Oakland Press Co.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Oakland Press Co., a Subsidiary of Capital Cities Communications, Inc. and Local 372, International Brotherhood Of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers Of America. Case 7-CA- 13059 May 6, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS PENELLO AND WALTHER On January 5, 1977, Administrative Law Judge James L. Rose issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefsI and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge 2 and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, The Oakland Press Co., a subsidiary of Capital Cities Communica- tions, Inc., Detroit, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in said recommended Order. Respondent's request for oral argument is denied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and positions of the parties. 2 The Administrative Law Judge properly found, inter alia, that the Union's March 15, 1976, letters of notification to Respondent terminated their collective-bargaining agreements for the two employee units herein as of May 31, 1976. However, Respondent, in a subsequent motion to reopen the record, opposed by the Charging Party, contends that a March 11. 1977. letter from the Union to a new employee. which refers to the union-security provision in "the existing contract," constitutes a clear admission by the Union that it did not terminate the collective-bargaining agreements. As the evidence adduced at the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge is sufficient to determine the contract termination issue, we find it unnecessary to consider the proffered evidence and we therefore deny Respondent's motion. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES L. ROSE, Administrative Law Judge: This matter was heard before me on October 18 and 19, 1976, at Detroit, Michigan, upon the General Counsel's complaint which alleged that the Respondent, The Oakland Press Co., a Subsidiary of Capital Cities Communications, Inc.,1 had violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151, el seq., by refusing to bargain with the Union for new contracts. Involved in this case are two bargaining units of the Respondent's employees, both of which are represented by the Union. Collective-bargaining agreements covering both units were effective from May 31, 1973, to June 1, 1976. In each there was a termination clause the effect which was that in the event neither party give notice to "terminate or cancel" the respective contract 60 days prior to the May 31 expiration date, the contract would remain in full force in effect for an additional year. On March 15, 1976, the union business agent sent identical letters to the Company by which it sought to "re- open" each contract and to negotiate certain changes. The Company takes the position that these letters did not comply with the termination clause of the contracts and accordingly, each contract was automatically renewed as of June 1, 1976. Thus the Respondent states that it will bargain with the Union concerning any matters not covered by either contract, but it is not obligated to bargain concerning modification of any term. The General Counsel alleges that by refusing to bargain with the Union concerning mandatory subjects, specifically including proposed amendments to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment, the Company has thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. An additional issue in this matter concerns the unit of district managers, all of whom the Respondent claims are supervisors, inasmuch as they are in charge of the paper carriers. The General Counsel contends that the paper carriers are independent contractors. Thus the district managers do not supervise employees of the employer and are therefore not supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(1 1) of the Act. All parties were represented by counsel and were given the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Upon the record as a whole, including my observation of the witnesses, briefs, and arguments of counsel, I hereby make the following: I The name of the Respondent appears as amended pursuant to the Respondent's posthearing motion, which is hereby granted. 229 NLRB No. 77 476 THE OAKLAND PRESS CO. FINDINGS OF FACT I. BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent is a Michigan corporation, engaged in the business of publishing and printing a newspaper of general circulation. During the calendar year 1975, a representative period, the Respondent had gross revenues in excess of $1 million, advertised various nationally sold products revenues from which exceeded $500,000, and purchased goods, products, and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Michigan. The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local 372, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, it is admitted by the Respondent to be, and I find, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE BARGAINING UNITS Although the Respondent did not admit the appropriate- ness of the unit description for the circulation department truckdrivers and city truckdrivers, there is no evidence in the record that this is not an appropriate bargaining unit. Since at least 1972, the Respondent has in fact recog- nized the Union as the bargaining representative for such a unit. The Respondent and the Union have negotiated collective-bargaining agreements covering the unit of circulation department truckdrivers and so far as can be determined from the record, the Respondent continues to recognize the Union as the representative of these employ- ees. Accordingly, I conclude that the following is a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All Circulation Department Truckdrivers and City Dealer Drivers of the Respondent, excluding all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. As indicated above, the Respondent denies the appropri- ateness of the unit of district managers on grounds that these individuals are supervisors within the meaning of the Act. Thus the Respondent argues that it may voluntarily bargain with