Armored Transport Of California, Inc.

574 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Armored Transport of California, Inc. and Currency and Securities Handlers Association. Case 31- CA-15654 April 22, 1988 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND BABSON On September 11, 1987, Administrative Law Judge Frederick C. Herzog issued the attached de- cision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief, and the General Counsel filed limited exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, fmdings, 1 and conclusions, as explained below, and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2 The Respondent has excepted to a number of the judge's conclusions. In order to discuss the specific exceptions, a review of the factual background is necessary. As set forth in the judge's decision, the Union represents employees in single facility units at several of the Respondent's numerous California facilities—Los Angeles, Ventura, Santa Maria, Sac- ramento, and Oakland. These proceedings involve only the Los Angeles and Ventura locations, where the Union prevailed in representation elections held in July 1984 and March 1985, respectively. The judge found that negotiations in the Los An- geles unit began in 1985 and culminated in the Re- spondent's implementation of a final offer, which included a reduction in employee wages. The re- ductions were announced in a letter dated October 11, 1985, 3 from the Respondent's president to all employees. The letter, set forth fully in the judge's decision, states in relevant part that the Respondent will experience decreased revenues in amounts ex- ceeding $2 million per year owing to the loss of a major customer. With respect to that customer, the letter states "we lost all our work in all offices" where certain classifications of wages exceeded specified amounts. In addition to informing em- ployees of further customer and revenue losses, and The judge's recitation in sec III,B of his decision of the text of the Respondent's February 28, 1986 letter to the Union is corrected at sen- tence four of item 4 to read, "Armored's negotiation posture has been and is now that it needs. 2 We have modified the judge's recommended Order to include a pro- vision that the Respondent furnish the Union with the financial informa- tion requested in the Union's letter of February 19, 1986, to the extent such information has not already been provided. 3 All dates are 1985 unless otherwise indicated. of price reductions given to unspecified customers "Mil order to avoid losing jobs and disrupting routes," the letter refers to internal thefts and dou- bled workmen's compensation and accident insur- ance costs. The letter then indicates that: "What this all adds up to is that Armored Transport can no longer pay its employees from two to seven dollars more per hour than the competitors who are taking our business and your jobs." Thus, the letter informs employees that effective November 1, overtime pay in all offices will be paid only after an increased number of hours are worked. Further, the letter announces that employees in the Re- spondent's Los Angeles, Orange County, and San Diego4 offices will experience a 10-percent pay cut effective November 1, while smaller cuts will be made in other offices based on profitability and production. A strike followed the Respondent's implementa- tion of the above changes. The judge found that the strike, which lasted from about November 25 until December 22, was in turn followed by a hiatus in negotiations. By letter dated February 19, 1986, the Union requested that the Respondent fur- nish it with certain information in order that it "may be able to bargain intelligently for collective bargaining agreements." Although certain items were provided, the Respondent refused to furnish copies of the following: correspondence with cus- tomers since November 1, 1982, regarding rate changes necessitated by employee wage rates; profit-and-loss statements for all facilities for the years 1983 through 1985; compensation records for officers, directors, shareholders, and management employees from 1983 through 1985; and informa- tion regarding investments made in all facilities for the years 1983 through 1985. By letter dated February 28, 1986, the Respond- ent explained its refusal to provide the above infor- mation on the grounds of relevancy and because it "is not now nor has it ever claimed an inability to pay." The Respondent added that its negotiating posture is that "it needs to bring its wage costs per truck in line with the competition in order to remain competitive." Despite the Respondent's failure to comply with the above portions of the Union's information re- quest, contract negotiations resumed in June 1986 and lasted until September 1986 when an agree- ment was reached for the Los Angeles facility.5 4 The employees in the Orange county and San Diego offices are not represented by the Union. The agreement was effective from October 31, 1986, to November 30, 1987. 