Delorean Cadillac

DeLOREAN CADILLAC DeLorean Cadillac, Inc. and Stanley Loch and Robert Rice. Cases 8-CA-8492 and 8-CA-8504 August 11, 1977 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS PENELLO AND WALTHER On April 13, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Charles W. Schneider issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, DeLorean Cadillac, Inc., Lakewood, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order. The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE CHARLES W. SCHNEIDER, Administrative Law Judge: This supplemental proceeding to determine the amount of backpay due Robert Rice and Stanley Loch, whose employment was discriminatorily terminated by the Re- spondent, was heard before me on November 16 and 17 and December 7 and 8, 1976, at Cleveland, Ohio, on the backpay specification of the General Counsel issued July 30, 1976, and the Respondent's answer filed August 12, 1976.1 All parties were afforded full opportunity to be The Order of the Board pursuant to which this hearing was held is dated June 30, 1975 (218 NLRB 1362). and the consent judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit enforcing that Order is dated January 26, 1976 (unreported). 231 NLRB No. 62 heard, to introduce and to meet material evidence, and to argue the issues orally on the record. On or about December 21, 1976, the parties entered into a stipulation concerning further certain facts, which was received by me on December 27, 1976, and is accepted as part of the record in the case. Brief were filed by the Respondent on February 14, 1977, and by the General Counsel on February 23, 1977, and have been considered. On the record made before me, the stipulation, from my observation of the witnesses, and consideration of the contentions and arguments of counsel and the briefs, I make the following findings. The Issues The case involves the amount of backpay or other relief due, if any, to Robert Rice and Stanley Loch, who were discriminatorily discharged by the Respondent on May 17, and July 10, 1974, respectively. The principal issues are: (I) Whether Rice could not get other employment because he intended to go to Florida, and whether the Respondent should therefore be relieved of any backpay obligation to Rice. (2) Whether Loch sustained a willful loss of earnings throughout the entire backpay period. (3) Whether Loch and Rice should be reimbursed for hospitilization insurance premiums paid by them after their discharges, and Rice reimbursed for the loss of use of a demonstrator automobile.2 (4) What formula should be used for determining gross backpay. (5) Whether Loch received a proper offer of reinstate- ment in August 1975 so as to terminate his backpay period on or about August 11, 1975. The backpay period for Rice begins May 17, 1974, the day of his discharge by the Respondent, and ends July 15, 1974, when he received substantially equivalent employ- ment, or decided to move permanently to Florida. Loch's backpay period begins July 10, 1974, the date of his discharge and, according to the General Counsel, ends November 24, 1975, when he was reinstated. The Respon- dent contends that Loch's backpay period ends August 7, 1975, when the Respondent assertedly offered Loch reinstatement, which he refused. The Applicable Principles In a backpay proceeding, the burden is on the General Counsel to show damage (that is, loss of earnings or other income by the discriminatee) and the amount of gross backpay due the discriminatee. The burden is on the Respondent to establish diminution of his liability, such as by reason of interim earnings, lack of work at the discriminatee's place of employment, willful loss of wages, or the discriminatee's unavailability for work. See, as illustrative, Brown & Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 447 (1963), 327 F.2d 958 (C.A. 8, 1964); Mastro Plastics Corporation, 354 F.2d 170 (C.A. 2, 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 972 (1966); 2 Loch does not claim reimbursement for loss of use of a demonstrator. 329 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Florence Printing Co., 376 F.2d 216 (C.A. 4, 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 366 F.2d 809 (C.A. 5, 1966). The employee claiming backpay must make reasonable effort to secure suitable new employment, and if he fails to do so he may not be reimbursed for wage losses willfully incurred. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.LR.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator Company, 90 NLRB 320 (1950). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia put the controlling principles as to willful losses thusly in Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union [Kansas Refined Helium Co.], 547 F.2d 598, 602-603 (1976): The Phelps Dodge Court made it clear that the willful loss of earnings doctrine was adopted not so much to affect "the minimization of damages" but rather to encourage "the healthy policy of promoting production and employment" .... The boundaries of the willful loss of earnings doctrine have been defined in subsequent opinions. Backpay may be reduced to the extent that the employee "fails to remain in the labor market, refuses to accept substantially equivalent employment, fails diligently to search for alternative work, or voluntarily quits alternative employment without good reason." .... The burden of proving such willful loss of earnings is always upon the employer ... The discriminatee is merely required to make "reasonable efforts" to mitigate his loss of income, and only unjustified refusals to find or accept other employment are penalized under this rule.... An employee need not "seek employment which is not consonant with his particular skills, background, and experience," or "which involves conditions that are substantially more onerous than his previous position." . . . He is not required to accept employment which is located an unreasonable distance from his home ... Efforts at mitigation need not be successful; all that is required is an "honest good faith effort," ... .3 Thus, only reasonable effort to find employment is required. 