Electrical Workers, Local No. 396

ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL NO. 396 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 396 (Central Telephone Company) and Shelly McLane Brown and Toni R. Pepe. Cases 31 -CB-2056 and 31-CB-2056-2 May 6, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND MURPHY On August 19, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Irving Rogosin issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein. Respondent is party to a collective-bargaining agreement with the Company. This collective-bar- gaining agreement contains no provision for union security, agency shop, or other forms of compulsory membership.' In April 1975, Respondent Business Manager and Financial Secretary Robert Kinney mailed a copy of the recently negotiated contract together with a membership application to all unit employees including those who were not members of the Union. On September 30, Kinney mailed a followup letter to those employees who had not authorized a deduction and to delinquent members. The following letter, addressed to one of the Charging Parties, is illustrative of Kinney's mailing: Dear Ms. Pepe: We have made numerous efforts to contact you pertaining to your Union dues. You have received applications, on April 25, 1975, from the local Union which you have elected to ignore. You now owe the Local Union for the month(s) of April through September. Dues are assessed monthly at one hour of your pay rate, plus $2.00 if paid on time. Please remit this amount to the Union so you will be current and all your benefits may take effect. I The contract appears to be in compliance with Nevada's "Right to Work" statute (Nevada Revised Statutes, Sec. 613. 230, erseq.). 229 NLRB No. 74 Sincerely, Robert A. "Red" Kinney Business Manager Financial Sec. RAF/geh 9/75 Upon receipt of this letter, employees Pepe, Brown, and Wheeler, who were not members of the Union, each separately called Kinney and told him they had no intention of paying union dues. According to the credited and uncontradicted testimony, Kinney told each employee that although the Union was required to bargain for all employees, without regard to union membership, and that under state law employees could not be required to be members of the union as a condition of employment, there was no law that said they did not have to pay union dues. Kinney also told these employees that if they did not pay union dues he would refer the claims to a collection agency and institute court action if necessary. Union member Mary Reynolds received the identical followup letter from Kinney. Reynolds credibly testified that she called Kinney in January 1976 and told him that she wanted to withdraw from the Union and that she had notified the payroll department to discontinue her deduction. Reynolds also told Kinney that she would not voluntarily pay any more dues. Kinney responded, "Well, you can't be an employee of the telephone company without being a member." The Union took no action to enforce payment of dues from any unit employees. The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon- dent, acting through its business manager, violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act by notifying nonunion bargaining unit employees that they would be required to pay union dues as bargaining dues, and by threatening to collect such dues by referring claims therefor to a collection agency or by institut- ing court proceedings. The Administrative Law Judge also found that Respondent, by its actions, sought to impose agency-shop conditions as a requirement for employment contrary to the "Right to Work" laws of the State. The Administrative Law Judge further found that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) by attempting to impose union- security conditions on Reynolds' right to continue employment in violation of state law and the provisions of Section 8(a)(3). We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent by its actions violated Section 8(b)(l)(A). However, our finding is predicated not 469 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD upon any possible violation of the laws of the State of Nevada but rather upon the conclusion that Respon- dent's actions restrained or coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The fact that the incidents occurred in a "Right to Work" State is irrelevant to our determination. Kinney's statement to Reynolds that she could not resign and would not be permitted to resign from the Union if she wished to remain in the Company's employ was an obvious threat of job loss. Such threat plainly interferes with Reynolds' right to refrain from any and all union activities and may be legitimized only by an agreement requiring membership in the Union. There were no union-security provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement between Re- spondent and the Company, and it is axiomatic that, in the absence of a valid union-security clause, threats to employees that they will lose their jobs or otherwise be discriminated against in employment because of nonpayment of dues violate Section 8(b)(1)(A). The violation exists even though the Respondent could not require the Company to discharge Reynolds. The Board has held that the threat is coercive "because it was a threat of loss of employment reasonably calculated to have an effect on the listener without regard to the question of the Union's ability to carry out the threat." 