MFP Fire Protection, Inc.

840 318 NLRB No. 61 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is de- nied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties. 1 Sec. 8(a)(5) makes it unlawful for an employer ‘‘to refuse to bar- gain collectively with the representatives of his employees.’’ Sec. 8(a)(1) outlaws employer actions and statements that ‘‘interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7.’’ Sec. 7 declares pertinently that ‘‘[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor orga- nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection[.]’’ 2 Specifically, the Respondent admits, and I find, that; (a) the Union’s charge was served on it on or about the date it was filed; (b) the Respondent is a Colorado corporation headquartered in Colo- rado Springs, Colorado, which; (c) annually buys more than $50,000 worth of goods, materials, or services from Colorado suppliers who themselves received those same goods directly in interstate com- merce, and which; (d) annually sells more than $50,000 worth of goods to other Colorado customers who are themselves directly en- gaged in interstate commerce, and therefore; (e) the Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 3 John Deklewa & Sons, 282 NLRB 1375 (1987), enfd. sub nom. Iron Workers Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 889 (1988). 4 Counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for the Respondent filed timely briefs within the deadline allotted, which was extended by a few days on the Respondent’s unopposed request. MFP Fire Protection, Inc. and Road Sprinkler Fit- ters Local Union 669, U.S., AFL–CIO. Case 27– CA–13246 August 28, 1995 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS BROWNING AND COHEN On May 10, 1995, Administrative Law Timothy D. Nelson issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions, the General Counsel filed a brief in response, and the Respondent filed a reply brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs1 and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec- ommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, MFP Fire Protection, Inc., Colorado Springs, Colorado, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. Michael T. Pennington, Esq., for the General Counsel. Rita Byrnes Kittle and Steven L. Murray, Esqs. (Fattor & Kittle, P.C.), of Denver, Colorado, for the Respondent, MFP. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE TIMOTHY D. NELSON, Administrative Law Judge. Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union 699 (the Union) filed an unfair labor practice charge against MFP Fire Protection, Inc. (the Respondent) on June 28, 1994. After investigating, the Re- gional Director for Region 27 issued a complaint against the Respondent on August 12, 1994. I conducted the trial of this prosecution in Denver, Colorado, on March 7, 1995. In the complaint, the Regional Director alleges in the name of the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board that the Union has been the exclusive collective-bar- gaining representative under Section 9(a) of the Act of the Respondent’s sprinkler fitters since June 1985, and that since on or about April 26, 1994, the Respondent has been violat- ing Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act1 by (a) ‘‘fail[ing] and refus[ing] to . . . bargain collectively with the Union con- cerning wages, hours and other terms and conditions of em- ployment,’’ (b) ‘‘withdr[awing] recognition’’ from the Union, and (c) ‘‘unilaterally chang[ing] the wages, hour, and other terms and conditions of employment’’ of its sprinkler fitters. In its amended answer, the Respondent admits, and I find, that the Board’s jurisdiction is properly invoked,2 and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(5) of the Act. The Respondent further admits that, on and after April 26, 1994, it refused to bargain with the Union and repudiated its relationship with the Union and acted uni- laterally with respect to the wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment of its sprinkler fitters. The Respondent, however, denies that the Union was ever the exclusive representative of those employees within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act, and avers as an affirma- tive defense that it has ‘‘lawfully repudiated a bargaining re- lationship established and maintained in accordance with Section 8(f) of the Act.’’ The central issue in the case, after Deklewa,3 is this: Did the Union and the Respondent’s bargaining relationship, ad- mittedly begun with a prehire agreement privileged only under Section 8(f) of the Act, become converted to a ‘‘full,’’ 9(a) relationship after the Respondent signed one or more written agreements containing acknowledgements that the Union was the 9(a) representative of its employees? Upon my study of the whole record and the parties’ briefs,4 and based on my findings and reasoning below, I judge that the Respondent’s execution of a written acknowl- edgment in October 1987 was enough to convert the parties’ bargaining relationship to one enjoying the full panoply of protections afforded by Section 9(a) of the Act, and that the Union’s exclusive representative status under Section 9(a) must be presumed to have continued at all times