Mega Van And Storage, Inc. And Mega New York Warehouse Corp.

MEGA VAN & STORAGE Mega Van and Storage, Inc. and Mega New York Warehouse Corp. and Local 814, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America , AFL-CIO. Case 29-CA-13286 June 12, 1989 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND HIGGINS On September 8, 1988, Administrative Law Judge James F. Morton issued the attached deci- sion. The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in opposition. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, I and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondents, Mega Van and Storage, Inc. and Mega New York Warehouse Corp., their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. i The Respondent contends that Laurice Abruscati, the secretary of the Respondent's president, Steve Balestra, is a confidential employee In finding merit to that contention, we rely on the fact that she is routinely present in private meetings Balestra has with other members of manage- ment regarding labor relations, including strategy sessions She also re- searches and relies on information contained in employee personnel files in composing discipline letters to employees and the Union, on Balestra's behalf, and appears to play a role in the investigation of grievances for Balestra As Balestra is the one who formulates, determines, and effectu- ates the Respondents' labor relations policies and Abruscati assists him in a confidential capacity, we find her to be excludable from the unit under the "labor nexus" test approved in NLRB v Rural Electric Corp, 454 U S 170 (1981) See also Associated Day Care Services, 269 NLRB 178, 181 (1984) The exclusion of Abruscati, who signed a card for the Union, merely means that, as of May 29, 1987, when the Respondent agreed orally to recognize the Union, the Union had a majority of four out of five unit employees instead of five out of six The majority on May 29 may be further reduced to three of four unit employees if Eileen Ann Sherlock's card is not counted because she was due to resign on that date Sher- lock's card was submitted but apparently not relied on by counsel for the General Counsel because of her theory of the case, which rested on the Union's having majority status on June 8, when the Respondent signed the recognition agreement The Respondent contends that Sherlock effec- tively resigned the day before May 29 and therefore should not be in- cluded in the unit It is undisputed that she had left the Respondent's employ by June 8 In fact, it is immaterial whether she is counted in the unit at all, because the Union represented a majority of three out of four on both dates, assuming the exclusion of both Sherlock and Abruscati We therefore affirm the judge's finding that the Union represented a ma- jority on both May 29 and June 8 975 Kathleen M. Troy, Esq., for the General Counsel Harvey Tropp, Esq., of New York, New York, for the Re- spondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES F MORTON, Administrative Law Judge. The complaint, as amended, alleges that Mega Van and Stor- age, Inc. and Mega New York Warehouse Corp. are joint employers of employees at their facility in Brook- lyn. This allegation was admitted at the hearing. These companies shall hereafter be referred to jointly as Re- spondent. The amended complaint alleges that Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act (the Act) by having coercively questioned its office clerical employees respecting their support of Local 814, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (the Union), by having circulated among them, and including them to sign, a petition to decertify the Union as their collective-bargaining representative, and by having un- lawfully withdrawn recognition from the Union as their representative. Respondent contends that it lawfully withdrew recog- nition from the Union and it bases that contention on al- ternate grounds. First, that Respondent itself had been coerced unlawfully into signing an agreement in which it recognized the Union as the representative of its office clerical employees and, secondly, that the Union never did represent a majority of employees in the office cleri- cal unit. The hearing was held in Brooklyn, New York, on March 16 and 17, 1988. Upon the entire record, includ- ing my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses and after due consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS The pleadings, as amended at the hearing, establish that Respondent, in its operations annually, meets the Board's standard for asserting jurisdiction over nonretail concerns. The pleadings and admissions made at the hearing also establish that the Union is a labor organiza- tion as defined in Section 2 (5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Respondent provides warehousing and moving serv- ices for commercial customers in and about New York City. Its drivers, warehousemen, and helpers have been represented by the Union for a number of years. Its office clerical employees, however, were unorganized until the spring of 1987, as described below. All dates hereafter are for 1987 unless stated differently. 