the
following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
David E. Weber, Respondent herein, is, and has been at
all times material herein, the sole proprietor of the firm
doing business under the name State Radiator Company.
Respondent is engaged in the business of repairing
automobile and truck radiators in Los Angeles, California.
During the course and conduct of its operations , Respon-
dent performs services valued in excess of $50,000 for
customers located in the State of California, each of which
purchases and receives products directly from points
located outside the State of California valued in excess of
$50,000 annually, or causes products valued in excess of
$50,000 annually to be delivered directly to customers
located outside the State of California. As the foregoing
allegations of the consolidated complaint were not denied
by Respondent's answer, I find them to be admitted.
Accordingly, it is found that Respondent is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act and that it would effectuate the purposes
of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The consolidated complaint alleges, Respondent's an-
swer does not deny, and I find that
International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Dis-
I Hereafter all dates will refer to the calendar year 1972 unless otherwise
specified.
2 Served on Respondent on May 5.
3 Served on Respondent on August 18, amended on August 24, and
served on Respondent on August 25.
4 The record stands corrected in certain particulars.
202 NLRB No. 32
336
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
trict Lodge No. 94, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A.
Prefatory Statement
Respondent and the IAM have been parties to a series of
collective-bargaining agreements for approximately 10
years. The latest of these agreements5 was effective April 1,
1969, and expired by its terms on April 1. Shortly prior to
the expiration date and for a period of time thereafter, the
evidence shows that Respondent engaged in certain
conduct described below, which tended to undermine the
IAM's majority status and violated Section 8 (a)(1) of the
Act by interfering with employees' rights under Section 7
of the Act.
These acts in turn were advanced by
Respondent as an excuse for its refusal to enter into
negotiations for a new collective-bargaining agreement in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. In addition, the
complaint alleged and evidence was introduced, as
described below, to show that Respondent discharged one
employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Respondent did not call any witnesses to refute the
evidence of the General Counsel but relied upon oral
argument contending that the General Counsel had failed
to prove that Respondent had engaged in any unfair labor
practices . As I find below, contrary
to
Respondent's
contentions, that the General Counsel has in fact proved a
strong prima facie case, it is further found that the General
Counsel has indeed sustained the burden of proof required
by law to prove the allegations of the complaint.
B.
Alleged 8(a)(1), Interference, Restraint, and
Coercion
Marvin
Wedell testified that he was employed by
Respondent from April 11 to July 25; that about 1 week
after
he commenced his employment, Foreman Jack
McCrary told him that they were circulating a petition to
get the Union out of the shop as the boss could not
compete with other shops that were not union. McCrary
then said that if he wanted to sign the petition, Sam Luna,
another employee, would be coming around with a petition
in a few days .6 A few days later, Luna approached Wedell
and said he had been selected by the boss to pass around
the petition to get the Union out and to sign it "if you want
an election to get the Union out." Wedell signed the
petition.? I find that Luna on this occasion was Respon-
dent's agent thereby Respondent further violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. On cross-examination, Wedell testified
that prior to his conversation with McCrary, referred to
above, he had heard from other employees that the plant
was a union shop.
Lee Burke, an employee from July 1969 until his
discharge on April 13, testified that he was classified as a
general radiator mechanic; that Weber approached him in
the work area a few days before April 1 and said that the
Company was negotiating with the Union for a new
contract; and that if the Union "stayed in," he would have
to close the shop. Weber added that the Union was not
going to do anything for the men and that the money paid
to the Union by the men and himself could be added to
their paychecks. Burke replied that the Union had been
doing a "pretty good job for us," and that he (Burke) was
not in favor of getting rid of the Union because it meant
security. Burke also told Weber that he would not sign
anything to get rid of the Union. The conversation
concluded with both Weber and Burke becoming angry. A
little later, while Burke was on a break having coffee with
three other employees, Weber approached and asked the
group8 if they had made up their minds about the Union.
Burke said he still felt that they needed a union. Weber,
asked by Ball what kind of benefits he would grant, said he
couldn't give them anything in writing but would check
around to see what other shops were doing. Burke
continued to assert he was in favor of the Union and
wouldn't vote the Union out. On cross-examination, Burke
testified that after the incidents described above, Weber
mentioned to him that he had been absent several times.
