264 NLRB 251
Local 262, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (Arthur Paul, Jr., Electrical Contractor, Inc.)
LOCAL 262, IBEW
Local 262, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, AFL-CIO (Arthur Paul, Jr., Electri-
cal Contractor, Inc.) and James R. Miller and
Plainfield Division of the Northern New Jersey
Chapter, Inc., National Electrical Contractors
Association, Inc., Party in Interest. Case 22-
CB-4500
September 28, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, ZIMMERMAN, AND
HUNTER
On February
11,
1982,
Administrative Law
Judge Edwin H. Bennett issued the attached Deci-
sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order, as modified
herein.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Local 262, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, AFL-CIO, Clinton, New Jersey, its offi-
cers, agents, and representatives, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order, as
so modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph l(b):
"(b) In any like or related manner restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.2
We have modified the injunctive portion of the recommended Order
and of the notice to employees to prohibit only the restraining or coerc-
ing of employees in the exercise of their rights under Sec. 7 of the Act.
which is the standard language utilized in enjoining future violations of
Sec. 8(h)(l)(A) of the Act
2 In the event that Ihis Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted b)
Order of the National
abhor Relations Hoard" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals LEnforcing ain
Order of the National I habor
Relations HBoard
264 NLRB No. 38
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all parties participated
and were afforded the opportunity to present evi-
dence in support of their respective positions, it has
been found that we have violated the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, in certain re-
spects, and we have been ordered to post this
notice and to carry out its terms.
WE WILL NOT fail in our duty to fairly rep-
resent employees by arbitrarily, and without
lawful and legitimate reason, causing or at-
tempting to cause employers to discharge,
layoff,
transfer,
or otherwise
discriminate
against employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL make James R. Miller whole for
any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a
result of our having caused Arthur Paul, Jr.,
Electrical Contractor, Inc., to remove him
from the job of standby electrician at the
Exxon site in Clinton, New Jersey, on Febru-
ary 9, 1981, with interest.
LOCAL 262, INTERNATIONAL BROTH-
ERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL
WORKERS,
AFL-CIO
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
EDWIN H. BENNETT, Administrative Law Judge: This
matter was heard on November 19, 1981.' The com-
plaint issued on March 31, alleging, in substance, that
Local
262, International
Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, hereinafter called the Union or Respondent,
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by effecting a
layoff or job transfer of James R. Miller on February 9.
The underlying charge was filed by Miller on February
13. Respondent denies that it has violated the Act as al-
leged and contends that whatever role it played in Mill-
er's removal from the job was not in contravention of
the statute.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due considera-
tion of oral arguments and briefs filed by the parties, I
make the following:
' Unless otherwise indicated all dates hereinafter are in 1981
251
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FAC I
I. J URISDICT 1ION
Jurisdiction in this proceeding is predicated on the
business operations of Arthur Paul, Jr., Electrical Con-
tractor, Inc., herein called Paul or the Employer, a New
Jersey corporation. The Employer is engaged as an elec-
trical contractor in the building and construction indus-
try providing such services to various enterprises in the
State of New Jersey. On an annual basis, the Employer
furnishes services valued in excess of $50,000 to enter-
prises located in the State of New Jersey, including, inter
alia, the Exxon Corporation, whose business operations
satisfy one of the Board's direct standards for asserting
jurisdiction.
Respondent
admits,
the complaint
(as
amended on this issue) alleges, and I find that the Em-
ployer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Further, the com-
plaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that it is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Miller has been a member of Respondent since 1959
and is classified as a journeyman wireman. For about the
past 2-1/2 years he has worked for Paul at various job-
sites including the construction of a research and devel-
opment center for the Exxon Corporation at Clinton,
New Jersey, where Paul was a subcontractor to a firm
identified as Mercantine which in turn had its contract
from Gilbane Construction, the construction managers.
Another electrical contractor on the job at or about the
same time working pursuant to a subcontract with Mer-
cantine was Joyce Electrical. Both Paul and Joyce had
identical collective-bargaining contracts with the Union. 2
In early February, Mercantine, it appears, was in the
process of considering bids for certain standby electrical
work from both Paul and Joyce that Gilbane had award-
ed to Mercantine. On Friday, February 6, Paul was noti-
fied by a Larry Rebel of Mercantine that Paul had been
the successful bidder, and consequently it was to have a
standby electrician assigned to the site on Monday, Feb-
ruary 9, in addition to its other electricians already
working there. The work of the standby electrician, also
referred to as a temporary electrician, essentially was to
handle all electrical needs for various contractors work-
ing on the job, and to be prepared to handle any electri-
cal emergency that might arise. Arthur Paul, owner of
the Employer, credibly testified that because of this short
notice he was required to make a hasty decision as to
who would be assigned the job. At or about this time.
Miller was working intermittently for the Employer at
two Exxon jobsites, the one at Clinton and another one
in Franklin Township. In addition, Miller did not live far
from the Clinton site. For these reasons, Miller, whom
Paul considered fully qualified to perform the job, was
assigned by Paul, and he reported for work, as the stand-
2 These contracts were identical to an agreementl
between the Urnilon
and the Plainfield Disision of the Northern New Jersey Chapter,
Inc.
Natilonal Electrical Contractors Associationll Inc, named in the caption as
a Parts in Interest I'aul was riot a member of this Ass( ciai.alo
by electrician on February 9, at the Exxon site in Clin-
ton.
During the previous week the Union's business agent,
Robert Cartwright, had been at the Exxon jobsite and
had met with Pezzullo, construction manager for Gil-
bane, who inquired of Cartwright as to which electrician
would be the standby electrician on the job. Cartwright
replied that this depended upon which contractor, i.e.,
Paul or Joyce, was awarded the work. Pezzullo told
Cartwright that there was an electrician by the name of
Jack Lacamera who had worked many months for Joyce
at the Exxon site installing the electrical lines and there-
fore was the most qualified person to be the standby
electrician. Pezzullo impressed upon Cartwright that La-
camera was preferred by him because of his familiarity
with the electrical work at the site.
On February 9, Cartwright visited the jobsite where
he met with Paul and conveyed to him Pezzullo's re-
quest that Lacamera be employed as the standby electri-
cian. According to both Paul and Cartwright the conver-
sation was polite and businesslike, devoid of any threats
or coercive remarks. Cartwright informed Paul that it
was Pezzullo's desire that Lacamera serve as the standby
electrician. However, there is no doubt, and Cartwright
candidly conceded. that he clearly requested that Laca-
mera be hired in place of Miller in order to satisfy the
desires of Pezzullo. Further, Cartwright did not seek to
determine Paul's desires in the matter; i.e., whether or
not Paul wanted to retain Miller or hire Lacamera.
Arthur Paul testified that he acquiesced to Cartwright's
suggestion and immediately removed Miller from the
standby position and hired in his place Lacamera, an
electrician whom Paul did not even know.3 Lacamera
began work for Paul as the standby electrician February
10, and the job lasted until April. It appears from the
record that this job carried with it higher rates of pay
than the job to which Miller was then assigned.
Arthur Paul further testified without contradiction that
at no time did Mercantine or Gilbane request that Laca-
mera be hired, or that Miller be removed, and that his
sole reason for removing Miller from the job was that on
February 9 Cartwright requested it be done. Arthur Paul
credibly denied that Cartwright had mentioned prior to
February 9 that Pezzullo had a preference for Lacamera.
For that matter, the record leaves no doubt that, but for
Cartwright's request to Paul on February 9, Miller
would have remained as the standby electrician for the
duration of that job.
Cartwright testified that he did not act out of malice
towards Miller, and indeed there is no suggestion in the
record that he did, but that in asking Paul to hire Laca-
mera he merely was seeking to have an individual who,
in his opinion, possessed greater qualifications for that
job than anyone else. Further, Cartwright believed that
article VI of the Union's bylaws privileged his action.
That article authorizes the business manager to "remove
any member from any shop or job . . . when he decides
the best interest of the Local Union requires such remov-
l
Miller stayed at the Clinton site for about 2-1 2 days performing
other electrical work and then was sent by Paul to all cntirels different
tobsite
252
LOCAL 262. IBEW
al." Therefore, he had no hesitancy in accepting Pezzul-
lo's request that Lacamera be hired as the standby elec-
trician and in conveying that request to Paul Cartwright
further testified that in recommending Lacamera's hire to
Paul his only concern was to satisfy Pezzullo's request,
and the fact that Lacamera at that time was unemployed
was not, in any sense, a factor motivating his actions. 4
Indeed, Cartwright testified he "made a commitment to
[Pezzullo to] ....
do what I could do to have Mr. La-
camera" hired as the standby electrician. That Cart-
wright expected to fulfill this commitment is borne out
graphically by Lacamera who testified that it was
Cartwright, and not Paul, who told him on February 9
to report for work to Paul.
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
There are two distinct issues presented for resolution.
Did the Union (Cartwright) cause, or attempt to cause,
Miller's layoff from the Clinton job? If so, did such con-
duct restrain or coerce Miller in violation of Section
8(b)(l)(A) of the Act? Respondent argues for a no
answer to the first question and contends that, as a
matter of law, its conduct, no matter how it is character-
ized, did not contravene the Act.
The record evidence, in my judgment, indisputably es-
tablishes that Cartwright caused Paul to remove Miller
from the Clinton job on February 9. We need not look
beyond Cartwright's testimony for this conclusion. He
committed himself to Pezzullo to achieve that result, he
urged Paul to follow his recommendation that Lacamera
be hired, and it was he not Paul who notified Lacamera
that he was hired. When coupled with Paul's ready ac-
quiescence, the fact that Paul was satisfied with Miller's
job performance, and that Lacamera was a total stranger
to him, to deny that the Union "caused" Miller's remov-
al from the job is to deny the plain meaning of that
word. These circumstances, together with the fact that
Paul was tied to the Union by a collective-bargaining
agreement, and enjoyed cordial relations with the Union
which he no doubt desired to maintain, compel a finding
that Cartwright's recommendation amounted to more
than a bare, naked, inconsequential request.
It was,
rather, a direct instruction to Paul amounting to an effi-
cacious request, satisfying the term "cause or attempt to
cause" as used in the Act. San Jose Stereotypers' and Elec-
trotypers' Union No. 120, etc. (Dow Jones & Company,
Inc.), 175 NLRB 1066, fn. 3 (1969); American Bakery and
Confectionery Workers International Union, AFL-CIO,
Local 173 (Continental Baking Company, Inc.), 128
NLRB 937 (1960).
Furthermore, when union conduct adversely affects
employment opportunities in this manner, it visits eco-
nomic sanction upon an employee within the definition
' There was a contention made at the hearing, renewed again in Re-
spondent's brief. that Lacamera's unemployment status in part justified
the Union's actions Lacamera had worked for Joyce at Clinton until
about February 4. Cartwright was asked if this fact motivated his recom-
mendation to Paul His reply was. "To answer your question directly, no
sir. If I had not had the very specific request from Pezzullo. I would not
have recommended Jack Lacamera." In light of this testimony, the oper-
ation of the hiring hall run by the Union. as it might have applied in La-
camera's case. was not litigated further, and Respondent's argument in
this respect is rejected as contrary to the esidence
of the words "restraint and coercion" as used in Section
8(b)(1)(A). An economic pressure of this kind interdicts
the intendment of Section 8(b)(I)(A) both directly and
derivatively when Section 8(b)(2) is involved.5
We turn then to whether the Union's conduct meets
the test of lawfulness, or runs afoul of Section 8(b)(1)(A),
because it constituted an exercise of union power for an
illegitimate purpose. It is now well recognized that a
union properly may affect an employee's status and that
"when the circumstances do not involve an objective of
furthering, requiring, or conditioning employment on
union membership as such, the illegality, if any, must be
found in those actions by a union that infringe upon the
employment relationship which are arbitrary, invidious,
or irrelevant to legitimate union interests." Ashley. Hick-
ham-Uhr Co., 210 NLRB 32 (1974).
It is this last criteria that is involved here. The touch-
stone for resolving this question under Section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act is whether or not the Union has dealt fairly
with the employee, 6
for there are countless situations
when union action will leave an employee dissatisfied but
without recourse to statutory relief. Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). Respondent's reason for
having Miller replaced by Lacamera was that it was sat-
isfying not some union concern, but rather the legitimate
concerns of the construction
manager.7
Therefore,
argues Respondent, inasmuch as Gilbane had a legitimate
purpose, i.e., to have the best man on the job, the Union
is cloaked with that same purpose.
I do not agree with Respondent's argument. While
Gilbane may have been able to request Paul to hire La-
camera, or even conditioned the award of the job to
Paul on Lacamera's hire, without Gilbane having violat-
ed the Act, Gilbane did not do so.8 But the Union has a
statutory duty to employees it represents which has no
counterpart in employer-employee relations, and thus a
union is subject to statutory obligations that simply are
irrelevant to an employer.
When a union deprives an employee it represents from
employment opportunities, as Respondent did here, it
must justify that act by demonstrating that it was for the
benefit of the bargaining unit as a whole. Cf. Ohio Valley
Carpenters District Council, etc. (Cincinnati Fixtures. Inc.),
226 NLRB 1032 (1976). Here, Respondent's justification
was that it acted for the benefit of an employer, and one
which was a total stranger to the bargaining unit at that.
s The issue is discussed at length by the Trial Examiner in United Me-
chanics' Union Local 150-F etc. (.4American Photocopy Equipment Compa-
ny), 151 NLRB 386. 393-395 (1965)
Miranda Fuel Company. Inc. 140 NLRB 181 (11962).
