Peerless Food Products, Inc.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Peerless Food Products, Inc. and Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFl-CIO, Local Union No. 553. Case 19-CA- 8880 August 22, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND WALTHER On March 15, 1977, Administrative Law Judge James M. Kennedy issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a brief in support thereof. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein. We adopt the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, but as a basis for this finding we rely solely on Respondent's conduct at the August 31, 1976, negotiating session, in which Respondent agreed to sign the collective-bargaining agreement, the final terms of which were negotiated on August 3, 1976- only on the condition that the Union drop its lawsuit against Respondent. In agreement with the Adminis- trative Law Judge, we find that Respondent's insistence on the dropping of the lawsuit as a precondition to signing the agreement violated Section 8(a)(5). But we disagree with the Administrative Law Judge's failure to direct the parties to sign the collective-bargaining agreement which the Union submitted to Respondent in the final negotiating session on August 31, 1976. For, as we stated above, the final terms of the parties' collective-bargaining agreement were hammered out on August 3. At that meeting Respondent's representative merely asked for time to obtain final approval from Respondent's president, Jerry Morris, and its attorney, John L. Vogel, on the inclusion of two sentences-one stating that the bargaining unit would include both full-time and part-time production employees, and the other stating that the agreement would not have any effect on the prior agreements of the parties. On August 31, both Vogel and Morris were present at the negotiations. At that meeting they agreed to sign the contract, as worked out on August 3. But 231 NLRB No. 95 they conditioned agreement on the further under- standing that the Union would drop the lawsuit. Thus, but for the illegal condition, the parties, as of August 31, had a complete collective-bargaining agreement. Accordingly, we shall modify the Admin- istrative Law Judge's recommended Order to direct the parties to sign the August 31 agreement. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and hereby orders that the Respon- dent, Peerless Food Products, Inc., Chehalis, Wash- ington, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommend- ed Order, as so modified: 1. Substitute the following for paragraph l(a): "(a) Insisting to impasse upon the settlement of a lawsuit as a condition for a new collective-bargaining agreement." 2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a): "(a) Upon request by the Union, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North Ameri- ca, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 553, sign the collective-bargaining agreement, as agreed to on August 31, 1976, and as set out in General Counsel Exhibit 3." 3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all parties had the opportunity to present evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and we have been ordered to post this notice to our employees. The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, gives all employees the following rights: To organize themselves To form, join, or support unions To bargain as a group through a represen- tative they choose To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from any or all such activity except to the extent that the employees' bargaining representative and employer 530 PEERLESS FOOD PRODUCTS have a collective-bargaining agreement which imposes a lawful requirement that employees become union members. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 553, by conditioning a collective-bargaining contract upon the Union's settling a pending lawsuit. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL, upon request, sign the collective- bargaining agreement reached on August 31, 1976. PEERLESS FOOD PRODUCTS, INC. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES M. KENNEDY, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard before me at Olympia, Washington, on February 17, 1977, based upon a complaint issued on October 15, 1976,1 by the Acting Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board for Region 19. The complaint was based upon a charge filed by Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 553, herein called the Union, on September 9. The complaint alleges that Peerless Food Products, Inc., herein called Respondent, has engaged in certain violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Issues The principal issues are whether or not: (I) The parties reached an agreement which Respondent was obligated to sign; and (2) if not, whether or not Respondent insisted upon the inclusion of certain nonmandatory subjects of bargaining to the point of impasse. All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evidence, and to examine and cross- examine witnesses. The parties waived both their right to oral argument and their right to file briefs. Upon the entire record of the case and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER Respondent admits, and I find, that at all material times it has been a State of Washington corporation with an office and place of business located at Chehalis, Washing- ton, where it is engaged in the business of manufacturing sausages. During the past year, a representative period, it sold and shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 to customers outside the State of Washington and during the same period purchased from sources outside the State goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 which were directly transported to Respondent from those out-of-state suppliers. Accordingly, Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. n1. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union is, and has been at all material times, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Respondent has had a collective-bargaining relationship with a local of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, for over 20 years. In 1972, apparently as a result of a merger of locals, Respondent entered into its first agreement with the Union, the survivor of the merger. Prior to May 1, 1976, when the last agreement expired, each of the previous contracts had a duration of only 1 year. Thus, until the instant dispute, Respondent and the Union had negotiated four successive collective-bargaining contracts and the parties had a reasonably good collective-bargaining rela- tionship. Each of the expired agreements contained identical "Recognition and Bargaining Unit" clauses in which Respondent recognized the Union as the exclusive bargain- ing agent for its employees and the Union recognized Respondent as the exclusive bargaining agency for itself. That portion of the clause relating to Respondent's recognition of the Union is set forth in full as follows: Peerless Food Products Co. Inc. hereby recognizes, during the term of this Agreement, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL- CIO, Local Union No. 553, as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agency for all employees of the Employer working under this Agreement. Despite the language stating that the Union was the sole bargaining agent for "all employees of the Employer working under this Agreement," nowhere in the agreement are the job classifications listed. Instead, section 8(1) of the contract divides the jobs into heavy and light duty wage rates. Section 8(3) states: "A list of heavy and light duties shall be attached to this agreement and also posted on the bulletin board." The parties are in a minor disagreement with regard to the manner in which section 8(3) was carried out, but it appears that at least in 1972 such a list was prepared, though perhaps not for the following agreements. I Hereinafter all dates are 1976 unless otherwise noted. 531 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The 1972 list, prepared on Respondent's stationery, listed the following jobs as heavy and light: Heavy Sausage Kitchen Manufacturing Stuffing Machine Operator Grinding Boner Shipping Clerk Truck loading Light Sausage Kitchen Stuffers Assistant Packaging Room Packaging Peeling Slicing Curing Dept. Cure pump operator Ham stuffer & hanger Fresh meat slicer Fresh meat packaging As Respondent changed the products it was manufactur- ing, these classifications changed slightly, apparently without effect on wage rates. Other pertinent contract clauses included a standard union-shop clause and a requirement that Respondent make contributions to the Washington Meat Industry Pension Trust "on account of each member of the bargaining unit." At some point not shown in the record, but apparently during the life of the 1975-76 agreement, the Washington Meat Industry Pension Trust instituted a lawsuit against Respondent in state court in order to collect contributions it contended were due on behalf of certain employees it believed to be in the bargaining unit. Respondent success- fully resisted the lawsuit at the trial level but, as of the date of the hearing in this matter, the Trust had filed an appeal which has not yet been decided. The principal question presented in the lawsuit is the scope and definition of the bargaining unit covered by the past contracts. The Trust contends that the contracts covered all production employ- ees while Respondent contends that certain part-time production employees were not in the bargaining unit. This dispute will be more fully explicated below, as it has a bearing on the instant matter. B. The 1976 Negotiations After the 1975-76 contract was timely reopened for negotiations, the parties held a number of negotiation meetings. The first five meetings took place on April 14, June 16, and July 8, 23, and 27. Attending these meetings on behalf of Respondent were Jerry Morris, its president; Karl Muller, its manager; and John L. Vogel, its attorney. Attending on behalf of the Union were Marvin Jacka, its financial secretary and business representative, and Leon- ard Folino, a vice president of District 2, Washington State Federation of Butchers. The July 27 meeting was conducted under the auspices of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. At that meeting, according to Folino, there was some discussion of the pending lawsuit. He testified that, although they did not reach an agreement on that date, Attorney Vogel "agreed to include the part-time help, and make the contributions [to the Trust] on the part-time help on the outcome