4 The finding of an unfair labor practice and discriminatory discharge is "presumptive proof that some backpay is owed." Mastro Plastics Corp., supra at 178. In case of doubt, benefit should be given the discriminatee as the innocent person, rather than the employer who is responsible for the dilemma.5 Rice's Efforts to Find Employment After discriminatee Robert Rice had been discharged, he applied for unemployment compensation and registered for employment with the appropriate public authorities. However, he received no referrals to jobs from those sources. The Respondent contested Rice's application for 3 Case citations have been omitted. 4 Arduini Manufacturing Corp., 394 F.2d 420, 423 (C.A. 1, 1968), the discriminatee "is held .. only to reasonable exertion in this regard, not the highest standard of diligence." 5 In NHE/Freeway, Inc.. et al., 545 F.2d 592, 594 (1976), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said: "[A ]ny doubt in the evidence must be resolved in the favor of the employee, not the employer. N.LR.B. v. unemployment compensation, on what ground is not disclosed, but Rice was ultimately awarded compensation. There is no evidence that Rice had interim earnings from other employment, or was offered or rejected other employment during the backpay period. Rice testified that during his backpay period, May 17 to July 15, 1974, he applied unsuccessfully for employment at some 27 dealers in the Cleveland area. Two of the dealers indicated interest: Arthur Pontiac and LaTour Oldsmobile. Rice's undenied and credited testimony is that Arthur Pontiac, after initially indicating that they could use him, called DeLorean Cadillac and then advised Rice that they were sorry, but they had no opening for him. At the original unfair labor practice hearing, Rice testified concerning approximately six similar experiences he encountered in seeking employment. (DeLorean Cadillac, Inc., 218 NLRB 1362, 1364 (1975)). Rice applied for employment at LaTour Oldsmobile on May 21, 1974, 6 days after his discharge. LaTour was then considering adding a salesman to its force and subsequently did so. After speaking to Rice, Sales Manager George Weather- wax of LaTour told Rice that he might be able to do something for him and would get in touch with Rice. Weatherwax then called Charles DeLorean, owner of the Respondent, and asked DeLorean why the Respondent had discharged Rice. DeLorean responded that he would "have to get back" to Weatherwax and terminated the conversation. DeLorean did not thereafter contact Weath- erwax, and, as a result, Weatherwax did nothing further about hiring Rice, because of apprehension over DeLore- an's action. Owner DeLorean testified that he received some six calls from places (unidentified) where Rice applied for employ- ment after his discharge by the Respondent. Except as to Weatherwax, according to DeLorean, he told each caller that Rice had resigned because he was planning to move to Florida shortly. DeLorean further testified that the first call had been from Weatherwax, and at that time DeLorean "didn't know what to tell him," so he called his attorney who advised him to state "the plain truth," but without reference to any union activity.6 According to DeLorean's further testimony, he called Weatherwax back once, but was unable to reach him, and thereafter the matter "slipped [DeLorean's] mind." There is no indication in the evidence that DeLorean identified himself or his purpose in calling back Weatherwax. Whatever DeLorean's intent, it is apparent that his failure to advise Weatherwax of the reason for Rice's termination caused Weatherwax to drop consideration of Rice. As Weatherwax put it in his testimony, "It scared me." Though Rice looked at newspaper ads, he found nothing suitable. There is no evidence that, during Rice's backpay period, newspaper ads for auto or other desirable sales Madison Courier Inc., 153 U.S. App. D.C. 232, 472 F.2d 1307, 1319-21 (1972)." And see United Aircraft Corporation, 204 NLRB 1068: ". . ITIhe backpay claimant should receive the benefit of any doubt rather than the Respondent, the wrongdoer responsible for the existence of any uncertainty and against whom any uncertainty must be resolved." 6 It is not explained why union activity was referred to. Unfair labor practice charges were not filed until late July 1974. 330 DeLOREAN CADILLAC positions, or other appropriate employment, appeared in the newspapers. The Respondent concedes that Rice made "an apparent effort to find other similar type employment," but it contends that it should not be penalized for Rice's failure to get a job because he was moving to Florida. Rice did in fact ultimately move to Florida. His credited testimony is that he finally concluded that he could not find employ- ment in Cleveland and would have to leave town. However, if knowledge of that impending occurrence was a factor in Rice's inability to secure employment in Cleve- land, it is the Respondent who is responsible for that. As we have seen, DeLorean told prospective employers who inquired concerning Rice that Rice had resigned because he intended to move to Florida shortly. Rice's credited testimony is that he did not advise prospective employers of such an intention. It is found that Rice made a diligent search for employment throughout his backpay period, and that