Brown Transport Corp. And Chauffeurs, Teamsters And Helpers Local Union No. 391

BROWN TRANSPORT CORP. Brown Transport Corporation and Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 391, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 11-CA- 12831 June 12, 1989 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS CRACRAFT AND HIGGINS On March 2, 1989, Administrative Law Judge Hutton S. Brandon issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board had dele- gated its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, I and conclusions2 and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Brown Transport Corporation, Greensboro, North Caroli- na, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. ' The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings 2 We find it unnecessary to rely on the judge's alternative analysis, pre- mised on the acceptance of discredited testimony, in affirming his finding that the Respondent unlawfully threatened unspecified reprisals for en- gaging in union activity We affirm the judge's dismissal of the General Counsel's unlawful sur- veillance allegations in the absence of exceptions Paris Favors, Jr., Esq., for the General Counsel. Walter O. Lambeth, Jr., Esq. (Elarbee, Thompson & Trap- nell), of Atlanta, Georgia, for the Respondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HUTTON S. BRANDON, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried at Greensboro, North Carolina, on January 24, 1989. The charge was filed by Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 391, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL- 969 CIO (the Union), on July 22, 1988,1 and the complaint based on the charge issued on September 28 The issues presented by this case are whether Brown Transporta- tion Corporation (Respondent or the Company), engaged in surveillance of its employees' union activities and threatened them with unspecified reprisals if they en- gaged in union activities thereby violating Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the oral argument of the General Counsel at hearing and the posthearing brief filed by Respondent, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent is, and has been at all material times, a Georgia corporation with a terminal located at 503 Banner Avenue, Greensboro, North Carolina, where it is engaged in interstate transportation of freight and com- modities. During the 12-month period prior to the issu- ance terminal gross revenues in excess of $50,000 for services performed outside the State of North Carolina. During the same period Respondent transported materi- als valued in excess of $50,000 directly from the State of North Carolina to points outside the State of North Carolina. Based on these facts which Respondent admits, Respondent further admits, and I find, that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The complaint alleged that the Union is a labor organi- zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act Re- spondent's answer claimed insufficient knowledge of the labor organization status of the Union and denied the complaint allegation. While no independent evidence was offered to establish the complaint allegation I take offi- cial notice of other Board proceedings in which the Union was found to be a labor organization, e.g., PPG Industries, 251 NLRB 1146 (1980), APAC-Carolina, Inc., JD(ATL)-71-87 (Dec 31, 1987), I infer in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the Union's status as a labor organization has not changed, and I therefore con- clude that the Union continues to be a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act as the complaint alleges. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES It is undisputed that the Union began an organizational campaign among Respondent's employees at its Greens- boro, North Carolina, terminal in late March or early April. In connection with that organizing effort the Union through Bobby Blanket, an assistant organizer for the Union, distributed handbills at various times to Re- spondent's employees in or about the driveway entrance to Respondent's Greensboro terminal. This handbilling and Respondent's observation thereof provides the predi- cate for the first allegation set forth in the complaint that Respondent, through its terminal manager, Bobby M. I All dates are in 1988 unless otherwise stated 294 NLRB No. 86 970 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Brooks, engaged in unlawful surveillance of its employ- ees' union activities in "late March 1988 (exact date pres- ently unknown)." The only remaining complaint allega- tion of unlawful action asserts that Respondent, again through Brooks, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employees on August 16 "with unspecified reprisals if they engaged in union activities." Respond- ent's answer denied the two complaint allegations of un- lawful activity thus putting the General Counsel on her proof. The alleged unlawful conduct will be treated below in the order alleged. A. The Alleged Surveillance 1. The evidence Blanket testified