207 NLRB 83
Ridgely Manufacturing Co.
RIDGLEY MANUFACTURING CO.
83
Ridgely Manufacturing Company and Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Case
26-CA-4169
November 8, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
Act. Respondent, in its answer, denies the commission of
the alleged unfair labor practices.
The case was tried in Tiptonville, Tennessee, on October
24 and 25, 1972, and adjourned for the purpose of enabling
the General Counsel to seek and secure enforcement
against Respondent in the United States District Court of a
subpena. Thereafter, compliance with the subpena having
been ordered by the aforesaid court, the instant trial was
resumed and concluded at Dyersburg, Tennessee, on
February 27 and 28, 1973.
On May 29, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
Ramey Donovan issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions,
and General Counsel -filed a brief in answer to
Respondent's exceptions and in support of the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The 'Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as . amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, Ridgely Manufactur-
ing
Company,
Ridgely,
Tennessee, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order.
1 In addition to the evidence relied on by the Administrative Law Judge
to support the finding that Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by terminating Marcene Fussell, the record reveals that, on the next
workday following the election, Supervisor Chapman approached her and
stated that "if you make one little mistake you are gone r
DECISION
RAMEY DoNovAN, Administrative Law Judge: The
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
herein the Union, filed a charge and an amended charge
against Ridgely Manufacturing Company, Respondent, on
November 18 and December 28, 1971. A complaint issued
on January 7, 1972, alleging illegal threats and interroga-
tion and the discharge and failure to reinstate six named
employees, all in violation of Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the
1 Mrs. Roseman is also an attorney by profession.
2 Hickman Garment Company, 172 NLRB 1168, enforced 408 F.2d 379
(C A 6, 1969) (threatening and discharging or refusing employment to
employees because of union activity);
Ridgely Manufacturing Company,
Case 26-CA-3143, Trial Examiner (now Administrative Law Judge)
Decision, November 26, 1968; Hickman Garment Company, 184 NLRB
64 (discharge and threats in order to defeat union during an election
campaign),
Hickman Garment Company,
184 NLRB 888
(threatening
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent, at all times material, is a corporation
engaged in the manufacture of wearing apparel at its
Ridgely, Tennessee, plant. In a representative 12-month
period, Respondent, in the course of its business, pur-
chased and received at its Ridgely, Tennessee, plant,
materials and supplies valued in excess of $50,000 directly
from points located outside Tennessee. In the same period,
Respondent sold and shipped products valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to points outside Tennessee.
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act.
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Background and Procedure
Nettie Roseman is vice president and the corporate
secretary of Respondent and she has been plant superin-
tendent for 14 years. She is the chief operating official of
Respondent and handles the, general running of the plant;
plant
policies;
financial
matters;
and relations
with
customers.
At a distance estimated to be about 35 miles from the
Ridgely plant, there is another plant known as Hickman
Garment Company. Phillip and Nettie Roseman are
husband and wife and are the principal officers of both
Ridgely and Hickman.'
Both companies have been
involved in litigation with the Board and both companies
have been found to have violated the Act by various acts
and conduct, including threatening employees regarding
their union activity, interrogating employees, and discharg-
ing or refusing employment to employees because of their
union activities.2
On or about October 5, 1972, the General Counsel had
served 'subpenas on Nettie Roseman and Olen Shelton to
appear as witnesses at the commencement of the instant
hearing on October 24, 1972.3 Neither witness appeared at
the hearing on October 24, 1972. Weis, who represented
and interrogating employees regarding union activity); both cases enforced.
437 F2d 956 (CA. 6, 1971): N L-R B v. Hickman Garment Company, 471
F.2d 611 (C.A. 6, 1972), December 18, 1972, in which the court of appeals
found the Company guilty of civil contempt of the order of the court
enforcing 184 NLRB 64, and 184 NLRB 888, supra
3 Shelton was plant manager from. 1969 to the end of 1971 and was
supervisor of engineering at the time of the instant hearing.
207 NLRB No. 17
84
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent in this case and who tried the case for
Respondent, simply indicated at the hearing on October 24
that he would recommend that the witness appear on the
following day.4 The hearing was then adjourned until
October 25, 1972.
At the commencement of the hearing on October 25,
counsel for the General Counsel called Nettie Roseman as
a witness:
MR. WEIs: Mrs. Nettie Roseman won't be available
for a while. She is tied up in a conference and she said
when she could come, she would be here ... .
MR. BERGER [counsel for the General Counsel]:
Well, your Honor, we feel that a U.S. Government
subpena is very important also and Mrs. Roseman
didn't appear in response to it yesterday also and we
think this is very repulsive to the autonomy of this
hearing and in respect to your Honor, for her to fail
twice in a row to company with a subpena.
JUDGE DoNovAN: I think so, too, but I think you
ought to enforce the subpena in Court. Obviously
Respondent doesn't pay much attention to these things
MR. BERGER: We do not want to delay the hearing
again unnecessarily, your Honor. We had it postponed
for a full day yesterday because of lion compliance
with our subpena duces tecum and ad testificandum and
we have every desire to go forward with this hearing.
Witness Shelton, who did appear on October 25, was then
examined for 120 pages in the transcript of testimony. At
the conclusion of Shelton's testimony in the afternoon,
Berger called for Mrs. Roseman as a witness. Weis stated
that Roseman was not present but was coming to the
hearing. In response to a question, Weis stated that
Respondent's plant was approximately 10 minutes away
from the Court House where the hearing was being held in
Tiptonville. A short recess was taken. At its conclusion,
Weis announced that Roseman was present. Although
Weis stated that Mrs. Roseman was vice president of the
Company, he announced that he would not allow her to be
called as a witness under Section 43(b) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States District Courts .5 No claim
was made that Mrs. Roseman was not qualified to be a
43(b) witness. Since Weis persisted in his position, the
hearing was adjourned to permit the General Counsel to
institute proceedings to enforce his subpenas ad testifican-
dum and duces tecum.
Thereafter, enforcement of the subpenas was ordered by
the United States District Court and the instant case
resumed on February 27, 1973.
Before noon on February 28, 1973, the counsel for the
General ' Counsel, having substantially completed his case
in chief, stated on the record that certain documents and
records subpenaed from Respondent, had not yet been
produced by Respondent, notwithstanding the order of the
United States
District
Court enforcing the subpena.
Counsel for the General Counsel referred specifically to
payroll sheets or records of the employees alleged in the
complaint to have been discriminatorily discharged. Mr.
Weis then stated:
Well, it's five or ten minutes to twelve. If you want to
adjourn until 1:00 o'clock, I'll be back at 1:00 o'clock
with them [the records referred to ]
The hearing was then adjourned to 1 p.m. At the latter
time, Mr. Weis stated on the record that, despite a diligent
search, the aforesaid records had not been found that he
had left instructions with office personnel at the plant to
continue the search and to notify him if the search was
successful. Mr. Weis admitted that the payroll sheets of the
alleged discriminatees were not among the documents that
he had given to the General Counsel pursuant to the court
enforced subpena. The General Counsel made an offer to
prove that if the documents referred to were produced they
would show that the payroll records of Betty Cook and
Shawanne Cook bore the inscription or designation
"permanent lay-off" and that no payroll records of
nonalleged discriminatees bore such a designation. The
General Counsel stated that although he believed the
payroll sheets of three other alleged discriminatees bore the
same designation, he was not prepared to make the same
definitive statement regarding them as he had made with
respect to the records of Betty and Shawanne Cook.
I then stated, although the record incorrectly shows an
interposition of Attorney Brown at this point, that
As I indicated in an off the record discussion, this case
has been going on at intervals since last October and I
am not disposed to keep the record open for any
further records, but if before the close of the hearing
this afternoon, Mr. Weis, you hear from your people or
call the plant and check it before closing time . . . and
if they have them [the records] I will receive them into
evidence, but if I close this hearing today, I am not
going to keep the record open indefinitely.
Subsequently, that afternoon, Mr. Weis reported that the
records could still not be found. The hearing continued
and was closed that afternoon on February 28, 1973.