of the appeal." He recalls that during the meeting Respondent's representatives "kept maintaining that if we would drop the appeal [of the lawsuit], they would sign the agreement." Folino replied that the Union did not have the authority to make such a trade-off, but agreed to telephone the Trust's administrator and ask him about it. During a caucus, he did so and learned that, as he had suspected, the Union did not have the authority to enter into such an arrangement. He told Vogel that the Union could not approach the problem that way and that dropping the appeal was up to the trustees of the pension plan. Jacka did not testify in great detail with regard to the meeting of July 27, saying only that a wage offer was made which was taken to the union membership for approval and rejected. Both he and Folino testified that Folino then made a telephone call to Morris, asking for an additional 10-cent-per-hour wage increase. Morris agreed to that figure. When the additional 10 cents per hour was presented to the membership, they approved. Within a day or two, Jacka, following the form of the past agreements, had had his Tacoma office type a complete, clean agreement. This agreement was nearly identical to the past agreements but differed in two principal ways from them. Except for vacation eligibility language, wage scales, pension contributions, and renum- bering some clauses, it, like the others, consisted of seven pages, with signature lines for both parties on page 7. It also contained a page 8, together with separate signature lines on that page, and an unnumbered ninth page. The "Recognition and Bargaining Unit" clause remained the same as in the previous contracts. On August 3, Jacka and Union Vice President Harold Hansen took this document to Respondent's Chehalis plant and met with Muller. At the hearing Respondent conceded that, except for material which appeared on the new page 8, Muller agreed to the terms of the contract, including, at least in principle, the wage scales contained on the unnumbered ninth page. Page 8 began with the sentence "All workers working under the classifications listed below must be members of the bargaining unit regardless if they are full time or part time employees." Below that sentence was a list of the "heavy" and "light" job classifications. These were similar to the classifications contained in the 1972 list, but contained some differences. Under the "heavy" classifica- tion in the sausage kitchen, the classification "linker" had been added. At the meeting, Muller asked that the "night smoker" be added to the sausage kitchen as a "heavy" classification. Jacka agreed and inked in the change. The new page 8, unlike the 1972 list, also contained as a 532 PEERLESS FOOD PRODUCTS "heavy" classification "Truck Drivers working inside." Muller asked that that classification be changed so that it covered truckdrivers working inside "more than 50% of the time." Jacka agreed and inked in the change. Muller noted that under the "light" category the classification of "Corn Dog Manufacturing employees" appeared. He questioned its inclusion on the list as the "corn dog" employee was a part-time employee. Believing that the inclusion of a part- time employee might have an effect on the lawsuit, the parties agreed to insert the following conclusionary language: "This page pertains to this Agreement only and does not have any bearing on previous Agreements." Muller testified that he then offered to sign the signature line on page 7 but did not believe he could sign page 8 until he had given Morris and Vogel an opportunity to go over it, as it might have affected the pending litigation. He said Jacka insisted that he sign both pages 7 and 8, and that Jacka said the Union couldn't sign page 7 without both parties signing both pages. At the hearing Muller added that he couldn't sign page 8 because it referred to the "corn dog" employee and Respondent did not consider that employee as a part of the unit. Hansen testified that he did not recall if Muller said anything at all about it being necessary to discuss page 8 with Morris or Vogel, but conceded that it might have happened. Jacka was not asked if Muller made that statement. In any event, Jacka and Hansen returned to Tacoma where the contract, reflecting the changes made on August 3, was typed in final form. Jacka caused three copies to be sent to Respondent. He testified that on several occasions thereafter he asked Muller to sign and return two copies. Muller did not do so. On August 31, a meeting was held in Attorney Vogel's office in Seattle. Representing Respondent were Vogel, Morris, and Muller; representing the Union were Jacka and Folino. Also attending was Attorney Dusty McCreary, who represented the Washington Meat Industry Pension Trust. Folino testified that the purpose of the meeting was to try to come to a compromise on what would be paid on contributions to the Trust, apparently in an attempt to settle the lawsuit. When asked what if anything was said about the unsigned contract, he stated that he could not recall. Jacka testified, without specifying who was speak- ing, that Respondent's representatives said they would not sign the agreement until the lawsuit was over. He also testified that Respondent's representatives said that if the Union would drop the suit, they would sign the agreement. The meeting ended without the contract being signed or the lawsuit being resolved. IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS A. Matters Relating to the Unit Illustrative of the manner in which Respondent defined the bargaining unit is Muller's testimony regarding the two pension plans. He testified that Respondent paid into two pension plans on behalf of its employees. These plans were the Washington Meat Industry Pension Trust and Respon- 2 A classification which the parties agree is clearly within the contract unit. See both the 1972 and 1976 lists. dent's own private plan for nonunit employees. When I asked Muller a hypothetical question regarding the pension plan to which Respondent would contribute if a newly hired full-time "stuffing machine operator" 2 refused to join the Union, he replied: "Well, if he isn't a member of the union, and I don't receive a letter from Marvin Jacka stating or asking me to discharge that man [for being in violation of the union-shop clause], I'm under the under- standing that Marvin Jacka does not consider this man a member of the bargaining unit. So, therefore, he goes into our other pension plan as soon as he qualifies into it." From the foregoing testimony it is fair to conclude that Respondent equates unit membership (coverage under the contract) with union membership. Muller also testified that from time to time Respondent employed part-time employ- ees in all the production jobs. When this occurred, he ,aid, that employee was paid either the "light" or "heavy" wage scale, depending on which scale applied to the job being performed. It is clear from the record, the past contracts, and the past practice, that the parties intended the bargaining unit to cover production employees only. It has long been Board law to include regular part-time employees in any appropriate unit. Farmers Insurance Group, et aL, 143 NLRB 240, 244-245 (1963). It appears clear to me that Respondent has distorted the unit because of its misunder- standing of the law in this regard. Certainly Muller's reliance on the Union's vigor, or lack thereof, in enforcing the union-shop clause is not a sufficient ground on which to define the bargaining unit. Indeed, it has no bearing on the unit whatsoever. If I were to accept Muller's logic, I would be constrained to find that the past contracts were "members only" contracts. Certainly the contracts contain no language justifying that conclusion. Nowhere do the past agree- ments, or even any of the terms of the proposed new agreement, say that the contract shall apply only to union members. Accordingly, I conclude, as a matter of law that the appropriate bargaining unit was, and is: 3 All full-time and regular part-time production employ- ees employed by Respondent at its Chehalis, Washing- ton, packing plant, excluding office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. B. Offer and Acceptance The General Counsel contends that the August 3 meeting between Muller, Jacka, and Hansen resulted in an offer and an acceptance of the collective-bargaining agreement. I am unable to accept that contention, because it is clear to me that Muller told the union officials that the new page 8 would have to be submitted to the corporate president and the corporation's attorney for final approval. I reach this conclusion because this was the only meeting not attended by Morris and Vogel, and page 8 contained material which Muller recognized might be viewed as a retreat from the position taken in the lawsuit. It seems reasonable to me that, before signifying Respondent's acceptance of such 3 Respondent does not contend that the Union has lost its majority status in the unit as clarified herein. 533 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD material, he wished to consult with the company attorney to determine if it might have an undesired legal effect on the lawsuit. It may also be contended that Respondent's statements at the August 31 meeting as recounted by Jacka should be considered as an admission that an agreement had been reached on August 3. Jacka stated, without specifying who was speaking, that Respondent's representatives offered to sign the agreement in the event that the Union dropped its appeal of the lawsuit. First, Jacka was not corroborated by Folino. Folino recalled Vogel made a similar remark at the July 27 meeting, but not on August 31. Perhaps Folino is mistaken about the date. Assuming that Folino is mistaken about the date and that it did occur on August 31, I cannot regard the statement as an admission. In my opinion the remark is ambiguous. Certainly Respondent could make such a statement without conceding the acceptance of the offer. In fact the statement constitutes a counteroffer perfectly consistent with Respondent's stance-it no doubt means: "We will accept your offer of August 3 if you drop the appeal of the lawsuit." Under these circumstances, I am unable to conclude that Respondent accepted the offer of August 3, and therefore I conclude that no contract was agreed to on that date. Accordingly, I reject the General Counsel's contention that any agreement was reached on August 3. Nor is there any evidence that Respondent accepted it at a later date. Since there has been no acceptance of the offer, I cannot order Respondent to execute the contract. H. K. Porter Co., Inc., Disston