the representative of such employees, but it need not do so and failure to do so is not violative of the Act. The question of whether the district managers constitute an appropriate bargaining unit depends on the status of some 1,250 individuals who deliver newspapers for the Respondent. The Respondent contends that these 1,250 individuals are employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) and since the district managers have the authority to hire them, fire them, direct them, and the like they are necessarily supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(1 1) of the Act. The General Counsel, on the other hand, contends that the paper carriers are independent contractors and therefore the district managers are not supervisors of employees. Without necessarily concluding that the carriers are independent contractors, I do agree that they are not employees. And whatever supervisory authority the district managers may exercise, it is not supervision of employees. Therefore they are not supervisors within the meaning of the Act. Newsday, Inc., 171 NLRB 1456 (1968). As to the status of the paper carriers, the evidence and argument is directed principally to the question of whether or not they are independent contractors. Of course if they are, then they are not employees. But that is not the real issue. The real issue is whether these individuals are employees. I conclude they are not, without deciding whether they are actually independent contractors. The Respondent sought to show that it maintains control over the manner and means by which the carriers deliver the papers, and the Respondent presented evidence of a number of indicators found by the Board to establish such "right of control." On the other hand, the General Counsel sought to establish that the Respondent controls only the result-delivery of the newpapers to specified customers by a certain time each day. And the General Counsel presented evidence of some indicators found by the Board to demonstrate lack of control over the manner and means. In brief, the material facts show that most of the 1,250 paper carriers are children of approximately 12 years of age who have rather small routes and who deliver the newspaper on their skateboards, bicycles, by walking, or on horseback. (There are about 35 motor routes handled by adults.) They typically have about 50 subscribers on their routes and typically make about $2 a day from this work- 4 cents per paper. (The motor carriers have 175-200 subscribers and are paid 6 cents per paper, 2 cents of which is to cover automobile expenses. Thus the adults make $7 to $8 per day, plus expenses.) They do not own their routes and indeed if they fail to deliver the papers or appropriate- ly collect for them, they are summarily terminated. The evidence also shows that typically these young people maintain their routes for a period of 6 months to a year. (The adults tend to keep their routes somewhat longer.) It is difficult to conceive that subteenage children who carry newspapers for a period of 6 months to a year for which they are paid in the range of $2 a day are entrepreneurs in the traditional sense of an independent contractor. This, however, does not necessarily mean that they should be considered employees. Their employment, if any, is very minimal, amounting to only a few hours a week and lasts, as indicated, typically less than a year. The question here is not so much whether a 12-year-old who delivers newspapers I hour a day on a skateboard is an entrepreneur, but whether, as a matter of policy, they (or the adults) should be treated as employees. Though the factors cited by the parties do have some bearing on whether one is found to be an independent contractor or not, there are additional, and important, considerations here. Specifically, the Respondent has always treated the carriers as nonemployees, and still does. The Respondent does not consider them employees for purposes of income 477 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tax withholdings, the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, unemployment compensation, or workmen's compensa- tion. Unlike other employees, the carriers sign a "lease" agreement and post a $10 bond. The Respondent has clothed them with indicia of independent contractors, and in 1970 agreed that they were nonemployees when the district managers unit was organized. From the record as a whole, it is clear that the Respondent's contention that these carriers are employees is taken for purposes of this case only. Newsday, Inc., supra, was also a case involving whether district managers who supervised carriers were employees and, as here, this hinged on the status of the carriers. The carriers' duties, their ages, pay, method of delivery were essentially identical to the facts here. The employer, as here, had always considered carriers to be "independent contractors." The Board found that the carriers not to be employees and hence the district managers were not supervisors. The Board therefore found appropriate the petitioned-for unit of district managers. As to the foot carriers, Newsday is on all fours with the instant case. The motor carriers' situation here is not sufficiently different to change the result. I therefore conclude that the district managers are employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act and are not supervisors in that they do not exercise supervisory control over other employees of the employer. The following is a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All Circulation Department District Managers of the Respondent, excluding all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. IV. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE The 1973-76 contracts covering the two bargaining units in question have identical "termination" articles which read, in material part: This Agreement shall be in full force and effect from June 1, 1973, to and including May 31, 1976, and shall continue in full force and effect from year to the year thereafter, unless written notice of desire to cancel or to terminate the Agreement is served by either party upon the other at least sixty (60) days prior to the date of expiration. On March 15, 1976, Elton L. Schade, secretary-treasurer of the Union, wrote identical letters to the Respondent which stated, in material part: You are hereby notified that Newspaper Drivers and Handlers Local 372, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, desires to continue its current collective bargaining agreement with your firm, but 2 The contract requires bargaining to commence at least 45 days before the May 31 expiration date. Though mentioned in its brief, the Respondent apparently does not contend that violation of this language excused its also to negotiate certain changes or revisions in its provisions, including those set forth in memorandum agreements and other supplements thereto to take affect during the contract period commencing June 1, 1976. Local 372 offers to meet and confer with your representatives for the purpose of negotiating said changes or revisions at a mutually convenient date, time and place. The changes or revisions to be negotiated will be sent to you at a later date. The Respondent's new labor counsel, Robert Ballow, received this letter sometime on or after April I. He concluded that the Union had not followed the language of the termination clauses of the contracts and therefore did not, by sending this letter, appropriately terminate either contract. Ballow concluded that the two contracts would automatically be renewed for a period of I year. Negotiation sessions were set up and the parties in fact met on several occasions in April, May, and June.2 A fair summary of Ballow's testimony, and that of Schade, is that during these negotiation sessions Ballow undertook to construct a record. In effect he stated that, even though the contract was not appropriately terminated, he nevertheless wanted to give the Union an opportunity to do so but that Schade refused. Thus Ballow argues that the Union's letter was an attempt on the part of the Union to negotiate changes in the contract but at the same time not have the contract terminate, because were the contract to terminate, "con- tractual provisions" (as opposed to those which covered mandatory subjects of bargaining) would immediately come to an end, particulary including dues checkoff. Ballow's carefully constructed argument has a medieval tone. Since Schade did not use the appropriate magic words in the March 15 letter, it could not have terminated the contract. This, however, does not take into consider- ation the past history of bargaining between these parties or other extrinsic evidence which clearly slows the Union's position and which reasonably put the Respondent on notice concerning it. Having carefully considered Ballow's testimony, I am persuaded that, following receipt of the Union's March 15 letter, he undertook to posture the Respondent in such a way that by using a technicality, which Ballow admits, the Respondent would not be required to bargain with the Union over the subjects covered in the two contracts until 1977. I conclude that this was a deliberate attempt to avoid the Respondent's obligation to bargain with the Union on the full range of mandatory subjects. If the March 15 letter was inartfully drafted, at best the defect was technical. A mere technical deficiency in complying with the termination of clause of a contract is not a sufficient reason to excuse one's obligation to bargain in good faith. In a substantially similar situation, the union did not give the proper termination notice under the contract but it did file with the Federal Mediation Conciliation Service refusal to bargain. The first session of April 21 (less than 45 days from May 31 ) was arranged on April 6 to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. 478 THE OAKLAND PRESS CO. Standard Form F-7, a copy of which was sent to the employer within the appropriate time interval. In finding that such a notice was legally effective to reopen the contract for negotiations, the Board adopted Administra- tive Law Judge Fitzpatrick's reasoning which concluded that "So long as the essential message was conveyed, it is not reasonable for Respondent to hold them to the standards of a Philadelphia lawyer." Champaign County Contractors Association, 210 NLRB 467, 470(1974). Similarily, in South Texas Chapter, Associated General Contractors, 190 NLRB 383 (1971), the union had failed to use the word "termination" in its reopening letter. Nevertheless, in analyzing the letter against the contract clause, the Board concluded that the union had in fact terminated the contract and the employer was therefore required to bargain for a new one. The significance of this case does not involve the particular words of the Union's letter. Rather, the Board will interpret an ambiguous letter to find the union's true intent. I find that the essential message was in fact conveyed, even if not in the precise, technical terms of the contract. It is clear from the letter that the Union considered the contract would expire on May 31 and it wished to negotiate changes to take effect "during the contract period com- mencing June 1, 1976." A collective-bargaining agreement is a total document. Changes in one or more of its terms necessarily implies termination of the agreement and emergence of a new one. The Union's March 15 letter necessarily implied termination. In 1973, Schade sent the identical letter to the Respon- dent concerning negotiating new contracts. At that time there was no question concerning the effectiveness of the letter and indeed the parties did negotiate new contracts. Inasmuch as they were unable to reach these agreements until after the May 31, 1973, expiration date, extension agreements were entered into. The point here is that the past practice was to treat the Charging Parties' letter as a letter to reopen the contract for negotiation of all substantive terms and absent agreement prior to May 31 the contract would terminate as of that date. However, the Union would consider entering into extension agreements. Further evidence of Schade's actual intent are his letters of April II and 19 transmitting the Union's