By letter of April 3, 1973, Attorney Geiger for Respon-
dent, writing from his office in New York, moved to
reopen the record to receive the payroll sheets of the
alleged discriminatees, explaining that Mr. Weis had found
these records in "the files here" "upon returning to New
York" and had advised opposing counsel of the fact. The
letter or motion to me, aforementioned, was accompanied
by what appear to be payroll record sheets although I have
not read them. Subsequently, the General Counsel filed in
opposition to the granting of the aforesaid motion.
Respondent's motion to reopen the record to receive
certain payroll records subpenaed by the General Counsel
is hereby denied. Respondent had adequate time and
opportunity to produce subpenaed documents before the
close of the hearing. The hearing was a protracted' one
because of the necessity of securing subpena enforcement
against Respondent in the Federal District Court. The
hearing began in October 1972 and ended on February 28,
1973. It also appears that the documents, submitted by
4 "Mr Weis: All I can say is that it is my understanding that these
5 On the first day of the hearing, counsel for the General Counsel had
witnesses are going to be available. I don't control these witnesses, if they
made it clear that he was calling both Roseman and Shelton as Section
don't want to come, fine. But I would say as far as I am concerned that I am
43(b) witnesses. When Shelton appeared on October 25, he was examined as
going to recommend that they come. Now that's their privilege."
43(b) witness.
RIDGLEY MANUFACTURING CO.
85
Respondent on April 9, 1973, with its motion, have not
been properly authenticated and no stipulation of the
parties regarding authenticity has been presented.
Although adequate justification exists for doing so, I
have found it unnecessary to draw and to rely upon any
adverse inference against Respondent with respect to its
conduct relating to the aforementioned payroll records or
with respect to the contents of such records.6
The Section 8(a)(1) Violations
The Union, had filed a petition for certification as
collective-bargaining agent in May 1971. A stipulation for
certification upon consent election was approved on June
28, 1971, and an election was scheduled for August 20,
1971, among the employees at the Ridgely plant. The
election was thereafter held on the scheduled date.
Leroy Cook had been employed by Respondent as a
cutter from July 1960 to April 1972 when he quit his job.
Throughout the approximately 12 years of Cook's employ-
ment, the cutting department had received two pay
increases a year, one at the first of the year and one in the
middle of the year. In 1971, prior to the vacation in the first
of July, Weis had a conversation with Cook in the cutting
department.? Weis said that the July raises would be 10
cents. However, the employees did not receive the July
raise in that month and Weis explained to employees that
it was because the Union would not allow him to give the
raise.
Subsequently, the pay increase was granted in
November 1971; and in January 1972, Respondent
retroactively paid the employees the increase that they
normally' would have received beginning in July 1971.
These actions all took place after the August 1971 election.
Cook's testimony is not controverted and it was also
stipulated that, in accordance, with its custom and practice
in past years, Respondent would have given a pay increase
in its cutting department about July 12, 1971.. It is
Respondent's position that it did not give the July pay
increase because such act would have been in derogation
of the National Labor Relations Act.
The regular semiannual July pay raise was "an existing
form of compensation, and a term and condition of
employment regularly expected by the employees." 8
Respondent therefore was obliged to continue its normal
custom and practice of granting the increase in July and
this obligation could not be legitimately affected by the
fact that there was a union and an impending Board
election in the picture. Respondent's action in departing
from its normal practice and withholding the increase and
attributing this withholding of the increase to the union
6 General Counsel's motion to correct the record, being unopposed, is
granted. The motion is, of course, unconnected with the matters I have been
describing above
7 Weis tried the instant case on Respondent's behalf. Respondent admits
that at all relevant times, including 1971-73, Weis has been an agent of
Respondent.
8 General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. N.L.R B., 476 F.2d 850 (C.A.
1, 1973), enforcing 196 NLRB 137-
9 The Gates Rubber Company, 182 NLRB 95; The May Department Stores
Company, d/b/a Famous Barr Company, 174 NLRB 770; Dorn's Transporta-
tion Co., Inc., 168 NLRB 457. Moreover, it is more reasonable to conclude,
in view of Respondent's past history of violations of the Act, that its action
in withholding the increase was not due to a good-faith concern that it
presence constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act .9
Billy Joe Cook, a brother of Leroy Cook, had worked for
Respondent in the cutting department from April 1963 to
June 1972, when he quit. Cook testified that he was present
at several speeches to the employees given by Weis in the
plant lunchroom in the June-August 1971 period. Weis
spoke about union dues and initiation fees; he spoke of
plants that had closed because of the union and that many
such plants had moved overseas where the work could be
done more cheaply. That the foregoing was not simply an
abstract commentary but was mentioned as something
relevant to Respondent's situation and possible future
action became clear, when Weis said, that he was not going
to work under a union contract. Weis said that the Union
was the reason the Company was being moved and
probably would go out of business.
The last-mentioned reference to possible changes in the
Company's business operations is better understood if we
consider some background evidence. Employee Jackson,
who had worked for the Company for 8 years and quit in
the middle of May 1971, testified that, in 1971, while he
was still employed, Chapman, supervisor of the cutting
department, spoke to Jackson and the other men in that
department. This was shortly after the Union had advised
the Company of the union organizing of the cutting
department. Chapman advised the men that he did not
know which plant Mrs. Roseman was going to close or
what she was going to do. Chapman also said that Mrs.
Roseman would have about 100 employees at Ridgely and
about 80 at Hickman. In the context of Chapman's remark
it is apparent that the low employee complements were
being tied into the union organizing effort.10
Dons Cook, who had worked for the Company from
1961 to 1966 and from 1966 to August 16, 1971, testified
that on August 13, 1971, a week before the election, Weis
addressed employees in the plant lunchroom. Weis said
that he was not going to be high pressured and he
threatened to close the plant. In another speech on August
16 Weis mentioned union plants in the area that were
closed or were laying off substantial numbers of employ-
ees. He referred to the Hickman plant, in which the Union
had been organizing, as having 270 employees last year
and now had slightly more than 70. The Ridgely plant,
which was having the impending election, had had 450
employees and, according to Weis, was now down to 170.
The implication of Weis' remark was clear that the adverse
employment statistics at Hickman and Ridgely, as well as
at the union plants referred to by Weis, were attributable
to the presence of the Union.
might violate the Act by granting the increase in July, but was rather due to
a desire to impress upon the employees that it was the union presence that
forced the withholding shortly before the scheduled Board election In
short, the message to the employees, a few weeks before the August election,
was that your employer would have given you a wage increase in July
except for the fact that a union was in the picture.
10 These figures indicated
a substantial reduction in the normal
employee complement since at Ridgely Respondent had a number well in
excess of 200 employees. This is apparent in view of the assistant plant
manager's testimony that from March 1971 to September 1971 Respondent
laid off about 200 employees at Ridgely. The Hickman complement in the
earlier Board decisions, supra, 184 NLRB 864, and 184 NLRB 888 was,
208 and 200 employees, respectively
86
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Doris Cook and other witnesses also testified that Weis
told the employees that the Union and the Company had
been in contract negotiations for 7 months at Hickman and
had still not come to an agreement. Quite evidently this
reference to the fruitless negotiations at Hickman was
intended to convey to the Ridgely employees the futility of
union representation. Weis might have been on more
tenable grounds in making this reference to the Hickman
negotiations if the Company had been bargaining in good
faith at Hickman and had still not reached agreement.
However, in N.LR.B. v. Hickman Garment Company,
supra, the court of, appeals adjudged the Company to be
in civil contempt of the court order of February 5, 1971,
enforcing the Board's order, to bargain in good faith with
the Union. The Company therefore was in a compounded
illegal position to cite its illegal bargaining conduct at
Hickman as an illustration to the Ridgely employees of the
futility of union representation.
I find, therefore, that the complaint allegations that
Respondent, through Weis, has violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by speeches in August 1971, is amply supported by
the evidence. Neither Weis nor any other witness of
Respondent testified regarding his speeches.
Uncontroverted testimony supports complaint allega-
tions that-Supervisor Chapman engaged in the following
coercive conduct violative of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
On the day of the election, August 20, 1971, Chapman
learned that Leroy Cook was to be a union observer at the
election. He told Cook on that day, "win or lose there's no
use coming back to the cutting department because you
won't have a job here."