Division-Danville Works v. N.LR.B., 397 U.S. 99 at 105- 106, 108 (1970); cf. Lathers Local No. 42 of the Wood Wire and Metal Lathers International Union (Lathing Contractors Association of Southern California, Inc.), 223 NLRB 37 (1976). C. The Impasse Was Unlawful Two factors, injected into the bargaining process by Respondent, interfered with the bargaining process. The first was Respondent's continued insistence on distorting the appropriate bargaining unit by excluding a regular part-time production employee, the corn dog maker. Muller testified that he could not sign page 8 because it caused the corn dog maker to be included in the unit. Section 8(d) of the Act states that the collective-bargain- ing obligation requires the parties to bargain in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Both the Board and the courts have held that bargaining unit considerations are not within the scope of Section 8(d). N.L.R.B. v. Southland Cork Company, 342 F.2d 702 (C.A. 4, 1965); Hess Oil & Chemical Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 415 F.2d 440, 443-445 (C.A. 5, 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 916 (1978). Thus, while the parties are not prohibited from negotiating changes in the bargaining unit, they may not condition an agreement upon such changes, without running afoul of Section 8(d) and 8(a)(5) and (1). N.LR.B. v. Wooster Division of Borg- Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). It is clear to me that this 4 Jacka's testimony is not free from doubt. He did not, and perhaps could not, say which of Respondent's representatives made the remark, and Folino does not corroborate him. If Folino was mistaken about the date, and the conversation he reported as having occurred on July 27 really is exactly what Respondent has done here. It conditioned the contract on the exclusion of the corn dog maker (and inferentially all other regular part-time production employ- ees) from the bargaining unit. By imposing such an impediment on the bargaining process, Respondent failed to meet its bargaining obligation under Section 8(d) and thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1). N.LR.B. v. Southland Cork Co., supra; Hess Oil & Chemical Corp. v. N.L.R.B., supra; see also McQuay-Norris Manufacturing Company v. N.LR.B., 116 F.2d 748, 751 (C.A. 7, 1940), cert. denied 313 U.S. 565 (1941). The second factor contributing to the failure to reach an agreement was Respondent's conditioning a contract upon the Union's dropping the appeal of the lawsuit. Aside from whether the Union had the power to make such an arrangement, it is Jacka's testimony that on August 31, at Vogel's office, Respondent's representatives said they would not sign the agreement until the lawsuit was over. Respondent did not refute Jacka's testimony and I shall accept it as it is undisputed.4 Settlement of the lawsuit as a condition for agreeing to a contract, like the unit issue, is a nonmandatory bargaining subject. By insisting that the lawsuit be settled as a condition precedent to entering into a collective-bargaining contract Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices by insisting to impasse upon the inclusion of nonmandatory bargaining subjects in a new collective- bargaining agreement, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent Peerless Food Products, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce and in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 553, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The appropriate bargaining unit is: All full-time and regular part-time production employ- ees employed by Respondent at its Chehalis, Washing- ton, packing plant, excluding office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. By insisting to impasse upon the inclusion or resolution of nonmandatory bargaining subjects as a condition for a new collective-bargaining agreement occurred on August 31, he only corroborates Jacka to the extent that Vogel, or someone else from Respondent, offered to sign the agreement if the appeal were dropped. 534 PEERLESS FOOD PRODUCTS Respondent has engaged in violations of Section 8(aX5) and (I) of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 5 Respondent Peerless Food Products, Inc., Chehalis, Washington, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: I. Cease and desist from: (a) Insisting to impasse upon the inclusion or resolution of nonmandatory bargaining subjects as a condition for a new collective-bargaining agreement. (b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain in good faith with Amalga- mated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 553, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described below I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. with respect to rates of pay, wages, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree- ment: All full-time and regular part-time production employ- ees employed by Respondent at its Chehalis, Washing- ton, packing plant, excluding office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Post at its Chehalis, Washington, place of business copies of the attached notice marked "Appenoix." 6 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Respondent, shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 6 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 535