226 NLRB 76
Morristown-Hamblen Hospital Association
76
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Morristown-Hamblen Hospital Association and Com-
munications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Peti-
tioner. Cases 10-RC-10642, 10-RC-10643, 10-
RC-10644, and 10-RC-10645
September 22, 1976
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTIONS
BY MEMBERS FANNING, PENELLO, AND WALTHER
Upon petitions duly filed under Section 9(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, a hear-
ing was held before Hearing Officer Thomas A.
Palmer of the National Labor Relations Board on
April 2, 7, and 13, 1976. Following the hearing and
pursuant to Section 102.67 of the National Labor Re-
lations Board Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as
amended, and by direction of the Regional Director
for Region 10, this proceeding was transferred to the
Board for decision. Thereafter, the Employer and the
Petitioner filed briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the Hearing Officer's rul-
ings made at the hearing and finds that they are free
from prejudicial error. They are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, the
Board finds:
1. The parties stipulated, and we find, that the
Morristown-Hamblen Hospital Association, herein-
after the Hospital or the Employer, is a Tennessee
corporation with an office and place of business lo-
cated in Morristown, Tennessee, where it is engaged
in the operation of a hospital, and that during the
past year the Employer had gross revenues in excess
of $250,000, and additionally during this period has
purchased and received goods in excess of $20,000
directly from "customers" outside the State of Ten-
nessee.
However, a question exists as to whether the Hos-
pital is an "employer" within the meaning of Section
2(2) of the Act. The Hospital contends that it is a
political subdivision of the State of Tennessee and
Hamblen County, Tennessee, and is therefore ex-
empt from the coverage of the Act.'
The Board has held that an entity is entitled to the
statutory exemption as a political subdivision under
Section 2(2) if it is either (1) created directly by the
i Sec. 2(2) of the Act excludes from the definition of "employer" any
wholly owned Government corporation
. or any State or political subdi-
vision thereof .. .
State, so as to constitute a department or an adminis-
trative arm of the government, or (2) administered by
individuals who are responsible to public officials or
to the general electorate.2
In January 1952, 13 private citizens-described in
the record as "public spirited citizens" of Hamblen
County joined together and applied for a charter of
incorporation in order to establish a nonprofit hospi-
tal. The application was granted by the State of Ten-
nessee and a general welfare corporation known as
the Morristown-Hamblen County Hospital Associa-
tion was formed.3 The corporation was established
for the object of engaging "in the establishment,
maintenance and operation of a non-profit hospital."
Based on the above, the Petitioner contends, and
we agree, that Hamblen County did not directly
create the Hospital, which therefore cannot be found
to be a political subdivision under the first test enun-
ciated in Hawkins.
However, the Employer argues that the corpora-
tion, shortly after its formation and prior even to the
construction of the Hospital, changed its thrust so as
to become a political subdivision. The Employer, af-
ter being incorporated, conveyed its land to Ham-
blen County. Thereafter, Hamblen County expended
funds (through the issuance of general obligation
bonds guaranteed by the county) for the acquisition
of land, the building and equipping of the hospital,
and for a time the operation of the hospital. Further,
the Hospital pays no property taxes, no income tax,
no state franchise and excise tax, and, with minor
exceptions, no sales tax.
However, the Board has held that an entity does
not necessarily become an administrative arm of the
State by occupying state-owned property .4 Further,
as we have stated in cases such as Grey Nuns of the
Sacred Heart,' the receipt of funds and assistance
from exempt government entities does not necessari-
ly cause an employer to become a political subdivi-
sion of the government. The facts herein are similar
to those in the aforementioned cases, and we thus
conclude that the financial assistance rendered by
Hamblen County to the Hospital is not such as
would make the Hospital an exempt governmental
entity.
The Employer's reliance on Camden-Clark Memo-
rial Hospital6 is misplaced. In that case, unlike here,
the hospital in question was originally created by the
city (i.e., the city of Parkersburg, West Virginia).
2 See N L R B v. The Natural Gas Utility District of Hawkins County,
Tennessee, 402 U.S. 600 (1971).
3 The charter was renewed in 1973 without significant changes.
4 See, e.g., Bishop Randall Hospital, 217 NLRB 1129 (1975), and Highview,
Incorporated, 223 NLRB 646 (1976)
'221 NLRB 1215 (1975)
6 221 NLRB 945 (1975)
226 NLRB No. 13
MORRISTOWN-HAMBLEN HOSPITAL ASSN.