Also on that day of the election, Chapman told Billy Joe
Cook that Chapman had not known that Leroy Cook was
to be a union observer. Chapman said that although Leroy
was the best cutter he had, Leroy did not have a chance
since no matter what he did he would be fired.
The fact that the foregoing threats were not subsequently
carried to fruition does not exculpate the illegality of the
threats when made. It is also a fact' that cutters were a
skilled class of employees and experienced cutters were not
readily available or quickly replaced.
At' or about the time employee Jackson told Chapman
that he was quitting his job, in,May 1971, Chapman said
that it did not make much difference because Mrs.
Roseman had decided to keep him and put him in the
shipping department and she had said "she was going to
get Chuck or Billy Joe Cook and Leroy and said she hadn't
decided yet what she was going to do with Earl Mar-
kum." 11 All the foregoing persons were in the cutting
department under Chapman and they had all signed union
cards. Chapman had previously asked employee Todd in
the cutting department if he had signed a union card and
had been given a negative answer. All the other employees
in the department told Chapman that they had signed
cards.
The day before the election, Chapman told employee
Fussell and another employee in his department that he
it On cross-examination by Respondent , the witness was asked:
Q.
You said he [Chapman ] said that they were gomg to get rid of
the Cooks and keep you and transfer you into the shipping department.
Is that right?
A.
Yeah.
hoped that the Union did not get in. He interrogated
Fussell as to whether she "was union or not union and I
[Fussell] just said, no." Fussell actually was one of the
union observers at the election on the following day. The
denial of prounionism or the ambiguous answer that she
had given to Chapman on the previous day, when he
interrogated her about her union sentiments, is confirmato-
ry of the coercive and inhibiting effect of such interroga-
tion.
The Terminations
Doris Cook had worked for Respondent as a sewing
machine operator from 1961 to 1966. In that period she
worked on several different types of operations in the plant
and decided to quit when she found herself being required
to perform five or six different jobs at the same time. She
then
worked briefly
in 1966 at a garment plant in
Tiptonville. Weis and Mrs. Roseman contacted her at that
time and asked her to return to Respondent's plant. They
assured her that she could return with her former seniority
and other benefits unimpaired although 2 ,or 3 months had
elasped since she had left Respondent's employ. Cook then
returned to Respondent in 1966 as a sewing machine
operator. She worked, on darting hoods and also on sewing
hoods and tunneling hoods. Her testimony that, during her
approximately 10' years in Respondent's employ, she had
performed 24 or 25 different operations was not contro-
verted. Nor was it controverted that in 1966 she had
returned to the plant after being solicited to do so by Weis
and Mrs. Roseman. Such fact, coupled with her many
years in Respondent's employ, and the different operations
she had performed, are indicative that she was a compe-
tent, versatile, and effective sewing machine operator. She
had worked on civilian garments during her 1961-66
employment at Ridgely and on military garments in the
1966-71 period.
At sometime in the spring of 1971, just after the Union
had informed the Company that it represented - the
employees in the cutting department, Cook was sitting and
conversing with her brother-in-law during or at the end of
a break period in the plant. Plant Manager Shelton came
up and asked the two employees what they were talking
about. Cook spoke up and said that they were talking
about the Union and that she was for the Union.
On August 16, 1971, a few minutes, before quitting time,
Plant Manager Shelton `brought her check to Cook,
together with a layoff slip. When she asked if it meant that
she would not be called back, Shelton said "not necessari-
ly" and that- she might be called back if the Company
secured a lot of work.
On several occasions, in November 1971, Respondent's
representatives, when asked, said that the Company had no
work for Cook and others with her.
Respondent, by letter of February 17, 1972, offered
employment to Cook. However, when she learned that she
would come back as a new employee, without seniority,
vacation and other rights, Cook declined. Again, by letter
of January 1973, Respondent ' offered employment to
RIDGLEY MANUFACTURING CO.
87
Cook. She ignored the offer because she had been
promised a job by another company.
Shawanne Cook was first employed by Respondent in
1963. After working for a few months, she quit and went to
work in a garment plant in Tiptonville. She returned to
Respondent's plant on several brief periods and then
stayed for 4 years as a sewing machine operator engaged in
top stitching, hemming, and other operations at the
Tiptonville garment plant. In 1969 Mrs. Roseman asked
Cook- to return to Respondent's plant. Cook returned and
worked as an operator setting pockets, top stitching, flaps,
corduroy coats, and raincoats. Cook worked on both
civilian and military garments. She made production and
had never been warned about her work.12 She continued
working from 1969 until her termination on August 13,
1971.
On August 13, 1971, Plant Manager Shelton gave her her
paycheck and a termination slip. He remarked that other
employees had also been laid off. Cook asked how long she
would be off. Shelton advised her to call the plant at some
later unspecified time. Although she did not know their
names, Cook's uncontroverted testimony was that new
employees had been hired prior to her layoff at a time
when Cook and others were finishing work on army jackets
in a military contract; and the new employees were being
put to work on civilian garments.
Several times after her termination, Shawanne called the
plant office to inquire about work and once she went to the
office and made the same inquiry. The net response to
these attempts to secure work was that there was no hiring
being done. The exact time of these inquiries about work is
not altogether clear but evidently they occurred between
her termination and November 1971 since on the occasion
of her visit to the plant, Cook mentioned an item in the
local newspaper that was dated November 11, 1971. The
front page newspaper story was to the effect that over
$61,000 in Federal funds had been approved, according to
Senator Howard Baker, under the Federal job opportuni-
ties program, for the Company to hire and train 44 jobless
persons.
The two aforementioned employees, Doris and Sha-
wanne Cook, were the wives of Leroy and Billy Joe Cook,
respectively. Leroy and Billy Joe were brothers. Leroy was
active in the union movement. He talked to other
employees about the Union, employees came to his home
to discuss union matters, and Leroy secured employee
signatures on union cards. Billy Joe was not as active as his
brother but he did talk to others about the Union and had
signed a union card, -a fact known by his supervisor,
Chapman.
Neither Leroy nor Billy Joe was terminated by Respon-
dent and both quit their jobs. In the period after he quit,
Leroy worked part time for Respondent 13 Both Leroy and
Billy Joe worked in the cutting department with about
three or four other male employees. Leroy was referred to
by his supervisor, Chapman, as his best cutter. Since work
in the cutting department is skilled and is one of the most
important operations in a garment plant, this fact, together
with the fact that it takes a year or more to train a cutter,
can well explain the continued tenure of Leroy and Billy
Joe. They were both experienced cutting department
employees, having worked for Respondent for 12 and 9
years, respectively, prior to their quitting.
Relevant background regarding Respondent and Leroy
and Billy Joe Cook and their wives, Doris and Shawanne,
is
the following uncontroverted testimony regarding
Supervisor Chapman.14
On August 20, 1971, when Chapman learned that Leroy
was to be a union observer in the election, he told him that,
win or lose, there was no use in coming back to the cutting
department because Leroy would not have a job. Employ-
ee Jacksonl5 testified that in May 1971, Chapman told him
that Mrs. Roseman was going to get rid of Leroy and Billy
Joe and Chapman said, "if I [Jackson] would watch, he
would get shut of [get rid of] their wives because they
worked for the Union, Billy Joe and Leroy." Billy Joe
testified that in April 1971, Chapman told Leroy and
himself that if they did not have a job at Goodyear
[another employer in the area] they had better get one
because Mrs. Roseman planned to get rid of them, and
their wives "were going to get fired."
In 1971, a government contract for military garments on
which Respondent had been working since about 1969 was
nearing completion. As the military work was being phased
out, new civilian work was undertaken. There were
reductions in personnel during this period for lack of work.
While there was evidently a net reduction in personnel
overall, a picture emerges of some employees not being laid
off and some employees being laid off or terminated while
new employees were being hired. Additionally, the ques-
tion of who in management selected particular employees
for lay off and termination and the reasons for the
selection invites scrutiny -6
Mrs.
Roseman testified that she was not personally
involved in the decision as to which employees were to be
terminated. In 1971, and at all other times, according to
Roseman, the aforementioned decisions were made by
Plant Manager Shelton and Assistant Plant
Manager
Dockery and "after they have made the decision, it comes
to me [Roseman]."