Clarence Alexander testified that he was in his fourth
year of employment with Respondent; that he was a
radiator mechanic, and was a member of IAM; that he was
the shop steward; that on March 21, Weber called him into
his office and handed him a papers with figures purporting
to show how much the employees were paying the Union
and how much Weber was paying the Union by way of
contributions; that Weber mentioned that a new contract
was coming up; that he was asking the employees to get
out of the Union because the money being paid to the
Union could be put into the employees' pockets; that
Weber said that if the employees remained in the Union,
Weber could not compete with other radiator shops and
would have to sell the business or shut the doors; that later
that evening Weber gave him another paper 10 asking him
to pass it around and have the men sign it. Alexander took
the paper, showed it to some of the men, and then put it
into a drawer of his desk. Continuing his testimonial
account, Alexander said that later he notified Crago of the
incidents; that about a week later Weber again called him
into his office and showed him another paper" with some
figures on it; that Weber on this occasion said that the
figures represented the total Weber had to pay out a year;
that about a week later Weber called a shop meeting of the
men;12 that Weber said at this meeting that he was asking
if they would sign to get out of the Union because he could
distribute to the men the money he was paying to the
Union; that they could also have in their own pockets the
money they were paying to the Union; that if they
remained in the Union, he could not compete with other
shops and would have to sell the business; that if there was
a strike, he would sell the business and that he presently
had opportunities to sell the business. Alexander also
5G.CExh9
6 Foreman Crary's conduct is clearly violative of Sec. 8(a)(1) as it
interferes with an employee's rights guaranteed by Sec. 7 of the Act It is so
found
7GCExh2.
8 The group consisted of Burke, Clarence Alexander, Robert Able, and
Ernest Ball
9 G. C. Exh. 6.
10 G. C Exh 7
11GCExh.8.
12 Able and Burke were absent
STATE RADIATOR COMPANY
337
testified that a few days later, Alexander overheard Weber
talking with Able and Burke, repeating what he had said at
the meeting of employees that was held when they were
absent; that Weber also asked if all the men were in the
Union and what they decided to do about it; that Able at
this point walked away and left Burke talking to Weber.
On cross-examination, Alexander testified that Weber
had called him in to talk about the expiration of the union
contract because Weber thought Alexander had influence
with the men.
Robert Able, a helper in the employ of Respondent since
April 1971, testified that Sam Luna contacted him about
signing a petition to oust the Union; that Alexander told
him that Weber had given him such a petition; that
Alexander had shown him the paper but did not ask him to
sign it; that he was present at the employee meeting when
Burke was present; that Weber on that occasion asked
them to drop the Union; that Weber said that if this was
done it would benefit them by putting more money in their
pockets; that Burke said he was for the Union and that
Ball had asked Weber how the employees would benefit.
Ernie Ball testified that he has been in the employ of
Respondent as a helper for the past 2 1/2 years; that
Alexander told him about the petition' Weber gave him;
and that he was present at both meetings of employees
when Weber attempted to persuade the employees to drop
out of the Union; Ball's testimony concerning the various
statements made by Weber at these meetings corroborated
the testimony of Able, Alexander, and Burke.
The evidence recited above is uncontradicted in the
record and the General Counsel's witnesses impressed me
as being worthy of credit. I, therefore, find that Respon-
dent by coercing employees, by promising benefits to
employees, by threatening employees with reprisals, and by
attempting to dissuade employees from continuing their
support of the Union, interfered with the employees' rights
guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act and thereby
engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
C.
Alleged 8(a)(3) Allegation; The Discharge of
Burke
The record discloses that Burke was most articulate in
voicing
his
open opposition to
Weber's attempts to
persuade the employees to withdraw from the Union.
Burke, a journeyman mechanic, had been in Respondent's
employ for almost 3 years. There is no evidence to
demonstrate that Burke's work was deficient or that his
absences
were
more numerous than those of other
employees or that his absences were not excused. Never-
theless, Burke was discharged on April 13 without any
prior notification. McCrary told Burke at the close of
business that day that he was being laid off because work
was slow. However, there was no evidence to show that
work, in fact, was any slower than it had been for several
months previously. When Burke filed for unemployment
insurance benefits, he was denied benefits because his
employer, Respondent herein, had reported that Burke had
walked off the job. The evidence adduced at this hearing
shows that Burke did not walk off the job at anytime and
that he left early on occasion with the permission of
management because there was no work. In addition to the
above reasons for Burke's discharge, Weber told Crago
that Burke was continually being garnished and that he
had paid off on Burke's behalf a number of times so that
he would not take Burke back after he had walked off the
job.
The shifting defenses and reasons for Burke's
discharge hardly constitute a rebuttal of the credited
evidence on the record.
The evidence shows that Weber and Burke had argued
several times concerning the employees' continued adher-
ence to the Union and on one occasion at least the
argument was quite heated .
It was also shown that
Respondent's unlawful conduct , described above, occurred
within a period of 1 month prior to Burke's discharge and
that Burke's arguments with Weber also occurred within
the same period. Under all the circumstances, I conclude
that Burke's strong, vociferous, and adamant adherence to
the Union was the motivating factor in his discharge on
April 13. Accordingly, I find that Burke was discharged in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
D.
The 8(a)(5) Allegation; Refusal To Bargain
Thomas Crago,
business representative of the IAM,
testified that he wrote a letter to Respondent about the
latter part of January, notifying him, as was customary 60
days before the expiration of a contract, that the IAM was
opening the contract for negotiation of modifications.
After meeting with the employees sometime in February,
Crago forwarded a list of proposed modifications to Weber
and stating that he was prepared to negotiate a new
contract whenever Weber was available. About I week
later, not having heard from Weber, Crago called Weber
and reached an agreement with him to meet on March 28.
Weber
stated
business reasons prevented an earlier
meeting. On the morning of March 28, Crago called Weber
to verify his appointment and was told by Weber that
urgent business made him unavailable to meet that day. As
Crago was scheduled to be out of town until April 9, he
told Weber to call his office and leave word when they
could
meet.
Finding no messages for him when he
returned, Crago tried to reach Weber. Later that evening,
one of the employees, Craig Alexander, called Crago and
told him that Weber had given him a petition for
decertification to pass among the employees. A few days
later, Crago heard that an employee, Lee Burke, had been
discharged out of seniority allegedly for lack of work.
Crago called Weber but was unable to reach him and
talked with a foreman referred to as "Jack." Jack told
Crago that Burke had walked off the job and was
terminated. Crago told Jack to have Weber call him as "we
have a contract to settle." Hearing nothing further from
Weber, Crago consulted his attorney who wrote a letter to
Weber stating that if he did not hear from him on or before
April 21, charges would be filed with the National Labor
Relations Board. About 4:30 p.m. on April 21, Weber
called Crago and arranged a meeting for April 25.
When Crago arrived at Weber's office on April 25,
Weber said that he understood the men had filed a petition
to get out of the Union and that they did not want the
Union; therefore, "there was no sense in talking about an
agreement."
The foregoing sequence of events, relating to the subject
338
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
matter of this section, amply demonstrates that Respon-
dent predicated his refusal to bargain on his own
misconduct. Moreover, in contradiction to his statement to
Crago, the evidence shows that the employees did not, in
fact,
file a petition for decertification despite Weber's
threats and, promises.13 The circumstances compel the
rather obvious conclusion that Respondent arbitrarily,
unilaterally, and without legal reason attempted to sever
his relationship with the Union and gave an unjustifiable
excuse for his refusal to enter into negotiations. It seems
clear that Respondent, by the foregoing conduct, violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
E.
Respondent's Oral Argument
Initially, counsel for Respondent argues that the General
Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that unfair labor practices have been committed.
Contrary to this contention, I find that there is an
abundance of evidence recorded without contradiction to
support findings that Respondent unlawfully engaged in a
course of conduct for objects proscribed by the Act. In
enumerating various allegations of the complaint and
attempting to absolve Respondent, counsel, in his argu-
ment, failed to give proper weight to uncontradicted
testimony of witnesses whom I find to be credible and
thereby has failed to draw the proper legal conclusion. In
these circumstances, I find that counsel's oral argument
does not warrant the conclusions urged by him.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the
entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2.
The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3.
Respondent, commencing March 28, 1972, unlawful-
ly refused to recognize and bargain with the Union as the
collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit, described as follows:
All radiator production and maintenance employees
and apprentices; excluding all office and clerical
employees, guards, professional employees, and super-
visors as defined in the Act.
4.
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
engaging in the following conduct:
(a) Threatening employees with curtailment of work and
work opportunities unless they withdrew their support
from the Union;
(b) Circulating or causing to be circulated petitions
among employees renouncing union membership.
(c) Soliciting employees to withdraw from the Union.
(d)
Promising
monetary and other benefits to the
employees if they withdrew their support of the Union.
5.
By discharging Lee Burke because of his member-
ship and adherence to the Union, Respondent unlawfully
discriminated against Burke and thereby violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
6.
Violations alleged in the complaint and not specifi-
cally found herein are hereby dismissed.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and that it be required to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
As Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Lee
Burke by discharging him on April 13, 1972, it will be
recommended that Respondent offer Burke immediate and
full reinstatement to his former position without prejudice
to his seniority and other rights and privileges or, if this job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, and
to make him whole for any loss of pay that he may have
suffered by reason of Respondent's discrimination against
him, by paying to him a sum of money equal to that he
normally would have earned as wages from April 13, 1972,
to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less his
net earnings during that period. The amount of backpay
due him shall be computed according to Board policy set
forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with
interest on backpay computed in the manner set forth in
Isis Plumbing & Heating Company, 138 NLRB 716. Payroll
and other records in possession of Respondent are to be
made available to the Board or its agent to assist in such
computation.
It will also be recommended that Respondent bargain
collectively with the Union. In view of the nature of the
unfair labor practices which I have found to have been
committed, I shall further recommend that Respondent
cease and desist from in any manner interfering with its
employees' rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record herein, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I hereby
recommend that there be issued the following: 14
ORDER
Respondent, David E. Weber, d/b/a State Radiator
Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1.
Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers , District Lodge
No. 94, AFL-CIO, or any organization of its employees by
discharging any of its employees because of their member-
ship in, sympathy for, or activity in behalf of, the above-
named Union or any other labor organization, or by
discriminating against its employees in any like or related
13 Even if such a petition had been filed during the 60-day insulation
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
period, prior to April 1, Respondent's duty to bargain in good faith would
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
not be terminated.
its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
14 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the
deemed waived for all purposes.
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
STATE RADIATOR COMPANY
manner in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment.
(b) Refusing to bargain with the above-named Union as
the exclusive representative of its employees in the unit
found above to be appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining.
(c) Coercively interrogating its employees concerning
their union activities, sympathies, or desires.
(d) Causing to be circulated or circulating petitions
among its employees for withdrawal from the Union.
(e) Threatening employees with economic reprisals by
closing or selling the business and thereby curtailing work
available or work opportunities.
(f) Promising benefits to its employees in order to
dissuade them from continued union adherence or mem-
bership.
(g) Soliciting employees to withdraw their support of the
Union.
2.
Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Lee Burke immediate and full reinstatement
to his former position without prejudice to his seniority,
and other rights and privileges or, if, his job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, and make him
whole in the
manner set forth in the Section of this
Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Upon request, bargain collectively in good faith with
the
above-named
Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees in the unit found appropri-
ate herein with respect to pay, wages, hours of employment
and other conditions of employment and, if an understand-
ing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(d)
Post at its place of business in Los Angeles,
California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix." 15 Copies of the notice on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 21, after being duly signed
by an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall
be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof,
and be maintained for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
15 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
339
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activity
on behalf of International Association of Machinists
and
Aerospace
Workers,
District
Lodge No. 94,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by dis-
charging any of our employees or by discriminating
against them in any like or related manner in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment, except as authorized in Section 8(aX3)
of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees
concerning their union activities, sympathies, and
desires.
WE WILL NOT circulate nor cause to be circulated
petitions among our employees to withdraw from the
above-named Union or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with economic
reprisals, loss of employment or loss of opportunities
for employment because of their continued support of
the above-named Union.
WE WILL NOT promise benefits to employees in order
to dissuade them from continued union adherence and
membership.
WE WILL NOT solicit our employees to withdraw their
support of the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act,
except to the extent that such rights may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organi-
zation as a condition of employment as authorized in
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer to Lee Burke immediate and full
reinstatement to his former job without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges, or if this job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job, and we
will make him whole for any loss of pay he may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination against him.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively in good
faith with the above-named Union as the exclusive
bargaining representative of our employees in the unit
found appropriate by the National Labor Relations
Board for the purposes of collective bargaining with
respect to pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
terms or conditions of employment and, if an under-
standing is reached, embody it in a signed agreement.
The bargaining unit is:
All radiator production and maintenance em-
ployees and apprentices; excluding all office and
clerical employees, guards, professional employ-
ees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
DAVID E. WEBER, D/B/A
STATE RADIATOR COMPANY
(Employer)
340
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Dated
By
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
(Representative)
(Title)
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, Eastern Columbia Building,
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
849 South Broadway, Los Angeles , California 90014,
anyone.
Telephone 213-688-5229.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,