Beatrice Grocery Products, Inc.

302 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Beatrice Grocery Products, Inc. and Aluminum, Brick and Glass Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, Petitioner. Case 26-RC-6647 16 December 1987 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS BABSON, STEPHENS, AND CRACRAFT The National Labor Relations Board has consid- ered objections to an election held 8 March 1984 and the hearing officer's report recommending dis- position of them. The election was conducted pur- suant to a Stipulated Election Agreement. The tally of ballots shows 34 for and 31 against the Pe- titioner. The Board has reviewed the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and adopts the hearing of-_ ficer's findings and recommendations, and finds that a certification of representative should be issued. We adopt the hearing officer's recommendation that the Employer's Objection 2 be overruled. (See the pertinent portions of the hearing officer's report attached as an appendix.) Thus, we find that Union Representative Black's single statement in- volving an alleged racial appeal, made in the first of seven union meetings and more than 1 month before the election, does not warrant setting the election aside. In Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 66 (1962), the Board held that it would set aside elections when a party embarks on a campaign which seeks to over- stress and exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant, inflammatory appeals. 138 NLRB at 72. Sewell itself involved a party's sustained course of con- duct, deliberate and calculated in intensity, to appeal to racial prejudice. The Board in Sewell dis- tinguished such conduct from isolated, casual, prej- udicial remarks. The Board has adhered to this dis- tinction. Compare Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consoli- dated, 232 NLRB 717 (1977), in which the Board overruled an objection involving a supervisor's statements to a number of employees that a poten- tial union steward did not like blacks, finding that such conduct did not rise to the level of a sustained appeal to racial prejudice of the type condemned in Sewell, with YKK (U.S.A.) Inc., 269 NLRB 82 (1984), in which the Board sustained an objection based on a union's campaign involving, inter alia, racially inflammatory remarks made at two of its preelection meetings, the union's dissemination of racially oriented and inflammatory remarks in sev- eral of its handbills, the wearing of shirts bearing racially oriented slogans by two employees who were also officials of the union, and racially orient- ed graffiti. Accord: State Bank of India Y. NLRB, 808 F.2d 526, 541-542 (7th Cir. 1986) (declining to set aside election on basis of union assertion that the employer was maintaining poor working condi- tions "because most of you are of Indian national- ity and other minority groups"). Our dissenting colleague emphasizes the refer- ence in Sewell to a party's burden to show that its racial messages are truthful and germane. He fur- ther argues that because we must assume, based on the hearing officer's findings, that Union Repre- sentative Black told employees at one meeting that Hampton, the Employer's general manager, had used a racially derogatory epithet in referring to them and because it is not established that this was a truthful report of Hampton's actual words,' we must therefore set aside this election on the basis of Sewell. We believe this is an overly broad reading of Sewell. It is instructive in this regard to compare the cir- cumstances in Sewell with those presented here. In Sewell the employer had disseminated to employees a number of articles, pictures, and other communi- cations calculated to incite opposition to the union on the ground that it and other labor organizations supported black civil rights organizations and countenanced socializing between members of the black and white races. The Board found it "obvi- ous from the kind and extent of propaganda materi- al distributed that the Employer calculatedly em- barked on a campaign so to inflame racial prejudice of its employees that they would reject the Peti- tioner out of hand on racial grounds alone." 138 NLRB at 72. The Board also noted that the articles and photographs "were not germane to any legiti- mate issue involved in the election" and thus rein- forced the conclusion regarding the employer's aim of exacerbating race prejudice. In the present case, by contrast, it is clear that race was not a significant aspect of the campaign.2 Further, the offensive word involved here, if it was in fact uttered, was part of a comment on the Em- ployer's treatment of its employees that was made in response to employee complaints about that treatment. Thus, several employees had told Union Representative Black that Hampton had talked to ' The hearing officer made no credibility resolutions concerning the different versions of the statement made by Union Representative Black. It is apparent, however, that Black's statement , which attributed certain remarks to the Employer, contained racial overtones . The hearing officer did not make a finding concerning the truth of the report, so we must assume for purposes of this case that no representative of the Employer used a racial epithet. 