294 NLRB No. 90 976 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD B. The Events in May, June, and July On May 5, five of Respondent's office clerical employ- ees signed authorization cards for the Union and, on May 14, the Union filed a petition in Case 29-RC-6826 for an election. A hearing was held in that case on May 28, at which Respondent represented that it employed seven office clerical employees. There were other devel- opments that day which bear upon the issues before me. Those developments are discussed in a separate section below. On May 29, the Union establishes a picket line outside Respondent's premises. All of Respondent's drivers, war- ehousemen, and helpers honored that picket line. As Re- spondent had a major moving job to be done that day, its president with great reluctance directed Respondent's counsel to notify the Union that Respondent recognized the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the office clerical employee unit. Respondent's counsel immediately notified the Union's counsel of this. The Union's counsel then arranged to have hand-delivered to Respondent's counsel that same day a letter enclosing a recognition agreement to be signed and enclosing also photocopies of the five authorization cards which had been signed by office clerical employees on May 5, as re- counted above. The agreement recited that Respondent recognized the Union after "having been provided with satisfactory evidence that [it] represents an uncoerced majority in an appropriate unit of office clerical employ- ees." Respondent's counsel forwarded the recognition agreement to Respondent's president who signed it. On June 8, Respondent's counsel mailed the signed agree- ment to the Union. In July, the Union sent Respondent its contract pro- posal and, in August, Respondent's president met with the Union's president at that time. Respondent's presi- dent then signed a "Stipulation of Agreement" setting out contract terms, including provisions for a 3-year con- tract through July 31, 1990, annual wage increase, wel- fare and annuity benefits, hours of work, vacations and holidays, and a no-strike clause. C. The Withdrawal of Recognition On or about October 16, the Union forwarded to Re- spondent a final draft of the contract for the office cleri- cal employee unit. Respondent's president, Stephen Ba- lestra, testified that this upset him considerably as he had been hoping that the Union's interest in representing the office clerical employees "would die," particularly in view of the fact that the Union had done nothing since August to indicate that it was still interested. Also, as discussed further below, the Union's president was then in the process of being ousted from leadership and Bales- tra apparently felt that, with his ouster, the Union would abandon the office clerical unit. Balestra did not sign the proposed contract. Several days later, he received a request from the Union to visit its office. He went there and informed the Union's offi- cials then that Respondent would not negotiate with the Union as to the office clerical employee unit unless and until the Union is chosen as the representative* in a Board-conducted election. D. Interrogation and the Circulation of a Petition to Oust the Union; the Solicitation of Employee Signatures on that Petition In about mid-November, Respondent's counsel tele- phoned Respondent's office and asked the office manager and other employees there if they wanted the Union to represent them. They told him that they did not. He asked them if they would authorize him to file a petition to have the Union decertified and they assented. He then filed petitions which were docketed as Cases 29-RM-259 and 29-RD-603. t E. The Defenses 1. Alleged illegal coercion by the Union Respondent contends first that it was illegally coerced into recognizing the Union and that the recognition agreement thereof was a nullity. In support thereof, Re- spondent's president, Balestra, testified on May 28, the then president of the Union, Ignatius (Buddy) Bracco, told him that, if Respondent did not recognize the Union as the representative of its office clerical employees, he will pull Respondent's barn, i.e., that Respondent's driv- ers, warehousemen, and helpers will stop work. 2 Balestra did not agree to recognize the Union then. Instead, the hearing in that representation case was adjourned at the request of Respondent to afford it time to present its case. It was contesting the eligibility status of several office employees, as discussed separately below. On the following day, May 29, two union officials car- ried pocket signs outside Respondent's premises. Most of the other office employees honored that picket line. All the drivers, warehousemen, and helpers honored it. At least one of the office employees joined the picket line. Balestra testified that, because Respondent had a major moving contract to be completed without delay at that time and as this obviously could not be done while the drivers, warehousemen, and helpers refused to work, he telephoned Respondent's attorney and, with great reluc- tance, authorized him to tell the Union that Respondent agreed to recognize it as the representative of the office clerical employee