Shelton testified that "Mrs. Roseman did the hiring and
12 Making production in a garment plant means that an employee
produces the quota of work or number of piece items specified by the
employer for a particular operation and the employee is, in effect, paid an
incentive rate An employee who does not make production, ie., who does
not produce the specified quota, is paid an hourly rate, usually the
minimum wage rate required by law.
13 In this connection, Chapman had asked Leroy if he would like to be
an assistant supervisor. Such a promotion might well have removed Leroy
from any alignment with the Union or with the rank-and-file unit
employees
14 Chapman was not called as a witness. He was still employed by
Respondent at the time of the hearing.
15 Jackson and Billy Joe Cook were the spreaders in the cutting
department
16 There appears to be no real distinction between a permanent layoff
and a termination. Respondent regarded the six alleged discriminatees in
this case as permanently laid off and Respondent states in its brief that at
the August 20, 1971, election it challenged the ballots of the six, as well as
other laid off employees, on the ground that they "were permanently laid
off for lack of work prior to the date of the election."
88
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
firing." He testified that what he referred to as the "office"
and "personnel" made the decisions.17 If Shelton, who was
in charge of production, needed employees he would
verbally inform the office that he needed, for instance, two
sewing machine operators in a certain section or operation;
or, if there were too many operators in a section in view of
available work, he would report that fact. Shelton stated
that he was not "familiar" with "the decision" to terminate
Shawanne Cook. He stated that "personnel" made that
decision and then defined "personnel" as "higher manage-
ment other than myself." 18 Although it is not clear what
role Shelton played or did not play in the decision to
terminate Doris Cook, he testified that he could not
remember that she was qualified to perform any operation
other than hood tunneling, which she was doing when
terminated and which operation was being eliminated as
the military contract was being phased out.19
Assistant plant manager, Dockery, compounds or per-
haps contributed to the conflicting evidence surrounding
the decisions to terminate certain employees in 1971.
Dockery states that Shelton and himself, plus a relevant
department supervisor, "like for instance, Bill Chapman" 20
make the decisions regarding which employees are to be
terminated.
Shelton testified that in August 1971, when Respondent
terminated Shawanne and Doris Cook and others, that
"there were some [new employees] hired, yes." He states
that on the military contract, a raincoat and field jacket
were being manufactured. The civilian work that came in
as the military work was being phased out was an all
weather car coat, ski pants, and a B-9 bomber jacket,
similar to a military flight jacket or military parka. Shelton
estimated that the military contract was completely
eliminated by October 1971.
While various sewing operations on the military items
were not used on the civilian work, the various military and
civilian items above mentioned, in my opinion, were not as
basically dissimilar as Respondent seeks to portray them.
Perhaps if the military work had consisted of steel breast
plates and chain mail garments as contracted with civilian
cloth apparel the difference would be apparent. The
difference between a military raincoat or a military flight
jacket, as compared with a civilian raincoat and a civilian
jacket termed a B-9 bomber, is not the difference between
black and white. The military specifications were in fact
more exacting than the civilian and it is reasonable to
conclude that experienced operators who had worked on
both civilian and military garments in the past could make
the transition to civilian work, at least better than new
employees.
Dockery testified that about half the force had been laid
off between March and September 1971. He also stated
that about 35 or 40 employees were hired in August 1971
and an equal number in September. He did not mention
October but Shelton had testified that people were hired in
that
month.
According to Dockery, November and
December are bad months in the business and the
17 As far as appears, the "office" and "personnel" consisted of Mrs.
Roseman; an office employee named Brenda Crittenden, and some other
office people.
18 Other than Shelton, Mrs. Roseman was the highest management
official in the plant.
Company began hiring again in January 1972. The parties
stipulated on the record that in "September 1971 through
October 1972, the Company rehired many former employees
and also new employees in various positions in the plant,
that had been formerly occupied by the 8(a)(3)s [the
alleged discriminatees] or into positions that the 8(a)(3)s, if
they had not been terminated, would have normally been
transferred to in the normal course of business."
Dockery testified that Doris Cook could perform more
than one job and during her employment she had been
assigned to different jobs. He said that he and Shelton
made the determination to terminate her. He was asked
whether Doris "ever performed on the job of tunneling."
Dockery replied, "she could have" but he stated that he
believed she was setting pockets when terminated. He said
Doris never made production on any job. Doris testified
that her job was tunneling when she was terminated and
that she regularly made production on that job. Shelton
testified that he could not remember Doris performing any
job other than tunneling and that she was not qualified to
perform other operations. Shelton said nothing about her
production in his testimony. As to Shawanne Cook,
Shelton said she performed "just generally bad work," that
she could not follow her guage and this affected the seams
she sewed. Dockery did testify about Shawanne. Mrs.
Roseman testified that Dockery and Shelton made the
decision to terminate Shawanne but Shelton, as we have
seen, said that the decision was made by the "office" or
"personnel" and that he did not decide on a particular
employee.
Respondent's conflicting testimony as to who made the
decisions to terminate Shawanne and Doris Cook and the
varied reasons offered is not convincing. Nor has Respon-
dent undertaken to explain its termination of these
employees while it was hiring new employees. It is not
convincing to assert, for instance, that Shawanne did
generally bad work and could not perform the elementary
sewing function of following a guage to sew a correct or
straight seam during her years as an operator with
Respondent or that Doris could not perform other jobs,
when there is abundant evidence that such was not the
fact. Nor does the distinction that Respondent sought to
make between the ability of an experienced operator to sew
military but not civilian garments carry conviction. Doris
had worked for Respondent for 12 years on different jobs,
military and civilian work, and in 1966 had returned to the
plant at the request of Weis and Roseman after she had
voluntarily quit. Shawanne had worked for Respondent in
1963 and quit; she worked for another garment plant for 4
years and in 1969 returned at Mrs. Roseman's request to
work for Respondent until her termination in August 1971.
She had worked on military and civilian garments.
The evidence in the case in the context of Respondent's
opposition to union activity and an express background
statement earlier in 1971 that Shawanne and Doris, the
wives of two union advocates among the employees, would
be fired because of their husbands' union advocacy, fully
19 Doris Cook, as we have seen, was an experienced operator who had
performed different operations in the plant from 1961 to 1966 and from
1966 to 1971. She had worked for at least 5 years on civilian garments.
20 Chapman's statements to employees have been earlier described.
RIDGLEY MANUFACTURING CO.
89
warrants a finding of a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act in the selection and termination of Shawanne
and Doris Cook on August 13 and 16, 1971, respectively, a
few days before the Board election. I so find.
Ida Lou Williams Beginning in 1966, Williams worked
for about 2 years for Respondent as a sewing machine
operator stitching sleeves. She quit voluntarily. She
returned in 1969 and worked until the middle of 1970 when
she quit. During this period she was setting sleeves. At the
Company's request, Williams returned to work in January
1971 and continued until she was terminated on August 17,
1971. During this last period she was a machine operator
setting sleeves. Around August 2, 1971, Williams told
Shelton that she was going to quit her job. Shelton asked
her to defer her quitting because one of ' the other
employees
was to have a baby. Williams therefore
continued at her job. On about August 4, Williams and her
daughter, Mary Terry, also an employee, were at the end of
a break period. Shelton remarked to them it was time to go
back to work. Williams said that she guessed that he knew
that they had been talking about the Union and she
guessed that he knew that they were for the Union. Shelton
made no comment. Shelton does not refer to this incident
in his testimony although he testified about Williams, her
work, and the fact that he had asked her to defer her
quitting and that she had agreed to stay. I credit Williams
regarding the foregoing conversation with Shelton about
August 4.
Mary Terry testified in corroboration of
Williams. Some days later Shelton came to Williams in the
plant and said that he could let her go now if she wished to
quit. Williams replied that she had decided to continue
working. Shelton then asked her if she wanted to quit and
she repeated that she did not want to quit but wished to
continue working. Shelton said, "Well, I already told them
that you are for the Union" and he then left.'
The last-mentioned remark of Shelton is not controvert-
ed or denied by Shelton or by any other witness. In the
context of Respondent's opposition to the Union and the
impendency of the Board election, Shelton's remark
indicates that he told "them," presumably Respondent's
office, that Williams was for the Union because he and
Respondent considered such intelligence to be important.