2 See the attached portions of the hearing officer's report generally and particularly at fn. 5. 287 NLRB No. 31 BEATRICE GROCERY PRODUCTS 303 them about the signing of union cards and peti- tions. Commenting on the alleged inability of some of them to read or write, Hampton had expressed doubt that such expressions of union support could represent the employees' own opinions. The em- ployees said they resented this as a denigrating sug- gestion that they were dumb. It was against this background that, as the hearing officer assumed ar- guendo, Black told the employees at one meeting that either Hampton or some other representative of the Employer had called the employees "dumb niggers."3 The remark that we must, for purposes of decid- ing this case, assume was made, clearly contains an offensive racial epithet; and it may well be an untrue report of what any representative of the Employer actually said . But it is not far off the mark as a characterization of the demeaning way the employees believed they were being treated by the Employer with respect to their signing of union cards and petitions. It was, therefore, arguably ger- mane to the election. Because the statement repre- sented an effort to denounce racial prejudice in an- other (the Employer), rather than to incite preju- dice against a particular racial or religious group, it is more like the statement at issue in State Bank of India v. NLRB, supra, 808 F.2d at 541-542 (accus- ing employer of "trying to keep depressed condi- tions and low wages for its employees, because most of you are of Indian nationality and other mi- nority groups") than the bigoted attacks on individ- uals that concerned the courts in M & M Supermar- kets v. NLRB, 818 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1987), and NLRB v. Silverman's Men's Wear, 656 F.2d 53, 58- 60 (3d Cir. 1981).4 As such, it does not constitute the kind of gratuitous appeal to racial prejudice that Sewell brands as objectionable conduct. a Black also testified that the employees' complaints called to his mind a recent antiunion campaign at the plant of a different employer who re- tained the same law firm as did the Employer here. In that other cam- paign, he testified, a member of an antiunion employee committee had re- ferred to the union representatives as "niggers." 4 It should also be noted that neither the Board nor the court in State Bank of India made any finding concerning whether in fact the employer was keeping wages and benefits low because of the employees' race or nationality The statement was treated as simply the opinion of the union, and it was regarded as insufficient as a basis for setting aside the election. See also Singer Co, 191 NLRB 179, 180 (1971) (declining to set aside election on basis of inaccurate employee rumors that employer 's attorney was anti-Spanish, when the rumors arose out of a misunderstanding con- cerning the attorney's precipitous ejection of a Spanish-language inter- preter from the polling area), and American Enka Co., 231 NLRB 1335, 1342-1343 (1977) (election not set aside on basis of racial epithets includ- ed in remarks of black union supporters , made in presence of union agent, expressing the supporters' opinions about significance of employer's pro- motions of minorities) The present case is distinguishable from NLRB v. Eurodrive, 724 F.2d 556 (6th Cir 1984), a rather unusual case in which a union agent made a racial appeal on two occasions within 8 days of the election and the re- marks tended to encourage employee resentment of the single black em- ployee in the unit. We wish to make clear, however, the limits of our holding. We do not condone the use of racial or ethnic epithets such as that at issue here. Had a union representative used such a term in comments attacking a particular racial , ethnic, or religious group, or made racial, ethnic, or religious refer- ences as part of an inflammatory campaign theme, or had the representative brought up references to racial, ethnic, or religious groups in a totally gratu- itous way, unconnected to any employee concerns, we would not hesitate to set aside the election. Under the circumstances here, however, we cannot conclude that this single incident "so lowered" proper election standards "that the uninhibited de- sires of the employees could not be determined in the election." Sewell Mfg. Co., supra, 138 NLRB at 72. In view of the foregoing, we agree with the hearing officer's recommendation that Objection 2 be overruled. We further adopt her recommenda- tion that the Union be certified.5 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE IT IS CERTIFIED that a majority of valid ballots have been cast for Aluminum, Brick and Glass Workers International Union , AFL-CIO, CLC and that it is the exclusive collective -bargaining repre- sentative of the employees in the following unit: All full-time and regular part-time production and maintenance employees employed by the Employer at its Jackson, Tennessee facility, excluding office clerical employees , guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. CHAIRMAN