for the General Counsel that he began handbilling at or near Respondent's terminal entrance be- ginning in late March or early April and continued doing so on a more of less regular basis approximately twice a week up until September. He usually timed his handbill- ing to coincide with the shift changes of Respondent's employees in the hope of reaching as many of Respond- ent's approximately 150 employees as possible with his handbill messages. Respondent's terminal entrance is a driveway which is doublewide for truck tractor and trailer passage. The driveway leads from the intersection of Apache and Banner avenues, both public streets, approximately 250 to 300 feet, according to Brook's estimate, to Respond- ent's terminal building. Except perhaps for width and type of paving, the driveway in direction would appear to be a continuation of Apache Avenue which in fact terminates at Banner Avenue. Approaching the terminal from the intersection Respondent's driveway is bounded on the right by a narrow grass strip and an employee parking lot which, except for two ungated entrances off the driveway, is bordered by a chain link fence. On the left the drive way is bounded for approximately half its length nearer the terminal by a vacant lot and for the re- mainder of its length by a fenced trailer parking area uti- lized by another employer. Respondent's terminal build- ing, based upon photographs received in evidence as well as testimony of the witnesses, is also fenced with a gate, normally opened, on the driveway as it approaches the left end of the terminal. The terminal is a long one-story building occupied pri- marily by loading doors and docks on the right, an office area more to the center and what appear to be shops to the extreme left. The intersection of Banner and Apache avenues can be observed from almost any point at the front of the terminal building, and specifically, all parties herein concede, from the office area. It is undisputed that the driveway is, and at all materi- al times was, Respondent's property. It is also undisputed that at the material times herein one side of the driveway was unpaved and in disrepair with a number of pot holes which drivers were forced to either drive around or pro- ceed through slowly in order to prevent their loads from being thrown about. The existence of this condition had the effect of reducing the driveway's useful width. Blakeney testified that in handbilling he generally stood at a point about 5 feet inside the Banner Avenue curb on the left side (facing the terminal) of Respond- ent's driveway. Occasionally he would handbill from the right side of the driveway, and sometimes he handbilled from the center of the driveway so that he could more easily distribute to the employees whether they were ar- riving at, or departing from, the driveway. It was Bla- keney's belief, based upon a concrete marker a few feet off the Banner Avenue curb at Respondent's driveway, that he was not on Respondent's property.2 Blakeney further testified that at various times Terminal Manager Brooks came out in his car during the handbilling and parked on either the left or right side of the driveway some 20 to 30 feet away from Blakeney and observed the handbilling for periods of time ranging from a few min- utes to 20 or 30 minutes. Blakeney could recall talking to Brooks only on one occasion and his recollection of that occasion was vague. Thus, he testified that Brooks mo- tioned him over to his car and said "something about giving out the handbills on company time," and "Stop- ping or something of that nature." Blakeney conceded that Brooks was "real friendly," and he testified that Brooks never accused him of trespassing on Respond- ent's property. Blakeney's testimony regarding the conduct of Brooks on one particular occasion was corroborated by then em- ployee Paul Nichols. Nichols, a line haul driver for Re- spondent at the time, testified that in late March or early April, as he was returning to the terminal after a trip he noted Blakeney, an old friend, handbilling at the drive- way entrance. As Nichols pulled into the driveway slowly because of some bumps he stopped briefly to ex- change comments with Blakeney, but, not wanting to stop or obstruct traffic, he proceeded on into the termi- nal after a short time. He then conducted his work at the terminal, got in his personal vehicle, proceeded out to Blakeney's location, parked his car on Apache Avenue, and got out and talked to Blakeney. During the course of their conversation, Blakeney pointed out to Nichols that Brooks was parked on the right side of Respondent's driveway beside the fence to the employee parking, lot. Nichols was not familiar with Brooks at the time be- cause, as a road driver he spent little time at the terminal and Brooks was a relatively new terminal manager.3 Brooks in testimony for Respondent did not generally dispute Blakeney's testimony. He conceded that he 'had on a number of occasions, primarily in March and April, gone out to observe the handbilling from his car after parking it along the side of the driveway, although