thereafter. Therefore, I will conclude that the Respondent’s admitted re- pudiation of the bargaining relationship—and its actions after April 1, 1994, related to that repudiation—violated its con- tinuing duty under Section 8(a)(5) and Section 9(a) to recog- nize and bargain with the Union, and that the Respondent 841 MFP FIRE PROTECTION, INC. thereby committed unfair labor practices, substantially as al- leged in the complaint. FINDINGS OF FACT The Respondent, operating from offices in Colorado Springs, installs and services automatic fire sprinkler sys- tems. Lawrence Martin formed the Respondent in 1984, and he has been its president and the person in charge of its op- erations since then. The Union is a labor organization affili- ated with the United Association of Journeymen and Appren- tices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada (the UA). Although the Union is denomi- nated a ‘‘Local’’ of the UA, the jurisdiction ceded to it by the UA covers fire sprinkler installation work done through- out the United States. Max Jenkins is the Union’s business manager for its ‘‘District 4,’’ which covers Colorado and Wyoming. Collective bargaining in this industry is typically con- ducted by the Union with National Automatic Sprinkler and Fire Control Association, Inc. (the Association). For decades, those parties have negotiated successive master labor agree- ments (Association Agreements), which are binding on all of the Association’s employer-members nationwide, and on any other, ‘‘independent’’ employers in the industry, such as the Respondent, who may assent to their terms. The parties’ relationship began in November 1984, when, after forming the Respondent, Martin signed an agreement tendered by the Union’s Jenkins under which the Respondent agreed to be bound by the terms of the then current Associa- tion Agreement, which was due to expire on March 31, 1985. On February 20, 1985, when the Association Agree- ment was about to expire and be replaced by a new one, Martin signed an ‘‘Assent and Interim Agreement’’ (A&I Agreement), with the Union. Under this A&I Agreement, the Respondent agreed to be bound by the new, 1985–1988 As- sociation Agreement. The first paragraph of the A&I Agree- ment said this: THIS AGREEMENT is freely and voluntarily made this 20th day of February, 1985 by and between MFP Fire Protection, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the Em- ployer’’) and Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 U.A. (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the Union’’), as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of its employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, for the purpose of es- tablishing wages, hours, and working conditions for all journeymen sprinkler fitters and apprentices in the em- ploy of the Employer, and for the purpose of reducing work stoppages, thus preserving a harmonious uninter- rupted relationship between the parties. On October 20, 1987, during the term of the 1985–1988 Association Agreement, Martin admittedly signed a separate document (the October 1987 acknowledgement), which states in full as follows (emphasis in original): ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE STATUS OF ROAD SPRINKLER FITTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 69, U.A., AFL–CIO The Employer executing this document below has, on the basis of objective and reliable information, con- firmed that a clear majority of the sprinkler fitters in its employ have designated, are members of, and are rep- resented by [the Union] for purposes of collective bar- gaining. The Employer therefore unconditionally acknowl- edges and confirms that Local 669 is the exclusive bar- gaining representative of its sprinkler fitter employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act. Martin, although admitting that he signed this acknowledg- ment, and entered the date ‘‘10–20–87’’ on it, claimed not to recall the circumstances surrounding his signing. There is no affirmative, independent evidence in this record that the Union had, in fact, proffered any ‘‘objective and reliable in- formation,’’ or that the Respondent had, in fact, ‘‘con- firmed’’ before Martin signed this acknowledgment that a ‘‘clear majority’’ of its bargaining unit employees were ‘‘members of, and . . . represented by’’ the Union. On February 4, 1988, again anticipating the expiration of the current Association Agreement, Martin signed another A&I Agreement, under which the Respondent became bound to the new, 1988–1991 Association Agreement. The 1988 A&I Agreement contained new language in its preamble, as follows: The Employer hereby freely and unequivocally ac- knowledges that it has verified the Union’s status as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, for the purpose of establishing wages, hours, and working conditions for all journey- men sprinkler fitters, apprentices and pre-apprentices in the employ of the Employer. On March 29, 1991, Martin signed another A&I Agree- ment under which he bound the Respondent to the 1991– 1994 Association Agreement. This A&I Agreement contained the same, ‘‘freely and unequivocally acknowledges’’ lan- guage in its preamble that first appeared in the 1988 A&I Agreement. So far as this record