DOTSON, dissenting. Contrary to my colleagues, I would find a reso- lution of credibility most favorable to the Employ- er's objections requires finding that the Union false- ly attributed insulting racial remarks to the Em- ployer to stress and exacerbate racial feelings, and that such conduct requires that the election be set aside. However, because the hearing officer failed to determine whether the Union in fact attributed the inflammatory racial remarks to the Employer or the Employer's counsel, I would remand the case for resolution of this critical fact. 5 We adopt the hearing officer's recommendation that the Employer's Objections 3 and 5, which allege, inter alia, that the Union, through its agents and employees, engaged in improper electioneering in and around the polling area, be overruled. In so doing, we agree, based on the par- ticular facts here, with the hearing officer 's conclusion that the employee involved was not an agent of the Union . We therefore find it unnecessary to pass on the hearing officer's reliance on Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 256 NLRB 1135 (1981), and the other cases cited by the hearing officer in support of her conclusion. 304 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The testimony, when viewed in a light most fa- ble.3 The burden is on the party making use of a vorable to the Employer, establishes that at a union racial message to establish that it was truthful and meeting attended by 30 to 40 employees, a majority germane, and when there is doubt whether the of whom were black, Union Representative Black total conduct of a party is within the described attributed an insulting racial remark to the Em- bounds, the doubt will be resolved against him.4 ployer's general manager, Hampton. Black told the My colleagues, glossing over the fact that employees that Hampton , the highest executive at Black's remark was false, find that it was germane the plant where they, worked, said, "that we did- and isolated, and therefore not grounds for setting not need a union in our plant, because the dumb aside the election . I disagree. niggers did not know how to read or write . . . At the outset, I emphasize that for a racial mes- [and], didn't have enough sense to vote , much less sage to be permissible under Sewell, it must be both read or write," or words to that effect . Black at truthful and germane . Here, Hampton did not make this time knew that after the union petition was the racial remarks attributed to him . Thus, Black's filed,- Hampton, in- a -speech - to_the_predominantly statement cannot be justified as truthfully setting black work force , ' said, "Some of you can't read forth the Employer's position on race. or write, so if anyone has been signing your name Nor can it reasonably be found that Black's to these [union authorization ] cards without your racial message was germane to the election cam- permission, its a felony and a penitentiary fine ." paign . The only cord of commonality between Black also knew, based on employee reports, that Black's attribution and Hampton 's actual statement the employees were already upset and disturbed to employees is the reference in both to employees because they thought Hampton was accusing them being unable to read or write. The point of Hamp- of being illiterate and dumb . ton's actual statement was that employees unable to It is undisputed that Hampton ' denied ever read or write might have been misled into signing making the racial slur attributed to him by Black, authorization cards. Black knew what Hampton and that the Union did not again raise the subject said, but apparently never explained to employees of race after the above comment by Black about 6 the importance of valid authorization cards. In- weeks before the election . It is also undisputed that stead, Black took Hampton's statement about the before the advent of the Union, some , employees employees' inability to read or write completely believed the Respondent made employment deci - out of context, a context relevant to the election campaign, and linked it to an intemperate and abu- sions based on race, and that the subject of the sive racial slur. These facts belie my colleague's Union generated heated discussions along racial finding that Black's statement "was made in re- lines even after the election had taken place . On sponse to employee complaints " about Hampton's these facts, I would find that the Union's attempt authorization card statement and represented an at- early in the election campaign to inject the issue of tempt to "denounce racial prejudice in another (the race by attributing false and racially inflammatory Employer), rather than to incite prejudice against a remarks to Hampton , could serve no purpose but particular racial or religious group . . . ." My col- to exacerbate racial feelings and, for the reasons set league's willingness to conclude that Black's state- forth below, find that such conduct reasonably ment, even if erroneously attributing the use of the tended to interfere with the employees' free and term "niggers" to Hampton , was relevant and ger- uncoerced choice of representative . mane, ignores the insulting