his failure to receive employment in Cleveland was probably the result of the Respondent's actions. Whether Loch Willfully Lost Earnings The Respondent contends that Loch made no reasonable effort to find other employment, and thus willfully lost wages, and is therefore not entitled to recover any backpay. The General Counsel contends that Loch made a reason- able effort to find other employment. After Loch was discharged, he, like Rice, applied for unemployment compensation and registered for employ- ment with the appropriate public authorities. He received no referrals for jobs from those sources. The Respondent also contested Loch's application for unemployment compensation on undisclosed grounds, as it did Rice's, but with different results-such compensation was denied Loch. Loch had no employment during the backpay period from July 1974 to November 1975. Loch is a highly qualified automobile salesman, who over the years has won a number of honors in recognition of his outstanding sales record. Loch's credited testimony is that he made various efforts to find employment throughout the backpay period, as follows. Loch testified that at more or less regular intervals during the backpay period, from July 1974 to November 1975, he applied for employment at some 30 auto dealers in the Cleveland area but was never able to secure employ- ment. His uncontroverted and credited testimony is that he also sought employment, unsuccessfully, as an insurance agent with New York Life Insurance Company, several realty firms, local and Florida, for employment as a real estate agent, with Fidelity Investment as a broker, and Addressograph Multigraph Company as a sales representa- tive. The Respondent introduced testimony by representatives of a number of the automobile dealers identified by Loch 7 A spot check of the Plain Dealer's issues over Loch's backpay period, which included each Sunday and two or three randomly selected days during each week, discloses that the Plain Dealer carried 557 ads for automobile salesmen, ranging in number from I to 24 per month. and as places where he sought employment (some of them places where Rice also unsuccessfully sought employment) to the effect that they had no recollection or record of Loch applying to them for employment. That Loch may not have applied to those particular individuals does not preclude the possibility that he applied to someone else at the establishments. The Respondent thus did not discharge its burden of proving that Loch did not apply, particularly since a significant number of witnesses conceded that they could not recall all applicants. In any event, Loch's testimony that he applied at the remaining dealerships is undenied. Loch's testimony as to his applications for employment are therefore credited. Thus, Loch made a prima facie reasonable search for employment. Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 195 NLRB 395 (1972). However, during Loch's backpay period, approximately 50 automobile dealers in the Cleveland area, including a number of places at which Loch applied for employment, advertised for automobile salesmen in the Cleveland Press and in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, newspapers of general circulation in the area. Except for a period of 7 weeks in late 1974, in which the two papers did not publish, each newspaper, and the Plain Dealer in particular, carried such ads each month during the period.7 Loch did not respond to any of those ads. Indeed, he did not look for employment in the newspapers at all. The reason he gave in his testimony for not doing so, was that he felt that he could "do better on [his] own" by personal application to the dealers. Perhaps Loch should have assiduously read the want ads. However, the issue is whether his failure to do so is per se fatal to his backpay claim, and automatically disqualifies him from recovering any part of his losses, even though he otherwise made a reasonable search for employment. I find that it is not. As we have seen, Loch made a reasonable search. That he suffered substantial wage losses is unques- tioned. There is no evidence that he was offered, or refused, desirable new employment. While the Respondent argues that if Loch sought new employment he would, in view of his outstanding sales record, have been immediately hired (as some dealers so testified for the Respondent), no such conclusion seems justified from the record. As we have seen, Loch applied at some of those dealers, as well as at some of those who advertised, and was rejected. So did Rice, with similar result, though there is no evidence that at the time of Rice's applications, those dealers were advertis- ing for help. There may be a question, too, as to what kind of referral Loch would have got from the Respondent had he applied to the advertisers. Rice's experience, stated above, does not offer encouragement. There is no compel- ling reason to anticipate that if Loch had responded to the advertisers he would have fared any better than he did on his own. In view of these facts, I conclude that it has not been established that Loch willfully incurred a loss of wages. There is no requirement that a discharged employee "must exhaust all possibilities in seeking interim employ- ment." Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., supra at 398, a case in averaging 37 per month. A similar spot check of the Cleveland Press for the same period discloses that the press carried 174 ads for automobile salesmen, ranging in number from 2 to 33 per month and averaging 11-1/2 per month. 