shows, from November 1984 through the April 1, 1994 expiration of the 1991–1994 Association Agreement, the Respondent honored all terms and conditions established by the successive Association Agreements, in- cluding by making payments into the health and welfare and pension trusts established by those agreements. In the spring of 1994, however, the Respondent did not sign a new A&I Agreement, and on April 1, 1994, the Respondent ceased making such trust payments and admittedly began to make other unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of em- ployment of its employees in the recognized bargaining unit. The Union’s Jenkins wrote to Martin on April 7, request- ing separate negotiations with Martin for a new agreement, and on April 13, Jenkins faxed to Martin a copy of a union bulletin outlining in some detail the changes to the Associa- tion Agreement that had been recently negotiated by the na- tional bargaining parties. On April 26, 1994, Martin wrote to the Union’s offices in Columbia, Maryland, and mailed a copy of this letter to Jenkins. In that letter, Martin said in material part: 842 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 5 In arguing that ‘‘the Union’’ had the burden of making such a showing, the Respondent relies chiefly on arguments made by Mem- ber Oviatt in his dissent in Casale Industries, supra at 311 NLRB at 953–954. 6 Because I find that the Respondent’s October 1987 acknowledg- ment was enough to convert any 8(f) relationship that may have ex- isted previously into a full, 9(a) relationship, I do not reach the Gen- eral Counsel’s alternative arguments that the Respondent’s signing of A&I agreements in 1985, 1988, and 1991 containing 9(a) recognition language likewise had such a relationship converting effect. I have reviewed the terms of the new agreement . . . and have concluded that it would not be in the best in- terest for [sic] our company.’’ Therefore I will not sign nor be signatory to Local 699 at this time. On May 31, 1994, Jenkins wrote to Martin, again demand- ing ‘‘that your organization engage in good-faith independent negotiations with the Union for a new collective-bargaining agreement between the parties.’’ Martin did not reply to that letter. Nor did he reply to a final letter from Jenkins dated June 23, in which Jenkins objected to the Respondent’s re- fusal to bargain and its having made unilateral changes af- fecting bargaining unit employees, and demanded that the Respondent ‘‘cease and desist from your unlawful conduct, restore the status quo, and agree to bargain in good faith with Local 669 for a new agreement.’’ Analysis This case is materially identical to and is controlled by the Board’s decision in Triple A Fire Protection, Inc., 312 NLRB 1088 (1993). There, the employer in October 1987 signed an ‘‘Acknowledgement of the Representative Status of Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669’’ that was identical to the one that Martin signed on the Respondent’s behalf on October 20, 1987. There, as here, many years later, the employer sought to impeach this acknowledgment by ar- guing that the union never represented an uncoerced majority of its employees, and therefore never achieved lawful, 9(a) status. There, the Board said (id. at 1088–1089), By executing the acknowledgement, the Respondent voluntarily and unequivocally granted recognition to the Union as 9(a) representative. It is clear that the parties intended to establish a bargaining relationship under Section 9(a) of the Act. [cit. omitted] Contrary to the approach of the judge and the Respondent, we will not at this late date inquire into the Union’s showing of majority status. In Deklewa, the Board stated that unions should not have less favored status with respect to construction industry employers than they possess with respect to those outside the construction industry. In nonconstruction industries, if an employer grants Section 9 recognition to a union and more than 6 months elapse, the Board will not entertain a claim that majority status was lacking at the time of recognition. As parties in the construction industry are entitled to no less protection against such late claims, we will not en- tertain a challenge here, where the Respondent volun- tarily recognized the Union as a 9(a) representative in 1987 and waited until 4 years later to object. See Casale Industries, 311 NLRB 951[.] The Respondent’s arguments in defense break down into two main ones: First, the Respondent argues that Martin, un- tutored in labor law, did not understand the legal significance of what he was doing when he signed; (a) the 1985 A&I Agreement containing explicit 9(a) recognition language; (b) the October 1987 acknowledgement ‘‘verif[ying]’’ the Union’s majority status under Section 9(a); (c) the 1988 A&I agreement containing a similar ‘‘verifi[cation]’’ that the Union was the exclusive representative of the unit employees under Section 9(a), and; (d) the 1991 A&I agreement con- taining a ‘‘verif[ication]’’ identical to the one he signed in 1988. Second, the Respondent argues that the ‘‘Union’’ did not meet its ‘‘burden of showing the parties established a 9(a) relationship.’’ The Respondent’s first argument amounts to an ‘‘igno- rance of the law’’ excuse; that is to say, it presents no le- gally cognizable excuse at all. In any case, the Board’s hold- ing in Triple A Fire Protection fully disposes of all argu- ments urged by the Respondent. Under Triple A, the Respondent’s October 1987 acknowl- edgement of the Union’s majority representative status under Section 9(a) was alone enough to make it ‘‘clear that the par- ties intended to establish a bargaining relationship under Sec- tion 9(a) of the Act.’’ And when the Respondent failed with- in 6 months thereafter to challenge the Union’s majority sta- tus under Section 9(a), but instead twice more in the next 4 years signed A&I Agreements ‘‘freely and unequivocally acknowledg[ing] that it has verified the Union’s status as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act,’’ the Respondent cannot now legitimately claim that ‘‘the Union’’ (or the General Counsel) operated under the ‘‘burden’’ of making some additional showing that the Union was, in fact, the representative designated by a majority of the employees in October 1987.5 Rather, following precedent in the non- construction sector, the Board clearly held in both Triple A and Casale Industries, supra, that as a matter of policy, the Board will not even ‘‘entertain’’ such ‘‘late claims’’ as to a union’s majority status at the time the employer initially con- ferred 9(a) recognition. And if the Board will not entertain any such attacks by the employer after more than 6 months have passed since the initial 9(a) recognition, it necessarily follows that the prosecuting parties operated under no ‘‘bur- den’’ when this case was tried in 1995 to somehow prove by independent evidence that, in fact, the Union had dem- onstrated its majority status to the Respondent before Martin signed the October 1987 acknowledgement. Under those au- thorities, as I construe them, the General Counsel satisfied all pertinent burdens when he showed without contradiction; (a) that the Respondent formally acknowledged in October 1987 that the Union was designated by a majority of its bargaining unit employees as—and was—the exclusive representative of those employees within the meaning of Section 9(a);6 (b) that more than 6 months passed thereafter without any challenge by the Respondent (or anyone else) to the legitimacy of this 9(a) recognitional acknowledgement, and (c) that the Re- spondent thereafter repudiated the bargaining relationship and made unilateral changes. Under these circumstances, for the Respondent to escape liability for its repudiation in April 1994 of the long established 9(a) relationship with the Union, it must have shown either that, at the time of its repudiation, it had a good-faith doubt based on objective considerations 843 MFP FIRE PROTECTION, INC. 7 See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, 110 S.Ct. 1542 (1990). 8 Specifically, where the record shows that the 1991–1994 Asso- ciation Agreement established the terms and conditions of employ- ment under which the unit employees worked immediately before the Respondent’s unilateral changes, this order contemplates that the Respondent shall restore all terms and conditions established by that agreement. 9 Make-whole amounts owed to employees under this order are to be computed as prescribed in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970); interest on such amounts is to be computed as pre- scribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). 10 Any amounts that the Respondent must pay to the trusts to sat- isfy this remedy are to be computed at the compliance stage, consist- ent with directions in Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213 (1979). 11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec- ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.’’ of the Union’s continuing majority support in the bargaining unit, or that the Union did not, ‘‘in fact,’’ enjoy such major- ity support.7 The Respondent made no effort to meet either of these burdens, and therefore the Union’s presumption of continuing majority support has not been rebutted. CONCLUSION OF LAW Accordingly, I conclude as a matter of law that when the Respondent admittedly repudiated the bargaining relationship in April 1994, and thereafter made unilateral changes in its employees’ wages and other conditions of their employment, it violated its continuing duty under Section 8(a)(5) and Sec- tion 9(a) to recognize and bargain with the Union, and thus committed and is committing unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. REMEDY Because I have found that the Respondent committed these unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative actions designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. These required actions shall include the following, all of them subject to the Union’s duty to make an appropriate request, and all without prejudice to the Respondent’s right under the Act, after good-faith bargaining with the Union to agreement or lawful impasse, to implement future changes consistent with any such agreement or its last offer before impasse: The Re- spondent must fully restore to its bargaining unit employees the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ- ment they enjoyed immediately before the Respondent made unlawful unilateral changes in those areas,8 and must make them whole by paying them backpay, with interest, for any financial losses they suffered as a consequence of the Re- spondent’s unilateral changes in such terms and conditions,9 and must make whole the health and welfare and pension trusts established under the 1991–1994 Association Agree- ment for any losses they suffered as a consequence of the Respondent’s unilateral discontinuance of contributions to those trusts on and after April 1, 1994.10 On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended11 ORDER The Respondent, MFP Fire Protection, Inc., of Colorado Springs, Colorado, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Repudiating its 9(a) relationship with Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union 669, U.A., AFL–CIO (the Union). (b) Refusing to meet and bargain with the Union for a labor agreement to replace the 1991–1994 Association Agreement which bound the parties until its expiration on April 1, 1994. (c) Unilaterally changing the wages, hours of work, or other terms or conditions of employment established by the 1991–1994 Association Agreement for its employees in the established bargaining unit of nonsupervisory journeymen and apprentice and preapprentice sprinkler fitters. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Upon the Union’s request, and consistent with the rem- edy section of this decision, take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Recognize the Union as the exclusive representative within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act of its employ- ees in the established bargaining unit. (b) Meet and bargain collectively in good faith with the Union over terms of a labor agreement for its bargaining unit employees to replace the terms established in the 1991–1994 Association Agreement, and if such an agreement is reached, reduce it to writing and sign it. (c) Until such time as it shall have fully discharged its re- cognitional and bargaining obligations to the Union, fully re- store and apply to its bargaining unit employees the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment estab- lished by the 1991–1994 Association Agreement. (d) Make whole those bargaining unit employees, with in- terest, for any financial losses they suffered as a consequence of the Respondent’s unilateral changes in such terms and conditions made on or after April 1, 1994. (e) Make whole the health and welfare and pension trusts established under the 1991–1994 Association Agreement for any losses those trusts suffered as a consequence of the Re- spondent’s unilateral discontinuance of contributions to those trusts on and after April 1, 1994. (f) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (g) Post at its Colorado Springs offices, and at any of its jobsites where it may be permitted to maintain such postings, copies of the attached notice, marked ‘‘Appendix.’’12 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 27, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent imme- diately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days 844 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (h) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio- lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protection To choose not to engage in any of these protected concerted activities. WE WILL NOT repudiate our relationship with Road Sprin- kler Fitters Local Union 669, U.A., AFL–CIO as the exclu- sive representative within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act of our nonsupervisory journeyman and apprentice and preapprentice sprinkler fitters. WE WILL NOT refuse to meet and bargain with the Union for a labor agreement for those bargaining unit employees to replace the 1991–1994 Association Agreement which bound us until its expiration on April 1, 1994. WE WILL NOT unilaterally change the wages, hours of work, or other terms or conditions of employment established by the 1991–1994 Association Agreement for our bargaining unit employees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Upon the Union’s request WE WILL recognize the Union as the exclusive representa- tive within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act of our em- ployees in the established bargaining unit. WE WILL meet and bargain collectively in good faith with the Union over terms of a labor agreement to replace the terms established in the 1991–1994 Association Agreement, and if such an agreement is reached. WE WILL reduce it to writing and sign it. Until we have fully discharged our recognitional and bar- gaining obligations to the Union, WE WILL fully restore and apply to our bargaining unit employees the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment established by the 1991–1994 Association Agreement. WE WILL compensate our bargaining unit employees, with interest, for any financial losses they suffered as a con- sequence of our unilateral changes in such terms and condi- tions made on or after April 1, 1994. WE WILL make whole the health and welfare and pension trusts established under the 1991–1994 Association Agree- ment for any losses those trusts suffered as a consequence of our unilateral discontinuance of contributions to those trusts on and after April 1, 1994. MFP FIRE PROTECTION, INC.