Colin Service Systems, Inc.

70 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Colin Service Systems, Inc. and Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home and Allied Health Services Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO and Building Service Em- ployees -International Union, Local 32E, AFL-CIO, Party to the Contract. Case 2-CA-13877 September 21, 1976 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND WALTHER On June 7, 1976, Administrative Law Judge James L. Rose issued the attached Decision in this proceed- ing. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions. The Respondent filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The-Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Colin Service Systems, Inc., New York, New York, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. 1 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to over- rule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings 2 Since the remedy would be the same, we find it unnecessary to pass on the General Counsel's contention that Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) as well as Sec. 8(a)(1) by discharging employees Hill, Jones, and Lopez. Pres- cott Industrial Products Company, 205 NLRB 51 (1973) Member Jenkins would find and enjoin the violation of Sec 8(a)(3) DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES L. ROSE, Administrative Law Judge: This matter came on for hearing at New York City on April 5, 6, and 7, 1976, on the Regional Director's complaint alleging, in general terms, that Colin Service Systems, Inc., violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq., by: requiring newly hired employees to sign union membership and checkoff authorization cards within 30 days of their initial employment; and discharging three employees for their having engaged in union and other protected concerted activity. Upon the record as a whole, including my observation of the witnesses, arguments, and briefs of counsel, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent is a New York corporation engaged principally in the business of maintenance contractor pro- viding building cleaning and related services to industrial, educational, and other commercial accounts. During the year preceding the issuance of the complaint herein, the Respondent performed services valued in excess of $500,000, of which services valued in excess of $50,000 were performed for various enterprises located in New Jer- sey and Connecticut. I find that the Respondent is, and at all times material herein has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED Building Service Employees International Union, Local 32E, AFL-CIO, is admitted by the Respondent to be, and I find is, a labor organization within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(5) of the Act. Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home and Allied Health Services Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO, has been shown to be an organization in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose of negotiating with employers concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of employees. I accordingly find Local 144, is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organi- zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Factual Background Sometime in the summer of 1975, the Respondent en- tered into a contract with Carl H. Neuman, M.D., d/b/a Co-op Care Center, the essence of which was that, for a certain predetermined hourly rate, the Respondent would furnish people to do light janitorial work at the Co-op Care Center-distributing laundry, mopping, sweeping, and the like. The Respondent apparently has different types of ar- rangements by which it undertakes to do janitorial work for commercial concerns. Sometimes the Respondent fur- nishes all of the employees, along with supervision and 226 NLRB No. 17 COLIN SERVICE SYSTEMS, INC. equipment. On this particular project, however, the Re- spondent did not furnish any materials or direct supervi- sion. The Respondent supplied employees who then were directed in their work by an employee of the Co-op Care Center, in this instance one Lesmes Ruiz. The Respondent's district manager, Luis Otero, testified that he would spend only about 15 minutes to an half hour each morning at the Co-op Care Center to insure that the employees of Respondent had in fact shown up for work and that Co-op Care Center had as many workers as it needed, He stated that, when Co-op Care Center wanted more people, Ruiz would call him and then Otero would undertake to furnish them. Thus it was that Otero inter- viewed, hired, and fired employees of the Respondent who worked at Co-op Care Center. However, while at work they were under the direct supervision of Ruiz in that he assigned them their jobs and directed them in their work. Employees hired by the Respondent for the Co-op Care Center job were new hires as opposed to transferees from other projects. The Respondent ran newspaper ads and employees learned of the openings by various other meth- ods. In any event, it appears that most of the new employees at the Co-op Care Center project were interviewed in Ruiz' office by Otero who had them fill out an application for employment. Also, at the time employees were hired, Otero advised them that the Company had a union shop, under a contract with Local 32E. He would customarily tell them that this meant that their membership in that Union was required after 30 days of employment. At this time, he would give them an application for membership, as well as a dues- checkoff authorization card. There is no testimony in the record that Otero made any type of threat to any employee concerning membership in Local 32E. Nor is there evidence that he said membership was required prior to the end of 30 days of employment or that any employee had to sign the checkoff authorization card. Nor is there any evidence that Otero made signing the checkoff card a condition of employment-either ex- press or implied. Thus, of the employees in question, Jewell Hill and Nao- mi Jones signed checkoff authorization cards while Ray- mond Lopez did not. Dues were in fact withheld from the paychecks of Hill and Jones, presumably pursuant to the authorizations. The money, however, was apparently not transmitted to the Union and was in fact refunded to Hill and Jones on their discharge. The parties are also in general agreement that on Mon- day morning, August 25, 1975, Michael Galati of Local 32E, along with Otero, Ruiz, and a Spanish-speaking repre- sentative of the Union, met with all of the Respondent's employees at the Co-op Care Center to explain the labor agreement. Jones, Hill, and Lopez asked a number of ques- tions concerning the wage rate, benefits, and the like. The parties also agree that, on the morning of August 26, Hill, Jones, and Lopez were discharged by Otero. They had been employed less than 30 days. It was stipulated that the pay week for these employees ended on Sunday and began on Monday. Thus Hill, Jones, and Lopez were each paid for 8 hours for Monday, August 71 25, and for 2 hours for Tuesday, August 26. The parties further stipulated that the three discharged employees were replaced on August 26. On or about September 7, Co-op Care Center canceled its contract with Colin and, apparently in the process of doing so, did not pay Cohn for services rendered. This became the subject of litigation which was ultimately set- tled between Colin and Co-op in November 1975. B. Analysis 1. The checkoff authorization The complaint alleges that the Respondent required Hill and Jones to sign union membership and checkoff authori- zation cards notwithstanding that they had not been em- ployed for 30 days., It should be noted that there is no testimony from any of the General Counsel's witnesses to the - effect that Otero threatened prospective employees or in any way required them to sign the checkoff authorization cards or made the signing of the checkoff authorization a condition of em- ployment. Nor is there any evidence that Otero required any new employee to join Local 32E before the expiration of 30 days of employment. Thus, we have in this matter the bare fact that, at or about the time of their employment, Hill, Jones, and Lopez were tendered applications for membership in the Union along with checkoff authorization cards. Hill and Jones signed the checkoff authorization cards and returned them to the Respondent, and, thereafter, union dues were de- ducted from their paychecks. The Company, however, re- turned the amount deducted to them following their dis- charges because they had not been, employees for more than 30 days. Lopez, on the other hand, did not sign the checkoff authorization card and there was no deduction from his wages. Absent any specific threat or other intimidatory state- ment or act by Otero with regard to this matter, I cannot find that the mere fact that the Respondent gave to em- ployees checkoff authorization cards and applications for union membership within the first30-days of their employ- ment is violative of Section, 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3) of the Act. Counsel for the General Counsel stated at the hearing his theory that it is unlawful for a company to deduct dues pursuant to a checkoff authorization within the first 30 days of employment. There was a union-shop clause in the collective-bargain- mg agreement between the Respondent and Local 32E. This clause, conforming to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, pro- vided that as a condition for continued employment each employee must become a member of Local 32E-after 30 days. There is nothing in the Act to prohibit an employee from joining the Union and authorizing dues to be deduct- ed within the first 30 days of employment. The matter of union dues checkoff is covered under Sec- tion 302(c) of the National Labor Relations Act. This sec- tion prohibits an employer from deducting from employ- ees' wages union dues and submitting them to the union absent a written authorization to do so. Neither Section 302(c) nor any other section of the Act prohibits dues de- 72 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD duction pursuant to a written authorization within the first 30 days of employment. Here, as a part of the hiring procedure, the Respondent gave employees checkoff authorization cards which, in the case of two employees, were signed and returned to the Respondent, and the Respondent undertook to set up its payroll to make the appropriate deduction. One of the three employees did not choose to sign the authorization card and did not do so, and no deduction was made. An employer cannot make a condition for employment membership in a union within the first 30 days. However, tendering new employees' applications for membership along with checkoff authorization cards without a further showing of intimidation or coercion, particularly where the collective-bargaining agreement contains a union-security clause, is not a violation of Section 8(a)(3) or 8(a)(1) of the Act. Accordingly, I recommend that paragraph 7 of the complaint be dismissed. This case was pled and tried on the theory discussed above; namely, that the Respondent "required" new em- ployees to join Local 32E and sign dues-checkoff authori- zation within 30 days, and that in any event to make a dues deduction within 30 days, even pursuant to a written au- thorization, is violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3). For the first time in his brief, the General Counsel ar- gues an alternative theory-under the facts outlined, the Respondent aided Local 32E to the detriment of the em- ployees' right to select another union or no union. In short, the General Counsel now argues that the Respondent en- gaged in 8(a)(2) activity and suggests this is so because the facility where the Respondent's new employees worked constituted, or could have constituted, a separate appropri- ate bargaining unit. Hence, the new employees had the right not to accept Local 32E as their bargaining-agent. While this argument has some validity (Penn Traffic Company, Riverside Division, 219 NLRB 189 (1975); Tus- chak/Jacobson, Inc., t/a Franklin Convalescent Center, 223 1298 (1976) ), it must be rejected. The General Counsel pled that the appropriate bargaining unit included the new employees at the facility in question; all parties tried this cause from the reference that Local 32E was the bargaining agent and that the contract was in full force and effect. There is no allegation in the complaint of unlawful assis- tance or a violation of Section 8(a)(2). To consider so substantive a change of theory at this stage of the proceeding would be to deny the Respondent the fundamental right to know in what manner it is alleged to have committed unfair labor practices so that it can fully defend the complaint. For instance, critical to the unlawful assistance theory is the matter of whether the employees are an accretion 'or constitute a new separate appropriate bargaining unit. While there is some evidence on this point, it was not fully litigated. The question of unlawful assistance was not raised in the complaint and the Respondent was never put on notice that such a violation was in issue. Accordingly, the unlaw- ful assistance ) aspect ' of the General Counsel's argument could not be the basis of finding a violation of the Act. Georgia, Florida, Alabama Transportation Company, 219 NLRB 894 (1975). 2. The discharge of Hill, Jones, and Lopez Jones, Hill, and Lopez all generally testified that, at the meeting on August 25 with Otero, the representatives of Local 32E, Ruiz, and the other employees, each of them made some comment concerning the wages and working conditions that they were to receive under the Local 32E contract. Significantly, they all testified that Galati did not have in hand at that time the contract and could not there- fore give a good answer with regard to the wages and other benefits. Indeed, another meeting was set for the next day. Nevertheless, Hill, Jones, and Lopez questioned why their wages were only $112 a week ($2.80 per hour) while other unions representing employees in the same industry were able to get more money for their members. On the morning of August 26, Jones, Hill, and Lopez arrived at work slightly before the 7 a.m. starting time. They were then variously informed by Otero that they were discharged. Included also was Laura Stanford who left with the other three. They first went to Lopez" home and then to the Local 32E hall. They stated that Galati ex- pressed surprise at their discharges and they went with him back to Co-op. Hill testified that Ruiz praised her work one time, partic- ularly with the way that she did the linen and that, in any event, he never complained of her work. She, incidentally, was a housekeeper for approximately 17 years until her employers moved to Florida and thus was experienced in the work she was doing. Ruiz testified that he does not remember ever praising Hill's work but, on the other hand, he stated that he never criticized her and his only objection to her was that on occasion she talked to residents of the nursing home. Lopez testified that there had been no complaint con- cerning his work, although no praise for it either. Jones arrived at work about 10 minutes before 7 p.m. and saw Otero, who stated that Jones was being discharged because her work was not satisfactory. She told him that was not true and he said words to the effect, "You make trouble." This comment by Otero to Jones was undenied by Otero. When Jones saw Ruiz, she told him that there had been no complaints about her work. He threw up his hands and stated, "I know nothing." Jones also testified that they went to see Galati at the union hall, and he said that, if they signed cards, he would get their jobs back. Then they all went back to the Co-op Care Center. The four discharged employees arrived some time after Galati, and when they got there he was already meeting with the other employees explaining to them the benefits of the con- tract. After the meeting the four remained, and Otero and Galati met privately. At this time Galati said to Lopez words to the effect "`Young man, I hear you are talking about Local 1199 [another union representing employees in this industry] but Local 32E is here to stay." Jones testified that Hill asked something to the effect of why was "Laura discharged, she didn't say anything yesterday"; and Stan- ford was put back to work. Finally, when the employees asked Galati why they were COLIN SERVICE SYSTEMS, INC. 73 discharged, he said, "All I can say is that he [Otero] let you go before 30 days was up." Ruiz testified that he never told Otero that the employ. ees were poor performers. He stated only that Hill and Jones occasionally talked to residents, which was against the rules, but that this was not a serious problem. Otero testified that, while he had not warned any of the three discharged employees that they were performing poorly, nevertheless he was aked by Ruiz to discharge them because they were unsatisfactory employees. Otero directly testified that Ruiz requested that Hill, Jones, and Lopez be discharged. Otero also testified that Ruiz had told him that he had warned Lopez on several occasions about his poor work and that Ruiz gave several reasons to replace the three. Otero said that, to the extent Ruiz testified different- ly, he was not telling the truth. There is an obvious testimonial conflict between Ruiz and Otero on a matter of fact which is relevant to the Respondent's motive in discharging the three employees. One of the principal material issues in this matter is whether the Respondent had cause to discharge the three employees or whether the alleged reason-that the employ- ees were poor performers-is false. The Respondent does not have to prove a cause for dis- charging employees. Indeed, it can discharge employees for any reason or no reason at all other than their having en- gaged in protected concerted activity. Nevertheless, where a prima facie case of an unlawful discharge has been made, then whether the Respondent's alleged cause withstands scrutiny is important in determining the true motive. In this matter, it is noted that the three employees in question were all discharged on the morning following a meeting of employees with a Local 32E representative dur- ing which these three had raised questions concerning the inadequacy of their wages. The timing here suggests that a precipitating reason, at least, for the discharge was the questions that they had raised- in the August 25 meeting. The pay week begins on Monday and ends on Sunday. They were fired on Tuesday. Had incompetence over the 3-week period of their employment been the sole reason, as alleged by the Respondent, they more reasonably would have been discharged on their last working day of the week and prior to the meeting, rather than on the second day into a new pay week. It also stands undenied that these three employees were the active speakers with regard to wages andworking con- ditions at the employee meeting on August' 25. A fourth employee was discharged but was put back to work when it was pointed-out that she had not said anything. This is all rather sketchy but on balance, and particular- ly crediting the testimony of Jones, it is concluded that in fact these three employees were discharged in part because they questioned the wage rate and other conditions and became, therefore, "troublemakers." I believe Jones' testimony that, on the day of her dis- charge, Otero told her, "You make trouble." In crediting Jones' testimony, I consider her demeanor as well as the fact that Otero did not deny this particular statement. Be- yond that, I resolve in favor of Ruiz the direct conflict between his testimony and that of Otero. The Respondent argues that because Ruiz works for Co-op Care Center, in this matter he would deliberately lie-. There is no basis for such a conclusion. That Co-op Care Center and Colin have had business difficulties resulting in litigation is not a suffi- cient reason to discredit Ruiz' testimony. It is- noted that Ruiz was called as a witness by the General Counsel early in the case, did not hear the testimony of others, and had no particular reason to know what answers would be re- quired of him that would be detrimental to Colin. Ruiz has no interest in the outcome of this litigation. On the other hand, Otero does. Ruiz, to a substantial extent, is an uninterested and independent- witness whose testimony is more probably truthful than not. Further, had Ruiz requested the discharge of these three employees for incompetence, it stands to reason that he would have done so at the end of the pay week or following some particular event, rather than, at 3:30 on Monday af- ternoon, as testified to by Otero. Otero's testimony is just not realistic. Further, I found Ruiz to be' straightforward and positive in his testimony and his demeanor impressed me. Therefore, to the extent that his testimony is at vari- ance with Otero, I credit Ruiz. I find that he did not re- quest the discharge of Hill, Jones, or Lopez nor did he tell Otero that their work was unsatisfactory. I find that Ruiz only told Otero that Hill and Jones talked to residents, but this was not relayed then from Otero to Jones or Hill, even though Otero testified that as a matter of practice, prior to discharging employees, he warned them. There is no evidence in the record that in fact Hill, Jones, and Lopez were poor performers or did incompetent work. I do not believe Otero's testimony that he relied upon Ruiz' statements to this effect. In short, I conclude that the Respondent's reasons for effecting the discharges were not just pretextuous, they were false. "If he [the trier of fact] finds that the stated motive for a discharge is false, he certainly can infer that there is anoth- er motive." " Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation [Iron King Branch] v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466, 470 (C.A. 9, 1966). Thus here I infer that Otero, undertook to discharge these em- ployees as a preventive measure to stop what he considered the possibility of brewing trouble between his employees and the Union with whom he had a contract. The questions and comments by Hill, Jones, and Lopez at the employee meeting were not the typical overt activity normally associated with Section 7. Nevertheless, such questioning arising in the context of an employee meeting, particularly one of new employees where a representative of the incumbent union is present, at least amounts to pre- liminary, discussion which could reasonably lead to further activity on the part of employees concerning matters in- volving their mutual aid and protection. As such, the state- ments ,here are acts protected by Section 7. Cf. Mushroom Transportation Company,,,Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 330 F.2d 683, (C.A. 3, 1964). Thus, in discharging the three employees for having spo- ken out at the meeting, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Based upon the record as a whole and noting, for in- stance, that there is no evidence of activity on behalf of Local 144, 1 cannot conclude that these three employees 74 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD were discharged because they engaged inactivity on behalf of Local 144 or any other union. Rather, from the totality of the evidence, I- conclude that it was the -statements of these three employees at the meeting on- August 25 which caused Otero to replace them as being probable trouble- makers. CONCLUSIONS-OF LAW -1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home and Allied Health Services Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO, and Building Service Employees International Union, Local 32E, AFL- CIO, are labor organizations, within- the meaning of, the Act. - - 3. The General Counsel, has not established by.a pre- ponderance of the evidence that any employee was re- quired by the Respondent to sign a union membership ap- plication pr a checkoff authorization card in violation of Section 8(a)(l) and/or 8(a)(3). The allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the complaint, as amended, have'-not been sustained. 4. On or about August 26_1975, the Respondent did discharge employees Jewell Hill, Naomi Jones, and Ray- mond Lopez because they had engaged in protected con- certed activity within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act and Respondent thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. The Respondent's unfair labor practices occurring in connection with its business set forth above have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce and lead to labor disputes affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. - REMEDY It having been found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging three employees, it will be recom- mended that the Respondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The Respondent will be ordered, to offer Jewell Hill, Naomi Jones, and Raymond- Lopez im- mediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if such jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent posi- tions, without prejudice to their seniority or other'nghts and privileges, and that they be made whole for any loss of earnings. Any backpay found to be due shall be computed in accordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Wool- worth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). Upon the entire record, the above findings of fact, and conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER2 The Respondent, Colin Service Systems, Inc., New York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns; shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging employees because they engage in or are thought to have engaged in concerted activity for their mutual aid and protection. - (b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the, rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act: - (a) Offer Jewell Hill, Naomi Jones, and Raymond Lo- pez reinstatement to their former jobs or, if such jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them,whole for any loss of wages or other bene- fits m.the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitlted "The Remedy."- -,. (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents,-for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment,, records, timecards, personnel - records and reports, sand all other, documents necessary and relevant to analyze andcomputethe amount of backpay due under this recommended Order= (c) Post at its facility at the, Colin Service-Systems, Inc., copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 3 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 2, after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized representative,, shall be - posted by it immedi- ately upon receipt thereof, and rmaintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to emplo_yees.are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to insure, that said notices are not, altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. - (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 2, in writ- ing, within 20 days,from the date' of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegations in the com- plaint in all respects not specifically found violations of the Act be dismissed. i One statement attributed to Galati indicated that he thought Lopez was working on behalf of `Local 1199. Without, more, this statement is not evi- dence that Otero discharged Lopez 'for such activity, . 2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec._ 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings; conclusions, and Order, and all , objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 3 In the event that the Board's Order,, is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words , in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National 'Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court'of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board ", , APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all parties were represented by attorneys and afforded the opportunity to present evidence COLIN SERVICE SYSTEMS, INC. in.support of-their respective positions it has been found' that we have violated the National Labor Relations Act in certain respects and we ,have been ordered to post this no- tice and carry out its terms. WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against employees because they ask questions con- cerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment or engage in any other concerted ac- tivity for their mutual aid or protection. WE WILL offer immediate reinstatement to Jewell Hill, Naomi Jones, -and Raymond Lopez to their-for- 75 mer jobs or, if such jobs no longer exist, to substantial- ly similar positions of employment, and WE WILL make them whole for any loss of wages or benefits suffered by them as a result of the discrimination against them with interest at 6 percent per annum. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. COLIN SERVICES SYSTEMS, INC.