The context also carries the clear implication that, despite
the fact that Williams had informed Shelton that she did
not wish to quit but to continue working, it was now too
late.
Shelton apparently regarded Williams' desire to
continue working as being, in effect, negated and rendered
futile because he had already reported that she was
prounion. What other meaning Shelton's remarks could
have had, I do not perceive.
On August 17, 1971, Shelton told Williams that he would
have to let her go and at the end of the day he gave her her
check which had the word "terminated" thereon.
About a week or 10 days after her termination, Williams
called the plant office to ask if there was any work for her.
She was told there was not. About the first of November
Williams went to the plant office and was told there was no
work for her. She telephoned the office a few days later
and was again told there was no work for her.21 In
February 1972, the Company, by letter invited Williams to
return to work. Williams went to the office and, upon
learning that she could return to work only as a new
employee, without seniority, holiday and vacation pay and
insurance, she declined to return.
By letter of January 9, 1973, the Company again offered
employment to Williams as a new employee. A few days
later she returned to work and worked on sewing sleeves.
She worked about a week, until January 19, and then quit.
Williams testified that she quit because she did not feel
that she "was being treated right." She stated that the job
she was given was usually performed by a double needle
machine but she had to use a plain stitch and perform two
operations and she received the same rating as other
employees who were on the double needle. On January 19,
the supervisor advised her that the work she was on was
being completed and on the next day she would be
assigned to a felling machine which is a double needle
machine. In her testimony, Williams described the felling
machine as a "big old machine" on which she had once
worked briefly. She decided to quit and did so.22 In my
opinion, Williams quit voluntarily, in January 1973, and
the evidence is insufficient to show the contrary. This
conclusion, however, does not dispose of the matter of her
original termination on August 17, 1971.
Mrs.
Roseman testified that employees were terminat-
ed for lack of work but,she did not participate in the
decision that a particular individual, such as Williams,
would be one of those terminated. Mrs. Roseman, as we
have seen, testified that -Shelton and Dockery decided
upon the individuals to be terminated.
Shelton testified that he did not recommend that
Williams be terminated. In fact, Shelton's testimony is, in
effect, that Williams quit her job in August 1971. Thus, at
the hearing, Shelton was asked about Williams' termina-
tion "on August 17, 1971." Shelton stated that, "two to
three weeks prior to that date," Williams told him she was
going to quit but he asked her to remain a little longer until
a particular operation was completed. Williams, according
to Shelton, told him she "would talk [think?] about it and
the next day she told me she would stay and . . . . a
couple of days later, she didn't come in and word was sent
in that she quit.""
The foregoing testimony of Shelton, if scrutinized, would
place the quitting by Williams as 2 or 3 days after she had
first told Shelton of her intention to quit. And she had first
told Shelton, according to Shelton's testimony, of her
intention to quit 2 or 3 weeks prior to August 17. However,
Respondent's answer admits that Williams was terminated
on August 17, 1971. Moreover, Respondent's time cards,
daily production records, payroll entries, and so forth
would certainly show if Williams had worked until August
17 as she testified, or whether she ceased to be on the
payroll a week or two prior to that time, as Shelton's
testimony would indicate. No such records appear in the
21 On these various occasions when she made inquiries about work ,
was surrounded by coats which, she felt, isolated her from other employees
Williams also asked about work for her daughter, Mary Terry, who had
She admitted , however, that the piles of coats were present before she had
been terminated on August 19, 1971.
started work in January.
22 In the course of her testimony Williams stated that her work station
90
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
record. For this and other reasons, I credit Williams'
testimony, as previously described.
Although testifying that Williams had quit in August
1971, Shelton stated that her job of setting lining sleeves on
military garments was eliminated. He testified that there
was "no comparable operation [in civilian work] of setting
lining sleeves, [but] there was a comparable operation of
setting sleeves." In response to questions as to Williams'
qualifications, Shelton denied saying that Williams was not
capable of performing any job on the new civilian
contracts. He was also asked:
Q.
She wasn't qualified to set sleeves on the new
contract?
A. ... I didn't say she wasn't qualified.
Shelton said that he had not felt that Williams would be "a
good operator" because if he had felt that she would be a
good operator her job in the past would have been shell
sleeves instead of lining sleeves. Shelton said there was
more margin for error in lining sleeves than in shell sleeves.
But Shelton admitted that there had been no problem
about the quality of Williams' work. He also admitted that
she made production and he does not claim that she had
ever been tested on shell sleeves or setting sleeves and had
been found unqualified. Prior to 1969, Williams had
worked almost 2 years on civilian garments at Respon-
dent's plant.
Dockery testified that Williams' job ceased to exist when
the military contract was phased out and, Dockery stated,
he believed that this was the only job that Williams could
perform. According to Dockery, there was nothing wrong
with the work performed by Williams. Referring to the
period after Williams' termination in August 1971, Docker-
y states that Shelton had recommended that she be
rehired.23 According to Dockery, Williams had a job of
setting -sleeves and top stitching in 1973. There is no
indication that her work was unsatisfactory and she quit of
her own accord.
It is apparent from the foregoing that there is a welter of
conflicting contentions made by Respondent regarding the
reason for Williams' termination in August 1971. Shelton
would not say that she was not qualified to work on
civilian contracts but by rather circuitous "reasoning" said
that she was not a good operator although neither he nor
Dockery found her quality of work or production to be
unsatisfactory. She was allegedly terminated because the
military work had been phased out, yet Williams had
previously performed civilian work for Respondent for
almost 2 years. Moreover, on Shelton's recommendation,
she had been offered reemployment in February 1972 and
in January 1973, when Respondent was performing no
military work. When she returned in 1973 she performed
the civilian work satisfactorily and thereafter quit voluntar-
ily. What has been previously stated in connection with the
conflicting evidence as to who in management selected
individual employees for termination and the evidence that
23 She was offered a job as a new employee in February 1972 and in
January 1973. As we have seen, she did return to Respondent's employ in
January 1973
24 Aside from the fact that the testimony of Williams and Terry was
uncontroverted on this aspect, the profession of union sentiments by
employees may have been a reaction to at least three antiunion speeches by
Respondent was hiring new employees while it was
terminating old employees is also pertinent.
I find that Williams was discriminatorily selected for
termination on August 17, 1971, and that her termination
was in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Although she had told Shelton before her termination that
she wished to continue working, he told her, in effect, that
it was too late because he had already reported her pro-
union sentiments to Respondent's officialdom, Respon-
dent's office.
Mary Terry had worked for Respondent from June 1969
to March 1970. She was a machine operator on side
seaming. In the latter part of her 1970 employment she was
making production. She quit her job voluntarily. She
returned in December 1971 and was put on inspecting. She
was promised an operator's job when a machine became
available. When no machine was available after 2 weeks,
she quit. Terry was rehired in January 1971 and worked
until August 4, 1971, when she was laid off and terminated
on August 19, 1971. Her job was sewing the side seams of
sleeves on a double needle folder.
Terry was present in early August 1971 when her mother,
Williams, told Shelton that they had been talking about the
Union and that they were both for the Union 24 Later that
day, evidently Wednesday, August 4, Terry spoke to
Shelton about noon. She said she was short of work and
asked if she could be placed on another assignment.
Shelton said she could leave early that day. Terry asked
when she would be recalled. Shelton said probably Friday
or Monday. Terry then left the plant. She called Shelton at
a later date and asked if he had anything for her. He said,
no. On August 19 Terry received her check through the
mail and it was marked, final check, terminated. The lay
off slip that came with the check, said, permanently laid
off, lack of work. After that Terry called the plant a few
times inquiring about work and her mother had also called
on behalf of herself and Terry. On all these occasions, the
Company said that there was no work for Terry or
Williams, her mother. By mail on January 30, 1972, the
Company asked Terry to return to work. She did not return
or reply since she had another job. The Company again
sent her a letter to return in January 1973. Terry did not
respond because she was employed elsewhere. There is no
doubt that on 'both of the foregoing occasions, the
Company was offering Terry a job as a new employee.
Mrs.