he could have observed the handbilling from his office. He also conceded that he had talked to Blakeney at least a couple of times. Thus, he related that he first observed Blakeney handbilling at a time when Brooks was pro- ceeding to work. As he turned into the driveway Bla- keney gave him a handbill, and Brooks identified himself as a member of management and told Blakeney he would 2 His belief in this regard was apparently contradicted by Brooks who testified Respondent's lease to the terminal premises extended all the way to Banner Avenue 8 Brooks, formerly employed by Thurston Motor Lines, had only become terminal manager around the first of the year as a result of the merger of Thurston and Respondent BROWN TRANSPORT CORP appreciate it if Blakeney would stay out of the driveway and off the property and not impede the traffic flow in and out of the facility. Brooks testified that at that point Blakeney was 10 to 15 feet inside the driveway and on Respondent's premises Thereafter during the first week of handbilling, Brooks observed Blakeney flagging down an incoming truck stopping it half way into the drive- way. Brooks found it necessary to go out and tell Bla- keney, "I've asked you before to stay out of the drive- way." Still later, but in the first few weeks of handbill- ing, Brooks noted that outgoing trucks began to back up on the driveway from Banner Avenue to and around the terminal. On this occasion he again went out and told Blakeney, "Look, I've asked you before to stay off the property, and don't impede the traffic," and "Now either clear it and stay out of it or I'll call the sheriff's depart- ment." Subsequently, whenever it was reported to Brooks that Blakeney was impeding traffic he admittedly went out to the driveway, parked his car and observed the handbilling for periods from a few minutes to about 20 minutes. Brooks indicated in his testimony that he be- lieved his presence was necessary on these occasions so that Blakeney could see him and, in this way, keep Bla- keney "honest" about not being on Respondent's proper- ty It is undisputed that Brooks never found it necessary to call any police or other authorities as a result of the handbilling or any traffic problems incidental thereto. 2. Arguments and conclusions While conceding that an employer "has a right to de- termine whether or not its proprietary rights or its prop- erty rights have been violated by trespass of nonem- ployee personnel," the General Counsel argues that an employer does not have the right to go out of his way to observe its employees receiving union handbills. "If an employer does something out of the ordinary, then the presence of the company representatives at or near the place of distribution becomes a coercive and intimidating element which violates Section 8(a)(1) as surveillance of employees' union activities." Applying the argument to the facts in this case the General Counsel contends that Respondent did "something out of the ordinary" when Brooks purposely positioned himself near the handbilling so that employees could observe and be intimidated by his presence when Brooks could have accomplished his professed purpose (the prevention of trespass, traffic delays, and traffic hazards) by watching the handbilling from his office Respondent argues in its defense that there was no evi- dence that Brooks intended to interfere with handbilling or the union activities of any of Respondent's employees. On the contrary, it is urged that Brooks did nothing to stop the handbilling or prevent employees from talking to Blakeney who clearly identified himself to all observ- ers as a union advocate by his wearing of a hat and jacket bearing the union name or logo. In short, Brooks was only ensuring strict observance of Respondent's property rights and the unrestricted and unendangered ingress and egress of Respondent's employees to the premises. The absence of any intention to coerce em- ployees in their union activity is shown, Respondent as- serts, by Brooks' failure to come to the driveway and ob- 971 serve the handbilling on every occasion when the hand- billing occurred. The Board has long adhered to the principle that union organizers and the employees they seek to orga- nize have no cause to complain that the employer of the employees has observed their activities where such ac- tivities are openly conducted at the employer's premises. See Emenee Accessories, 267 NLRB 1344 (1983); Porta Systems Corp., 238 NLRB 192 (1978); Chemtronics, Inc., 236 NLRB 178 (1978); Larand Leisurelies, Inc., 213 NLRB 197, 205 (1974); Milco, Inc., 159 NLRB 812 (1966). See also Columbia Casuals, 180 NLRB 741, 747 (1970). In Tarrant Mfg. Co., 196 NLRB 794 (1972), an administrative law judge with Board approval stated the principle in somewhat broader and clearly more forceful terms saying at 799, "The notion that it is unlawful for a representative of management to station himself at a point on management's property to observe what is taking place at the plant gate is too absurd to warrant comment " The Board has suggested that the principle finds additional