331 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD some respects similar to the instant one. As the First Circuit has said, what is required is only "reasonable exertion" and "not the highest standard of diligence.8 What the result may have been in a different context of fact need not be determined. The Formula There is dispute between the General Counsel and the Respondent as to the formula for determining the amount of backpay Loch and Rice would have earned had they not been discharged. The General Counsel contends that the proper formula is the average monthly earnings of each during the year prior to their terminations. The Respon- dent contends that the proper formula is the percentage relationship that the discriminatees' sales during the entire period of their employment bear to the total sales of the Respondent during that period of time-in Loch's case 18.44 percent and in Rice's case 14.746 percent. The Respondent's total sales during the backpay period of each of the discriminatees would then be multiplied by that percentage, thus giving the gross backpay due each.9 The Respondent's formula would substantially reduce the amount of the General Counsel's claim, for the reason that after the discharge of Loch and Rice the Respondent's sales fell some I I-plus percent in 1974 and an additional 6- plus percent in 1975. The actual earnings of employees in a representative period prior to their discharge is a foundational formula traditionally used by the Board in determining the amount of backpay due discriminatees. As Administrative Law Judge Knapp said in Chef Nathan Sez Eat Here, Inc., 201 NLRB 343, 345 (1973), that is "the most fair, suitable, and equitable formula to employ, and should not be departed from in the absence of special circumstances .... " The formula proposed here by the General Counsel substantial- ly fits those requirements. It covers a period of employment broad enough to be representative, and recent enough to be typical of relevant performance. That being so, the burden is on the Respondent to establish special circumstances requiring deviation from it, and to propose a more satisfactory formula. In my judgment the Respondent here has not met either of those burdens. That the Respondent's sales fell after the discharges of Rice and Loch may be attributable, not to market factors, but rather in some measure to the very fact of their absence. Both were outstanding salesmen, and their departure from the staff should necessarily have had some adverse affect on sales, unless they were replaced by equally competent salesmen-of which there is no evidence here. Whether that adverse effect would amount to the 11- percent and 6-percent drop experienced, no one can say- at least in the absence of evidence as to the size and quality g Arduini Mfg. Corp., 394 F.2d 420, 423 (1968). 9 The Respondent's answer avers that the parties agreed on the Respondent's formula prior to hearing. While the Respondent made such a proposal in the course of settlement discussions, there is no evidence that it was accepted by the General Counsel or the discriminatees. '0 Loch's case is illustrative of the distortion which may result from averaging the discriminatees' proportion of sales during their total employment. During Loch's period of employment beginning in 1968 and running through 1973, his last full year, his earnings consistently rose year-by-year from $14,930.89 in 1969 to $26,063.62 in 1973. of the Respondent's remaining sales force as compared to the situation prior to the discharges, the number of prospects given to salesmen, the number generated by them, and the latitude allowed salesmen in dealing-facts now perhaps incapable of reliable ascertainment. Thus, the Respondent's formula is deficient in its initial assumption that had Rice and Loch remained, the Respondent's sales would have dropped to the point that they did. There is evidence that new car registrations in Cuyhoga County fell in 1974 and 1975, but there is no evidence that Cadillac registrations also fell. To assume that they did would be speculative, but in any event not conclusive as to what Rice's and Loch's sales would have been had they remained employed. Thus the Respondent's drop in sales cannot reliably be ascribed to inevitable and economic factors. But even if it is thought that market factors might have played a part in the Respondent's sales losses, the Respondent proposes no alternative method by which the losses due to the absence of Rice and Loch and the losses due to market factors can be apportioned. Nor does the Respondent's proposed formula become acceptable, even if the Respondent's actual sales in 1974- 75 be deemed a reliable basic figure from which to begin computations. As has been seen, figures from which the Respondent would derive its percentage to be multiplied against the Respondent's actual sales includes all sales by the Respondent and the discriminatees in the total period of their employment. The result of that calculation would be questionable relevance, since it would not be based on a representative current experience, the preferrable method, and no persuasive reason has been advanced for substitut- ing the proposed alternative. Finally, the figures given by the Respondent for commissions paid during the backpay period are based on an assumed average, which admittedly was incorrect in some instances, and do not represent the actual commis- sions paid to salesmen. In the light of these considerations, the Respondent's proposed formula is rejected and that of the General Counsel is approved. Cf. Folk Chevrolet, Inc., 176 NLRB 277, 279-280.10 Hospitalization Premiums and Use of Demonstrators The General Counsel claims reimbursement for premi- ums for hospitalization insurance paid by Loch and Rice during the backpay period, which premiums the Respon- dent had paid during Loch's and Rice's employment. Additionally, the General Counsel claims reimbursement for the loss of the use of a demonstrator automobile which the Respondent had furnished Rice. Loch made no claim for such reimbursement. The Respondent contends that By using the Respondent's proposed formula, Loch's most productive (and most recent) years would be diluted by earlier, and presumably learning, years. It may also be noted that in the formula adopted here, half of Loch's formula year, and a substantial portion of Rice's, includes 1974, when the Respondent's sales fell most. Thus the Respondent has the benefit of some of the drop of those years, even though the illegal terminations of Loch and Rice may have contributed to the decline. 