Roseman testified that she did not know or recall
an employee named Mary Terry. Shelton states that
Terry's job of goring sleeves with a double needle machine
was eliminated and she was terminated. Prior to that,
Shelton states that Terry's job was joining side seam linings
in the lining section. On both these jobs, Terry used a
double needle machine with a closed folder attachment.
Although double needle machines are used in both civilian
and military work, Shelton states that there was no closed
folder attachment used in a double needle machine on
civilian work. Shelton also asserts that Terry was, not
Respondent to the employees during this period. Sometimes certain
personalities react to such speeches by, in effect, professing their own
convictions to demonstrate their independence as individuals or as an
expression of solidarity with union-oriented friends, fellow workers, or
relatives. The Cooks, husbands, wives, and in-laws, are an example of the
latter type of loyalty.
RIDGLEY MANUFACTURING CO.
91
making production when she was terminated but Respon-
dent offered no production or payroll records to support
this assertion although Terry testified that in her last
month or two she was making production.
As to a double, needle machine, which Terry had
operated during her employment, and a single needle
machine, Respondent used both types of machines in its
civilian work. Shelton admitted that it is easier to train an
operator for a' single needle machine than for a double
needle machine. He said that a double needle machine is
"an intricate, difficult machine to learn how to operate"
but once it is mastered it does not involve as many
elements as a single needle machine. Assuming the
foregoing, it is not apparent why Terry could not, or could
not readily be trained to, operate a double needle machine
without a closed folder attachment since, as Shelton states,
the latter was not used on civilian work. Also, since it was
easier to learn how to operate a single needle machine than
a double needle machine, it is not clear why Terry, who
had mastered and had worked on a double needle
machine, could not be inducted into a single needle
operation.25
Dockery testified that he probably participated in the
decision to terminate Mary Terry. He stated his belief that
she was terminated`because of "absence" but was not sure.
Dockery admittedly had not spoken to Terry about any
absences but he said that the girls in the office "were told
to give them a pep talk about the absenteeism." This
matter was not mentioned by Shelton in his testimony and
Dockery offered no specifics about absence other than as
described above.
In the light of Respondent's hostility toward having a
union in its plant and its knowledge that Mary Terry and
her mother were prounion, I find that Terry's selection for
termination, on August 18, 1971, during a period when
Respondent was hiring new employees, was discriminatory
and in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Betty (Alice) Cook.26 This employee is the mother of
Leroy and Billy Joe Cook, and the mother-in-law of Doris
and Shawanne, all of whom have been referred to earlier in
this Decision. She performed civilian work of sewing the
shell to the linings .while employed by Respondent from
1963 to 1965. She quit her job in 1965. Cook returned to
Respondent in 1968 doing top stitching. She became ill
after a few weeks and quit after undergoing surgery. In
1969 Cook again was rehired by Respondent as a top
stitcher and worked until her termination on August 18,
1971.
On August 17, 1971, the day after Doris Cook had been
terminated and 4 days after Shawanne Cook's termination,
Betty spoke to Shelton in the plant. She asked him why
Doris and Shawanne had been fired and was it "on
account of the union." Shelton said, "no, not necessarily,
we do have slack work." 27 Alice then said that she wanted
him to know that she and Mary were both for the Union.28
The following day, August 18, Shelton brought her
paycheck to Betty (Alice) Cook in the plant and told her
she was laid off.
Alice called the plant on August 28, 1971. She asked
Mrs. Roseman if there was work for herself and her
daughter-in-law, Doris Cook. The answer was negative. On
October 6, 1971, the unemployment service sent Cook to
the plant. At the plant she was told there was no job
available.29
Betty Cook appeared at three unemployment compensa-
tion hearings, including one on behalf of herself. The
Company was opposing the payment of unemployment
compensation.
By letter of January 5, 1972, the Company invited Betty
Cook to return to work. Cook declined the offer when she
was informed that she would have to return as a new
employee. On January 8, 1973, Cook received a similar
letter and offer from the Company and Cook did not
respond to it.
In the approximately 5 years of her employment with the
company Cook had received no criticism of the quality or
quantity of her work and she made production. In addition
to her relationship with members of her family who were
union adherents and advocates, Alice Cook had signed a
union card and had talked to other female employees
about the Union. On August 17, 1971, when she asked
Shelton
why Doris and Shawanne Cook had been
discharged on August 13 and 16, respectively, Alice Cook
affirmed her own prounion sentiments. She was terminated
the next day.
Mrs.
Roseman testified that Shelton and Dockery
made the decision to terminate Cook and that Roseman
did not participate. Shelton testified that the top stitching
job that Cook was performing when she was terminated
was not eliminated and was continued on the civilian work.
Shelton states that he did not recommend that Cook be
terminated and he does not know why she was chosen for
termination. Dockery testified that when the military
contract was phased out the work available, for Cook was
to do repairs and, according to Dockery, "Betty didn't like
to do repairs. I mean, none, of the girls do-like to do
repairs." It is not explained why repair work became
significant around August 19, 1971, or why it was more
prevalent or important, if it was, at that particular time.
Presumably Cook and others had performed repair work in
the past and, according to Dockery, none of the employees
liked such work. However, there is no evidence that Cook
25 In the period when Terry was terminated, Respondent was hiring new
employees According to Shelton, the competency of a new employee was
determined "by setting them down on a machine and observing them." The
new employee was given an "observance job" which involved some simple
operation like sewing a piece of canvas to a facing. Unless the new
employee demonstrated complete incompetence in sewing, it would be 4 or
5 days before a decision was made as to whether or not the new employee
should be taken from the observance job, a nonproduction task, and
assigned to a production job. It is fairly clear that Respondent would not
have been obliged to undertake the foregoing steps if it elected to reassign
or give additional training or opportunity to one of its experienced
operators who was being laid off or terminated for lack of work in a
particular operation.
26 The name appears in the record as both "Alice" and "Betty" Cook. I
am satisfied that the name refers to the one person who testified.
27 This was an ambiguous answer and can be compared to a doctor
being asked whether a patient died because the surgeon made an error in
the course of the operation. The doctor answers, -no, not necessarily, the
patient was suffering from cancer." Such an answer is, of course, evasive.
28 Mary Jane Moore Betty's daughter, was with her' during this
conversation.
29 It is not unreasonable to assume that the Company had requested the
unemployment service to send applicants to the plant because the Company
was admittedly hiring help during this period.
92
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
had ever refused to perform such work in the past or that
she would not have accepted such work in August 1971 in
preference to termination. Further, unlike Dockery, Shel-
ton testified that the top stitching, which Cook was
performing-when terminated, was not discontinued when
the military work expired but was continued in civilian
work.
The selection of Alice Cook for termination, in the
circumstances described hereinabove, including Respon-
dent's
hiring
of new employees during this period,
persuades me that her discharge on August 19, 1971, was in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Marcene Fussell commenced working for the Company
in January 1968 and continued until September 23, 1971,
when she was terminated. Fussell worked in the numbering
department and Chapman was her supervisor.30 Fussell's
job was not a productionjob and I assume that this means
that she did not work on a piece rate since she was being
paid $1.82 per hour at the time of her termination. There
would therefore be no question as to whether or not she
made production. Fussell testified that her supervisor had
never spoken to her about the quality of her work in the
past although we shall see a reference to this aspect at the
time
of her discharge in September 1971. Fussell's
uninterrupted employment for more than 3 1/2 years tends
to indicate that she was a satisfactory employee.
On August 19, 1971, the day before the Board election,
Chapman, in a conversation in the plant, told Fussell that
he hoped that the Union would not get in because the
employees were hard to get along with as it was (even
without a Union); Chapman expressed the view that the
Union would not get in; and he asked Fussell if she was
union or not union; Fussell responded to this interrogation
rather cryptically and testified that "I just said, no." She
also testified that she had not talked to other people about
the Union and did not believe that anyone knew that she
was for the union. Whatever "cover" Fussell had, however,
on the union matter, was removed on the following day
when she, together with Leroy Cook, was a union observer
at the election. We have earlier seen the statements and
threats uttered by Chapman when he learned on the day of
the election that Leroy Cook was to be one of the union
observers. It is unlikely that any milder sentiments were
entertained regarding Fussell when her role was revealed.