and racially inflamma- The Board in Sewell Mfg. Co.,2 found that "so tory nature of Black's statement. Indeed, it is diffi- long . . . as a party limits itself to truthfully setting cult to imagine any circumstance when a union's forth another party 's position on matters of racial racial message falsely accusing a high-ranking man- interest and does not deliberately seek to overstress agement official of calling the employer 's predomi- and exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant , inflam- nantly black work force "dumb niggers," could be matory appeals, we shall not set aside an election found related to an election issue . A reading of M on this ground." Racial statements which are made & M Supermarkets v. NLRB,5 makes this point in a generally temperate fashion , are true, and in- clear. There an employee , during a preelection volve economic issues which form the core content company meeting, referred to the company's of . representation contests, such as those which owners as "damn Jews . . . who pay us pennies evoke black racial pride, have been found permissi- . . . and take all their money to the bank ." Supra I The parties stipulated that approximately 70 percent of the 66 em- ' See generally NLRB v Bancroft Mfg Co, 516 F 2d 436, 441 (5th Or ployees in the bargaining unit are black The tally of ballots showed 34 1975) votes for the Petitioner and 31 against 4 Sewell Mfg Co, supra at 72 2 138 NLRB 66, 71-72 (1963) 5 818 F 2d 1567 (11th Or 1987) BEATRICE GROCERY PRODUCTS 305 at 1569. The court, applying Sewell, found that the employee's remarks were so "inflammatory and de- rogatory that they inflamed racial and religious tensions against the Jewish owners . . . and de- stroyed the laboratory conditions necessary for a free and open election." Supra at 1573. The major- ity's minimization of Black's interjection of a false and racially inflammatory epithet into the cam- paign in a way which is not even tangentially relat- ed to a legitimate campaign issue,6 contravenes the basic tenets of Sewell, reaffirmed in M & M Super- markets.7 To find Black's remark isolated is to ignore the totality of the facts in this case . Black did not talk separately to a handful of unit employees. Rather, he spoke to 30 to 40 employees assembled for a union meeting, and said that Hampton, the highest representative of the Employer at their plant, had made demeaning and insulting racial remarks. The majority of these employees, representing almost half of the entire work force, were black. By de- picting the Employer as a racial bigot through statements falsely attributed to Hampton, Black en- gaged in conduct capable of persuading employees, otherwise not inclined to support the Union, that a union was needed to protect them from the racial prejudices they already suspected the Employer of harboring.8 The remark Black attributed to Hampton was such that the employees were not likely soon to forget it. "Isolated" may mean "singular" but not necessarily "without effect." The history of the term "nigger" has rendered the use of it so oppro- brious that it triggers instanter a whole complex of memories and resentments . We may as well ignore the devastating effects of a discharged firearm by describing the pull of the trigger as "isolated" as pass silently by the effects the use of this single word is capable of causing. These considerations are particularly germane given that the employees were already upset by Hampton 's statements about authorization cards which they had interpreted as accusations that they were illiterate and dumb. a See NLRB Y. Eurodrive, 724 F 2d 556 (6th Cir 1984). The court found the Board should have set aside an election based on union orga- nizer Loy's remarks at a preelection meeting stressing the union's ability to provide white employees with needed "protection," using as an exam- ple, the recent discharge of a white employee for racial harassment toward the sole black unit employee. The court found the statements, while tangentially related to legitimate issues , nonetheless placed undue emphasis on racial issues which Loy must have known would exacerbate preexisting racial tension. r See also Schneider Mills P. NLRB, 390 F 2d 375 (4th Cir. 1968). The court found the Board erred in not setting aside an election where, in campaign literature, the union compared the company's president to Hitler after falsely accusing him of saying he wished he could tie two women supporters of the union "to their machines and set them on fire and watch them burn to death." 