support in the general recognition of an employer's legitimate property rights and the "proprie- tary perogative" to expel and bar nonemployee union or- ganizers from the employer's premises. Hoschton Gar- ment Co., 279 NLRB 565, 567 (1986). Thus, the principal has particular application in those case where nonem- ployee union -organizers are found to be trespassing on the employers premises in connection with their handbill- ing or other organizational efforts Id. Accordingly, even an employer's close, as opposed to casual, observation of union activity at or near his premises in order to pre- clude trespass cannot be found to constitute unlawful surveillance of that activity. In short, the "monitoring of trespassory activity" of nonemployee union representa- tives does not violate Section 8(a)(1 ) of the Act. Id. Notwithstanding the foregoing, where an employer's observation of open union activity is shown not to be casual in nature, based upon trespassory concerns, or concerns over safety of ingress or egress, but rather upon a deliberate attempt to interfere with the legitimate union activity of employees (as in cases where the observation is coupled with overt actions extending beyond the em- ployer's premises or demonstrating that the observation is specifically calculated to disrupt the union activity) such observation will be found to be unlawful surveil- lance violative of Section 8(a)(1). See Hoschton, supra, Gainesville Mfg. Co., 271 NLRB 1186 (1984); Reeves Southeastern Corp., 256 NLRB 574, 578 (1981); Shrews- bury Nursing Home, 227 NLRB 47, 50 (1976); Dumas, Inc., 169 NLRB 892, 897 (1968). In determining whether an employer's observation of union activities at its premises is casual, innocent, or prompted by legitimate concerns on the one hand, or calculated to unlawfully interfere, on the other hand, a number of factors must be considered. These include the duration of the observation, the frequency and timing of the observation, the proximity of the observer to the union activity being conducted, the likelihood or actual- ity of tiespassory actions by nonemployees engaged in the union activity, and the reasonableness of any percep- tion on the part of the employer of any safety risks to 972 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees or customers associated with the conduct of the union activity. Additional factors include the exist- ence of demonstrated union animus on the part of the employer, the commission of other acts to interfere with the activity being conducted, and the employer observ- er's departure from customary or normal practice repre- sented by his presence in the immediate vicinity of the union activity. Although each of the foregoing factors are significant, in the final analysis, all the circumstances surrounding the observation must be considered and evaluated. In considering Respondent's motivation in the observa- tion herein one must determine the facts including the claim by Brooks that there was actual trespass by Bla- keney on Respondent's premises. Based on Brook's un- contradicted testimony that Respondent's premises ex- tended to Banner Avenue, and in the absence of evi- dence regarding local street right of ways , I am com- pelled to conclude that Blakeney did trespass. Blakeney conceded that he at times was inside and upon the curb on Banner Avenue and Respondent's driveway. I also credit the testimony of Brooks that he observed Bla- keney within the boundaries of the driveway on the first occasion Brooks saw the handbilling . While Blakeney, contrary to Brooks' testimony, acknowledged no warn- ing from Brooks regarding trespassing, Blakeney's recol- lection regarding exactly what Brooks told him im- pressed me as extremely vague, incomplete and unreli- able. I therefore find that there was at least minimal tres- pass which would warrant Respondent's subsequent monitoring of Blakeney's handbilling activity. In addition, I find, consistent with Brooks' testimony, that there existed on Respondent's part reasonable con- cerns regarding traffic problems attendant to the hand- billing. The handbilling was not restricted to automobiles of employees reporting to or leaving work. It extended to outgoing and incoming trucks driven by Respondent's employees on worktime.4 Brooks' testimony that on one occasion Blakeney's handbilling caused outbound trucks to back up around the terminal was not contradicted by any other witness and provides a basis for Brooks' claimed concern over the delays caused by the handbill- ing. Therefore, Brooks' monitoring of the handbilling to insure the absence of traffic problems and attendant delays was not so unreasonable as to suggest that the monitoring was motivated by an intent to interfere with the union activity. While Brooks conducted his observation of the hand- billing on several occasions and on one or two occasions for periods of up to 20 minutes, it is clear that he made no effort to monitor the handbilling on each day it was conducted. And on those days he did come out to watch he was not there for the full duration of the handbilling. This sporadic