About a month after the election, on Monday, Septem-
ber 20, 1971, Fussell was given the job of numbering a coat
or jacket. She told Chapman that she did not know how to
do the coats so Chapman had another employee, Ramsey,
to show Fussell how to do the work. Ramsey took "just a
few minutes" to show Fussell how to do the coats. Fussell
30 Fussell mentions another supervisor, Dorothy Cantrell, who was
apparently a subordinate of Chapman's in the department. Mrs. Roseman
referred to a supervisor in the department as Dorothy-and said that she
could not remember Dorothy's last name. Apparently the reference was to
Dorothy Cantrell.
31 Apparently the error or mistake was that the flaps had not matched
the coat. The numbers correspond but they were not the right shade. In
short, the different parts of a garment are numbered and if a stack of flaps is
numbered Ito 20 and the fronts are numbered I to 20, when they are sewed
together they match or should match.
32 McBride, a sister of Fussell , had worked in the numbering department
for 3 years She had last worked in March 1969, when she quit and worked
out of state. She testified that work in the numbering department had to be
worked on this task from noon on the 20th, and on
September 21 and 22. Shortly before quitting time on the
22d, Chapman brought some work back to Fussell and told
her to line them up in order and get the numbers in order.
Fussell then lined up the coats and the bundle of flaps that
had been brought back to her and did this before quitting
time on the 22d.31 Although the situation is not entirely
clear, Fussell testified that none of the coats had been sewn
together and all that was necessary to do was to realign the
flaps. Fussell testified that there were five girls in the
numbering department doing the same type of work, and
that employee Bridges numbered the first part of this
particular coat. According to Fussell, Bridges had returned
to her, "got back the welts and braidings because they were
shaded [a variation in matching the colors ]" and, in fact,
Bridges "got back all she numbered." Fussell states that
she, Fussell, did not get back any more work than the other
girls. Fussell states that in the past she and the other girls
did have work returned to them occasionally.32
On September 23, 1971, when Fussell came to work, her
timecard was not in the timecard rack and she therefore
could not punch in and go to work. As Fussell went toward
the office, Chapman was coming out and he said that he
guessed that she had noticed her card was not in the rack.
He said that Mrs. Roseman and Todd were mad about
some flaps that were shaded., Thereafter, Fussell received
her separation slip and check.
In November 1971, Fussell accompanied Ida Lou
Williams and Doris Cook when they all went to the plant
and unsuccessfully sought employment. Fussell also called
the plant office around the first of December 1971 and was
told that they were not hiring anyone. In February 1972,
the Company by letter advised her that there was a job
available for her. When she came to the plant she was told
that the job available for her was on a sewing machine.
Fussell said that she could not do the work of a sewing
machine operator.33 She therefore declined the job for this
reason and for the added reason that the Company was
offering her employment only as a new employee. In
January 1973 the Company offered Fussell employment as
a new employee in the numbering department. Upon her
return home, Fussell learned that her baby was sick and
had to be taken to the doctor. She wrote the Company a
letter explaining why she could not take the job and return
to work at that time. This was the last contact with the
Company.
Mrs.
Roseman was asked at the hearing, who had made
the decision to terminate Fussell Roseman replied, "I
imagine it was Mr. Chapman, who was her supervisor."
The witness also testified that she had participated in the
redone quite frequently and that she had had work returned to her when she
was in that department. She states that she knew of others in the department
who were also obliged to redo their work. McBride had not signed a union
card and was not involved in the Union She had, in fact, not worked in the
plant since 1969. McBride was rehired on September 23, 1971, in the
numbering department. At the time, McBride was not aware that Fussell
had been terminated on September 23 and that McBride was being hired to
take Fussell's place.
33 in 1964 or 1965 Fussell had operated a sewing machine in a
Tiptonville garment plant for 3 or 5 months. She had no prior experience as
an operator and did not make production while working at Tiptonville She
quit that job.
RIDGLEY MANUFACTURING CO.
93
decision. According to Roseman, Fussell was terminated
because she made "some very great errors in the number-
ing department at the cost of thousands of dollars" and
Roseman states "this was the second or third time she had
done this, made these same errors." Roseman was asked,
"what specific error did she make which was the basis for
her termination?" "A. Her work wasn't good." Asked to be
more specific, Roseman said that Fussell "messed up"
work in the numbering department and "instead of
numbering from one to twenty, she would make it from
thirty to forty" and when the articles were put together the
colors and shadings were wrong. Roseman was asked if she
knew "what part was shaded" and she said she did not
know. When asked whether Fussell had been warned
about this series of errors, Roseman said "she certainly
was" warned by her supervisor, Dorothy, whose last name
Roseman could not remember. Roseman stated that she
had "no idea" when these warnings were given but then
stated that it was when the errors were made.34 Roseman
stated that other employees had been discharged for
similar errors but could cite no examples. Roseman stated
we would have to go back on the individual records to see
who had made a mistake like that [Fussell]." No such
records were introduced at the hearing nor did the witness
subsequently testify on this aspect.
Dockery was asked:
Q.
Did you participate in the decision to terminate
her [Fussell ]?
A.
That was Mrs. Roseman, I would think.
A fair interpertation of the foregoing is that Dockery did
not participate in the decision to terminate Fussell.
Dockery went on to testify that "the only thing" he knew
about the Fussell matter was that she had made "a couple
of mistakes . . . close together" and as a result "some of
them [the garments J7 that had been sewn together had to
be taken apart by ripping out the stitches 35 When asked if
Fussell had been given any warnings about making
mistakes, Dockery's answer was, "Mr. Shelton would have
taken care of that." In short, Dockery knew of no warnings
and Shelton did not testify regarding Fussell and as far as
appears was not involved in her termination.
Although Mrs. Roseman testified, contrary to Dockery
who said Roseman made the decision, that "I imagine that
it was Mr. Chapman, who was her supervisor" who made
the decision to terminate Fusser Chapman did not testify.
Eventually, Dockery admits that, when supervisor Dorothy
reported that she needed an employee in the numbering
department, he recommended that Fussell be reemployed.
So far as appears neither Roseman, Chapman, nor
Dorothy objected to this recommendation, and the job was
offered to Fussell. This fact is not easily reconciled with
Roseman's unsupported testimony that Fussell was an
employee who had been terminated after warnings and a
34 "1 have no idea. At the time the errors were made " The latter remark,
in my opimon, has the appearance of conjecture or the tailoring of the
testimony to fit the situation. Neither Chapman, nor Dorothy, nor any
supervisor, floorlady, or employee testified about Fussell's work in the 3 1 /2
years she was in the numbering department nor did they testify from direct
knowledge about her work on September 22 or at any other time that
allegedly was the cause of her discharge.
35 The basis of this intelligence is not disclosed and Dockery does not
series of major mistakes that cost the Company "thousands
of dollars."
The people who the evidence shows were in the best, if
not the only, position to testify regarding specific errors or
mistakes by Fussell at any time and particularly on
September 22, the day before her discharge, were Chap-
man, Dorothy Cantrell, and any floorlady, or employee
directly involved in the alleged shading or misaligning of
the flaps with the coats. None of these persons testified and
Fussell's testimony is uncontroverted that she was aware of
no error in numbering the flaps when Chapman, on
September 22, brought back to her five bundles of coats
and one bundle of flaps and told her to realign the work,
which she did at the time in a relatively brief period. This
was the only conversation she had with Chapman on that
day. Fussell also testified that during her entire period of
employment with the Company she received no warnings
or reprimands. On the following day, when Fussell was
discharged, Chapman said that Mrs. Roseman and Todd
were "mad about the flaps" and "that was it." Todd, the
only employee among the cutters and spreaders in
Chapman's-department who had not signed a union card, a
fact known to Chapman, was a witness for Respondent.
Todd's testimony, in substance, was that he had never
heard Chapman say anything untoward or threatening to
the Cooks or about their wives, all union supporters, as
earlier described. Todd, however, gave no testimony about
the Fussell episode although for some unexplained reason
he was importantly involved in the matter to the extent
.that Chapman told Fussell when she was discharged (and
this was the extent of the explanation for the discharge),
that Mrs. Roseman and Todd-were mad about the flaps.