proposals. He stated in each letter: "Enclosed please find two (2) copies of the Union's proposal to amend the current District Managers contract, which expires on May 31, 1976." Schade would not have used the phrase "which expires on May 31, 1976," had he in fact taken the position that the contract would continue in full force in effect after that date. The Respondent contends that on every occasion from April 6 on, when asked if he intended by his March 15 letter to have terminated the contracts, Schade responded in the negative. Thus at the April 21 meeting, Ballow gave Schade a letter which said, in material part, "It is the understanding of The Oakland Press that any agreement- written, oral, or implied-or any condition of employment between the parties will terminate as of May 31, 1976." Since Schade did not agree to the conclusions of this letter, such means, according to the Respondent, that the Union did not intend that the contracts would terminate as of May 31. Such is a possible construction of Schade's response. Equally possible, and in my view more probable, Schade did not believe that all conditions of employment should or would terminate. At the April 21 meetings, and those which followed, Ballow may very well had been talking about terminating the collective-bargaining agreement but keeping such matters as wages in effect, at least until impasse. However, I believe Schade when he says that he thought Ballow was talking about terminating the collective-bargaining rela- tionship. Schade may be an experienced labor representa- tive but that does not necessarily mean that he is totally versed in the fine nuances of words of art in these matters. At best there was confusion and no real meeting of the minds concerning what the parties meant when they talked about what the Union intended by its March 15 letter. Ballow testified from extensive notes he took during the negotiating sessions. As indicated, the thrust of his testimony is that he asked the union spokesman (normally Schade but on occasion Edgar Scribener, the Union's president) whether the Union had intended to terminate the contract. Every time he was told no. While I have no doubt that Ballow's testimony is literally accurate, I am also convinced that it is incomplete and does not present the true picture. For instance, Ballow testified concerning the May 26 meeting in part: He [Scribener] said the union was going to operate on the same basis that it has operated in the past. The union felt it had a contract which expired on May the 31st, 1976. He understood the company's position, that they had a one year extension. And I said, "Now, Mr. Scribener, you've injected a new word into this. You are now using the word 'expire' for the first time that I have heard it." It may be that this was the first time a union representa- tive had actually spoken the word "expire" during their meetings. But this was not the first usage of the word in this matter. Schade's letters of April 11 and 19 transmitting his proposals referred to the contract "which expires on May 31, 1976." In any event, regardless of what occurred on and after April 21, the question is whether or not the letter of March 15 was sufficient to terminate the contract such that the Respondent would be required to negotiate with the Union for a successor agreement and bargain in good faith on all mandatory subjects. I find that the Union substantially complied with the termination clause of the contract. In addition to sending the letter of March 15, Schade filled out the Federal Mediation Conciliation Service Form F-7 which also went to the Respondent. Reading the letter in light of the parties' past practice, along with the FMCS Form F-7, there can be no doubt concerning what the Union had in mind-to reopen the collective-bargaining agreement for negotiation on all matters involving wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. In short, to terminate the 1973- 76 contracts and negotiate new ones at any time. 479 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Respondent cites several cases where the Board "strictly construed" the provisions of a contract which foreclosed automatic renewal. These cases are substantive- ly distinguishable in that they dealt with the time period within which notice must be sent. Even so, "the Board will consider mitigating circumstances, in determining the timeliness of a notice," such as the postal service not promptly delivering the letter. Mailing the letter was considered to be compliance with the termination clause. United Electronics Institute of Iowa, 222 NLRB 814 (1976). This situation is in any event more analogous to Champaign County Contractors Association, supra, and South Texas Chapter, Associated General Contractors, supra, where the Board looked through form to substance and found sufficient compliance with the termination clause to foreclose automatic renewal. But the Respondent contends that the Union had a reason for not actually terminating the contract during these negotiations-namely, to be able to have the production of the picket line clause should other unions strike. The Respondent also argues that, upon termination, the "noncontractual" checkoff provision would automati- cally end, and this the Union did not want. There is no evidence, however, that during their several meetings Ballow ever explained this Byzantine reasoning when he was attempting to "clarify" the Union's position. Further, there is no evidence that other unions would strike during the period following May 31 when the Union and the Respondent might still be negotiating. Finally, there was no picket line clause in the district managers' contract and therefore Ballow's reasoning would not be applicable to that situation in any event. Nor does it follow that the checkoff clauses would automatically terminate. In attempting to give credibility to its contention that it believed the Union had not terminated the contract, the Respondent attributes a strategy to the Union that I find it did not have. Each of these contracts has a no-strike probation. Thus the Respondent's reasoning also implies that the