332 DeLOREAN CADILLAC these are not compensable items, but cites no apposite authority." Almost three decades ago the Board ruled that premiums for group health and accident insurance covering employ- ees of an employer constitute wages, and it has never departed from that position. W. W. Cross & Company, Inc., 77 NLRB 1162, 1163-64, 1176 (1948). As the Board said in Ace Tank & Heater Co., 167 NLRB 663, 664 (1967): "...wages include such deferred benefits as . . . health insurance premiums." See also Padre Dodge, 189 NLRB 378, 387-388 (1971), and Bowen Transports, Inc., 196 NLRB 665, 666, 670 (1972). As to demonstrator automo- biles, the Board has similarly found them compensable items in backpay proceedings. Folk Chevrolet, Inc., 176 NLRB 277 (1969); Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 195 NLRB 395 (1972). Whether the Respondent Offered Loch Unconditional Reinstatement in August 1975 The Respondent asserts that it offered Loch reinstate- ment on August 7 and 11, 1975, and that its obligation for backpay consequently terminates them rather than on November 24, 1975, the date Loch was reinstated. The General Counsel contends that Loch was not given a valid offer of reinstatement in August. The facts are as follows. On Friday, August 7, 1975-about 5 weeks after the Board's decision finding that Loch and Rice had been discriminatorily discharged-the Respondent wrote to Loch offering him reinstatement as a "regular full-time automobile salesman . . . subject to all the privileges, rights, duties and responsibilities as other salesmen," and directing him to report Monday, August 11, 1975, at 9 a.m., for "appropriate assignment." Loch presented himself at the Respondent's premises before 9 a.m., on Monday, August 11, and was offered the job of used-car salesman under the direction of the used- car manager.' 2 Loch demurred, stating that the order of the Board required his reinstatement as a new-car salesman. Owner DeLorean told Loch that the Respondent was constructing new quarters, and that when they were completed, some months in the future, separate classifica- tions of new- and used-car salesmen would be abolished and all salesmen would sell both types of cars. In addition, DeLorean stated that the position offered Loch was the only one open in the sales department. Loch stated that he could neither accept nor reject the offered position pending consultation with the Board, and left. He has never accepted the Respondent's offer. It is clear, and admitted, that Loch was not offered reinstatement, as the Board ordered, to his "former job." While the Board's order provides, alternatively, in the event "that job no longer exists," for reinstatement to a "substantially equivalent position," the evidence establish- ' The case referred to by the Respondent as supporting its view, Brennan v. Modern Chevrolet Co., 363 F.Supp. 327 (D.C. Tex.. 1973), involved a different statute. 12 Loch so testified, and I construe owner Charles DeLorean's testimony as confirming Loch's testimony in that regard. 11 The Respondent began to institute the new system in November 1975, prior to the Respondent's move to its new quarters. 14 It is conceded that these are due and owing. es that the job of new-car salesman still existed on August 11 and that the new system was not in fact instituted until later.' 3 Since Loch's old job of new-car salesman still existed at that time, compliance with the Board's order required that he be offered it, even though it may have been filled by persons later hired. Since Loch was not offered reinstatement to that position, but to another and different one, it is found that the Respondent did not comply with its obligations under the Board's order. It is consequently found that the Respondent did not offer on either August 7 or 11, 1975, to reinstate Loch to his former and available position. General Conclusions On the basis of the evidence and the foregoing findings, it is concluded that Loch and Rice are, respectively, due the following amounts from the Respondent. Loch Backpay Insurance premiums Previously unpd. commissions '4 $33,908.31 731.19 1,202.10 $35,841.60 Rice 255 contest points'4 Backpay Use of demonstrators Insurance premiums $3,007.56 110.00 97.91 $3,215.47 Recommendations On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu- sions, and the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, I issue the following recommended: ORDER' 6 DeLorean Cadillac, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall pay to Stanley Loch the sum of $35,841.60 and shall pay to Robert Rice the sum of $3,215.47. Interest shall be calculated on both sums at the rate of 6 percent per annum in accordance with the principle set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). There shall be deducted from the amounts due any tax withholding required by law. In addition the Respondent shall give Robert Rice 255 contest points. 15 For a 2-month period, estimated use 500 miles per month at I I cents per mile. '8 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 333