unit. As set out above, this was done that same day; the recognition agreement was signed and returned to the Union. Respondent's initial defense is that the recognition agreement is a nullity as Respondent had been unlawful- ly coerced into signing it. In support of that assertion, it ' These petitions were dismissed as the issue as to whether a question concerning representation exists, as Respondent contends, is to be decid- ed in the instant case. 2 Respondent's counsel, Harvey Tropp, and the Union's counsel, Franklin Moss, also testified as to this conversation, which had taken place during a recess of the hearing held in Case 29-RC-6826 that day. Tropp's testimony essentially corroborated Balestra 's. Moss testified that, while he observed that Balestra and Bracco were conversing, he could not hear them. Moss also testified that he was then in the process of tell- ing Tropp that the Union had a right (under its contract with Respondent which covers the drivers, warehousemen, and helpers) to engage in re- cognitional picketing and that he was sure that they would observe the picket line. I credit Balestra's account as it is uncontroverted by any testi- mony offered by the General Counsel insofar as it pertains to statements made to Balestra by Bracco. For that matter, the differences in the re- spective accounts, for purposes of this case, are immaterial. MEGA VAN & STORAGE relies on the collective-bargaining agreement it has with the Union which covers its drivers, warehousemen, and helpers. One of the relevant provisions of that agreement contains a no-strike, no-lockout clause. Another section provides for a joint-board procedure which is to be used to resolve disputes of any kind, contractual or otherwise. Section 14 of that agreement is also relevant; it reads. It shall not be a violation of this agreement and it shall not be cause for discharge or disciplinary action nor shall an employee be permanently re- placed in the event an employee refuses to enter upon any property involved in a primary labor dis- pute, or refuses to go through or work behind any primary picket line including the primary picket line of the Union party to this Agreement, and including primary picket lines at the Employer's place of busi- ness. The rationale behind Respondent's first contention is that the Union unlawfully coerced Respondent into granting it recognition as the representative of the office clerical employee unit in that the Union induced Re- spondent's drivers, warehousemen, and helpers to stop work by putting up a recognitional picket line, notwith- standing that the contract covering the drivers and ware- housemen barred such a work stoppage That contention cannot stand, as a matter of law. Respondent does not assert that the Union was barred from picketing for rec- ognition as representative of the office clerical employ- ees. It is elementary that primary picketing is a right pro- tected by Section 7 of the Act, as are employees who participate in, or honor, primary picket lines. See Christo- pher Construction Co., 288 NLRB 1272 (1988). Respond- ent does not contend, either, that the Union waived its right to engage in such picketing. Essentially Respondent objects to the fact that its drivers, warehousemen, and helpers honored that picket line and asserts that the Union profited thereby as Respondent capitulated to the recognition demand because of the economic pressures brought about by the refusals of the drivers, warehouse- men, and helpers to cross the line. It is, however, well settled that a primary picket line is not rendered unlaw- ful because a union induces others to honor the picket line. See NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951) Respondent's ultimate claim is that the Union's action was derivatively unlawful because the Union induced a breach of a no-strike clause. That claim is simply without merit. A waiver of the right to strike will not be readily found but must be clearly shown. In Atlas Plastering, 285 NLRB 185 fn. 9 (1987), the Board held that the strike there was protected particularly as, inter alia, the con- tract in that case "appear[ed] to authorize strikes during [its] duration." Analogously, section 14 of the contract between Respondent and the Union in the instant case provides that it shall not be a violation of that contract for an employee to honor "primary picket lines at [Re- spondent's] place of business." In short, Respondent has not met its burden of demon- strating that the Union unlawfully coerced it into ac- 977 cording recognition on May 29. I thus find no merit to Respondent's first contention. 