288 NLRB No. 70 ARMORED TRANSPORT OF CALIFORNIA 575 Contract negotiations for the Ventura unit began after the Los Angeles negotiations were concluded Based on the above facts, the judge concluded that the Respondent went beyond the expression of a mere unwillingness to pay wage increases or to agree to other union bargaining demands. Instead, the judge found that by its words and conduct the Respondent, despite protestations to the contrary, conveyed to the Union an inability to pay within the meaning of Atlantic Hilton & Tower, 271 NLRB 1600 (1984), thereby triggering an obligation to provide the requested financial information under NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). y refusing to furnish the information, the judge con- chided that the Respondent violated its bargaining obligations under Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. In its exceptions, the Respondent disputes the judge's findings that negotiations began in 1985, were followed by the Respondent's implementation in late 1985 of a final offer which reduced wages and overtime pay, and continued with resumed ne- gotiations in 1986. The Respondent argues that ne- gotiations did not begin until the spring of 1986 and that the Los Angeles collective-bargaining agreement was entered into following those negoti- ations. Further, the Respondent argues that the Union's February 19, 1986 information request re- sulted from the Union's "anticipation" that the Re- spondent might claim an inability to pay in upcom- ing negotiations. The Respondent contends that no such claim was ever asserted.6 The Respondent's exceptions are based in large part on a contention that there were no pending negotiations at the time of the Union's information request. Contrary to the Respondent's assertions, we fmd that the parties were in the midst of pro- tracted negotiations when the Union sent its Febru- ary 19, 1986 letter to the Respondent. Richard R. Irvin, corporate counsel and chief executive officer of the holding company that owns the Respond- ent's stock, testified that he was involved in negoti- ations with the Union in 1985 and that a different group of officers controlled the Union until about October of that year. Irvin further testified that the 1985 negotiations came to a deadlock, following which the Respondent implemented some wage cuts and changes in working amditions. 7 In addi- 6 In addition, the Respondent contends in its exceptions that the record is devoid of any evidence that the executed contract included a provision for a wage reduction. While it is true that the record does not reflect the terms of the Los Angeles contract, whether the document included wage reductions does not affect our decision here that the Respondent violated the Act by failing to comply with the Union's information request 7 Unfair labor practice charges filed by the Union with respect to the implemented changes were dismissed by the Regional Director, The record does not reflect the basis for the dismissal. tion, the record indicates that a hiatus, or what was described as a "cooling off period" in negotiations, occurred after the employees engaged in strike ac- tivities during November and December. The uncontroverted testimony of Wilson Clark establishes that, upon becoming the Union's attor- ney in early November, he immediately wrote to the Respondent demanding that the wage cuts and other changes outlined in the Respondent's Octo- ber 11 letter to employees be withdrawn and be the subject of bargaining. Further, Clark testified he sent the February 19, 1986 information request to the Respondent, seeking financial data to prepare for the continuation of contract negotiations and to verify the reasons asserted by the Respondent in its October 11 letter as justification for the changes made in employee working conditions and wages. Clark also testified that there may have been an outstanding request by the Respondent to bargain about the time of his information request. In any event, the Respondent in its February 28, 1986 re- sponse to the Union's information request reveals an understanding that the parties were in the midst of negotiations through the use of such language as, "Armored's negotiation posture has been and is now . . . ." We conclude, based on all the above, that there is no merit in the Respondent's position that there were no pending negotiations at the time of the Union's information request. Addressing the information request itself, we find the Union's request for financial data made during negotiations was warranted as a response to state- ments made in the Respondent's October 11 letter. This letter, of which the Union was aware, had ex- plained the reasons for the Respondent's implemen- tation of earlier bargaining proposals. In light of the letter, we reject the Respondent's contention that in the course of negotiations it at no time pleaded an inability to pay and that thus the Union's information request was made solely in an- ticipation of the Respondent's future bargaining po- sitions. In support of its contentions, the Respond- ent relies on its February 28, 1986 response to the Union's information demand, in which it asserted solely the need to bring its wage costs in line with the competition in order to remain competitive. While it is true