Much later, about 1970, enabling legislation and city
code provisions were passed in order to insulate the
hospital from political influence. Nonetheless, the
hospital continued to be owned, operated, and con-
trolled by the city of Parkersburg. Various factors,
not present in the case before us and in addition to
financial support, demonstrated the control and
ownership of the hospital by the municipality. For
example, the hospital had no separate status as a le-
gal entity and all litigation involving the hospital had
to include the City .7 Also, membership on the board
of directors of the hospital was subject to city council
confirmation. In sum, the hospital in Camden-Clark
was directly created by the city, and the later legisla-
tion designed to end undue political influence did
not remove the hospital from the control of the city.
Here, additional factors cited by the Employer to
support its position are not persuasive. The Em-
ployer's board of trustees, while including mem-
bers who serve by reason of their public positions,
has a majority of members who serve as private citi-
zens or by virtue of holding office in private organi-
zations.8 A majority of the board of trustees may ap-
point additional members, and no members are
subject to confirmation or control by the municipali-
ty. Also, the public officials serving on the Board
hold office by virtue of the Hospital's articles of in-
corporation and not by virtue of any statute or ordi-
nance requiring their service on the board of trustees.
The board of trustees' primary purpose is to meet
once a year and appoint a nine-man board of direc-
tors. The board of directors has control over the wag-
es and working conditions of employees. Their poli-
cies are effectuated by the Hospital's administrator,
who oversees the day-to-day operations of the Hospi-
tal. The Hospital's administrator annually submits a
budget to the board of directors which either ap-
proves or modifies the budget. The budget is not sub-
ject to review by the board of trustees or any branch
of the county government.
It is clear that the local government plays a limited
role in the affairs of the Hospital. The inclusion of
some public officials on the board of trustees does
not warrant a different conclusion. It is significant
that the public officials who serve on the board of
trustees serve by virtue of the Hospital's articles of
incorporation and not by statute or ordinance. Also,
7In this case, the Employer has legal status separate from the county
Also, in defending itself in a recent lawsuit, the Employer stated that it need
not comply with the Tennessee Sunshme' Law because it was not a public
hospital corporation. Rather, in that litigation , the Employer, in its verified
amended answer, averred that it operated "as a private hospital for the
benefit of the community" and had "the right to govern and control its
facilities and the manner of its operation ...."
8 Of approximately 65 people currently serving on the board of trustees,
about 21 members hold their position by virtue of being public officials.
77
as noted above, the board of trustees' almost sole
responsibility is to appoint a board of directors, and
thus the board of trustees is far removed from the
actual direction and control of the Hospital.
The Employer also notes that a provision in its
bonds gives the county certain rights to protect itself
in the event of default. However, the provision in
question provides only that the Employer agrees, in
the event of default, not to oppose the appointment
of a receiver by a court of competent jurisdiction.
This act does not establish that, even in default, the
county would necessarily assume control of the Hos-
pital.9
The Hospital herein does not turn away indigents,
and it receives referrals from the county health de-
partment. However, as stated by the Hospital's ad-
ministrator, his posture toward the health depart-
ment is one of "no relationship" but one of
"cooperation." Thus, it is clear that the health de-
partment exercises no control over the Employer and
contributes
no
money to the Employer.10 The
Hospital's policy towards indigents is consistent with
its purpose of operating for the general welfare but
does not,convert its operation into a "governmental
function."
In light of the evidence before us, we find that the
Employer functions essentially as a private enter-
prise. It was created by private citizens and currently
operates with minimal involvement by the local gov-
ernment. Hamblen County, whose primary contribu-
tion to the Hospital has been through its issuance of
general obligation bonds to finance the construction
of the hospital facility," does not exercise any sub-
stantial degree of control over the Employer. Ac-
cordingly, we find that the Employer is not a political
subdivision of Hamblen County and is an employer
within the meaning of the Act.
2. The labor organization involved claims to rep-
resent certain employees of the Employer.
3. A question affecting commerce exists concern-
ing the representation of certain employees of -the
Employer within the meaning of Sections 9(c)(1) and
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. In regard to the appropriate units, the Petitioner
seeks to represent employees in four separate units.
9In Bishop Randall Hospital, supra, a lease between the hospital and the
county permitted the county, in the event of a breach by the hospital, to
cancel the hospital's lease. However, the Board found that such circum-
stances exhibited only insubstantial evidence of control by the county.
io Referrals from the health department are expected, if able, to pay for
hospital services, and the health department does not reimburse the Hospi-
tal for those who fail to pay.
"Though the county has at times contributed to the operating expenses
of the Hospital, it does not regularly do so and is apparently not doing so at
this time.
78
DECISIONS OF, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Case 10-RC-10642
In this case, Petitioner seeks a unit of all full-time
registered nurses. The Employer contends that this
unit should also include four emergency room physi-
cians and one registered pharmacist. The Employer
argues that, in view of the limited number of profes-
sionals other than nurses, these doctors and the phar-
macist should be included in an overall professional
unit. However, it has been the Board's policy, subject
to the facts in each case, to find appropriate a sepa-
rate bargaining unit of registered nurses when a peti-
tioner seeks that unit. 12
Here, the RN's are all employed in a single depart-
ment and subject to the single overall supervision of
the director of nursing services. The emergency room
physicians report directly to the Hospital's adminis=
trator or the board of directors, and the pharmacist
reports to the director of supply. The nurses- have
formal meetings among themselves, and there is no
evidence that the doctors or the pharmacist attends
these meetings. The nurses' educational prerequisites,
duties and responsibilities, and pay scales differ sub-
stantially from those of the emergency room physi-
cians and the pharmacist. Under these circum-
stances, we find the requested unit of all registered
nurses to be appropriate, and we shall exclude the
emergency room physicians and the pharmacist from
the unit found appropriate.
Also, the Petitioner contends, and the Employer
disputes, that nurse Lois Cameron is a supervisor
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. Cam-
eron works as an I.V. therapist and also, on every
other weekend, as a house nurse. During the time
that Cameron serves as house nurse, it is clear that
she exercises supervisory authority. As house nurse,
Cameron is in charge of and has ultimate responsibil-
ity for the 50 to 60 employees who work in nursing
services. Thus, the primary question regarding Cam-
eron is whether or not she serves as house nurse suffi-
ciently often to warrant finding her to be a supervi-
sor. The record shows that she worked in the
capacity of house nurse at least 16 hours during each
2-week period and that this service is on a regularly
scheduled basis. Under these circumstances, we find
that Cameron exercises supervisory authority on a
sufficient basis to justify finding her to be a supervi-
sor. Accordingly, we conclude that Cameron is a su-
pervisor and we therefore exclude her from the unit.
Cases 10-RC-10644 and 10-RC-10645
The Petitioner seeks to represent -the service and
12 Mercy Hospitals of Sacramento, Inc, 217 NLRB 765 (1975)
maintenance employees in a unit separate and dis-
tinct from the unit of technical employees. The Em-
ployer contends that the two aforementioned units
should be combined into one overall- unit. The Em-
ployer notes that the service and maintenance em-
ployees have significant contact with the technical
employees and that they are all hourly paid and are
required to punch a timeclock:
However, we find that, in the case before us, the
relationship between the technical employees and the
service and maintenance employees is very similar to
the situations in cases where we have found separate
units to be appropriate.13 Here, the technical employ-
ees are more highly trained, are frequently higher
paid, often work in separate laboratories or areas,
and perform work requiring a higher degree of re-
sponsibility than the service and maintenance em-
ployees. Accordingly, we shall grant Petitioner's re-
quest that the technical employees be found to
constitute a separate appropriate unit and the service
and maintenance employees be found to constitute a
separate unit.
Regarding the unit of technical employees, the Pe-
titioner contends, and the Employer disputes, that
Mira Callis should be excluded from the unit because
of supervisory status.
Callis serves as "Assistant Chief" to Chief Medical
Technologist James Oakes (a stipulated supervisor).
Testimony by Oakes indicated that whenever he is
not present Callis will "most likely" take over for
him. Also, Callis regularly makes out the schedule for
laboratory employees. As part of her scheduling du-
ties, Callis has authority to, approve ` overtime, to
grant time off for illness, and to coordinate transfers
with the section chiefs. When grievances arise but
cannot be settled between the grievant and the sec-
tion chief, the matter is referred to Callis, who at-
tempts to resolve the problem'. Should the matter still
not be resolved, it is referred to either Oakes or Dr.
Finney (director of the laboratory). In light of Callis'
authority-both when acting in place of Oakes and
when exercising her regular duties as
assistant
chief-we find that'Callis is a supervisor within the
meaning of the Act, and we shall exclude her from
the unit.
Case 10-RC-10643
The Petitioner seeks a unit of all business office
clerical employees. However, the Petitioner submits
that the medical records employees should be'includ-
ed in' the aforementioned service-and maintenance
13 See, e g., Newington Children's Hospital, 217 NLRB 793 (1975); Nathan
and Miriam Barnert Memorial Hospital Association d/b/a Barnert Memorial
Hospital Center, 217 NLRB 775 (1975)
MORRISTOWN-HAMBLEN HOSPITAL ASSN.
unit, whereas the Employer requests that they be in-
cluded in the unit of business office clerical employ-
ees.
The Board has normally included medical records
employees in service and maintenance units, but
where the facts of the case indicate their community
of interest lies with the business office employees the
Board has included them in the business office unit.14
There are seven employees in the medical records
department, two clericals and five transcribers. Their
office is located in a separate room across the hall
from the business office employees. They are super-
vised by Ruth Slover, who reports directly to the
Hospital's administrator. One of the clerks primarily
abstracts information from patients' charts for a
computer and supplies necessary information to doc-
tors and other departments throughout the Hospital.
The other clerk is primarily responsible for receiving
patients' charts, assembling and checking them, and
sorting and filing various medical records. The tran-
scribers transcribe all reports dictated by the doctors.
The patients' charts are usually brought to the medi-
cal records office by nurses or ward clerks. When
necessary, the employees in the medical records of-
fice take various charts and records to wherever they
are needed on the hospital floor.
Thus, the employees in question deal with patients'
medical records rather than with the type of records
dealt with in the business office, work closely with
doctors and nurses, and have frequent contacts with
service and maintenance employees (such as ward
clerks). Accordingly, we shall exclude the medical
records employees fromthe business office unit and
include them in the service and maintenance unit.
We find that the following employees of the Em-
ployer constitute units appropriate for the purpose of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) ' of the Act:
Case 10-RC-10642
All registered nurses employed by the Employer
at its Morristown-Hamblen Hospital facility in
Morristown, Tennessee; excluding house nurses,
pharmacist, emergency room physicians, super-
visors as defined in the Act, guards, and all
other employees.
Case 10-RC-1064315
All business office clerical employees employed
by the Employer at its Morristown-Hamblen
14 See William W Backus Hospital, 220 NLRB 414 (1975), but cf St
Luke's Episcopal Hospital, Texas Children's Hospital, Texas Heart Institute,
222 NLRB 674 (1976)
79
Hospital facility in Morristown, Tennessee; ex-
cluding medical records employees , confidential
employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in
the Act, and all other employees.
Case 10-RC-10644
All technical employees employed by the Em-
ployer at its Morristown-Hamblen Hospital fa-
cility in Morristown, Tennessee; excluding ser-
vice and maintenance employees, the assistant
chief medical technologist, professional employ-
ees, registered nurses, guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act, and all other employees.
Case 10-RC-10645
All service and maintenance employees em-
ployed by the Employer at its Morristown-Ham-
blen Hospital facility in Morristown, Tennessee,
including medical records employees; excluding
technical employees, professional employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act,
and all other employees.
[Direction of Elections omitted from publica-
tion.] 16
MEMBER PENELLO, dissenting in part:
I join my colleagues in their disposition of the is-
sues in this case except that, for the reasons set forth
in the dissenting opinions in Barnert Memorial Hospi-
tal Center 17 and in Newington Children s Hospital,'8 I
disagree with their decision to establish separate
units of technical employees and service and mainte-
nance employees.
Mindful of the congressional mandate, as evi-
denced by the legislative history preceding the pas-
sage of the 1974 health care amendments to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act,19 to avoid proliferation
of bargaining units in the health care industry, I
would require that the technical employees be in-
cluded in the service and maintenance unit.
15 In Cases 10-RC-10642 and 10-RC-10643, the Petitioner requested
units, respectively, of "all full-time registered nurses" and "all full-time busi-
ness office clerical employees." It is unclear from the record whether there
are any employees in either of these classifications who are other than full
time. However, it is the Board's established policy to include within an
appropriate unit all full-time and regular part-time employees. Accordingly,
our decision herein does not intend to exclude, regular part-time employees
from the appropriate units
16 [Excelsior footnote omitted from publication I
1' 217 NLRB 775 (1975)
1s 217 NLRB 793 (1975)
19S Rept 93-766, 93d Cong, 2d sess 5 (1974), H Rept. 93-1051, 93d
Cong, 2d sess 7 (1974)