2. Alleged lack of majority Respondent's second contention is that the recognition agreement it signed is void as the Union never represent- ed a majority of the unit employees. An employer may lawfully withdraw recognition from a labor organization if it presents affirmative evidence that the labor organization lacked majority support of the unit employees when it was voluntarily recognized. See Tri-State Culvert Mfg., 280 NLRB 743 (1986). On that aspect, the record before me discloses the following. Respondent had stated at the hearing on May 28 in Case 29-RC-6826 that it then had seven office clerical employees. It took the position at the hearing that four of those seven should be excluded from the unit and that another, its office manager, should be included The four it would exclude had signed union authorization cards on May 5. At the hearing before me, it contended that all five of the employees who had signed union cards should be excluded and urged that four individuals, not previ- ously referred to, should be added to the unit The Union would exclude those four and the office manager; it would include the five who had signed authorization cards. Respondent initially sought to include its office manag- er, Joyce Ramsey, but ultimately agreed on the record before me that she was a supervisor as defined in the Act. I shall thus exclude her. The parties also have agreed that Ronald Miller should be included in the office clerical employee unit He did not sign a union authorization card. The parties are in dispute as to the unit placement of seven individ- uals. The complaint alleged that the Respondent had recog- nized the Union on about June 8. That was the date that Respondent's counsel mailed the signed recognition agreement to the Union. The undisputed fact is that Re- spondent had recognized the Union on May 29. For the reasons set forth below, the issue of the Union's majority status is not affected by the use of the May 29 date, in- stead of June 8. Of the following seven individuals, whose unit place- ment is at issue, the first five signed union cards (a) Sharon Thomas-Riley Thomas-Riley worked for Respondent since Septem- ber 1983, doing accounts payable and related work. In early May, one of her coworkers, Patricia Donohue (whose unit placement is discussed below) informed her that Respondent was going to try to "lay someone off' and asked if she would like to be the one laid off. She agreed as she "needed the time off." It appears that her mother was very ill and also that she and the office man- ager, Joyce Ramsey, had a "personality conflict." She was then laid off. On cross-examination, Thomas-Riley acknowledged that when she accepted the layoff, her in- tention as to returning was "slim" and that , "for all in- tents and purposes [she viewed her layof] as the end of the line with (Respondent)." 978 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD At the hearing in Case 29-RC-6826 on May 28, Re- spondent took the position that she was on temporary layoff and that she should be included in the unit. She was notified in July that there was work available and was asked to return. She declined the offer. The evidence is clear that Thomas-Riley was on tem- porary layoff status on May 29 and had then a reasona- ble expectancy of being recalled . Respondent argues that she abandoned her employment with Respondent by ac- cepting the layoff as she acknowledged at the hearing that she viewed it as the end of the line . That observa- tion might be entitled to some weight, although I am he- sistant to accept as definitive her analysis at the hearing as to the state of her mind and particularly when a year has passed since that event . What I find to be significant is what she said and did then. She said then that she needed time off. This indicated that she viewed the layoff as temporary. Respondent too obviously did, as its position as stated on May 29 at the representation case hearing discloses. I find that Thomas-Riley was temporarily laid off as of May 29 and had then a reasonable expectancy of recall. I shall thus include her in the unit involved herein. (b) Eileen Ann Sherlock At the hearing on May 28 in the representation case, Respondent's counsel stated that Sherlock resigned effec- tive May 29 from its office staff. Her name appeared on Respondent's office clerical employee payroll. A photo- copy of her union authorization card had been sent to Respondent on May 29 along with four others, as re- counted above. It is apparent from the foregoing that Respondent has not offered any affirmative evidence to warrant her ex- clusion from the unit. In fact, an announced intention on her part to resign on May 29 would still not be a basis to exclude her. See Wright Plastics Products, 247 NLRB 635 (1980), and cases cited therein at 643. Cf. Amoco Oil Corp., 289 NLRB 280 (1988). I shall include Sherlock in the office clerical employee unit. (c) Karen Bracco She worked for Respondent from February 1986 to October 1987 as a computer operator. Respondent con- tends that she should be excluded from the unit because she is the niece of Joseph Bracco who was then one of Respondent's owners. There is no evidence that she re- ceived any special treatment by reason of this relation- ship. Nor did Respondent present any evidence to sup- port its alternate contention, that she should be excluded as a confidential employee. As Respondent has not met its burden of demonstrat- ing that she should be excluded, I shall include her in the office clerical employee unit as of May 29. (d) Agnes Santomarco Santomarco began working for Respondent in April 1986 and was employed by it as of the date of the hear- ing in this case. She worked as an invoice clerk. Re- spondent would exclude her on the ground that she is a first cousin of