that an increase in operating costs may place an employer in a disadvantageous posi- tion with respect to his competitors and that a mere assertion of such competitive pressures is not necessarily a claim of inability to pay, we are satis- fied that the Respondent went beyond asserting such a position here. In addition to references in the October 11 letter to "the competition," the Re- spondent further conveyed in that letter a clear plea of poverty by stating that, "Armored Trans- 576 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD port can no longer pay its employees from two to seven dollars more per hour than the competitors who are taking our business and your jobs." (Em- phasis added.) In its entirety, the letter, which pointedly mentioned substantial financial losses, put the Union on notice that because the Respondent was unable to continue current wages it certainly was in no position to meet any potential union demand for increases in benefits. By thus claiming during bargaining an inability rather than a mere willingness to pay, the Respondent made its finan- cial position relevant to negotiations. 8 We agree with the judge that at that point good-faith bar- gaining required that the Respondent provide the Union, on request, information relevant to its finan- cial status.8 Although the Union did not request the financial records until February 1986, we note that the delay apparently resulted from a "cooling off period" in the parties' negotiations and that whatever the pre- cise reasons for the hiatus, negotiations for the ini- tial collective-bargaining agreement in the Los An- geles unit, which occurred in 1985 and which re- sumed in 1986, are functionally part of a single course of bargaining rather than amounting to sep- arate bargaining ventures. The relatively brief hiatus between late December and mid-February 1986 does not of itself show the contrary. 1° We note further that the record contains no evidence that the Respondent's financial status changed in any material respect between October 11 and the following February such that the assertions con- tained in the Respondent's October letter were no longer applicable. Once a plea of poverty is established, the Board must determine whether the specific information requested is necessary and relevant to the bargain- ing process. We agree with the judge, for the rea- sons stated by him, that the Union has demonstrat- ed its need for, and is thus entitled to, the specific financial information requested in its February 19, 8 Compare Buffalo Concrete, 276 NLRB 839, 841 (1985), enfd. in rele- vant part 803 F 2d 1333 (4th Cir. 1986), in which the employers through- out negotiations consistently maintained that they merely wanted to obtain a more competitive position in their industry; i e, the employers asserted an unwillingness rather than an inability to pay. See also NLRB v. Harvstone Mfg. Corp., 785 F.2d 570, 575-576 (7th dr. 1986), cert. denied 123 LRRM 2591 (1986). 9 See generally Cowin & Co., 277 NLRB 802 (1985); Nielsen Litho- graphing Co., 279 NLRB 877 (1986); Coast Engraving Co., 282 NLRB 1236 (1987). 10 The Respondent's reliance on the 9-month delay between the Octo- ber letter and the resumption of actual negotiations in June 1986 is mis- placed. Obviously, the strike m November and December was in active support of the Union's current bargaining position. Further, the Respond- ent's unlawful withholding of the requested fmancial information in Feb- ruary 1986 may have been the cause of negotiations being resumed only several months after the Union's legitimate information request. 1986 letter." Therefore, we shall order the Re- spondent to furnish the requested information to the Union to the extent the information has not al- ready been provided. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Re- spondent, Armored Transport of California, Inc., Los Angeles and Ventura, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. Insert the following as paragraph 2(b) and relet- ter the subsequent paragraphs. "(b) On request, furnish the Union with the fi- nancial information requested in its letter of Febru- ary 19, 1986, and thereafter, to the extent the infor- mation has not already been provided." " Regarding the relevancy of profit-and-loss statements, see generally Cowin & Co., supra, and Nielsen Lithographing Co., supra, regarding com- pensation records, see S-B Mfg. Co, 270 NLRB 485 (1984); regarding in- - vestments, see generally Holey Printing Co., 262 NLRB 157 (1982) (union entitled to information regarding the employer's inventory and real per- sonal property). With respect to the Union's request for copies of corre- spondence with customers relating to rate changes, this information di- rectly bears on the Respondent's financial status, as particularly demon- strated by evidence submitted during the hearing indicating that the nu- merical information included in such correspondence, when compared with profit-and-loss statements and other fmancial data, may assist the Union in assessing the true financial status of the Respondent's oper- ations. Bernard T. Hopkins, Esq., for the General Counsel. Richard R. Irvin, Esq. (McLean & Irvin), of Woodland Hills, California, for the Respondent. Wilson Clark, Esq., of Covina, California, for the Charg- ing Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE FREDERICK C. HERZOG, Administrative Law Judge. This case was heard by me in Los Angeles, California, on 7 January 1987 and is based on a charge filed by Cur- rency and Security Handlers Association (the Union) about 13 March 1986 alleging generally that Armored Transport of California, Inc. (Respondent) committed certain violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act (the Act). About 24 July 1986 the Regional Director for Region 31 of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued a consoli- dated complaint and notice of hearing alleging violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, in addition to other allegations. About 28 November 1986 the Regional Di- rector issued a second consolidated amended complaint and notice of hearing alleging, inter alia, violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. In the course of the hearing, and pursuant to a motion advanced by all parties, Case 31-CA-15654 was severed from all other cases placed in issue by the second con- ARMORED TRANSPORT OF CALIFORNIA 577 solidated complaint, and Cases 31-CA-15395, 31-CA- 16109, and 31-CB-6455 were remanded to the Regional Director for his approval of agreements reached by all parties in settlement of all issues contained in the plead- ings having to do with those cases. Thus, the hearing proceeded only on the issues raised by the second con- solidated complaint having to do with the General Coun- sel's allegation that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by virtue of its failure and refusal to provide the Union with certain information, as requested by the Union, in preparation for or during the course of collective-bargaining negotiations between the Union and Respondent. All parties appeared at the hearing through counsel, and were given full opportunity to participate, to intro- duce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and file briefs. Based on the record, my consideration of the brief filed by counsel for the General Counsel, and my observation of the demean- or of the witnesses, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT The complaint alleges and the appropriate answer of Respondent admits, that Respondent is and has been at all times material, a corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Califor- nia, with an office and prinicipal place of business locat- ed in Los Angeles, with other facilities located in other cities, including, among others, Ventura, California; that the Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, annually sold goods or services valued in ex cess of $50,000 to customers or business enterprises within the State of California, which customers or busi- ness enterprises themselves meet one of the Board's juris- dictional standards, other than the indirect inflow or in- direct outflow standards. Based on these admitted facts, I fmd that Respondent is an employer engaged in and affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the Union is now, and at all times material has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Contentions of the Parties Counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for the Charging Party contend that in preparation for and during the course of collective-bargaining negotiations between the Union and Respondent, the Union submitted to Respondent certain requests for information and that Respondent unlawfully failed and refused thereafter to provide the Union with the information requested. Coun- sel for Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the information sought by the Union need not have been supplied because the Union's request was overly broad, had not been placed in issue in the negotiations by virtue of any express or constructive "plea of poverty" on the part of Respondent, and, in any event, was subsequently mooted by the parties' arrival at a full and complete col- lective-bargaining agreement. B. The Facts In the course of the hearing Respondent's counsel judi- cially admitted that Respondent carries out armored car operations not only in California, but also in Texas, Ari- zona, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Utah. Within the State of California Respondent operates facilities lo- cated in numerous locales throughout the State. The Union represents employees employed at Respondent's . facilities located in Los Angeles, Ventura, Santa Maria, Sacramento, and Oakland. Another union, unnamed in the record, is the certified collective-bargaining repre- sentative of Respondent's employees employed at its fa- cilities located in Merced, Fresno, Modesto, Salinas, San Jose, Orange County, San Diego, and San Marcos. All other employees employed at other facilities in California are unrepresented for collective-bargaining purposes.' Notwithstanding its enjoyment of representative status among the employees of various of the Respondent's fa- cilities, as shown above, at the time of the hearing the Union had entered into only one collective-bargaining agreement with the Respondent. This collective-bargain- ing agreement covered the Respondent's employees in the Los Angeles unit, and had an effective term from 31 October 1986 to 30 November 1987. However, at the time of the hearing, the parties were engaged in negotia- tions concerning the unit of employees employed at Re- spondent's Ventura facility, as well as Respondent's facil- ity at Santa Maria. The collective-bargaining agreement covering Re- spondent's Los Angeles facility was entered into follow- ing a period of negotiations that began in 1985 and that culminated in Respondent's implementation of a final offer that included provision for reduction in the pay of employees. The reductions were announced in a letter to all employees of Respondent from Respondent's presi- dent dated 11 October 1985. That letter read as follows: Dear Employees: Most of you have heard rumors and have experi- enced concern over the fact that Armored Trans- port of California, Inc. has lost all of its Federal Re- The complaint alleges, the answer adnuts, and the parties agreed during the course of this hearing that these proceedings are involved with, and only with, the following appropriate units for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec. 9(b) of the Act: a. Included All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time dnver/messenger/guards and vault-driver/messenger/guards em- ployed by the (Respondent) at its Los Angeles, California location. Excluded: All other employees, including house guards, clericals, clerical/deposit workers, computer operators, managers and supervi- sors as defined in the Act. b. Included: All full-time driver/messenger/guards and vault- driver/messenger/guards employed by the (Respondent) at its Ven- tura, California location. Excluded: All other employees, including house guards, clericals, clerical/deposit workers, computer operators, managers and supervi- sors as defined in the Act. 578 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD serve Bank work in Los Angeles, Orange and San Diego counties and most of its work in San Bernar- dino and Riverside counties, effective November 1, 1985. The loss of revenue to the company will amount to over $2,000,000 per year. The companies who have taken this work are Brinks, Loomis and Sectran. In summary, we lost all our work in all offices where the first and second men's wages were $10.00 per hour or more. We also lost in Pomona where the top wage is $9.85 per hour. In order to avoid losing jobs and disrupting routes, we have lowered prices to our major market chains and department stores over the last three years; for example, Vons is at a lower price than 1983 and we do not even have Ralphs any more. We did not raise our price to the Fed in Los Ange- les and Orange counties yet retained none of the Fed work. We also lost Bank of America city runs last January to Brinks. In addition to loss of business and loss of reve- nue, the cost of workmen's compensation has more than doubled and accident insurance has also dou- bled. In the Los Angeles office, we have had a series of internal thefts since January amounting to over $250,000 in losses. We then have had employ- ees who are unwilling to take a polygraph examina- tion to assist us in investigating these losses. What this all adds up to is that Armored Trans- port can no longer pay its employees from two to seven dollars more per hour than the competitors who are taking our business and your jobs. Effective November 1, 1985, all Armored Trans- port of California, Inc. offices will be earning over- time only after 50 hours of work in any week, Monday through Sunday. The 40 hour guarantee provisions for regular full time employees are not changed. Effective November 1, 1985, a 10% pay cut will apply for all Armored Transport of California, Inc. employees in the Los Angeles, Orange County and San Diego offices. Lesser cuts will be made in the smaller offices based upon profitability and produc- tion. Only time will tell if our competitors can per- form the work you have been doing for the banks using $5.00 and $6.00 per hour employees. We are working hard to retain as much bank work as we can from the independent banks; how- ever, the big banks will stay with the Fed as long as they can get their work done at a cheaper price. I regret very much to having to take this action as I know most of you have been working very hard and probably deserve an increase rather than a pay cut. More important at this time is to be thank- ful you have the best armored car job in the coun- try and wait to see what happens when Sectran, et al, have to play in the big league. Despite what appears to be a set-back, I am opto- mistic [sic] about the future. Do not panic and things should work out O.K. Sincerely, Armored Transport of California, Inc. /s/ Robert G. Irvin Robert G. Irvin, President Following implementation the Union struck Respond- ent from approximately 25 November until approximate- ly 22 December 1985, when employees apparently re- turned to work. There followed a hiatus in negotiations. In preparation for the renewal of negotiations, the Union's attorney wrote to Respondent on 19 February 1986, requesting that the Union be provided with certain information. Thereafter, Respondent furnished the Union with certain information and/or the parties otherwise disposed of a number of the possible disputes arising from the Union's request for information. However, it is undisputed that Respondent failed and refused to provide information in response to four of the Union's requests, which were: 4. Copies of correspondence with customers since November 1, 1982 regarding changes in rates be- cause of changes in employee rates of pay. ' 5. Copies of profit and loss statements covering all facilities for the years 1983 through 1985. 