observation lends credence to Brooks'con- tention that he was trying to keep Blakeney "honest" about not trespassing . It also renders reasonable Brooks' explanation for his presence in the driveway rather than monitoring Blakeney from his office , i.e., Blakeney could not see Brooks in his office and, believing Brooks would not be watching, would be more tempted to trespass to facilitate the handbilling. To be sure, Brooks was conspicuous in his observation of the handbilling as as result of parking his car on the side of Respondent's driveway in the general vicinity of the handbilling. Moreover, his parking in the driveway was, as the General Counsel contends, unlike the actions of the employer in Metal Industries, supra, extraordinary conduct for Brooks. Nevertheless, unlike the employer representatives in the Hoschton and Gainesville cases, supra, who stood next to the handbillers, Brooks was parked 100 feet or mores away from the handbilling. Indeed, Nichols testified he did not even notice Brooks until Blakeney called his attention to him. And although Brooks candidly admitted that he had a notebook with him during his observation of the handbilling, he claimed the notebook pertained to other matters, and he denied taking any notes regarding the handbilling. There was no evidence presented to contrary. As discussed infra, I have Brooks demonstrated union animus by as as result of his union activity. the Act and Brooks' sporadic observation unaccompanied by any overt physical interference with, the handbilling. con- cluded that Respondent through an unlawful threat to an employee. However, this single violation of effort to interfere with, or actual interference with, the handling. Considering all of the above and the fact that the Re- spondent's observation of the handbilling during its dura- tion from April to September was sporadic in nature, I conclude the insufficient to establish that the observation was calculated to interfere with the handbilling and the Section 7 rights of Respondent's employees. And while subjective impact on employees of Brooks' observation of the union activity is not a test for the violation al- leged, it is nevertheless noteworthy that no evidence of adverse impact on employees was adduced. The absence of any such impact at least suggests that none was in- tended. I therefore find no unlawful surveillance, and consequently no violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Respondent as a result of Brooks' observation of the union activity here. B. The Alleged Threat of Unspecified Reprisals 1. The evidence Perry Callicutt, a former employee of Respondent who worked as a local driver, testified for the General Counsel that he sought and obtained authorization cards from the Union in early to mid-August and thereafter began to talk to an estimated four or five of his fellow employees about the Union. He testified that he was always off the clock during such talks. Callicutt further testified that around August 16 Brooks called him aside on the steps to a terminal load- ing dock where the two engaged in a brief conversation during which Brooks told Callicutt that if "Charlotte [a 5 Brooks' testimony suggests, and Respondent's brief argues, that * It appears that both local and over-the-road drivers of Respondent Brooks parked 150 feet from the terminal entrance and the handbilling. used the Banner Avenue terminal . Based on Nichols' testimony local However, he did not always park in the same spot and I am unwilling to drivers were hourly paid while road drivers were paid by the mile. conclude that he was always 150 feet from the handbilling. BROWN TRANSPORT CORP reference to Respondent's home office] found out I was with the Teamsters, it could be made rough on me." Cal- licutt, who testified that he had not previously made known to his union inclinations,6 could recall little else about the conversation. Brooks did not deny having a conversation with Calli- cutt, but he did place it in a different context. As back- ground he explained that after the merger of Respondent and Thurston Motor Lines there was some unrest and dissension among the employees, most of whom were members of an organization referred to as the Drivers' Mutual Association and they apparently resented the Union. Brooks testified that he had a "couple of com- plaints" and had noticed some friction among employees "when Mr. Callicutt would voice his opinion about the unions." According to Brooks, Callicutt got some heated discussions going among the employees, so that one morning Brooks approached Callicutt and told him, "I don't have any objection to your doing this, but let's don't be so pushy about it with the other employees and get them inflamed." He admittedly added, "You got to be careful that you don't do this on company time be- cause this is the one thing that would not be allowed, and I and the officials from Charlotte take a very dim view of him using company time to further the union ac- tivities." 