Joseph Bracco, one of Respondent's owners in 1987 and also on the ground that she is a con- fidential employee. No evidence was proferred to estab- lish that she received special treatment based on her rela- tionship with Joseph Bracco. I shall include her in the unit on the same basis on which I included Karen Bracco as set out above. (e) Laurice Abruscati Abruscati began working for Respondent in March 1987. She performs secretarial services for Respondent's president, Balestra, and also works as a billing clerk. Re- spondent would exclude her as a confidential employee. The evidence thereon is that she prepares letters which notify the Union whenever a driver, warehouseman, or helper is given a warning under Respondent's progres- sive disciplinary policy applicable to that unit. In that regard, Abruscati is told by Balestra of the infraction and the identity of the driver, warehousemen, or helper. She then checks the personnel file for that individual to as- certin whether a first, second, or final warning should issue and types substantially a form letter for Balestra's signature. Although she testified that she is involved in grievance processing, it appears that her function there is limited to giving Balestra a grievance, getting it back from him after he had handwritten thereon his response, and then sending it back to the Union. Vague, general testimony was offered in an effort to show that she has access to confidential labor discussions that Balestra may have other owners of Respondent and that she will be performing secretarial functions for Balestra with respect to negotiations with the Union towards renewal of the current association contract, covering drivers and ware- housemen, which expires in March 31, 1989. The evidence proferred is clearly inadequate to sustain Respondent's contention that Abruscati should be ex- cluded as a confidential employee. In Inter-Mountain Rural Electric Assn., 277 NLRB 1 (1975), the Board, held under an analogous fact pattern, that the employer there failed to establish that the employee involved was a con- fidential employee. If anything, that employer offered more evidence than did Respondent in the instant case. See also Terraillon Corp., 280 NLRB 366 (1986). Based on the foregoing, I find that Abruscati was not a confidential employee on May 29 and I shall thus in- clude her in the office clerical unit. To sum up so far, the parties have agreed that Ronald Miller, who did not sign a union card, is properly in the office clerical employee unit and' I have found that the five who signed union cards also should be included. This, as of May 29, the Union had obtained authoriza- tion cards from five or six unit employees . The parties dispute the unit placement of two other individuals who did not sign union authorization cards. Obviously, it would not affect the Union's majority status even were they included. The Union then would still have a majori- ty, five who signed of the eight in the unit as of May 29. If the June 8 date is used, Sherlock would not be in the unit as she was then no longer in Respondent's employ and, of course, her card would also not count. On that basis, the Union would have a majority as four of the MEGA VAN "& STORAGE seven unit employees as of June 8 had signed union cards In the event that the Board were to find it necessary to decide the unit placement of the other two individuals in dispute, I would find as follows- (f) Patricia Donohue Donohue testified that she was the first office clerical employee hired by Respondent when it began operations in 1971. Although not legally married to Respondent's president, she had lived with him for at least 9 years in an apartment he rents. She received fringe benefits that were not available to any of the other office clerical em- ployees. She spent most of the months between June 1986 and June 1987 in Florida on full salary. Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, I would find that her interests are more closely aligned with manage- ment than with those of the unit employees and under the Board's rationale, approved by the U.S. Supreme Court, she should be excluded from the unit found ap- propriate herein. See NLRB v. Action Automobile, 469 U.S. 490 91985), and cases discussed therein. (g) Patricia Buckley Buckley is Patricia Donohue's daughter. She has worked for Respondent at various intervals since 1980. She last left its employ in April 1987 when she was preg- nant. She had a miscarriage in May. She returned to work for Respondent in October and has worked for it on a full-time basis since then. In the interval between April and October, she testi- fied that she worked at home and that she was then paid at an overtime rate pursuant to a decision made by Re- spondent's president. The General Counsel adduced evi- dence that her name was listed, not on Respondent's office clerical employee payroll, but rather on its payroll for the drivers, warehousemen, and helpers. It appears that the overtime payments she received were for over- time hours actually worked by her husband, Kevin, who works for Respondent as a carpenter Respondent has not persuaded me that she was on leave in late May or early June. The fact tht she