2 Similarly, we view Kinney's efforts to collect dues from nonmembers Pepe, Brown, and Wheeler as coercive and in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). We do not agree with the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent was threatening to impose an agency shop on the nonmembers, since there is no evidence that Kinney stated that the payment of dues was a condition of continued employment. Nevertheless, Kinney's statements to the nonmember employees that they would be required to pay dues for the privilege of being represented by the Union and that the Union would turn over claims against the employees to a collection agency or institute court proceedings for collection of dues violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) since Respondent had no legal basis to require nonmembers to pay dues. Section 7 of the Act protects the right of employees to refrain from any or all union activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition for employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3). The collective-bargaining agreement between Respon- dent and the Company contains neither a union- security nor an agency-shop provision, and therefore Kinney's threats to institute action to collect dues 2 United Furniture Workers of America, Local 309, et al. (Smith Cabinet Manufacturing Comparny Inc.), 81 NLRB 886, 887, fn. 3 (1949). 1 International Association of Machinists [etc.] (The H. O. Canfield Rubber Companv of Virginia, Inc.), 223 NLRB 832 (1976). Member Murphy, who cannot be viewed as an attempt to enforce a valid contractual provision and can only be viewed as coercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. In view of the above, we reject Respondent's contention that it is entitled to bring a court suit to determine whether it may charge nonmember em- ployees a bargaining fee. We have recently held that a collective-bargaining representative is obligated to represent all employees in the unit equally without a charge upon nonmembers. 3 In sum, for the reasons heretofore enunciated, we find that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) by threatening to take action against employees Pepe, Brown, and Wheeler to enforce payment of union dues, and by stating to employee Reynolds that she would not be permitted to resign from the Union if she desired to remain in the Company's employ. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 396, its officers, agents, and representa- tives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening to take action against nonunion bargaining unit employees to enforce payment of union dues and stating to employees that they cannot resign and will not be permitted to resign from the Union if they desire to remain in the Company's employ. (b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaran- teed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Notify Shelly McLane Brown, Toni R. Pepe, and Sandra W. Wheeler, in writing, that it will not threaten to take action against them, or against any other nonunion bargaining unit employees, to en- force payment of union dues. (b) Notify Mary A. Reynolds, in writing, that it will not state to her or any other bargaining unit employees that they cannot resign and will not be permitted to resign from the Union if they desire to remain in the Company's employ or that bargaining unit employees are required to become or remain union members as a condition of employment with the Company, and that it will not threaten to take action to enforce payment of union dues by stated therein that in some instances she would permit imposition of a fee, finds the attempt herein to require the payment of union dues was unjustified and illegal. 470 ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL NO. 396 nonunion bargaining unit employees of the Compa- ny. (c) Post at Respondent Union's business office and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 31, after being duly signed by Respondent Union's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu- ous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent Union to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Furnish to said Regional Director signed copies of said notice for posting by Central Telephone Company, at its option, in places where notices to employees in the unit covered by the collective- bargaining agreement are customarily posted. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director, after being signed by Respondent Union, as indicated, shall be forthwith returned to him for posting by Central Telephone Company, if it is so disposed. (e) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 4 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT threaten to take action against nonunion bargaining unit employees of Central Telephone Company to enforce payment of union dues. WE WILL NOT state to employees that they cannot resign and will not be permitted to resign from the Union if they desire to remain in the Company's employ. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees of the Company in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL notify Shelly McLane Brown, Toni R. Pepe, and Sandra W. Wheeler, in writing, that we will not threaten to take action against them or any other nonunion bargaining unit employees of the Company to enforce payment of union dues. WE WILL notify Mary A. Reynolds, in writing, that we will not state to her or other bargaining unit employees that they cannot resign and will not be permitted to resign from the Union if they desire to remain in the Company's employ or that employees are required to become or remain members of the Union as a condition of employ- ment with the Company, and that we will not threaten to take action to enforce payment of union dues by nonunion bargaining unit employ- ees of the Company. All employees of Central Telephone Company are free to become or remain or to refrain from becoming or remaining members of the Union. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL No. 396 DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE IRVING ROGOSIN, Administrative Law Judge: The conso- lidated complaint issued February 4, 1976, alleges that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(bX )(I)(A) and 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Specifically, the complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges that (1) on about October 3, 1975, Respondent, acting through its business manager, notified nonunion bargaining unit employees that they would be required to pay union dues as "bargaining" dues, and threatened to collect such dues by referring claims therefor to a collection agency or by instituting court proceedings; and (2) on or about January 30, 1976, Respondent, acting through the same agent, threatened a union member of the bargaining unit that she would not be permitted to withdraw from Respondent if she wished to remain in the Company's employ, and that Respondent would enforce the collection of dues from her by referring claims therefor to a collection agency or by instituting court proceedings against her. ' Respondent's answer, duly filed on February 12, 1976, admits the procedural and jurisdictional allegations of the complaint but denies generally and specifically the remain- ing allegations. Hearing on the consolidated cases was held before the duly designated Administrative Law Judge on March 25, ' Designations herein are as follows: General Counsel, unless otherwise stated or required by the context, his representatives at the heanng; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 396, Respon- dent, Respondent Union or the Union: Central Telephone Company. the Employer or the Company: the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq.), the Act; the National Labor Relations Board, the Board. The charge in Case 31-CB-2056 was filed on October 7, 1975, and served on October 9, 1975; the charge in Case 31-CB-2056-2 was filed on October 9, 1975, and served on October 14, 1975. Unless otherwise stated, all dates are in 1975. 471 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1976, at Las Vegas, Nevada. General Counsel and Respondent were represented by counsel, were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence relevant and material to the issues, to argue orally and to file briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Respondent's counsel argued orally on the record, but filed no brief; General Counsel waived oral argument but filed a brief on April 19, 1976. No proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law have been filed by any of the parties. Upon the entire record in the case and based upon the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses, and General Counsel's brief, which has been duly considered, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF EMPLOYER The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits, and it is hereby found that Central Telephone Company, the Company or Employer herein, a corporation duly orga- nized under the laws of the State of Delaware, with an office and principal place of business located in Las Vegas, Nevada, is, and at all times material herein has been, an employer engaged in the operation of an interstate telephone communication system. In the course of its business operations, the Employer purchases and receives goods or services valued in excess of $50,000 annually, directly from suppliers located outside the State of Nevada, and derives gross revenues in excess of $ 100,000 annually. Upon the basis of the foregoing, and upon the entire record, including the admissions in Respondent's answer, it is hereby found that at all times material herein the Company has been an employer engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 396, Respondent Union herein, is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Ill. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Respondent has been a party to a collective-bargaining agreement with the Company, covering employees in an appropriate unit described below.2 In conformity with the "right-to-work" statute of the State of Nevada, 3 the latest collective-bargaining agree- ment, presumably entered into shortly before April 1975, 2 The description of the unit is as follows: Included: Traffic Department employees, clerical employees of its accounting, commercial, general office, plant and traffic departments employed at its Las Vegas, Nevada facility. Excluded: All other employees, including plant department employees, professional em- ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. a Nevada Revised Statutes Sec. 613.230, et seq. 4 Although, as reported in the transcript of the proceedings, Kinney testified, "I sent it to all the ones paying dues, according to the seniority list, contains no provision for union security, agency shop, or other form of compulsory union membership. In April 1975, Business Manager and Financial Secretary Robert A. Kinney mailed a copy of the new collective- bargaining agreement, with highlights of benefits which the Union had achieved, together with a membership applica- tion, to all unit employees, including those who were not members of the Union.4 Under date of September 30, Kinney sent a followup letter on a union letterhead to unit employees, including nonmembers, as well as union members who had not authorized a dues checkoff and were delinquent in their dues.5 Among nonmembers who received a copy of this letter were Shelly McLane Brown and Toni R. Pepe, the Charging Parties in this proceeding, and Sandra W. Wheeler. As hereinafter related, Mary A. Reynolds, a union member who received such a letter, subsequently tried unsuccessfully to resign from the Union. 6 The letter addressed to Pepe will serve as a specimen of this mailing: Sept. 30, 1975 Toni R. Pepe 2627 So. Lamb Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada Dear Ms. Pepe: We have made numerous efforts to contact you pertaining to your Union dues. You have received applications on April 25, 1975 from the Local Union which you have elected to ignore. You now owe the Local Union for the month(s) of April through Sept. Dues are assessed monthly at one hour of your pay rate, plus $2.00 if paid on time. Please remit this amount to the Union so you will be current and all your benefits may take effect. Sincerely, Robert A. "Red" Kinney Business Manager-Financial Secy. RAK/geh 9/75 Toni Pepe, who had been in the Company's employ for nearly 2 years, was working as a Clerk IV, in the commercial department, at the time of the hearing. At no time during her employment had she been a member of the Union. On October 3, following receipt of the Union's letter of September 30, Pepe telephoned Kinney from work and, after identifying herself both by name and as an employee of the Company, referred to the union letter and all the members," it is obvious that Kinney either misspoke himself or that his answer was inaccurately transcribed. It is obvious that the primary purpose of this mailing was to solicit nonmember employees to join the Union. 