Union set out to negotiate changes knowing that the Respondent was not required to bargain concerning those subjects covered in the contracts and knowing that it was foreclosed from using economic pressure. Such is so unreasonable that the Respondent could not seriously have believed this to be the Union's bargaining posture. I am persuaded that the Respondent knew what the Union had in mind when it sent the March 15 letter-to renegotiate, as it had in the past, a new contract, which implies termination of the old. Had Ballow accepted this and undertaken to negotiate with the Union during April and May, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the contract would have been executed by May 31 or at least shortly thereafter. It is also reasonable to believe that the parties would have entered into an extension agreements as they had in the past. By raising this issue of whether the Union's notice effectively "terminated" the contract, the Respondent obstructed what had previously been an amiable collective-bargaining relationship. By doing so and by now refusing to renegotiate with the Union concerning all mandatory subjects of bargaining, the Respondent has violated its obligations under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. In view of the foregoing, I find it unnecessary to decide the additional issue of whether or not the Respondent waived the alleged inadequacy of the notice. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. The Oakland Press Company, a Subsidiary of Capital Cities Communications, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Local 372, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All circulation department truckdrivers, and city dealer drivers of the Respondent, excluding all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act is a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. All circulation department district managers of the Respondent, excluding all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act is a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 5. The above-named Union is, and at all times material hereto has been, the exclusive collective-bargaining repre- sentative of the employees in the units described in paragraphs 3 and 4 above. 6. On or about March 15, 1976, the Union sent appropriate notices to the Respondent pursuant to the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreements in existence between it and the Respondent covering employ- ees in the units above described to terminate or cancel the respective contract and to renegotiate a new contract. 7. The Respondent, by failing and refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the above-described units concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining since on or about April 21, 1976, has engaged in and is engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent engaged in an unfair labor practice, I will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. I will recommend that the Respondent be ordered, upon request from the Union, to bargain with the Union as the representative of the employees in the units herein found appropriate concerning all mandatory subjects of bargain- ing, and if an understanding is reached to embody the same into a written signed agreement. I further recommend that the Respondent post the notice set forth in the appendix attached to this Decision. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the entire record in this matter, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend- ed: 480 THE OAKLAND PRESS CO. ORDER 3 The Oakland Press Company, Detroit, Michigan, a Subsidiary of Capital Cities Communications, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: I. Cease and desist from: (a) Failing and refusing to bargain collectively upon request with Local 372, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America as the exclusive representative of its employees in the above-described appropriate units with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree- ment. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right is affected by the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action deemed neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above- named labor organization as exclusive representative of all employees in the above-described bargaining units with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment and if an understand- ing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its principal office copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith. :' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, he adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall he deemed waived for all purposes. 4 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all sides had the opportunity to present evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we have violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post this notice and to comply therewith. WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain collectively, upon request, with Local 372, International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the exclusive representative of our employees in the appropriate units described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ- ment, and other terms and conditions of employment. The bargaining units are: All Circulation Department Truckdrivers, and City Dealer Drivers, excluding all other employ- ees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. All Circulation Department District Manag- ers, excluding all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right is affected by the proviso to Section 8(aX3) of the Act. WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with Local 372, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the exclusive representative of our employees in the appropriate units described above with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understand- ing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. THE OAKLAND PRESS Co., A SUBSIDIARY OF CAPITAL CITIES COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 481