The fact that Fussell served as a union observer at the
Board election and thereby marked herself as a strong
union supporter in the eyes of an employer quite clearly
opposed to the unionization of this plant or its other plants
over a long period does not confer on her any immunity
from her employer's normal disciplinary power, including
discharge. However, the record reveals that she worked for
almost 4 years at one basic nonproduetion and hourly paid
type
of job in Respondent's numbering department
without warnings or reprimands. She and all others in the
department had, as the evidence reveals, made mistakes in
the course of the work over the years.36 She may well have
made an error or mistake on some work a day or two
before her discharge and she was told to realign some coats
and flaps on September 22. Precisely what the situation
was is difficult to determine since the only witness with
direct knowledge of the work in question, who testified,
was Fussell and she testified that there was no mistake in
numbering but she was given work to realign and had been
told about shadings that did not match on coats and flaps.
Mrs.
Roseman, I am convinced, was not directly
involved in the actual events on the factory floor and her
clams to have been personnally involved in the Fussell episode and did not
participate in the terminal decision.
36 Shelton, the plant manager during the relevant period, who spent all
his time on the floor of the plant observing the work of the employees and
the work flow, testified that there probably was not an employee "in the
whole plant that he did not speak to about the quality of their work "at one
time or another."
94
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
broad statements about Fussell causing damage in the
thousands of dollars despite a series of warnings is not
convincing. No part of her testimony about warnings and
extensive damage is supported by testimony of Chapman
and Dorothy Cantrell, the immediate supervisors. Mrs.
Roseman testified that Chapman made the decision to
terminate Fussell. Dockery testified that Mrs. Roseman
made the decision. Chapman did not testify but when he
notified Fussell of her discharge the only explanation he
gave was that Mrs. Roseman and Todd were mad about
the flaps. As previously noted, the role of Todd, a rank-
and-file employee, in this matter is unexplained. Dockery,
the assistant plant manager, did not participate in the
discharge decision and his knowledge of the alleged cause
of the discharge was, in my opinion, peripheral. Dockery
subsequently recommended an offer of reemployment to
Fussell in the same department and this offer was made.
Neither Dockery nor Shelton participated in the discharge
decision although at another point in her testimony, Mrs.
Roseman had testified that terminations and layoffs of
individuals was generally, if not always, decided upon by
Shelton and Dockery.
Upon consideration of the entire evidentiary picture, it is
my opinion that Fussell would not normally have been
discharged on September 23, 1971, for such error or
mistake as she may have made. Such mistake or error as
may have occurred, in my opinion, was used as a
convenient means of eliminating a known union adherent
in the course of Respondent's continuing effort to prevent
unionization of its plant. A violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act is found.37
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As found in the Decision, Respondent has violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogation, threats, and
coercive statements to its employees. Respondent had
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by withholding a wage
increase from its employees because of the presence of
union organizational activity.
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by terminating Shawanne Cook on August 13, 1971;
Doris Cook on August 16, 1971; Ida Lou Williams on
August 17, 1971; Betty (Alice) Cook on August 18, 1971;
Mary Terry on August 19, 1'971 ; and Marcene Fussell on
September 23, 1971.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has violated the Act in
certain respects, it will be recommended that Respondent
be ordered to cease and desist from such conduct and take
affirmative action to remedy the effects of its illegal
conduct.
The employees found to have been terminated discrimi-
natorily are to be offered reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent jobs with their seniority and all
other rights and privileges that they enjoyed at the time of
their terminations. The aforesaid employees are to be made
whole for any loss of pay they may have incurred by
reason of their terminations from the dates of their
respective discharges as found in this Decision to the date
of the offer of reinstatement, less any intermediate earnings
they may have had, and with the computation being made
on a quarterly basis and with interest at 6 percent.
Since Shawanne Cook; Doris Cook; Ida Lou Williams;
Betty Cook; Mary Terry; and Marcene Fussell have been
found to have been discriminatorily discharged, Respon-
dent's subsequent offers of employment to these employees
were inadequate since the offers were of jobs as new
employees without seniority, vacation and holiday, insur-
ance, and other rights and benefits that they enjoyed and
were entitled to prior to their terminations.
ORDER
Ridgely Manufacturing Company, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1.
Cease and desist from:
(a) Withholding normal pay increases from employees
because of the presence and existence of union activity
among the employees.
(b) Stating that employee support and selection of a
union would be futile because the Company did not intend
to work under a union contract and that the Company had
engaged in protracted and fruitless contract negotiations
with the union at another plant.
(c) Threatening employees with discharge because of
union activity.,
(d) Interrogating employees regarding their union senti-
ments or activities.
(e)
Discouraging union activity by discriminatorily
terminating
Shawanne Cook; Doris Cook; Ida Lou
Williams; Betty (Alice) Cook; Mary Terry; or Marcene
Fussell.
(f) In any other manner interferring with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.
2.
Take the following affirmative action to effectuate
the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Shawanne Cook; Doris Cook; Ida Lou
Williams; Betty (Alice) Cook; Mary Terry; and Marcene
Fussell immediate reinstatement to their former or sub-
stantially equivalent jobs, without prejudice to, and with
restoration of, all their seniority and other rights and
privileges.
(b) Pay to the aforenamed six employees the wages they
may have lost from the date of their terminations,
respectively, as found in this Decision, to the date of the
offer of reinstatement, described in the preceding para-
graph, less any intermediate earnings, and with the entire
computation being made on a quarterly basis, with interest
at 6 percent on any wages found to be due.
37 After the instant complaint issued, in winch Fussell was among those
and declined this limited offer. A year later, in 1973, Fussell was offered
named as discruninatees, Respondent, in February 1972, offered Fussell
employment in the numbering department, her former job, but as a new
employment as a new employee on the job of sewing machine operator.
employee
Fussell informed Respondent of her lack of ability to perform such work
RIDGLEY MANUFACTURING CO.
95
(c) Post, at its Ridgely Manufacturing Company plant in
Tennessee, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."38 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the
Regional
Director,
Region 26, after being signed by
Respondent's representative,'shall be posted by Respon-
dent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to
ensure that such notices are not altered , defaced, or
covered by other material.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination . and copying, all
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay that
may be due to Shawanne Cook; Doris Cook; Ida Lou
Williams; Betty (Alice) Cook; Mary Terry; and Marcene
Fussell, including payroll records, timecards, social securi-
ty records and other personnel and financial records.
(e) Notify the Regional Director, Region 26, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.
38 in the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial in which all parties participated, it has been
found that we have violated the National Labor Relations
Act in certain respects . To remedy these violations of the
law, we advise you that:
WE WILL NOT state that employee support and
selection of a union as their bargaining representative
will be useless or that we have negotiated with the
union at our other plant for many months and had still
not agreed to a contract with the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with discharge
because they have, or are, engaging in union activity or
union support.
WE WILL NOT illegally question employees as to
whether they favor or do not favor having a union.
WE WILL NOT discharge employees because of the
union activity or union sentiments.
WE WILL offer to Shawanne Cook; Doris Cook; Ida
Lou Williams; Betty (Alice) Cook; Mary Terry; and
Marcene Fussell immediate and full reinstatement to
their former or substantially equivalent jobs, without
prejudice to, and with restoration of, all their seniority
and other rights and privileges.
WE WILL pay to the said employees : Shawanne
Cook,
discharged August 13,
1971;
Doris
Cook,
discharged , August
16,
1971; Ida Lou Williams,
discharged August 17, 1971; Betty (Alice) Cook,
discharged August 18, 1971 ; Mary Terry, discharged
August 19, 1971; Marcene Fussell, discharged Septem-
ber 23, 1971 any wages they may have lost from the
dates of their respective discharges to the date of our
offer of reinstatement, less any intermediate earnings
they may have had and with interest at 6 percent on
any wages that we may owe them.
All our employees are free to join or support the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
or any other union, or to refrain from such activity.
Dated
By
RIDGELY MANUFACTURING
COMPANY
(Employer)
(Representative)
(Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, Clifford Davis Federal
Building Room 746, 167 North Main Street , Memphis,
Tennessee 38103, Telephone 901 534-3161.