5 Although Kinney's testimony was not altogether clear on the subject, it is reasonable to assume that a copy of this letter was mailed only to those employees mentioned above. 6 Allegations concerning Respondent's conduct in this regard were added at the outset of the hearing on prior written notice. 472 ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL NO. 396 told Kinney that she was not a union member and had no intention of paying union dues. Kinney told her that while under Federal law the Union was obligated to bargain for all (unit) employees, without regard to union membership, and although under state law employees could not be required to be members of the Union as a condition of employment, there was no law that said she did not have to pay union dues. Pepe rejoined that to the best of her knowledge there was no law which required her to pay union dues. According to Pepe, Kinney then told her that if she did not pay her union dues he would refer the claim to a collection agency and institute court action, if necessary. Kinney again asked her to identify herself but she replied that she had already done so and told him that she had to get back to work. The same day, Shelly McLane Brown, who had been in the Company's employ for nearly 3 years, and was employed as a final account representative at the time of the hearing, called the Union. Like Pepe, although she had never been a member of the Union, she too, had received a copy of the Union's September 30 letter. When Kinney finally returned her telephone call, Brown told him that she had called in regard to the union letter, which demanded payment of dues for the period from April through September. She told him that she had never been a member of the Union and did not owe any dues. Kinney then said, in her words, that the dues in question were "bargaining dues" which everyone was required to pay. Brown asked Kinney whether it were not true that the Company was an open shop. Kinney conceded that it was, but stated that under Federal law everyone was obliged to pay "bargain- ing dues." Brown told Kinney he was "full of bologna," and that she had no intention of paying any dues. With that, Kinney told her that if she failed to pay her dues the matter would be referred to a collection agency or the small claims court. Kinney also told Brown that if she agreed to join the Union at that time he would take up with the executive board the matter of waiving any past dues. Brown told Kinney that if he wanted to take the matter to court, she would see him there with the company lawyer.7 Brown repeated that she had no wish tojoin the Union and had no intention of doing so. Kinney remarked that she seemed quite upset, and asked her to contact him the following Monday after she had cooled down. Brown told Kinney that she had nothing more to say and that if he persisted in harassing her by phone or letter she would see him in court, and hung up. According to Brown, Kinney remarked that she was a "feisty little girl" and that they could use someone like her in the Union. Sandra W. Wheeler, who was first employed by the Company from April 1969 to late July 1971, was rehired on October 1973. At the time of the hearing she was employed as a service representative in the commercial department. Early in October, following receipt of the union letter, Wheeler called Kinney, told him that she did not owe any union dues, and asked him for an explanation of the letter. Wheeler told Kinney that she had no intention of paying any union dues, and he told her that the claim had already ? In the transcript the word after "company" is given as "later." The word "later" in this context is obviously an error in transcnption been turned over to a collection agency. Wheeler said, "Fine," and hung up. Mary A. Reynolds, an employee of the Company for a year and a half, and a service representative in the commercial department at the time of the hearing, had been a member of the Union until January 1976. About that time, Reynolds called the Union, identified herself by name, and stated that she wished to talk to someone about withdrawing from the Union. Kinney identified himself, and told her that she had signed a contract with the Union, and that there was no way she could withdraw. Reynolds said that she had not called to argue or to register any complaint but merely wanted to withdraw from the Union, and told Kinney that she had already notified the payroll department to discontinue her dues deduction. Kinney replied, according to Reynolds, that he doubted that "an act of God could remove [her] from the membership rolls." Reynolds repeated that she had not called up to argue or complain but that she no longer wished to belong to the Union. Kinney stated that the union dues were collectible and that he would turn the matter over to a collection agency and take her to court if necessary. Reynolds rejoined, "Do whatever you have to do, but I will not voluntarily pay any more dues." Kinney responded, "Well, you can't be an employee of the telephone company without being a member." Reynolds told him to do whatever he wished but that she just did not want to belong to his organization, and because he had told her that she could not withdraw, she wanted nothing to do with his "lousy outfit." Kinney again asked her who she was and she gave him her name. She, in turn, asked him to identify himself, and he told her he was "Red" Kinney. Reynolds wrote the Union a letter of resignation