did not return to work for Respondent for 5 months after her miscarriage, without any explanation for the hiatus, sug- gests to me that she had relinquished her employment status in May. Even if she had not, I would be com- pelled to exclude her from the unit as it is obvious, from the special treatment accorded her vis-a-vis the unit em- ployees that her interests were not aligned with theirs. Certainly Respondent has not demonstrated that they were. I therefore would exclude her. F. Analysis-Section 8(a)(1) and (5) The evidence discussed above established that the Union had been lawfully recognized as the bargaining representative of the office clerical employee unit. The evidence also established that Respondent by the con- duct described in section D, above, coercively interro- gated its office clerical employees respecting their sup- port of the Union and unlawfully sought to induce them to withdraw their support for the Union. See Williamson 979 Memorial Hospital, 284 NLRB 37 (1987). Respondent cannot lawfully withdraw recognition from the Union in those circumstances. See Hohn Industries, 283 NLRB 71 (1987). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent Mega Van and Storage, Inc and Mega New York Warehouse Corp. is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Local 814, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO is a labor organization as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The following employees of Respondent constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. All office clerical employees employed by Respond- ent excluding all other employees, guards, office managers and other supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. Since May 29, 1987, the Union has been the desig- nated exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the unit described above. 5. Respondent on May 29, 1987 , lawfully recognized the Union, as the representative of that unit. 6. Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by having coer- cively interrogated its employees, by having solicited their support in its effect to have the Union decertified as their representative and by the conduct described below in paragraph 7. 7. Respondent has committed unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by having with- out justification withdrawn recognition in October 1987 of the Union as the representative of the employees in the unit described above. 8. The foregoing unfair labor practices affect com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record , I issue the following recommend- ed3 ORDER The Respondent, Mega Van Inc. and Mega New York Warehouse Corp., New York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Coercively interrogating its employees as to their support for the Union, Local 814 International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. 3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses 980 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (b) Soliciting support of its employees in its effort to decertify the Union as their collective-bargaining repre- sentative. (c) Withdrawing recognition from the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of a unit comprised of its office clerical employees, unless and until the Union has been decertified by the Board. (d) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the representative of this unit. (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing its employees as to the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Notify the Union in writing that it recognizes the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa- tive of the employees in the unit described above regard- ing their rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. (b) On request of the Union , bargain in good faith with it as the representative of that unit of employees and, if an agreement is reached , reduce it to writing and sign it. (c) Post at its facility in Brooklyn, New York, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 29, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re- spondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- 4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY THE ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT ask you whether you support Local 814, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT request that you sign any petition aimed at decertifying the above-named labor organization as the collective-bargaining representative of our office clerical employees. WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from the above- named labor organization as collective -bargaining repre- sentative of our office clerical employees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Re- lations Act. WE WILL notify the above-named labor organization in writing that we recognize it as the exclusive collective- bargaining representative of our office clerical employ- ees. WE WILL, on request, bargain in good faith with the above-named labor organization as the representative of our office clerical employees and, if an agreement is reached, reduce it to writing and sign it. MEGA VAN AND STORAGE, INC. AND MEGA NEW YORK WAREHOUSE CORP.