The Union also asserts that because it acted merely as a conduit for
Gilbhane it bears no legal responsibility for Miller's removal Respondent
cannot hide behind Gilbane's skirts in this matter It is precisely because
of its role in causing Miller's replacement that it must bear whatever
legal consequences flow therefrom
I Why Gilbane did not directly inform Mercantine or Paul that it
wanted Lacamera on the job is unanswered in the record, and need not
be answered to resolve the case. However, two possibilities seem appar-
ent. Either Gilbane did not feel as strongly about having Lacamera on
the job as the evidence suggests, and it was Cartwright who was sponsor-
ing his employment, or Gilbane believed that the ULnion had greater
powers of persuasion than it had
253
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Gilbane hired no electricians and in fact had no contract
with the Union.9
Moreover, Cartwright accepted without question Pez-
zullo's assertion that Lacamera was the best man for the
job. He made no effort at all to determine if Miller's
qualifications were as good, and this despite Paul's com-
plete satisfaction with Miller. Such total reliance on an
employer's assertion to the detriment of a unit employee
is an abdication of the union's responsibility owed to the
employees. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Com-
pany, 236 NLRB 1470 (1978).
When reduced to its essentials, Cartwright's actions
were the exercise by him of union power to satisfy the
desires of a contractor for whatever reason. That exer-
cise of power had no basis in established union policy, in
the contract, or in any statutory provision. Nor has it
been shown that such actions served any legitimate union
purpose or that it advanced the interests of the unit or
membership as a whole. Accord: United States Postal
Service, 240 NLRB 1198 (1979). Accordingly, I conclude
that the Union violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) when it
caused Paul, on February 9, to remove Miller as the
standby electrician. '
CONCL USIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Arthur Paul, Jr., Electrical Contractor, Inc., is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
3. By causing the Employer to terminate James R.
Miller's employment as the standby electrician at the
Exxon jobsite at Clinton, New Jersey, on February 9,
1981, the Union breached its duty of fair representation
in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
TlEm REMI DY
Having found that Respondent has breached its duty
of fair representation in violation of Section 8(b)(l)(A) of
the Act I shall recommend that it cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act. Because the record re-
veals that Miller was transferred to a job that paid less
than the standby position, the recommended Order shall
provide for reimbursement of hackpay to him. As it ap-
pears that the standby position was temporary in nature
the backpay period shall run from the date on which
Miller was removed from that position until the date that
job ended. Miller shall be made whole by payment to
9 Ihis fact alone renders null Respondenlt's argument that its collec-
tive-bargaining agremelnt sith Paul permitted its actions. The hiring hall
provisions of that agreement,
ll
icl I hare founld inapplicable in any
event, provide for referral to the contract employer of an electrician with
special skills. even if that electrician 'ould not
lnormalfly be Ihe next one
referred, Xwhere a special request has been made t'aul of course made no
such request, and Giilhanle. as noted. had no standing to invoke the con-
tract. This "justification" strikes me as an afterthought.
0 Because the General Counsel expressly declined to allege an 8(b)(2)
\xiolation as \%ell. I make II,) inllding .is Io this provision of the Act
him of the loss of pay he suffered during that period
with interest thereon. The amount due shall be computed
in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company,
90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977)."
It also appears that, although the Union's conduct at
issue in this case involved only one employee at one em-
ployer, this was a fortuitous happenstance. The conduct,
as conceded by the Union, was not directed solely at
Miller, but grew out of the Union's misunderstanding of
the nature of the duty of fair representation it owes to
employees generally. In light of this, and the fact that
the Union, in failing to represent Miller, relied at least in
part upon its bylaws and upon the same collective-bar-
gaining agreement it has with Paul as well as with a mul-
tiemployer association, I shall not limit the recommended
Order to employees of the Employer involved but shall
require the Union to acknowledge its duty of fair repre-
sentation to all the employees it represents.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER' 2
The Respondent, Local 262, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents,
and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing in its duty to fairly represent employees by
arbitrarily, and without lawful and legitimate reason,
causing or attempting to cause employers to discharge,
layoff, transfer, or otherwise discriminate against em-
ployees.
(b) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act
in any like or related manner.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make James R. Miller whole for any loss of earn-
ings he may have suffered as a result of having caused
his removal from the standby electrician position, in the
manner set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Post in conspicuous places at its business offices,
meeting halls, and all places where notices to members
customarily are posted copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix." Copies of said notice, on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director for Region 22, after
being duly signed by an authorized representative of Re-
spondent, shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
II See, generally, IPis Plumbing & Hearing Co.. 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
t2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec
10246 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National L abor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted b) the Board and
become its findings. cochlusions. and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes
254
LOCAL 262, IBEW
(c) Sign and mail sufficient copies of said notice to the
Regional Director for Region 22 for posting by the Em-
ployer, if willing, at all locations where notices to its em-
ployees customarily are posted.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 22, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
255