on January 21, 1976, the same day she called Kinney. Although the letter was not produced at the hearing, Reynolds testifying that she had mislaid her copy, Kinney did not deny that the letter was received. Nor did he deny Reynolds' testimony that she was current in her dues at the time of her resignation. Admittedly, the Union has taken no further action against Pepe, Brown, and Wheeler to enforce payment of dues, nor has it since threatened to do so. Similarly, no action has been taken against Reynolds to enforce payment of dues since her resignation. The record leaves no doubt that, in his capacity as union representative, Kinney made a written demand, by letter dated September 30, on unit employees, including Pepe, Brown, and Wheeler, who had at no time been members of the Union, for payment of union dues for the months of April to September, inclusive. Inasmuch as the statutes of the State of Nevada expressly prohibit agreements requir- ing union membership as a condition of employment, these nonunion employees could not have been required to become or remain union members in order to retain their jobs. It is obvious that as soon as the Union secured its collective-bargaining agreement in April 1975 it embarked on a campaign to solicit the membership of nonunion employees by the distribution of membership applications, copies of the contract, and other union literature. When 473 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD this failed to produce the desired results, the Union attempted to compel nonunion employees to pay union dues or its equivalent as a condition of employment with the Company, despite the fact that they had never joined the Union, and that the "right-to-work" statute precluded union-security requirements. Although Kinney ackowledged that he probably spoke to Pepe, Brown, and Wheeler, among other unit employees, both union and nonunion,8 during the period in question, he could not recall details of these conversations. He testified, however, that in soliciting the membership of nonunion employees, he followed a uniform policy of informing all who communicated with him that the Landrum-Griffin Act prohibited discrimination against employees, based on union membership; that the Union was required to file grievances for all unit employees; and that state law prohibited unions from requiring member- ship as a condition of employment. He admitted, however, that he told employees to whom he spoke that he knew of no law which prohibited a union from charging nonmem- bers a "bargaining fee," and mentioned that, in some instances, employees had refused to join a union out of religious conviction, and implied that, in those circum- stances, they paid a "bargaining fee." He denied, however, that he ever threatened nonunion employees that he would turn over claims against them for union dues to a collection agency or institute court proceedings for that purpose. To the extent that this was intended as a denial of the statements attributed to him by each of the three nonunion employees who testified, it is found insufficient to over- come the more positive, credible, and mutually corrobora- tive testimony of these employees. Their testimony that, even after they explained that they were not then, and never had been union members, and that they had no obligation to pay dues, Kinney told them that he would take steps to enforce payment, is consistent with his contention that nonunion employees were required to pay their pro rata share of the cost of union representation. Kinney left no doubt, both in his statements to nonunion employees as well as at the hearing, that he believed that the Union had a right to require nonunion employees to pay the equivalent of union dues for the privilege of being represented by the Union. In short, Kinney was attempting to impose on nonunion employees what amounted to an agency shop, which, like the union shop, is prohibited by state law.9 Moreover, Kinney conceded that he told union members who contacted him, following the September 30 letter, that although the executive board had authorized the waiver of delinquent dues, the Union would refer claims, presumably accruing in the future, to a collection agency or resort to other methods of enforcing payment. It is altogether probable that, in his zeal to recruit nonunion employees as members, Kinney did not differentiate between union and nonunion employees in warning them of the consequences of nonpayment of dues. This conclu- sion is warranted from the uncontradicted evidence that " According to Kinney, following the mailing of the letter of September 30, over a period of a week or 10 days, he received an average of 25 to 30 calls a day, beyond normal union business calls from unit employees. 9 Independent Guard Association, Local No. I v. Wackenhut Services, Inc., 522 2d 1010 (Nev. Sup. Ct. 1974), 86 LRRM 2818. o1 Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 751, affiliated with the Interna- Kinney sent letters to Pepe, Brown, and Wheeler, nonun- ion employees, demanding payment of union dues for the period from April to the end of September. If Kinney were uncertain as to the membership status of any unit employees, he could have readily verified the fact by reference to the union membership roster or other records. But, even if he had erroneously assumed that they were union members, this would have afforded no justification for demanding payment of union dues from them. Since they were not union members, and under state law could not be required to become or remain members in order to retain their jobs, it was unlawful for the Union to demand that they pay union dues or to threaten them with collection or court proceedings to compel them to do so. With regard to union members, who had voluntarily elected to join the Union, there was nothing unlawful in requiring them to pay their dues or in threatening them with legal action for failure to pay delinquent dues, as long as they elected to remain members of the Union. The proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) especially vouchsafes to a labor organization the right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership. The Union's constitution and bylaws contain no procedure for resignation or withdrawal, except under conditions of honorable withdrawal, where the member accepts a supervisory position, leaves the industry, or is disabled from working for an extended period of time. When asked how a union member could resign from the Union, Kinney testified, he merely referred the member to the article dealing with honorable withdrawal. According to Rey- nolds' credited testimony, he told her in no uncertain terms that there were no other circumstances under which she could resign from the Union. In the absence of any stated procedure under the Union's constitution and bylaws for voluntary resignation from membership, or any other rules respecting the acquisition or retention of membership, it has been held that a member may resign at will.10 The issue, however, is not whether the Union had the right to prevent Reynolds from resigning but whether it could with impunity threaten Reynolds with loss of employment if she failed to remain a member of the Union. Accordingly, when Kinney stated to Reynolds that she could not resign from the Union and still remain employed by the Company, he was, in effect, asserting that member- ship in the Union was required as a condition of her continued employment, contrary to the express prohibition of the state statute, which proscribes any form of union security. It is immaterial that Reynolds may have been aware that she could not legally be required to remain a member of the Union in order to retain her job. For, the tional Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (The Boeing Company), 173 NLRB 450, 452 (1968); Local Union No. 621, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO (Atlantic Research Corporation d/b/a R & G Sloane Manufacturing Division of Atlantic Research Corporation), 167 NLRB 610(1967). 474 ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL NO. 396 coercive effect of the threat to job security is not dependent on the Union's ability to carry out the threat.I It is, therefore, found, on the basis of the foregoing and upon the entire record, that on or about October 3, 1975, Respondent through Union Representative Kinney, threat- ened to take action against Pepe, Brown, and Wheeler, nonunion bargaining unit employees, to enforce payment of union dues, despite the fact that they had never been union members and that under the "right-to-work" laws of the State of Nevada, could not be required to become or remain members of the Union as a condition of employ- ment. It is further found that Respondent, through Kinney, stated to these employees that the Union could lawfully require them to pay "bargaining dues" for the privilege of receiving union representation, in effect, seeking to impose agency shop conditions as a requirement for employment, contrary to the "right-to-work" laws of the State. It is also found that, in January 1976, Respondent, through Kinney, stated to Reynolds that she could not resign and would not be permitted to resign from the Union if she wished to remain in the Company's employ, thereby, in effect, attempting to impose illegal union- security conditions on her right to continued employment, in violation of the laws of the State of Nevada, and the provisions of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. It is therefore found that by the foregoing conduct, Respondent has restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)( I )(A) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent Union set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the Employer's operations described in section 1, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent Union has engaged in the unfair labor practices set forth above, it will be recom- II International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Chauffeurs. Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local No. 729 (Penntruck Company, Inc.), 167 NLRB 147 mended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Central Telephone Company, a Delaware corpora- tion, with an office and principal place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada, is, and at all times material herein has been, an employer engaged in commerce and in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and the jurisdictional standards of the Act. 2. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local No. 396, is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By threatening on or about October 3, 1975, to take action against employees Pepe, Brown, and Wheeler, to enforce payment of union dues despite the fact that they had never been union members, and under the "right-to- work" laws of the State of Nevada, could not have been required to become or remain members of the Union as a condition of employment; by stating to these employees that the Union could lawfully require them to pay "bargaining dues" in order to secure union representation, thereby in effect seeking to impose agency shop conditions as a requirement for employment, contrary to the "right-to- work" laws of the State; and, by stating to Reynolds in January 1976 that she could not resign and would not be permitted to resign from the Union if she wished to remain in the Company's employ, thereby in effect attempting to impose union-security conditions on her right to continued employment, in violation of state law and the Act, Respondent has restrained and coerced, and is restraining and coercing, employees in the exercise of rights guranteed in Section 7, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(bX IXA) of the Act. 4. The unfair labor practices in which Respondent Union has engaged are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] (1967); Local 511, St. Louis Offset Printing Union, AFL-CIO (Mendle Press, Inc.), 130 NLRB 324, fn. 1 (1961). 475