8 Id. at 379. Black, aware of this heightened employee sensitivi- ty concerning Hampton , nonetheless falsely ac- cused him of intemperate racial remarks . The only reasonable explanation for Black's conduct is a desire to seize on the factor of race and exacerbate it. Such conduct is not permissible under Sewell, supra. Further, Black's racial appeal was so criti- cally. timed that repeated comments of this nature were unnecessary to ensure that subject's being as- sociated with the employees' decision concerning unionization . For, as the evidence shows, even after the election, the subject of the union generat- ed heated discussions along racial lines. On these facts, particularly given the closeness of the election results, I find there is doubt that the Union's total conduct was within permissible bounds. As required by Sewell, I would resolve that doubt against the Union. Accordingly, should the hearing officer find on remand that Black in fact attributed the racially inflammatory remarks dis- cussed above to Hampton, I would set aside the election. APPENDIX OBJECTION 2 2. The Petitioner, through its agents, representatives, and employees, appealed to the racial prejudice of the employees and sought to stress and exacerbate racial feelings throughout the election campaign through a de- liberate appeal to racial prejudice thereby interfering with the rights of the employees and the results of the election. DISCUSSION.- In support of Objection 2, the Employer presented tes- timony concerning statements made by Union Represent- ative Revel Black and employee Howard Stevenson re- lating to race. The Employer presented testimonial evidence concern- ing a union meeting held on or about January 27, 1984, at a community center in Jackson, Tennessee. Six em- ployer witnesses and three union witnesses testified with varying accords concerning an alleged statement made in the January 27, 1984, meeting by white union representa- tive Revel Black . This meeting, occurring at the begin- ning of the organizational campaign and more than a month before the March 8, 1984, election was attended by 30 to 40 employees, the majority of whom were Black. The parties stipulated at hearing that approximate- ly 70 percent of the 66 employees in the bargaining unit are Black. The Employer presented Raw Materials Supervisor Darrell Isbell who testified concerning a conversation which he had with employees Joe Morton and Dan Martin on the day following the January 27, 1984, union meeting. Isbell gave a hearsay account of what Morton had told him, relating: 306 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD A Joe said that he was very upset about what the union man accused Mr. Hampton of saying.2 I asked Joe what happened, and Joe told me that the day before-the night before, they had a union meeting, and a white union man got up before the group and was talking to them, and Joe went on to say that the white union man told the group that Mr. Hampton had called Nashville, and told our lawyer to call back down here and talk to the union man, and to tell the union man that we did not need a union in our plant, because the dumb niggers did not know how to read or write. He went on to say that the dumb niggers didn't have enough sense to vote, much less read or write. So, Joe went on to say that the white union man kept emphasizing the word, "nigger, nigger, nigger," and said that everybody was getting mad. Joe did not say what else the white union man said when he was using the word "nigger." He just stated that one fact. Q. Did Mr. Morton indicate to you that he was upset about that? A. Yes. Joe told me he was very, very, upset over it, and a lot of other people in the plant were upset over it. Isbell testified that Morton had asked him to go in to Mr. Hampton and to ask him if he had made such a statement. The Employer present- ed as its witnesses both Morton and Martin who confirmed that Isbell, after talking with Hampton had given them assurances that Hampton had not made such a statement, and Morton testified that Hampton had come to him personally and had sworn to him that he had never called employees "niggers." Both Morton's and Martin's recollection of the conver- sation with Isbell varied from that of Isbell's. Morton ex- plained that he and Martin were talking with supervisors Isbell and Trammel on the day after the union meeting. Martin had recounted what had been said in the union meeting to Isbell after Isbell had asked Morton if he had attended the union meeting.3 Martin testified that he and Morton were saying different things about what had been said in the meeting and had then asked Isbell to go to Hampton to ask him what was said. Morton testified that he and Isbell had been "carrying on with each other," explaining that Isbell had called him (Morton) a nigger, and Morton had called Isbell a redneck. Morton testified that he recalled from the union meeting the statement "How can these niggers down there vote when they can't even read and write." He did not recall that Black had credited Hampton with this statement and 2 Mr Hampton was identified for the record as the General Manager and highest executive of the Employer's facility in Jackson, Tennessee 9 Isbell denied asking Morton about the union meeting He contended that he was just walking through the plant and Morton had stopped him and had initiated the conversation While Isbell initially testified on cross- examination that he had never had any prior conversations with Morton about the union campaign, he later admitted that Morton had talked with him previously about supporting the union and his attending union meet- ings in fact testified that Black had not said who had made the statement. Morton further denied that he had told Isbell that Black had credited Hampton with the state- ment Morton said that he had figured that it was the company lawyer who had made the statement. Morton testified that Black had used the work "nigger" once and that no one had gotten upset at the union meeting about what Revel Black had said. Morton described his own reaction to the statement in the meet- ing as being normal. He stated that he had attended all the union meetings but one and that neither Black nor anyone else had ever brought up racial issues in any other meetings. Morton confirmed that he had not been influenced by racial overtones and that in fact there had never been a lot of discussion about racial issues among the employees. Martin's account varied in that he recalled that Black had stated that Hampton had said "that they wondered how we got sense enough to organize a meeting when half the niggers down there couldn't read or write." Martin stated that he had been offended by the state- ment, but he had not heard any employees talk about the statement after the meeting. He said that after Isbell had assured him that Hampton had not made such a state- ment that he had not paid much attention. Martin con- firmed that racial issues were not a big factor with him and that he had been primarily interested in better work- ing conditions and how people were treated. When Employer witness Claudell Reeves was ques- tioned about the statement by Black in the January 27, 1984, union meeting, he initially said that Black had said that Hampton said that the employees couldn't read or write. Upon further questioning by the Employer's attor- ney, Reeves amplified his recall by saying that Black had said that "the niggers at Martha White most of them can't read or write." On cross examination, however, Reeves admitted that when Black had referred to the word "nigger" he only said that in relation to the law- yers and that Black had not said that Hampton had made this statement. In describing the statement of Black, Reeves contended that while this statement had not made him mad, it did make others in attendance mad. He said that he could tell by looking at them, but admitted that none of the employees said anything that night about the statement. He further admitted that he had heard nothing the next day about the statement and in fact for the next six weeks before the election, he never heard any employees talk about this union meeting. Reeves confirmed that Hampton had told employees that he had not made such a statement. The Employer also presented Marvin Joe Louis Eck- ford, Jr. to testify concerning the statement alleged to have been made by Black at the union meeting Eckford, however, was not present when the statement was al- leged to have been made. Eckford testified on direct that he heard employees discussing this meeting after the meeting although he did not discuss it with other em- ployees. On cross-examination, however, Eckford clari- fied that after the employees left that union meeting, he heard no further discussion of the statement. Eckford BEATRICE GROCERY PRODUCTS 307 confirmed that Hampton had told him that he had not made such a statement and Eckford had believed him. Employee Murrell Allen Lawhorn testified in behalf of the Employer, stating that he recalled that another em- ployee had told him that Black had said in the union meeting that Hampton or the lawyers had said that "the damn niggers down there couldn't even read and • how were they going to get a union in." Lawhorn had gotten to the meeting late and had not heard Black make this statement nor had he heard Black make any other state- ment using the word "nigger " Lawhorn testified that employees had talked about this statement in the meeting but, he could not recall any names of employees other than the employee who recounted the statement to him initially. He could not recall where these statements had been made nor when they had been made Lawhorn did confirm that he had already made up his mind about the election before this meeting and he further confirmed that he did not think that this statement changed anyone else's mind about the election. Union witness Howard Stevenson, who was called to testify concerning other objections was questioned by the Hearing Officer as to his recollection of Black's state- ment in the January 27, 1984, speech. Stevenson recalled that Black said something about the attorneys and the statement "dumb niggers down there are trying to start a union, and most of them can't read and write." Steven- son could recall nothing further that was said in relation to this statement. Union Representative Revel Black testified that prior to the union campaign at the Employer's facility, the union had been involved in a campaign in Franklin, Ten- nessee, at the Pelican, Inc , plant. During that earlier campaign, Pelican, Inc., had' been represented by the same law firm, Bass, Berry, and Sims. Black testified that there were certain similarities in the Pelican , Inc., cam- paign and the Employer's campaign , citing similarities in the establishment of an anti-union committee and similar- ity in the company's campaign literature Black testified that at the Pelican, Inc., plant one of the anti-union com- mittee persons had referred to the union representative as niggers. Black attributed the, law firm with control over the committee. It was this incident which had prompted his statement to employees in the January, 1984 union meeting which had occurred approximately two days after a company speech to employees by General Man- ager Hampton. Black testified that after the company's meeting with employees, the union had received calls from employees concerning what Hampton had said in his speech.4 Hampton had stated in his speech, which occurred after the union had filed the petition, that he had doubts about the employees signing the petition be- cause he knew that some employees in the plant couldn't read or write. Black said that employees were upset and disturbed about what Hampton was calling them, and his 4 Employee Josephine Hodges testified that she attended a meeting on or about January 13 , 1984, in which General Manager Hampton spoke with employees Hodges recalled that Hampton had said that "some of you can't read or write, so if anyone has been signing your name to these cards without your permission , its a felony and a penitentiary fine " Hodges testified that she had reported this statement to Union Represent- atives Hill and Black making accusations against them as being illiterate or dumb. Black explained that employees had told him that they felt that the company was calling them dumb be- cause they were illiterate and could not read or write. Black said that he had brought this up in the meeting and when he was asked to describe what was said in the meeting responded: Q. Okay. Can you describe what you said? 'A Yes. On the opening of my statement was that there was several questions that came to us from the employees by telephone, and individuals prior to the meeting, about what Mr. Hampton had said, and the statement that I made there was that the company did have the same law firm, that we had just left a campaign from, which was in Franklin, that the anti-union committee that was representing the company had called us niggers there, and the same law firm that was representing the company here, they was calling us dumb here. Black testified that no one had told him that Hampton had used the word "nigger" and he had no knowledge that Hampton had ever used the word "nigger " Black further testified that he had never said that Hampton had referred to anybody'as "nigger". Black explained that he had felt that employees at Beatrice should have had the information about the organizing committee at Pelican having called them niggers "because it shows the tactics that different union busting firms use and that if the anti- union committee there would call us niggers there, then the committee that was set up here, if it was by the com- pany, which we felt it was set up by the company and the attorneys, we could look for the same thing that could occur here." Black said that after he had told em- ployees that Hampton, had said there were employees in the plant who could not read or write, one of the em- ployees in the back said "Well, they are calling us dumb." Black responded to the employee, "Well, maybe they are calling us dumb here, because the anti-union committee is [sic] Franklin, Tennessee called us niggers there." Black testified that this issue was never raised again and it was not made a theme of the union campaign. He contended that race was not a significant issue and that the issues were seniority, benefits, treatment of employ- ees, and money.5 5 Lawhorn listed the issue of the election as bathroom privileges, re- quirement of doctor's statements, wages, working conditions, and treat- ment of employees The Union had talked about better benefits, wages, working conditions , and treatment There were no race problems and race had not been a big issue in the election campaign Eckford stated that he had already made up his mind about the election even before the meeting that night Eckford recalled that the Union had told employees to vote for the Union for better wages , better working conditions, better benefits, better insurance , and hospitalization He verified that race was not a big issue in the campaign and that he knew of no one who had changed their vote because of racial concerns Eckford attended all the union meetings except for two and never heard Hill, Black, or any of the union representatives say anything about employees being called "nigger " The only reason that Reeves recalled that the Union had given for supporting the Union was job security 308 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Employer also presented testimony of Supervisor Allen Billington concerning certain statements made by employee Howard Stevenson . The Employer's counsel explained that this testimonial evidence was presented to show the entire racial issue that was injected by the Union in addition to the statements made by Black in the union meeting. Billington testified that in mid-February, following a layoff, Stevenson had stated to him that the Company was trying to get rid of all the blacks , that the Company was out to get him, and that he (Stevenson) was next on the list. Billington testified that he had seen Stevenson in the hall outside the office on the day that he was terminated after Stevenson's having met with Su- pervisors Heavner and Smith. Stevenson had told Bill- ington that he was terminated and then had called the supervisors klux klan, rednecks, sons-of-bitch, and whites. The Employer also presented the testimony of Super- visor James Ractliff and employee Ronald Lee Watson to testify concerning an argument which occurred be- tween Stevenson and Watson immediately after the elec- tion. Watson, a white employee who had been against the Union, had made a comment in the breakroom while employees were gathered after the election . Watson testi- fied that he had said to employees that unions were for people who could not think for themselves . Watson re- called that Stevenson had responded by saying that "white boys think black boys can't think for themselves and that they need somebody else to do it for them." Both Watson and Supervisor Ratcliff testified that Ste- venson grabbed a folding chair and started toward Watson. Supervisor Ratcliff grabbed Stevenson and stopped the fight. Stevenson did not deny that he personally believed that there was racial prejudice at the Employer's facility, but contended that he had this belief even before the campaign had begun . He testified that he had told man- agement at the time of his discharge (which occurred after the election) that he thought that the Company was trying to get rid of all the educated blacks, although he denied that he had called management klu klux klan or rednecks. Stevenson also confirmed that he had asked Supervisor Billington in February, 1984 why the compa- ny had laid off a majority of the black employees when some black employees had more seniority than white em- ployees. Stevenson testified that these views were his own personal views and had nothing to do with the union campaign. He had never discussed with Union Representatives Hill or Black his feelings about the prej- udice at the plant. Stevenson did not deny the incident with employee Watson after the election. He said that he had taken Watson's comment personally and had responded in racial terms. He did not deny that he had also grabbed the chair while having the argument with Watson. RECOMMENDATION In support of its objection 2, the Employer has thus presented testimonial evidence concerning a statement made by one union representative in the first of seven union meetings for employees and which occurred more than a month before the election . While the Employer presented six witnesses concerning this statement, only three employee witnesses actually heard the statement. Of those three witnesses, only employee Martin recalled that Black had attributed the statement about "niggers" to General Manager Hampton . Employee Morton re- called that Black had not said who had made the state- ment, and employee Reeves recalled that Black had not said that Hampton had made this statement, but had re- ferred to the statement in relation to the attorneys. No witnesses were presented who recalled that Black or any other union representative made any other comments or statements about race in the January 27 , 1984 meeting or in any subsequent meeting. The Employer's witnesses confirmed that General Manager Hampton and Supervi- sor Isbell had assured employees that Hampton had not made racial comments about employees. With respect to comments made by employee Howard Stevenson, Stevenson admitted that he had made com- ments which reflected his beliefs that there was racial prejudice at the plant. He further testified, however, that he had this belief even before the union campaign. He testified that this was his own personal view , had noth- ing to do with the union campaign, and denied that he had ever discussed these feelings with the union repre- sentatives. The Board, in Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 66 (1962) held that, where a party embarks on a campaign which seeks to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings by irrel- evant inflamatory appeals to racial prejudice, the Board would set aside the election. In the instant case, there was no evidence that racial prejudice or even racial pride was a central focus or theme in the campaign. Em- ployee witnesses confirmed that the campaign issues were varied, including such things as working conditions and wages, but testified that race was not an important aspect of the campaign for themselves or for other em- ployees. There were no other comments other than the one alleged to have been made by Black on January 27, 1984, and those made by Stevenson in mid -February which dealt with race and which occurred before the election. 6 Assuming arguendo, that Black had attributed to Hampton a racial slur, and considering the remarks of employee Howard Stevenson, I do not find that the Union engaged in a deliberate campaign to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings.' Nor did such remarks impair the employee's freedom of choice in the March 8, 1984 election.8 Accordingly, I recommend that Employ- er's Objection number 2 be overruled. 6 YKK (U.S.A.) Inc., 269 NLRB 2 (1984). ' Sewell Mfg. Co, supra 8 Advertisers Mfg. Co., 256 NLRB 644 (1981), 677 F.2d 544, 546, 110 LRRM 2355 (7th Cir. 1982).