6. Copies of records of compensation paid to offi- cers, directors and shareholders of the Company and to management level employees for the years 1983 through 1985. 7. Information relating to investments made by the Company in all facilities, including any new fa- cilities for the years 1983 through 1985. By letter dated 28 February 1986, Respondent's coun- sel, the son of its president, set forth Respondent's objec- tions to the four items requested by the Union, as fol- lows: 4. We object to your request No. 4 regarding correspondence with the company's customers as being irrelevant and as not relating to the terms and conditions of employment. Obviously, all company's [sic] consider their wage costs along with a multi- tude of other concerns when assessing what to charge customers for services provided. Further, Armored is not now nor has it even claimed an in- ability to pay. Armored's negotiation posture has been and is not that it needs to bring its wage costs per truck in line with the competition in order to remain competitive. Additionally, the company is not now nor has it ever tried to negotiate wage costs below the competition. 5. We object to your request No. 5 concerning profit and loss statements for basically the same rea- sons we objected to your request No. 4. z' 6. We object to your request No. 6 concerning compensation of non-bargaining unit employees for basically the same reasons we objected to your re- quest No. 4. 7. We object to your request No. 7 concerning company capital investments for basically the same reasons we objected to your request No. 4. ARMORED TRANSPORT OF CALIFORNIA 579 Subsequently the parties negotiated from June until September 1986 and reached the agreement referred to above covering the Los Angeles facility. The Union, throughout these negotiations, repeated its demands for the information enumerated above and Respondent re- peated its refusal, as well as its denial that its refusal was predicated on an inability by Respondent to pay. Following the conclusion of the negotiations regarding Respondent's Los Angeles facility, the negotiations re- garding Respondent's Ventura facility began, and were in progress at the time of the hearing. All that has been said with respect to requests by the Union for informa- tion, and denials by the Respondent of the Union's right to such information, has equal application here, with only the dates being different. C. Analysis and Conclusions Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with a representative of his employees. . . ." Where an employer claims an inability to pay a wage increase, the employer's duty to bargain in good faith under Section 8(a)(5) includes an obligation to supply the union, on request, with fmancial records to verify the claimed inability to pay. As the Supreme Court explained in NLRB V. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-153 (1956): Good faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer should be honest claims. This is true about an asserted inability to pay an increase in wages. If such an argument is im- portant enough to present in the give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy. Without disclosure of such information, the union would be frustrated in performing its representative functions in collective bargaining and the statutory scheme would be defeated. Printing Pressmen Local 51 (Milbin Printing) v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1976); United Fire Proof Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 35,6 F.2d 494, 497-498 (7th Cir. 1966). Moreover, as the Board and the courts recognize, an employer's claim of inability to pay "need not be expressed with any particular magic words." At- lanta Hilton & Tower, 271 NLRB 1600, 1602 (1984). If the employer's refusal to meet a wage demand, reason- ably interpreted, is the result of financial inability to meet the employees' demand rather than a simple unwill- ingness to do so, the exact formulation used by the em- ployer in conveying this message is immaterial. Atlanta Hilton & Tower, ibid.; Printing Pressmen Local 51 (Milbin Printing) V. NLRB, supra; NLRB v. Unoco Apparel, 508 F.2d 1368, 1670 (5th Cir. 1975). A mere expression of un- willingness to pay wage increases of the sort being sought by a union during the course of negotiations will not trigger any duty to disclose financial records. Adver- tisers Mfg. Co., 275 NLRB 100 (1985). The requisite rel- evance of such records may be established if the employ- er's own words are deemed to be sufficiently specific to convey a meaning that the employer is unable to meet the financial demands of the union. Atlanta Hilton & Tower, supra. In this case I am unable to preceive how any reasona- ble construction of Respondent's own words, set forth in its letter to all employees on 11 October 1985, can lead to a conclusion other than that Respondent chose to go well beyond the mere expression of an unwillingness to pay the Union's financial demands. For the very words contained within the letter to all employees state without qualification: "What this all adds up to is that Armored Transport can no longer pay its employees from $2 to $7 more per hour than the competitors who are taking our business and your jobs." Such words cannot be con- strued as conveying a mere possibility, or a hint concern- ing Respondent's view of what was probable. They state boldly, unequivocally, flatly, and certainly, as fact, Re- spondent's inability not only to grant its employees a raise in wages, presumably being demanded by the Union at that time. Respondent's letter went on to state without qualification Respondent's financial inability to pay as justification for the various other actions of Re- spondent announced in that letter (i.e., raising the number of hours employees would be required to work before becoming eligible for overtime pay and the imple- mentation of the 10-percent pay cut for all employees in three of Respondent's facilities, with lesser cuts to be made in other offices based on "profitability and produc- tion").2 Thus, I find and conclude that, notwithstanding its repeated protestations to the contrary, Respondent did expressly state that it was financially unable to pay either a wage increase or to maintain wages at past levels. I have considered Respondent's argument that its sub- sequent conclusion of a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union has mooted the questions presented by the Union's request for information. I reject the argu- ment. First of all, the facts show that such an argument could be made, if at all, only with respect to one of the facilities, i.e., Los Angeles, because that is the only facili- ty where a collective-bargaining agreement has been concluded. Other, negotiations for other facilities were still in progress at the time of the hearing, and the infor- mation sought has obvious relevance in such negotia- tions. However, I also reject the argument as a matter of law because subsequent execution of a contract by a union without receipt of information previously sought does not render the information irrelevant because the union may simply have decided that the advantages of the contract in hand would outweigh those which it might enjoy with all the information available to it. NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 133 NLRB 877 (1961), enfd. 313 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 834 (1963). Finally, I conclude that the Respondent's arguments to the effect that the material sought is not producible be- 2 Neither Buffalo Concrete, 276 NLRB 839 (1985), nor Nielsen Litho- graphing Co., 279 NLRB 877 (1986), both cited by Respondent, is helpful to its position. Neither case deals with a factual situation such as this, where a respondent's chief executive officer has mformed all employees that, m effect, a raise in wages is not only impossible, but that a lowering of wages is an absolute necessity. 580 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD cause the requests are overly broad (an objection I read as meaning that the task gathering the information to- gether would be oppressive, or would require Respond- ent to produce private or privileged information, or be- cause Respondent should not be required to produce in- formation of such a sensitive nature) are all without merit. As shown above, it is Respondent's own words that placed each of these matters in controversy. Re- spondent's own letter to employees spoke of losses of business amounting to millions of dollars per year, and then went on to itemize certain increased cost factors. The net effect of this was to place in issue Respondent's alleged incapacity to compete or remain in business with- out concessions being made by employees both in the wages they receive per hour and in the number of hours they worked. Thus the inquiries into customers' rate changes, profit and loss statements, compensation paid to officers, direc- tors, shareholders, and management employees, and in- vestments made by Respondent, the four areas inquired about by the Union, are, in my opinion, reasonably relat- ed to the overall question of Respondent's profitability, which it placed in issue through its own letter to em- ployees. Thus, assuming that the Union would attempt to argue that Respondent's asserted need for concessions was unwarranted, or even that employees might be granted wage increases, the Union's requests appear to easily fit within the liberal definition of relevancy adopt- ed by the Board and the courts, which, in general, re- quires only that the information sought be directly relat- ed to the Union's function as bargaining representative and that it appear reasonably necessary for the perform- ance of this function. As the Supreme Court pointed out in NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967), this is basically a "discovery-type standard." Finally, in this regard, I reject the arguments concern- ing oppression and privacy on the basis that no evidence has been offered, and none appears from the face of the requests made by the Union, demonstrating that requir- ing Respondent to produce this material would be unduly oppressive or an undue invasion of privacy. Thus, I have concluded that Respondent was under an obligation to provide correct answers to the Union's in- quiries which are the subject of this case, and by its fail- ure to do so, acted inconsistently with its statutory duty to bargain in good faith. Respondent's failure and refusal was and is, therefore, violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Respondent's refusal to permit access to financial data in question clearly made it more difficult, if not im- possible, for its employees' bargaining representative to carry out its bargaining duties properly, and thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced those employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them under Section 7, all of which is violative of Section 8(a)(1), of the Act. On the foregoing findings and the entire record, I state the following CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By failing and refusing to turn over necessary and relevant fmancial data on request by the Union, Re- spondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- eds ORDER The Respondent, Armored Transport of California, Inc., Los Angeles and Ventura, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with Currency and Security Handlers Association as the ex- clusive collective-bargaining representative of its em- ployees employed in the following two units that are ap- propriate for purposes of collective bargaining: a. Included: All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/messenger/guards and vault- driver/messenger/guards employed by Armored Transport of California, Inc. at its Los Angeles, California location. Excluded: All other employees, including house guards, clericals, clerical/deposit workers, computer operators, managers and supervisors as defined in the Act. b. Included: All full-time driver/messenger/- guards and vault-driver/messenger/guards em- ployed by Armored Transport of California, Inc. at its Ventura, California location. Excluded: All other employees, including house guards, clericals, clerical/deposit workers, computer operators, managers and supervisors as defined in the Act by failing and refusing to disclose necessary and relevant requested financial information. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Bargain collectively and in good faith with Curren- cy and Security Handlers Association as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the units described above with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. (b) Post at its facilities in Los Angeles and Ventura, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- 3 All outstanding motions that are mconsistent with the terms of this Order are overruled. If no exceptions are filechas provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec- ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt- ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. ARMORED TRANSPORT OF CALIFORNIA 581 dix."4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 31, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are cus- tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order a the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the Untied States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with Currency and Security Handlers Association as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our employees employed in the following described units a. Included: All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time driver/messenger/guards and vault- driver/messenger/guards employed by us at our Los Angeles, California location. Excluded: All other employees, including house guards, clericals, clerical/deposit workers, computer operators, managers and supervisors as defined in the Act. b. Included: All full-time driver/messenger/- guards and vault-driver/messenger/guards em- ployed by us at our Ventura, California location. Excluded: All other employees, including house guards, clericals, clerical/deposit workers, computer operators, managers and supervisors as defined in the Act by failing and refusing to disclose necessary and relevant financial information. WE WILLS NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL turn over to the Union the financial informa- tion it requested on 19 February 1986, and thereafter, and which has not been previously turned over to them. WE WILL bargain collectively and in good faith with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre- sentative of all our employees in the above-described units. ARMORED TRANSPORT OF CALIFORNIA, INC.