2. Arguments and conclusions Based on Callicutt's testimony the General Counsel argues that Brooks was clearly threatening Callicutt with reprisals because of his union activities and therefore the threat was coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) Re- spondent, on the other hand, based on Brooks' testimony argues that Brooks' remark was justified by Callicutt's conduct in discussing the Union and "inflaming" employ- ees on company time The existence of a violation in this instance is largely dependent upon which witness is to be believed. Consid- ering the demeanor of the witnesses and the record as a whole, I am persuaded that Callicutt's version even if not fleshed out with extensive detail is the more accurate and truthful one. He appeared completely honest. More- over, he voluntarily left Respondent's employment short- ly after the events about which he testified occurred and is therefore more likely to be impartial. Brooks, in com- parison, was a much more sophisticated witness. Howev- er, his failure to detail or substantiate the claim of mis- conduct on Callicutt's part upon which the generalized warning was based clearly suggested exaggeration and served to diminish his credibility. The suggestion of ex- aggeration is supported by Brooks' concession on cross- examination that the complaints voiced to him by other employees about Callicutt's actions did not specify that they had occurred on work time. Their complaint simply was they were tired of hearing Callicutt's opinion about the Union. Further, there was no evidence regarding just how Callicutt was "pushy" or how he "inflamed" others. 8 Callicutt admitted, however, that he had previously stood and talked to Blakeney at Respondent's driveway entrance on more than one occa- sion On none of these occasions did he notice Brooks around 973 Crediting Callicutt, I find that Brooks issued the warn- ing to Callicutt in the language claimed by Callicutt. As the General Counsel argues, I find that language clearly threatened Callicutt with unspecified reprisals because of his activities on behalf of the Union I find, therefore, that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as the complaint alleges. Moreover, even if I were to accept Brooks' version of his remarks to Callicutt I would still find such remarks coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In the absence of a showing of Callicutt's interference with the his own or the work of his fellow employees, or his breach of a valid no solic- itation rule, a nondiscriminatorily applied no talking rule or some other valid and uniformly applied rule of con- duct, no basis for the warning existed, and it can only be concluded that the warning was calculated to intimidate Callicutt in his union activity. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent, Brown Transport Corporation, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union, Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 391, affiliated with International Broth- erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By coercively threatening its employees with un- specified reprisals if they engaged in union activities Re- spondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. Respondent did not engage in unlawful surveillance employees' union activities or in any other manner vio- late Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order Re- spondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer- tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act The remedy will include the posting of a re- medial notice to employees. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed7 ORDER The Respondent, Brown Transport Corporation, Greensboro, North Carolina, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Threatening its employees with unspecified repris- als if they engage in activities of behalf of Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 391, affiliated 7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses 974 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL- CIO or any other labor organization. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing, employees in the exercise of their rights 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Post at its terminal facility in Greensboro, North Carolina, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix."8 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 11, after being signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered , defaced, or cov- ered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply. 8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board having found, after trial, that we violated Federal Law by interfering with our employees' rights to join and support a union, we notify you that: WE WILL NOT coercively threaten our employees with unspecified reprisals if they engage in activity on behalf of Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 391, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Team- sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer- ica, AFL-CIO or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. BROWN TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION