Shasta Fiberglass, Inc.

SHASTA FIBERGLASS, INC. 341 Shasta Fiberglass, Inc. and David Tuggle and General Teamsters Local 137, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help- ers of America. Cases 20-CA-7239 and 20-CA-7386 March 12, 1973 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO On November 14, 1972, Administrative Law Judge Maurice Alexandre issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief , and General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three -member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge as clarified below , and to adopt his recom- mended Order. We find, in agreement with the Administrative Law Judge, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employee Ferguson on December 16, 1971, and employees Tuggle, Cone, Kell, and Hawksley on January 17, 1972. In addition to the reasons set forth in the attached Decision, we find other significant factors for concluding that the motivating cause of their discharge was their union activities and sympathies. Respondent asserts that the precipitating reason for Ferguson's discharge was his involvement in a dispute with employee Cozart on the date of his discharge . However, it is clear from the record that neither Supervisor Pereira nor Plant Manager Don Baker observed what caused this dispute and neither made any investigation of the incident before deciding to discharge Ferguson . We are convinced that Respondent used this incident as a pretext for discharging, Ferguson. It is clear that a direct consequence of Ferguson's discharge was the suspension of organizational activity among Respondent's Anderson plant em- ployees. However, this abeyance ended and there was a resurgence of such activity among these employees when they were informed by Respondent on January 7, 1972, that it was terminating its medical insurance program. Immediately following this reactivation of protected activity and their participation in it, Respondent discharged employees Tuggle, Cone, Kell, and Hawksley. Respondent contends they were discharged because of miscon- duct which consisted of excessive talking during worktime, loafing, horseplay, insubordination, and careless work. Although the Administrative Law Judge found that these employees, and Ferguson, had engaged in misconduct and been cautioned about it, it is clear from the record that other employees also engaged in the same types of misconduct and there is no evidence of their having been similarly disciplined. In addition, the miscon- duct of the dischargees was tolerated by Respondent over a period of at least a couple of months prior to their discharge, which took place on the day following a union meeting. These factors and others cited in the attached Decision compel us to conclude that Respondent was motivated to discharge these employees on January 17, 1972, because of the resurgence of union activity and their involvement in it. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Shasta Fiberglass, Inc., Anderson, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, except that the attached notice is substituted for the Administrative Law Judge's notice. 1 Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Act gives all employees these rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or help unions To bargain collectively through a repre- sentative of their own choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other aid or protection To refrain from any or all of these things. 202 NLRB No. 50 342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. WE WILL NOT unlawfully discharge employees or otherwise discriminate against them because of their union activities. WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate or threat- en our employees. WE WILL offer to restore James Ferguson, David Tuggle, Roy Cone, Gerald Kell, and Donald Hawksley to their jobs and pay them for all wages lost because of their discharges. SHASTA FIBERGLASS, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) We will notify immediately the above-named indi- viduals, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of the right to full reinstatement, upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 13018 Federal Building, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36047, San Francisco, California 94102, Telephone 415-556-3197. DECISION MAURICE ALEXANDRE, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard in Redding, California, on June 1 and 2, and on July 18 and 19, 1972, upon a consolidated complaint, issued on March 29, 1972,1 and amended at the hearing, alleging that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Respondent has denied commission of the unfair labor practices alleged. The issues presented are whether or not Respondent unlawfully interrogated and threatened employees, and whether or not it unlawfully discharged Employees Ferguson, Tuggle, Cone, Kell, and Hawksley. Upon the entire record,2 my observation of the witness- es, and the briefs filed by the General Counsel and by the Respondent, I make the following: 1 Based upon an original and amended charges filed by David Tuggle on January 24, March 6 and 28, 1972, and upon original and amended charges filed by General Teamsters Local 137 on March 20 and 24, 1972 2 Respondent's unopposed motion to correct the transcript is hereby granted The General Counsel has also moved to correct the transcript, and that motion is granted to the extent that it is unopposed by the Respondent FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. JURISDICTION Respondent has admitted the following allegations of the complaint: Respondent, a California corporation with a place of business at Anderson, California, is engaged in the manufacture of motorboats. During the past year, in the course and conduct of its business operations, Respondent purchased and received goods and supplies valued in excess of $50,000 directly from suppliers located outside the State of California. During the past year, in the course and conduct of its business operations, Respondent sold goods and products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of California. Respondent is, and at all times material herein has been, an employer engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. I find the facts to be as admitted, and that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED I find that General Teamsters Local 137, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (hereafter called the Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion The General Counsel asserts that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating and making threats to employees. Respondent takes a contrary posi- tion. The conduct relied on by the General Counsel is as follows: 1. Employee Ferguson testified that sometime in September 1971, while employed at Respondent's Central Valley plant,3 he obtained authorization cards from the Union and so advised other employees; that later that day, Bill Baker, Respondent's production superintendent, called Ferguson to his office and asked "what this union business was"; that Ferguson replied that the employees had no choice except to consider unionization because they had no bargaining power; and that Rickey, then a supervisor, was present. Ferguson further testified that about a week and a half later, while he was at the Anderson plant , Bill Baker asked him how "the union proceeding was going" and requested the names of those still interested in the Union. Baker denied such interrogation. He testified that at a meeting in September 1971 at the Central Valley plant with With regard to the remaining proposed corrections which Respondent opposes, the General Counsel has failed to sustain his burden of establishing that the transcript is incorrect He merely makes an assertion that errors were made in transcribing testimony Accordingly, the motion is denied as to such corrections 3 Respondent also has a plant at Anderson, California SHASTA FIBERGLASS, INC. 343 Ferguson and Rickey, they discussed Ferguson's discon- tent about receiving a smaller pay raise than his fellow employees. Rickey corroborated Baker's testimony regard- ing a discussion concerning the pay raise. In view of Baker's self-contradictions noted below, I find that he was not a reliable witness. Rickey was no longer in Respon- dent's employ when he testified at the hearing, and hence can be considered a disinterested witness. For this reason, I am inclined to accept his testimony regarding Ferguson's first conversation with Baker. It is clear, however, that Rickey was not present at the second conversation, and I credit Ferguson's version. I find that Baker asked the above questions during his second conversation with Ferguson, and that such ques- tions constituted unlawful interrogation violative of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. Struksnes Construction Co., Inc., 165 NLRB 1062. 2. Following his transfer from Central Valley to the Anderson plant sometime in October 1971, Employee Ferguson arranged for a meeting with representatives of the Woodworkers Union, and such a meeting took place at the Blue Ox Restaurant. The next day, Production Superintendent Bill Baker called several employees to his office, including Ferguson and Kell. Baker's brother, Don, was also present during the meeting. Kell testified that Bill Baker asked, "What did you gentlemen find out at the meeting last night?" On direct examination, Baker denied asking that question. In a prehearing affidavit and on cross-examination, however, he admitted that he had called Ferguson to his office and asked what his problems were, that the latter had told him that he and several employees had gone to a Woodworkers union meeting several nights prior thereto, that Baker then called the other employees to his office, and that he had asked what they had learned at the union meeting. I find that Bill Baker's admitted interrogation was unlawful. 3. Employee Ferguson testified that about a week and a half later, i.e., probably in early November 1971, Supervi- sor Pereira stated, "Of course, you know that they-will never let a union in here." When Pereira testified later the same day, he could not recall his conversation with Ferguson. When the hearing was resumed the following month, Pereira testified that he recalled suggesting to Ferguson that the employees form a group to discuss grievances with management. When asked by counsel for Respondent whether he said anything else about a union, Pereira replied, "Not that I know of." However, he denied stating that Respondent would never let a union into the plant. In its brief, Respondent does not deny that Pereira made the statement, but argues that it did not constitute an unlawful threat because it merely consisted of his personal opinion. I find that Pereira made the statement, that it was coercive, and that an employer is bound by coercive statements made by a supervisor. I therefore find that Pereira's statement violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. Pereira gave evasive testimony and then denied asking any employees about attempts to get a union into the plant. On further interrogation, however, he admitted that he discussed unionization with some of his men, including Employee Cozart and Employee Delassi; that he asked employees in his department about a meeting of Respondent's "employees with union members"; and that he asked employees in his department "about what was going on, about getting a union in." At one point, Pereira testified that he could not recall whether his conversation with Cozart took place between January 10 and 17, 1972, and stated that it could have been before or after that period. Elsewhere, he testified that he was certain that his conversations with Cozart and Delassi occurred after January 17. Respondent's brief does not discuss these conversations. I find that Pereira engaged in unlawful interrogation of Cozart and Delassi. 5. Employee Cleary testified that between January 10 and 17, 1972, Supervisor Hutchins asked him why the men had consulted him regarding the formation of a union. Cleary further testified that a few days later, Hutchins told him that Ken Baker, Respondent's president, had stated that, if the men continued to show interest in unionizing, he would invite a union "from some fiberglass industry" and this would probably result in lowering, or at least preventing an increase in, their wage scale . Hutchins testified that he may have asked the question attributed to him by Cleary, and did not deny repeating to Cleary the above statement by Ken Baker. Respondent's sole defense is that these conversations merely constituted interchanges of opinions between friends. This contention is without merit. I credit Cleary and find that Hutchins' question and statement respective- ly constituted unlawful interrogation and an unlawful threat. 6. Employee Cleary testified that on or about January 14, 1972, Supervisor Wick asked him who was going to attend a forthcoming union meeting. Wick did not contradict this testimony. I find that he asked the question attributed to him and that the question was unlawful. Respondent contends that Wick did not become a supervisor until after the time in question and that it is not responsible for his conduct. I disagree. At one point in his testimony, Wick admitted that Plant Manager Don Baker had told him that he had the power to hire and fire at the time in question. Baker did not contradict this admission. I accordingly find that Wick was a supervisor and that Respondent was accountable for his unlawful interroga- tion. 7. Employee Seaward testified that on January 14, 1972, Plant Manager Don Baker asked him what he knew about an employee walkout, and stated that he intended to get to the bottom of it. Baker testified that he had been informed that employees had discussed a walkout and had threatened Seaward by stating that they would turn over the car of anyone who crossed the picket line, and that he merely asked Seaward whether the latter had been threatened. Respondent contends that Don Baker's version should be credited. I disagree. In view of Don Baker's self- contradictions noted below, I credit Seaward's testimony and find that Baker's remarks were violative of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD B. Discrimination On December 16, 1971, Respondent discharged James Ferguson, and on January 17, 1972, it discharged David Tuggle, Roy Cone, Gerald Kell, and Donald Hawksley. The General Counsel asserts that they were discharged because of their union activities. Respondent contends that because of business losses, it engaged in an effort to reduce its costs of operation and to eliminate problems which hampered productivity, and that it selected the five employees for discharge because their continued miscon- duct4 interfered with their own productivity and that of other employees.5 With respect to Ferguson, Respondent also asserts that the precipitating reason for his discharge was his participation in a fight with employee Cozart on the date of his discharge. I find that, in selecting the five employees for discharge, Respondent was motivated at least in part by their union activities. 1. Ferguson Ferguson began working for Respondent at Central Valley on January 1, 1970, and was transferred to the Anderson plant in October 1971. There is evidence that he engaged in a certain amount of talking during worktime and that he was cautioned about this conduct. But this was also true of other employees. Moreover, it is undisputed that he shoved and threatened to "knock the hell out of" employee Cozart on December 16, 1971. Were there nothing more in the record, Respondent's explanation would be persuasive. However, the evidence shows that Ferguson was significantly involved in promoting unioni- zation of the employees; that he was interrogated regarding such unionization by Production Superintendent Bill Baker, and made clear to Baker that he favored unioniza- tion; and that Supervisor Pereira admittedly knew of Ferguson's union activity and told him that Respondent would never permit a union in the plant. Ferguson also testified without contradiction that several weeks before his discharge, Foreman Klein told him, "You had better watch out-the Bakers are after you." In addition, the evidence tends to belie Pereira's testimony that he made the decision to discharge Ferguson. Pereira admitted that he did not know what started the argument between Ferguson and Cozart, that he heard yelling but not the exact words that were exchanged, that he did not observe any physical contact between them, and that he did not ask either of them what started the argument. It thus appears that at the time he allegedly 4 The misconduct referred to by Respondent consisted of excessive talking during worktime , loafing, horseplay, insubordination , and careless work 5 In its brief, Respondent referred to certain decisions of referees of the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board denying unemploy- ment benefits to Cone, Kell, and Ferguson Attached to the brief and to a subsequent letter from Respondent dated September 18, 1972, were copies of such referee decisions, and the affirming decisions of the California Board with respect to Cone and Kell. The General Counsel has moved to strike all references to the referee decisions in the appendices attached to the brief and the letter The decisions of a state unemployment compensation agency may be judicially noticed Cf Sun Company of San Bernardino, 105 NLRB 515, 521; Nashville Corp, 94 NLRB 1567, 1569 Accordingly, the motion to strike is denied. Such decisions, however, are not controlling Supreme Dyeing & decided to discharge Ferguson, Pereira could not have known which of the two disputants was responsible for the argument. In addition, Don Baker's testimony suggests that it was he who made the decision to discharge Ferguson. In view of these considerations, as well as the unreliable testimony given by Don Baker and Pereira respecting other matters, I am inclined to credit Ferguson's testimony that at the time he was notified of his discharge by Pereira, the latter stated that he did not have any control over the matter and that Don Baker was responsible. I find that Don Baker made the decision to discharge Ferguson; and that in making his decision, Baker was motivated at least in part by Ferguson's union activity. I accordingly find that the discharge of Ferguson violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 2. Tuggle, Cone, Kell, and Hawksley Following the discharge of Ferguson, organizational activity at the Anderson plant became dormant. However, on January 7, 1972, Respondent informed its Anderson employees that it was terminating its medical insurance program. Organizational activities were then reactivated, and it is undisputed that employees Tuggle, Cone, Kell, and Hawksley engaged in such activities. These included communication with the Union, attendance at organiza- tional meetings, distribution and execution of authoriza- tion cards to employees in the plant, and discussions in the plant regarding unionization with fellow employees. As in the case of Ferguson and other employees, the evidence shows that the four dischargees engaged in misconduct and were cautioned about it .6 However, I am convinced that their union activities were responsible, in whole or in part, for their discharges. In so concluding, I rely on the following considerations: (a) All four of the dischargees, who had been employed by Respondent for periods ranging from almost 1 year to almost 4 years, were considered competent. In December 1971, Supervisor Jenkins told Plant Manager Don Baker that Tuggle and Cone were both capable workers. Jenkins stated in a prehearing affidavit that the two men produced approximately the same amount of work as the other employees; and that he frequently asked Cone to work overtime.? Pereira testified that the quality of Kell's work was "great." Supervisor Hutchins obtained a raise for Hawksley in December 1971. (b) It is undisputed that Respondent was aware of the union movement in the Anderson plant, and the evidence Finishing Corp, 147 NLRB 1094, 1095, In. 1, accord, N L R B v Tennessee Packers, Inc, 339 F 2d 203 (C.A 6), N L R B v Pacific Intermountain Express Co, 228 F 2d 170 (C.A. 8). Indeed, in the Tennessee Packers case, the court considered such a decision to be immaterial in that case, since it did not know how much of the relevant evidence had been before the state unemployment compensation agency 6 The General Counsel has moved to strike the statement on p 1, In I of Respondent's brief on the ground that it asserts facts not in the record The statement is that the dischargees here involved were not the only employees whose employment was terminated for the same reason The ground asserted by the General Counsel, even if true, is not a proper basis for striking material from a brief The motion is denied v Such requests to work overtime tend to refute Jenkins' testimony that Cone produced no more work than the slowest man in his group SHASTA FIBERGLASS, INC. 345 shows that it was determined to discourage it. Thus, as noted above, it attempted through interrogation to ascer- tain what organizational progress was being made; Supervisor Pereira told Employee Ferguson that Respon- dent will never let a union into the plant; and Respondent attempted to discourage such progress by threats of reprisal and by discharging Ferguson. (c) I am persuaded that Respondent had knowledge of the union activity of the four dischargees. Upon learning of the termination of the employee medical benefits, employ- ee Hawksley told Supervisor Hutchins, "Now there is nothing left to do but to get a union in here. Once they take this away from us, they'll start taking our wages away from us also." On January 13, 1972, employee Freelove told Supervisor Jenkins that the employees in the molding room, where Hawksley worked, had signed union authori- zation cards. In response to an inquiry by Supervisor Klein as to what his problem was, Hawksley stated that "they took our health and welfare plan away from us," that "they will start taking our wage away from us," and that "there was nothing left, but to get the union in." On January 15, 1972, Plant Manager Don Baker told employee Freelove that two employees in the motorroom would be dis- charged. Tuggle and Cone worked in the motorroom. Shortly prior to the discharges on January 17, 1972, Don Baker told Supervisor Jenkins that he believed that all the motorroom employees, except Lloyd and Gaekler, had signed union authorization cards. On January 15, 1972, employee Freelove told Don Baker that he planned to attend a union meeting scheduled for the following day, and that he would keep Baker informed. From remarks made to him by Cone, Tuggle, and Hawksley, Freelove became aware that they were interested in unionizing. On January 16, 1972, a number of employees, including Tuggle, Cone, and Kell, met at the union hall, where the three and several others signed authorization cards. (d) The timing of the discharges suggests an improper motive. On January 14 and 15, 1972, employee Freelove told Don Baker that well over half of the employees wanted the Union. On January 16, 1972, a number of employees met with the Union. On the following day, the four employees were discharged. It can hardly be a coincidence that Supervisor Hutchins decided to discharge Hawksley on the same day that Plant Manager Don Baker decided to discharge Cone, Tuggle, and Kell. In addition, the record shows that the four men, as well as other employees, had engaged in the misconduct relied on by Respondent for some time before January 17, 1972. Yet, the four were not discharged until the day after the union meeting of January 16-the meeting to which Baker was alerted by employee Freelove, who offered to report what occurred therein. It thus appears that, even though Respondent in November 1971 began a campaign to eliminate production problems, the misconduct of the four employees did not become sufficiently intolerable to prompt their discharge until after the January 16 meeting. (e) Respondent's witnesses gave self-contradictory and inconsistent testimony . Don Baker admitted that during a state unemployment compensation proceeding, he had testified that the decision to discharge Tuggle was made by Supervisor Jenkins. He also admitted, however, that he himself made the decision. Baker further testified that on January 12 or 13, 1972, he observed Cone engage in horseplay, and told Jenkins that he would discharge Cone the "next" time he observed the latter engage in horseplay. Baker then testified that he reached his decision to discharge Cone and Tuggle 4 or 5 days before January 17, 1972, i.e., on January 12 or 13 . Supervisor Jenkins stated in a prehearing affidavit that insofar as horseplay was concerned, employees Cone , Gaekler, and Grieder were the worst offenders. In his testimony, however, Jenkins sought to give the impression that Cone was the one most guilty of such misconduct . Don Baker testified that after observing misconduct by Kell several weeks before January 17, 1972, he told Supervisor Pereira that he would discharge Kell the "next" time he caught him engaging in misconduct. He further testified he made his decision to discharge Kell on January 17, 1972, after observing him talk for 3 or 4 minutes to another employee on the assembly line. In his prehearing affidavit , however, he stated that he made the decision several days before January 17, and that no particular incident prompted his decision. Don Baker testified that, during November and December 1971, several supervisors made complaints about Hawksley. However, Supervisor Hutchins testified that he obtained a wage increase for Hawksley in December and that he had no problem with Hawksley until January 1972. For all of these reasons, and based on the entire record, I find that the discharges of the four employees violated Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act. IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By interfering with , restraining, and coercing em- ployees, as found herein, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. By unlawfully discharging Ferguson, Cone, Tuggle, Kell, and Hawksley, as found herein, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. Respondent did not violate the Act by any conduct not found herein to constitute an unfair labor practice. V. THE REMEDY In order to effectuate the policies of the Act, I find that it is necessary, and I recommend , that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found, and from in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees. Affirmatively, I recommend that Respondent offer to Ferguson, Cone, Tuggle, Kell, and Hawksley immediate and full reinstatement to the position which each held at the time of his discharge or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges. I further recommend that Respondent make each whole for any loss of earnings suffered because of his discharge, by paying to him a sum of money equal to that which he 346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD would have been paid by Respondent from the date of his discharge to the date on which Respondent offers reinstatement as aforesaid less his net earnings, if any, during the said period. The loss of earnings under the order recommended shall be computed in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 8 ORDER Respondent, Shasta Fiberglass, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Unlawfully interrogating and threatening its employ- ees. (b) Unlawfully discharging employees, or otherwise unlawfully discriminating in regard to their hire, tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of any right guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action: 8 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 9 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by (a) Offer to Ferguson, Cone, Tuggle, Kell, and Hawksley immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions or, if those positions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, and make each of them whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason of Respondent's discrimination against him, in the manner set forth in the section herein entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and make available to the Board or its agents on request, for examination and copying, all payroll records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due and the right of reinstatement under the terms of this recommended Order. (c) Post at its plants in Central Valley and Anderson, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix."9 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being signed by a representative of the Respondent, shall be posted immedi- ately in conspicuous places. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision what steps have been taken to comply herewith. 10 order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " iu In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."